Kuwaiti foreign policy in light of the Iraqi invasion,with particular reference to Kuwait’s policy towards Iraq, 1990-2010 by Alazemi, Talal Zaid A
i 
 
 
 Kuwaiti foreign policy in light of the Iraqi invasion, 
with  particular  reference  to  Kuwait’s  policy  towards  Iraq, 1990-2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted by Talal Z A Alazemi  
to the University of Exeter  
as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy  
in June 2013 
 
 
 
This thesis is available for Library use on the understanding that it is copyright material and 
that no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper acknowledgement. 
 
 
 
I certify that all material in this thesis which is not my own work has been identified and that 
no material has previously been submitted and approved for the award of a degree by this or 
any other University. 
 
 
 
Signature:  Talal Zaid A. Alazemi 
                                                        
 
 
 
ii 
 
Dedication  
 
 
 
To my dear country Kuwait, 
 
To the spirit of my late father, may God bless him, 
 
To my dear mother, may God grant her long life, 
 
To my dear wife, children and family, 
 
To the spirit of Kuwait martyrs and prisoners of war. 
                                                                                  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iii 
 
                                                              Acknowledgment      
 
 
 
In the name of Allah, the Most Beneficent, the Most Merciful.  First and foremost, I sincerely 
thank Almighty Allah, who created the seven heavens in layers and the earth, the creator of 
everything, there is no God but Him, for the kindness and blessings that he has given us and 
bestowed on me, So for You is all praise and unto You all thanks.   
 
I would like to express my sincere gratitude to His Highness Sheikh Nasser Al Mohammed Al 
Ahmed Al Sabah and His Excellency Sheikh Dr. Ahmed Al Nasser Al Mohammed Al-Sabah 
for their full support throughout my period of study. I would also to thank HE Sheikh Dr. 
Mohammad Al-Sabah for his time and valuable information. I am deeply grateful for the 
continuous guidance and supervision of my supervisor Prof. Gerd Nonneman and truly 
acknowledge the valuable time, patience, and support of my supervisory team: Dr. Marc 
Valeri and Dr. István Kristó-Nagy. I would like to extend heartfelt thanks and appreciation to 
my dear beloved mother, my wife and my family for their invaluable role throughout my 
period of study, Sincere thanks are also due to my friends.  
 
Finally, I pray to Almighty Allah to make this study beneficial and a contribution from my 
part to all researchers.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iv 
 
                                                                     Abstract 
 
 
The study sheds light on the impact of the Iraq invasion of Kuwait in 1990 on Kuwaiti foreign 
policy, with particular reference to changes in behaviour towards Iraq, from 1990-2010, and 
the impact of this invasion on changes to the concepts of Kuwaiti foreign policy at regional, 
Arab and international levels. 
 
Thus,  the  study  investigates  the  ‘impact’  of  this invasion on Kuwaiti foreign behavior towards 
Iraq during the period from 1990 to 2010, the principles and determinants of Kuwaiti foreign 
policy towards Iraq in this period,  and  the  ‘outstanding  issues’  between  Iraq  and  Kuwait  and  
the Kuwaiti vision for Iraq  after  the  fall  of  Saddam  Hussein’s  regime  from  2003  until  2010.   
 
It finds that the trauma of the invasion drastically affected both Arab politics overall and 
Kuwait’s   own   policy:   for   the   first   time   the   notion   of   alliance   became   a   cornerstone   of  
Kuwait’s  overall   foreign  policy  – even if its geographical location and exposure to possible 
threats   from   Iraq   meant   that,   after   Saddam’s   fall   in   2003,   there   was   a   gradual   evolution  
towards trying to help a stabilisation in that country occur. The combination of geographical 
location and ideational factors in the shape of sectarian cleavages crossing domestic and 
regional theatres, meant a continued sharp focus not only on military security with external 
help, but also on the pre-emption of spill-over effects from the sectarianised Iraqi political 
landscape to Kuwait’s own latent ethno-sectarian divisions.  Even so, there were certain red 
lines that remained uncrossed, in the shape of the so-called outstanding issues that remained to 
be resolved between Iraq and Kuwait. 
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Chapter I 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The study of Third World foreign policy is in some ways distinct from that of other states 
– where the literature is well-developed – and more problematic to undertake. This is due 
to range of factors, including the fact that sufficient information is not always available, in 
addition to the ‘sohpistocated’   bureaucratic and institutional networks,1 such as those 
found in developed countries, in which it is assumed that the people have the right to be 
informed about their   governments’   actions,   and   where   mechanisms, such as the press, 
radio and mass media exist, by which the information is made available in order to obtain 
support for government decisions.2  Foreign policy is conceived and executed in 
accordance with interwoven requirements and impacts that are difficult to be separated 
from each other, because it is related to internal circumstances and external factors as well 
as to the ideational factors such as ideology , religion and cultural components etc.3 The 
politics   of  Third  World   states,   particularly   following   the   emergence   of   the   ‘new   states’,  
which have obtained their independence relatively recently, since 1945, have had a great 
impact on the new international map,4 part of which is represented by the endeavours of 
some Arab countries to achieve an advanced position in this new world through playing a 
more prominent and effective role in their territory, and hence perhaps beyond the 
international political scene.  
The study of Arab foreign policies is one of the least well-established academically. The 
first methodical attempt to study Arab policies came with the publication of the edited 
                                              
1  Sekhri,  Sofiane,  ‘The  Role  Approach  As  a  Theoretical  Framework  for  the  Analysis  of  Foreign    Policy  in  
Third  World  Countries’,    Vol.  3  ,  No.10,  African Journal of Political Science and International Relations, 
2009. p.424.  
2    Calvert, P., The Foreign Policy of New States, Wheat sheaf Books Limited, Brighton, UK, 1986.p. 11. 
3    Merritt, Richard L, Foreign Policy Analysis, Lexington, Mass: D.C. Heath and Company, 1975. pp.1-3. 
4    Calvert, P, Op. Cit. p.18. 
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1984 volume by Korany and Dessouki.5  In the period since then, other works gave 
followed, both region-wide or subregional, and case studies of individual countries – 
including, in fact, Kuwait – as I will illustrate later in this chapter, but both at the 
overarching and the country-level there remains a good deal to be done. The case of 
Kuwait, intersting as it is, stands out in this already fairly thinly populated landscape as 
one of the least studied. 
Kuwait gained its independence in 1961, and it has great oil resources, amounting to 101.5 
billion barrels in 2009, representing 7.6% of the total oil reserve in the World.6 It is located 
in the Arabian Gulf region, which has strategic and economic importance for the world, 
simply because this region has 64% of the total world reserve of oil,7 in addition to the 
events it witnessed from the late 1970s until the beginning of the 21st century. From its 
independence until the present day, Kuwait has used its diplomatic and economic tools to 
serve its external policy in order to occupy an important and effective position on the 
territorial and international level, in addition to the political and national objective, via 
granting loans and foreign aid to one hundred countries from 1961 until 2011 at a total 
value of KD 4.544 million (equivalent to $16 billion) via the Kuwait Fund for Arab 
Economic Development (KFAED).8 This is in addition to its confidential and sometimes 
undeclared contributions, which are beyond public control and are provided by Kuwait to 
some countries as a result of political and national   considerations   out   of   the   ‘General 
Reserve Fund’ in the form of aid, such as foodstuffs or medication, which may not be easy 
to quantify. These financial contributions have been estimated at $ 26.5 billion provided to 
Arab governments from 1963 to 1990.9 Since independence, Kuwait has endeavoured to 
activate the tools of its foreign policy and expand its diplomatic and economic activities 
towards a number of countries, including Arab countries in general and Iraq in particular, 
                                              
5    Nonneman, Gerd (ed.), Analyzing Middle East Policies and the Relationship with Europe, Routledge, 
2005.  p.6. 
6  BP p.l.c., ‘BP  Statistical  Review  of  World  Energy’,  June 2010.p.6.On the BP website; 
www.bp.com/statisticalreview     
7    Ghunaimi, Zain Eldeen Abdulmaqsoud , Al-Kuwayt  wa  taḥadiyāt  al-karn il-ḥādi  wal  ‘ishrīn:  Ru’yah  
Strātījīyah  was-tishrāfīyah ,  ‘Kuwait and the Challenges of the Twenty First Century. Strategic and 
Futuristic  Vision’, 1st edition, Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait , Kuwait, 2001. p. 24. 
8   Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development, Forty Nine Annual Report 2010 /2011, Kuwait, 
2011.p.13. 
9    Assiri, Abdul Reda, Al-kuwayt fis-siyāsah  ad-duwalīyah  al-muʽasirah:  ʼinjāzāt..  ʼikhfākāt..  taḥadīyat, 
‘Kuwait in the Contemporary International Policy:  Achievements,  Failures  and  Challenges’,  2nd edition, 
Kuwait University, Kuwait, 1992. p.116. 
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due to common factors between Kuwait and Iraq, such as common geographic, issues and 
territorial frontiers and similarity between the colonialist conditions that were imposed on 
both parties from the beginning of the 20th century.  
Kuwait in the modern period has always had to cope with the presence of three regional 
big powers – Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia – and given its small size and a shifting number 
of material and ideational challenges, was always in a vulnerable position. This was most 
strikingly illustrated in the invasion by Iraq on 2 August 1990. This occupation resulted in 
fundamental changes in the foreign policy of Kuwait on the Arab and international levels 
and of course also in its behaviour towards Iraq from 1991 until the present time. 
Therefore the purpose of the present study is to explore the impact of the Iraq invasion on 
the behaviour of the Kuwaiti foreign policy with particular reference to Iraq during the 
period from 1990, and on changes in the concepts of Kuwaiti foreign policy on the 
regional, Arab and international levels.  
 
Since its emergence in the 17th century, Kuwait’s   successive leaderships have adopted a 
generally neutral political approach to maintain the security of the entity against regional 
and international powers, particularly after the appearance of international competition on 
the Gulf region during the 18th and 19th centuries among international powers (the UK, 
Russia, Germany and the Ottoman Empire (now known as Turkey).10 During the 19th 
century, the Ottoman Empire constituted an actual threat to Kuwait. Therefore, Kuwait 
applied for British protection against the Ottoman threat and in 1899 Kuwait signed a 
treaty with the UK.11 Following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after World War I, its 
territories were divided and the Ottoman threat against Kuwait ceased to exist. Following 
the division of the territories of the Ottoman Empire, Iraq appeared as an integrated entity 
with clear boundaries in 1921 under the British mandate while Kuwait remained as a UK 
protectorate as per the 1899 treaty.12  In the early 1930s, Kuwaiti-Iraqi borders had been 
demarcated pursuant to correspondence among Iraq, Kuwait and the UK. Following the 
demarcation of borders, Iraq declared independence in 1932 and joined the League of 
                                              
10  Alazami, Walid, The Political History of Kuwait Through British Documents 1752-1960, Riad El-Rayyes 
Books LTD, London, 1st  edition 1991. pp. 49-52. 
11  Assiri, Abdul Reda, Op. Cit. p. 32. 
12  Al-Ghunaim, Yacoub Yousef, Al-kuwayt tuwajih al-,atmāʽ,  ‘Kuwait  Faces  Avidity’, 1st edition, Centre for 
Research and Studies on Kuwait, Kuwait, 1998. p. 77. 
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Nations at that time.13 From the time of its emergence, Iraq constituted a threat to Kuwait 
during limited periods   in   the   1930s   until   Kuwait’s   declaration   of   independence   on   19th 
June 1961, when the Iraqi president Abdul Karim Qasim (1958-1963) threatened to annex 
Kuwait to Iraq six days after independence.14  
 
This threat was finally realised on August 2nd 1990 when Iraq invaded and occupied 
Kuwait.15 The Iraqi invasion inevitably impacted Kuwait policy on the regional, Arabian 
and International levels, particularly but not only in terms of its behaviours towards Iraq.  
 
Following the liberation of Kuwait from Iraqi occupation in February 1991,   Kuwait’s  
foreign policy has adopted a pragmatic approach to safeguard its entity, resources and 
autonomy; it is a small country surrounded by many countries of greater population, 
geographic area and military might. The area of Kuwait is 17,818 km2 and it is located at 
the extreme north-western part of the Arabian Gulf, bounded on the west and the north by 
Iraq, while on the south it shares a long border with Saudi Arabia and on the east a 
maritime border with Iran.16 Therefore, Kuwait  is  located  within  a  ‘triangle’ surrounded by 
states that have conflicts with each other, particularly the Iraqi – Iranian conflict that ended 
with Iraq-Iran War, also sometimes known as the First Gulf War (1980-1988).17  
 
From independence to the Iraqi invasion, Kuwaiti foreign policy was shaped by three main 
drivers: internal   and   external   political   security   and   Kuwait’s   sovereignty; the values of 
‘Arabism’  and  Islam;;  and the need profitably to invest Kuwaiti funds abroad and directing 
part of the surplus to Arab and Third World countries to achieve political and humanitarian 
objectives abroad.18  The ways in which this was approached also, of course, depended on 
the nature of decision-making in the sheikhdom, and   particular   players’   views   and  
personalities – something to which we will turn later in some detail.  
                                              
13  Ibid, p. 83. 
14  Podeh,  Elie,  ‘Suez  in  Reverse:  The  Arab  Response  to  the  Iraqi  bid  for  Kuwait,  1961-63’,  Diplomacy &   
Statecraft, Vol. 14. No.1, Frank CASS, London, March 2003.  p. 103. 
15  Parasiliti,  Andrew  T,  ‘The  Causes  and  Timing  of  Iraq's  Wars:  a  Power  Cycle  Assessment’,  International 
Political Science Review, Vol 24, No. 1, SAGE Publications, London, 2003.  p. 152. 
16  Ministry of Information, Al- Kitāb  as-sanawī ,  ‘Yearbook  1998’ , State of Kuwait, 1998. p. 21. 
17  Al  Watan  Information  and  Studies  Center,  ‘Foreign  Policy:  Classification  No.  5  – 6’  dated  3/4/1997,  
Kuwait. 
18   Assiri, Abdul Reda, Op. Cit. p. 17. 
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The context in which policy-making happened and to which it had to respond, also 
included a number of specific events and factors. Between 1961 and the invasion, these 
included:  
1. The geographic location of Kuwait, directly overlooking Iraq.19 Further, Iraqi leaders 
and much of the population have long considered Kuwait as a wealthy country with a 
significant geographic location overlooking the Arabian Gulf, while at the same time it 
cannot protect its territories against any foreign aggression. Hence, the Iraqi ambitions 
to acquire this great wealth started in 1961 on several pretexts, including historical, 
economic or nationalist allegations until 1990 when Iraq occupied the State of 
Kuwait.20  
2. The claim of president Abdul Karim Qasim in 1961 that Kuwait was part of Iraq, until 
his regime overthrown by   a  Ba’athist  military   coup  on  8th February 1963,21 with the 
result   that   Iraq’s   new   regime   recognized Kuwait as an independent state as per an 
agreement (treaty) signed between the two countries in 1963 following the expiry of 
the regime of president Abdul Karim Qasim.22  
3. The lack of demarcation of borders under the agreements already signed between the 
two countries in 1963, which resulted in many violations of borders (with notable 
crises in 1966, 1967 and 1973) and pressure on Kuwait to submit territorial 
assignments in favour of Iraq, in addition to providing financial assistance due to the 
poor internal conditions witnessed by Iraq following the Iraqi-Iranian war, all of which 
variables  led  to  Iraq’s  invasion  of  the  State  of  Kuwait  in  1990.  23  
                                              
19  Nonneman,  Gerd,  ‘The  Gulf  States  and  the Iran-Iraq  War:  pattern  shifts  and  continuities’,  in  Larry  Potter  
& Gary Sick (eds.), Iran, Iraq and the Legacies of War,  New York: Palgrave, 2004, p. 169. 
20  Panel of Specialists,  Al-kuwayt  wujūdan  wa  ḥudūdan:  ḥaka’ik  mawḍūʽīyah  wal  id-diʽāʼāt  al-ʽirāqīyah,    
‘Kuwait  Statehood  and  Boundaries:  Objective  Facts  and  Iraqi  Claims’,  3rd edition, Center for Research 
and Studies on Kuwait, 1997. p.114. 
21  Worrall,  Richard  John,  ‘Coping  with  a  Coup  d’Etat’:  British  Policy  towards  Post-Revolutionary Iraq, 
1958 -63’,  Contemporary British History, Vol. 21, No. 2, June 2007. p.194. 
22  Podeh, Elie, Op. Cit. p. 120. 
23  Al Anezi, Rashid Hamad,  Alqanūn  ad-duwalī  al-ʽām:  wa  dirāsāt  khāsah  ʽan  mawqif il-qānūn  ad-duwalī    
min al-ʼiḥtilāl  il-ʽirāqī  li  dawlat  il  kuwayt ,    ‘Public International Law: Special Studies on the Stand of 
The  International  Law  from  Iraqi  Occupation  to  the  State  of  Kuwait’, 1st edition, Kuwait University, 
Kuwait, 1997. p. 700. 
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4. Political instability and military coups in Iraq from 1958 until 1968 in addition to 
political disruptions within Iraq, which resulted in the suspension of efforts to resolve 
many Iraqi Kuwaiti issues, particularly the demarcation of borders based upon signed 
treaties. 
5.  Economic instability in Iraq and the economic disorder it was suffering despite its oil 
wealth. This resulted in pressure on Kuwait to provide economic assistance to Iraq. 
6. Circumstances of political instability experienced by the Arabian Gulf region, 
represented by the Iranian Revolution (1979) and the implicit and explicit threats 
emerging from it and the outbreak of Iraqi-Iranian war (1980-1988), which resulted in 
the   changes   in  Kuwait’s   own   foreign   policy   stance   - including the rest of the GCC 
States - to support Iraq,24 and leading to the emergence of most of the economic 
problems in Iraq due to this war. 25  
 
Following the liberation of Kuwait on 26 February 1991 (the Second Gulf War), Kuwaiti 
foreign policy towards Iraq has insisted  on   Iraq’s   implementation  of  UN  resolutions   that  
are relevant to the occupation of Kuwait, including: 
1- Respect of international borders between Iraq and Kuwait in accordance with 
international resolutions; 
2- Payment of the compensations and financial obligations resulting from the losses 
sustained by Iraq; 
3- Return of Kuwaiti prisoners of war; 
4- Disarmament of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction; 
5- Restoration of the Kuwaiti properties that were looted during the period of Iraqi 
invasion to Kuwait.26 
 
                                              
24  Nonneman,  Gerd,  ‘The  Gulf  States  and  the  Iran-Iraq War: pattern shifts and continuities’,  Op.  Cit.,    
pp.168-174. 
25  Al-Rashidy, Ahmed el.at (ed.), Al-kuwayt min al-ʼimārah  ʼila  ad-dawlah,  ‘Kuwait  from  Emirate  to  State’ 
,Center for Political Research & Studies, Cairo University, 1993.  p. 476. 
26  For all international resolutions, see Weller, M. (ed.),  ‘Iraq  and  Kuwait:  The  Hostilities  and  Their  
Aftermath’, Cambridge International Document Series, Vol 3. Grotius Publications Ltd, 1993. pp.2-6. 
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During the period from 1991 to 2003 the relations between the two countries witnessed 
severe tension, represented by the mobilisation of more than 100,000 Iraqi soldiers on the 
Kuwaiti frontiers in 1994 and successive threats during that period for a variety of reasons 
that we will discuss later.27 The tension was aggravated after the USA-UK launched a war 
against Iraq in 2003, which resulted in dethroning the regime of Saddam Hussein in April 
2003.28 Following  the  collapse  of  Saddam  Hussein’s  regime,  several   crucial changes came 
to chacterise the foreign policy of Kuwait, one of which is that economic diplomacy 
became much more prominent, being designed to maximize benefits and increase the 
margin of political manoeuvre, and to construct economic alliances with the countries and 
blocks that have impacts on the world economy.29 Diplomatic relations between the two 
countries were resumed in 2004 and have been activated on all levels.30 Despite the 
advancements made between the two countries after the collapse of the Iraqi regime, 
relations remain poorer than desired as a result of certain outstanding issues that must be 
settled, the most important of which are the Iraqi debt, compensation, revealing the fate of 
Kuwaiti prisoners of war, restoration of the Kuwaiti national archive, security of borders 
and security issues between the two countries that are related to the UN resolution.31  
 
2. The Problem of the study 
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait inevitably had an impact on Kuwaiti foreign policy towards 
Iraq. This invasion led to changes in the concepts of Kuwait's foreign policy in several 
aspects on internal and external levels. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait resulted in the 
collapse of the concept of the Arab Security System, which was based on the 1950 Joint 
Defence and Economic Co-operation Treaty (IDECT) between the States of Arab League. 
The liberation of Kuwait by non-Arab troops established the inability and uselessness of 
                                              
27  Centre for Research and Studies on Kuwait,  Al-ḥushūd  ʽala  al-ḥudūd  il-Kuwaytīyah  uktūbar  1994:  dirāsa  
tawthikīya  li-rudūd  il-fiʽl  il-ʽarabīya  wal  ʽālamīya,  ‘The Iraqi Mobilization on Kuwait Borders: A 
Documentary  Study’,  2nd edition, Kuwait, 1997.  p. 99.  
28  Krebs,  Ronald  R  and  Jennifer  K.  Lobasz,  ‘Fixing  the  Meaning  of  9/11:  Hegemony,  Coercion,  and  the  
Road  to  War  in  Iraq’,  Security Studies, Vol. 16, No. 3, Taylor & Francis Group, LLC, July–September 
2007.  p.410. Also see Asharq Al Awsat Newspaper, Issue No. 8899, Thursday 10th April , London, 2003. 
29  Ministry of Foreign Affairs, At-takrīr  us-sanawi 2004, State of Kuwait, 2004. p. 31. 
30  Ibid. p.46. 
31  Al  Qabas  Newspaper,  ‘Al  Kuwait:  Al-Malafat al-‘alqa  ma‘a  al-‘Iraq,  Owram  Fi  Jassad  al-‘alaqat’,    
‘Outstanding  Files  with  Iraq,  Trauma  in  the  Body  of  Relations’,  Issue  No.  12936,  Kuwait, Wednesday, 
3/6/2009.  
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Arab security frameworks. Consequently, Kuwait attempted, following its liberation, to fill 
the security gap in the Arabian Gulf based on military results and it has laid out new 
principles and features for the new security defence group following the failure of the 
previous security system to stop the Iraqi aggression towards Kuwait. Therefore, Kuwait 
has depended on several complementary elements to create security arrangements to 
protect itself, particularly from the Iraqi threat but also that from Iran. These arrangements 
have been made on regional and international levels. In addition, this invasion changed 
foreign political concepts of Kuwait and the Arab Gulf States concerning the presence of 
foreign troops in the Gulf, as we will discuss later in this study.  
The present study investigates Kuwait’s foreign policy towards Iraq after the Iraqi invasion 
of Kuwait, or more precisely, the impact of this variable (the invasion) has had on Kuwaiti 
foreign policy towards Iraq from 1991 until 2010. 
 
3.  Significance, Objectives and Research Questions of the study 
 
The significance of the study stems from the gap it fills in the description and analysis of 
Kuwait’s foreign policy behaviour towards Iraq during the period from 1990s and the 
impact of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on changing the concepts of Kuwait foreign policy 
on the regional, Arabian and international levels: the dearth of research on this topic is 
quite striking. In the process, additional light is thrown on the reasons for the Second Gulf 
war. Most prior studies have focused on the Gulf crisis in 1990-1991 and the relationship 
between the two countries before Iraq invaded Kuwait, while academic studies that have 
focused  on  the  two  states’  specific  relations  with  regard  to  the  issues  at  hand  are  scarce. 
 
The study is designed: 
 
1- to shed light on the impact of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on the evolution of Kuwaiti 
foreign policy and its underlying role conceptions on the regional, Arabian and 
international levels. 
2- to examine the determinants and main outlines of the Kuwait foreign policy towards 
Iraq from the liberation of Kuwait until the present time. 
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3- more specifically, to identify the position of the Kuwaiti foreign policy regarding the 
‘outstanding’ issues between Kuwait and Iraq, such as Iraqi debts, borders, prisoners of 
war, compensation, Kuwaiti properties, weapons of mass destruction and UN 
resolutions already issued regarding the situation between Kuwait and Iraq. 
4- to examine Kuwaiti perceptions and positions concerning the events in Iraq from the 
liberation of Kuwait until the present time. 
The key research questions, then, are: 
1. What have been the main features of, and changes in, Kuwait’s  foreign  policy  towards  
Iraq since 1990?  
2. What  factors  have  shaped  Kuwait’s  evolving  policy,  or  policies,  towards Iraq? 
3. Specifically,  regarding  the  ‘outstanding  issues’  between  Kuwait  and  Iraq  since  the  fall  
of Saddam, what has Kuwaiti policy consisted of and what have been the explanatory 
factors?  
4. What have been the Kuwaiti perceptions of, and positions on, the US occupation of 
Iraq? 
5. How has Kuwait perceived, and what positions has it adopted, regarding events within 
Iraq since 1991? 
6. How has wider Kuwaiti foreign policy changed since 1991? What are the main 
explanatory factors?  
7. Within this, how has Kuwaiti foreign policy changed since the fall of Saddam Hussein 
in 2003? What are the main explanatory factors? 
 
4. Methodology 
There are three general research methods that involve, respectively, the collection of 
numerical data (the quantitative approach), the collection of non-numerical data (the 
qualitative approach) and the mixed-methods approach, which combines the quantitative 
10 
 
and qualitative approaches.32 The qualitative approach will be the most appropriate method 
for this study, as its primary sources involve written documents, maps, interview 
transcripts, statements, observations of situations and video and audio recordings relating 
to the relationship between Kuwait and Iraq, although the quantitative approach will be 
consulted for secondary sources such as statistical analyses. In this respect, I will use an 
essentially historical, analytical and case study approach, which I believe to be the most 
appropriate to the available data on this topic. Using these approaches, literature will be 
consulted from a range of sources that have dealt with Kuwait foreign policy and Kuwait's 
approach regarding the issues that are related to the relationship between Kuwait and Iraq 
in general.   
The primary sources used for this research include:  
1.  Documents from British and Kuwaiti reports referring to the issues between the two 
countries. In this section, the documents will be consulted from UK government's 
official archives published by National Archives in UK33 and edited by historians and 
Centers Research. This documents contain on the treaties signed between Britain, 
Kuwait and Iraq from 1899 till 1961 such as the protection treaty between Britain and 
Kuwait signed in 1899, and the correspondences among Britain, Kuwait and Iraq that 
demarcated the Kuwaiti-Iraqi borders in 1932 as well as to the historical maps that are 
related to the demarcation of the borders and events between Kuwait and Iraq during 
this period. In addition to the Iraqi documents left behind the Iraqi forces after the 
liberation of Kuwait and published by Centre for Research and Studies on Kuwait 
(CRSK) located in Kuwait that related to the Kuwaiti prisoners of war and the stolen 
Kuwaiti properties during the invasion.  
2. United Nations Documentation,34 which includes the ‘United Nations Treaty 
collection’ and ‘UN  resolutions’ concerning the ‘situation between Iraq and Kuwait’. 
In this section the treaty of 1963 will be obtained from the copies of UN documents 
regarding to the  ‘Minutes of the Agreement’, dated in October 1963, between Kuwait 
and Iraq on mutual recognition and confirmation of frontiers as specified and 
                                              
32  Murray, Neil and Beglar, David, Inside Track: Writing Dissertations &Theses, 1st edition, Pearson 
Education Limited, England, 2009.  p. 42. 
33  UK National Archives website:  http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk.  
34  United Nations website: http://www.un.org/en/documents/index.shtml 
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demarcated between both countries in 1932 as well as the treaty of friendship 
‘Exchange   of   Notes’ in 1961 between Kuwait and Britain in which Kuwait gained 
independence from Britain. It includes the UN resolutions, statements, mintues, 
speeches, reports and maps that issued by UN from 1990s until present time, 
concerning the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the demarcation of the borders between 
Kuwait and Iraq under  the  name  ‘  The  situation  between  Iraq  and  Kuwait’.   
3. The documents of United States embassy cables released by WikiLeaks.35 These 
contain confidential and secret documents sent by USA embassy in Kuwait from 1980s 
to 2010, regarding the Kuwaiti policy,  Kuwait’s  relation  with  Iraq,  the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait and the events in the Gulf region.  
4. Speeches of High Iraqi and Kuwaiti officials. The transcripts of the this speeches were 
consulted from UN website, official Kuwaiti institutions and government electronic 
sites such  as Kuwait Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Kuwait National Assembly.  
5. Interviews with influential figures such as high-ranking Kuwaiti officials and decision 
makers involved in Kuwait foreign policy, including personal face to face interviews 
with former and current senior members of the Kuwaiti government and members of 
National Assembly (Foreign Affairs Committee), who witnessed the period of my 
study. I used a semi-structured interview format as that was best suited to elicit the 
respondent's point of view about the events witnessed between Kuwait and Iraq.   
 
Secondary sources include:  
1. Academic studies and other published works in Arabic and English, wheter in books, 
chapters in edited collections, or scientific journal articles 
2. Unpublished M.A and Ph.D. theses in Arabic and English.  
3. Newspapers and reports in Arabic and English. 
4. Websites, the British library, Exeter university library and news channels.  
                                              
35 Wikileaks website;  http://www.wikileaks.org/  
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 5. Literature Review 
Academic work on the subject of this thesis has remained limited. This is true even if one 
includes work  on  Middle  East  and  GCC  states’  foreign  policies  as  a  whole,  and  work  on  
general Kuwaiti foreign policy. The broader category of work proposes some frameworks 
for analysis, but provides little detail on our specific subject. Most studies of Kuwaiti 
foreign policy stop their analysis before the Iraqi invasion. Works on Iraqi-Kuwaiti 
relations similarly do not extend the analysis beyond the invasion.  Simply providing a 
description and analysis of Kuwaiti-Iraqi relations after the invasion, therefore, by 
definition consititutes an addition to the literature. But in our own approach we can build 
on analytical approaches found in some of the earlier works, while adding to them in some 
specific respects. 
5.1. Studies of Middle East and GCC  states’  foreign  policies 
Since the approach in this thesis is informed by previous work on the foreign policies of 
Middle Eastern states, and since Kuwait clearly shares a number of features with its fellow 
GCC members also in foreign policy, it is worth starting this survey with some remarks 
about the key literature in this broader field, in so far as it feeds into our analysis of the 
Kuwaiti case: apart from other things, such a survey also shows up the gap referred to 
above. 
 
The analysis of Middle East foreign policies has received systematic and comparative 
attention only since the mid-1980s, starting with the volume edited by Korany & Dessouki 
– The Foreign Policies of Arab States36 – which combined an attempt to construct an 
analytical framework with case studies. There have really only been two significant 
attempts since then to build on this, in the shape of the edited volume by Hinnebusch & 
Ehteshami – The Foreign Policy of Middle East States37 – and the one by Nonneman – 
Analyzing Middle East Foreign Policies.  All provide a framework that combines external 
and internal factors, and ideational as well as material factors, in varying combinations. 
The stress in the Korany & Dessouki volume is relatively more on the effect of identity 
                                              
36  Korany, Bahgat & Ali Dessouki (eds.), The Foreign Policies of Arab States, Westview Press, 1984. 
37  Hinnebusch, Raymond & Anoushiravan Ehteshami (eds.), The Foreign Policy of Middle East States, 
Lynne Riener, 2001. 
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(Arab in particular) and external systemic factors, although particular factors of leadership 
and decision-making   are   not   neglected.   Hinnebusch   and   Ehteshami   take   an   ‘adjusted  
realist’  approach:    “adjusted”  as  it  brings  to  a  broadly  realist  approach  an  appreciation  of  
internal and regional values.  Nonneman’s   volume,   and   especially   his   own   two   chapters  
that   set   out   the   book’s   analytical framework, make a compelling case that Middle East 
states’   foreign   policies   need   to   be   analysed   by   building   on   a   ‘complex   model   of  
international   relations’   and starting   the   analysis   from   the   regime’s   concern   for   security  
(both external and internal), but viewing this in a triple context of the domestic 
environment, the regional environment, and the international environment, in each of 
which   he   locates   ‘material’   and   ‘ideational’   factors   – the latter including, among other 
factors, matters of identity, zeitgeist, etc.  In the Arab world and the Middle East, he 
acknowledges the fluctuating relevance of Arab and Muslim identies and values, as 
influencing both decision-makers and broader audiences. He also points out that the Gulf 
region – and within it the GCC – has subregional dynamics of its own, including, again, 
both ideational and materials ones. But he also stresses that it is the nature of the 
domestic system and decision-making that shapes the way these factors are 
interpreted and acted on, filtered by decision–makers’   perceptions   and   role  
conception.38  
 
Hinnebusch’s   contribution   to   Nonneman’s   volume39 builds on this and tweaks his own 
earlier work (and is in turn elaborated further in his subsequent book40). In essence his 
argument is that ideational elements – identity both Arab and Islamic – must indeed 
remain a significant part of the overall explanatory framework of Middle East international 
relations, but are so in ways that vary and fluctuate depending on the overall regional and 
global historical and material context.  
 
                                              
38  Nonneman, Gerd , ‘Analyzing  Middle  East  Foreign  Policies:  A  Conceptual  Framework’;;  and  ‘The  Three  
Environments  of  Middle  East  Foreign  Policy  Making  and  Relations  with  Europe’,  both in Nonneman, 
Gerd (ed.), Analyzing Middle East Foreign Policies and the Relationship with Europe, Routledge, 2005, 
respectively Chapters 1 and 2. 
39  Hinnebusch,  Raymond,  ‘Explaining  International  Politics  in  the  Middle  East:  The  Struggle  of  Regional  
Identity  and  Systemic  Structure’, In Nonneman, Gerd (ed.), Analyzing Middle East Foreign Policies and 
the Relationship with Europe, Routledge, 2005.  
40  Hinnebusch, Raymond, The International Politics of the Middle East,  Manchester University Press, 2003. 
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Each of these volumes draws in part on the evidence from the GCC states. Further work 
takes these states as its specific focus – some considering them comparatively/thematically 
as a category, some looking at particular GCC states other than Kuwait: here, too, one may 
reasonably expect to find observations relevant to our own case study. 
 
The GCC states 
 
Hassan Al-Alkim asserts that the GCC states’  foreign  policy  as  a  result  of  the  second  Gulf  
crisis in 1991 became mainly reactive rather than active and that these states became 
heavily dependent on foreign powers in their search for survival. His approach, not 
dissimilar  to  Nonneman’s,  posits that  the  GCC’s  foreign  policy  objectives and style must 
be understood in the context of three variables, namely, domestic milieu, external milieu 
and decision-making apparatus. He adds specificity to the latter by categorizing foreign 
policy decisions under three levels (1) decisions by the ruling families and their close elite 
associates; (2) decisions by members of the council of ministers; and (3) decisions by 
bureaucrats who formulate the detail of policies and execute them.41 This fine as far as it 
goes, and can be applied to the case of Kuwait as well,  but gives little sense of the 
conditions sunder which decisions are made and may be constrained, nor about the intra-
elite dynamics that may be crucial.  
 
Abdullah Baabood’s   analytical   overview   of   the   GCC   states’   foreign   policy   dynamics42  
does not dispute Al-Alkim’s   views   but   more   systematically   foregrounds   the   security  
imperative – both domestic and external – and   closely   follows  Nonneman’s   framework  
outlined above (indeed his contribution comes as a chapter in the Nonneman volume). His 
specific contributions lie in the able description of the domestic environment as a 
determinant, the decision-making system and style (noting especially the strongly 
personalised nature of decision-making – something which will be confirmed in our study 
of Kuwait), and the long-term pattern of pragmatic balancing between domestic and 
regional requirements, and between the search for a main external protector and 
complementary relationships. Both, he notes, chime with the need, among other things, to 
                                              
41  Al-Alkim, Hassan Hamdan, The GCC States in An Unstable World: Foreign-Policy Dilemmas of the 
Small States, 1st edition, Saqi Books, London, 1994. 
42  Baabood,  Abdulla,  ‘Dynamics  and  Determinants  of  the  GCC  States’  Foreign  Policy’,  in  Nonneman  (ed.),  
Analyzing Middle East Foreign Policies, op. cit, pp. 145-173. 
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take account of regional ideational frameworks, as well as of the material security 
challenges. 
 
He adopts  Nonneman’s  label  of  ‘managed  multi-dependence’  for  this  – a concept the latter 
first introduced in his article on Saudi –European relations,43 and then elaborated on both 
in the edited volume already referenced, but also in his subsequent study of the 
determinants of Saudi foreign policy:44  very similar contexts and motifs will also be 
shown to apply in the case of Kuwait in the period under examination. 
In less detail, and covering the eriod until the 1980s only, some of the same insights about 
the domestic inperative, the style of decision-making, and the need for pragmatic 
adaptation, also come through in the chapter on foreign  policy  in  Gause’s  earlier  volume  
on the Gulf Oil Monarchies,45 although he did not yet identify the long-term patterns that 
Nonneman does. Two academic precursors to the latter insights in this respect are 
Anscombe and Troeller. The former analyses the politics of the Gulf under the Ottoman 
Empire and does point out the extent to which local sheikhs were intent on carving out 
measures of autonomy while playing both on the then hegemon – the Otttomans – and 
other forces, thereby achieving the emergence of what become the autonomous and 
eventually independent entities of Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi Arabia.46 Troeller gives a more 
detailed picture of this in the case of the early years of the third Saudi state into the 1930s:  
arguably Abdulaziz Al Saud was one of  the  most  effective  practitioners  of  this  ‘managed  
multi-dependence’,   and   almost   certainly   learned   some   of   the   principles   and   tactics  wby  
observing Sheikh Mubarak the Great of Kuwait, when the Al Saud was in exile in the 
shaikhdom around the turn of the century: something which both Troeller and, later, 
Nonneman, point out.47  
 
                                              
43  Nonneman, Gerd, ‘Saudi-European Relations, 1902-2001: a pragmatic  quest  for  relative  autonomy’,    
International Affairs, Vol. 77, no. 3 (July 2001), pp. 631-661. 
44  Nonneman, Gerd, ‘Determinants  and  patterns  of  Saudi  foreign  policy:  “omnibalancing”  and  “relative  
autonomy”  in  multiple  environments’,  in  Gerd  Nonneman & Paul Aarts (eds.), Saudi Arabia in the 
Balance: Political Economy, Society, Foreign Affairs (New York : New York University Press & London: 
Hurst, 2006) , pp. 315-351. 
45  Gause, Gregory, Oil Monarchies: Domestic and Regonal Security Challenges in the Gulf (New York: 
Council on Foreign Relations, 1994). 
46  Anscombe, Frederick, The Ottoman Gulf, Columbia University Press, 1997. 
47  Troeller, Gary, The Birth of Saudi Arabia, London: Frank Cass, 1976. 
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5.2. Studies of Kuwaiti foreign policy 
 
Several studies have dealt with the subject of relationships between Kuwait and Iraq from 
the independence of Kuwait in 1961 until the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. A significant 
number of these studies were intended to explain the factors that shaped Kuwaiti-Iraqi 
relations before the invasion. All focus on geographical, population, social and economic 
factors, in addition to the Arab and regional environment, in understanding the nature of 
Kuwaiti-Iraqi relations up until 1990. Yet there is a striking shortage of studies regarding 
Kuwaiti foreign policy towards Iraq or even Kuwaiti-Iraqi relations generally, since 1991. 
Yet those studies that were undertaken to explain Kuwaiti-Iraqi relations before the Iraqi 
invasion remain significant for an understanding of the factors that shaped Kuwait's policy 
towards Iraq since then, because many of these factors have proven constants of a sort. In 
other words, an analysis of the policy patterns since 1991 requires an understanding of the 
dynamics and patterns of Kuwaiti-Iraqi relations up until 1990.  
 
In these studies, one finds varied combinations of (1) specific events and decisions being 
described and explained, sometimes with reference to broader frameworks; and (2) 
thematic explanations, implicitly or explicitly. 
 
The explanatory themes include much of was discussed above, although surprisingly little 
by way of long-term patterns of the sort examined by Nonneman and Baabood. Factors 
recognised explicitly or implicitly are: the influence of geography; population (social and 
demographic); economic factors; the regional security environment; ideational factors, 
especially the role of Arab identity in the region; and the nature and details of decision-
making.  Many of these, it turns out, are intertwined. 
 
Domestic social structrure and the population 
 
The influence of domestic social structure and the population factor on Kuwaiti foreign 
policy has been recognized by some works. Alduehis (1992)48 lent  his  support  to  Assiri’s  
                                              
48  Alduehis, Ahmad Hammoud, ‘Siyāsat  al-Kuwayt il-khārijīyah  min  1961  ʼilā  1990’,  ‘Kuwait’s  Foreign  
Policy from 1961 – 1991’    unpublished  master’s  thesis,  Jordanian  University,  Amman,  1992. 
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argument  that   the  ‘economic  factor’,  after  the  discovery  of  oil,  played  a  key  role   in Iraqi 
ambitions towards Kuwaiti natural oil resources. However, Alduehis focused on the impact 
of the   ‘social   structure  of   the  Kuwaiti  population’,  which  was  divided  between  Kuwaiti-
non Kuwaiti nationals with different origins, religions and affiliations – as an ideational 
factor - on Kuwaiti internal and external policy. He contends that, after the discovery of 
oil, the formation of ‘nationalism’  and  ‘pan-Arabism’,  up  until  the  Iraqi  invasion  in  1990,  
played a key role on the streets of Kuwait due to the large Arab immigrant population 
looking to earn a livelihood in Kuwait, which affected the internal security situation of 
Kuwait. He went on to say that the seriousness of the foreign and the Arab communities 
lies   in   the   fact   that   they   ‘saw  Kuwait   as   a   suitable   place   for   the   dissemination   of   their  
political   ideas   and   affiliation   among   its   sons’,49 which resulted in the country being 
exposed to internal security risks due to the affiliation of those immigrants to their 
countries. This was demonstrated by terrorist operations in Kuwait during the 1980s due to 
the Kuwaiti stance in supporting Iraq in its war against Iran (1980-1988).  
 
Alduehis’  approach is similar to that of Lori Plotkin Boghardt,50 who highlights the impact 
of the varied social structure of the Kuwaiti population on the internal security situation of 
Kuwait during the Iranian revolution in 1979, the Iraq- Iran war (1980-1988), and the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait as having an ideational and a regional impact. She argues that the 
variety  in  Kuwait’s  population,  whether  ethnic  origin  (Najdi,  Persian  and  Iraqi),  religious  
affiliation (Sunni -Shi'a) and racial (Arab and non-Arab), constituted political risks to the 
security of Kuwait through ideational challenges and terrorist operations stemming from 
the fallout of the events mentioned above, especially from Iranian and Arab immigrants. 
She suggests that Kuwaiti foreign policy from 1979 up until 1990, given   the   country’s  
small size and a shifting number of material and ideational challenges, could be seen in the 
context  of  its  ‘domestic  demographic  structures’  and  its  ‘ethnic  and  religious  composition’, 
which forced Kuwait to become engaged in the regional conflict due to the political and 
security activities of Kuwaiti and non Kuwaiti nationals.  Clearly, then, these domestic 
factors intertwine with those of ideas and those of the regional environment, which I will 
turn to next.  For the purpose of this thesis, these finding are relevant, as Kuwaiti foreign 
policy towards Iraq since 1991 can be understood not only in the context of ideational and 
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population   factors   since   the   fall   of   Saddam   Hussein’s   regime in 2003, but also in the 
context of the religious factor represented by sectarian violence between Sunnis and 
Shiites in Iraq, which has affected Kuwait (as we will illustrate later in this thesis). 
 
The Arab regional environment: security and identity 
 
The debate on the role of the Arab factor and regionalism in Arab politics has been much 
debated. The case of Kuwat in this respect is particularly interesting, as it offers a set of 
contrasts: a pro-Western monarchy that from the mid-20th century adopted fairly strong 
Arabist themes in its foreign policy, and then dropped those rather dramatically – at least 
in relative terms – following the trauma of the invasion. 
 
Assiri51 argues that Kuwait was more Arabist than were other Gulf States up until the Iraqi 
invasion in 1990, due to the spread of the   concept   of   ‘Arab   identity’,   including   the  
discourse of ‘nationalism’  and   ‘pan-Arabism’  – fanned by the influence of Nasserism in 
the Arab world. This Arab nationalist discourse, he piints out, was particularly strong in 
neighboring Iraq, where it was employed by successive regimes. This had a clear impact 
on Kuwaiti policy. He does not claim that this factor was  more important than that of the 
country’s  geopolitical  situation  at the head of the Gulf region surrounded by three regional 
big powers, but that it became intertwined with it given the Iraqi neighbour at a time of 
regional nationalist ferment.  
 
Assiri’s  argument  is  supported  by  Patrick (2006),52 who argues that the concepts  of  ‘pan-
Arabism’   and   ‘nationalism’   had   a   stronger   impact   on   Kuwaiti   politics   from   its  
independence in 1961 up until 1977 and in particular on its foreign policy due to the role 
played by Arab nationals in Kuwaiti society and in the Arab world having an ideational 
and regional impact.  Patrick   went   on   to   say   that   ‘Kuwait   was   for   the   most   part   only  
loosely associated with regional alliances, and that its non-alignment was part and parcel 
of an ideational construct that formed a key part of its foreign policy toward the Arab 
                                              
51  Assiri, Abdul Reda  Al-kuwayt fis-siyāsah  ad-duwalīyah  al-muʽasirah:  ʼinjāzāt..  ʼikhfākāt..  taḥaddīyat, 
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52  Partrick,  Neil,  ‘Kuwait's  Foreign  Policy  (1961-1977): Non-Alignment, Ideology and the Pursuit of 
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world   […]  However, Kuwait's regional vulnerability meant that it could not escape the 
need  to  assert  its  Arabism’.53 Assiri and Patrick show that  ‘Arab  ideology’  was  significant  
in Kuwaiti policy due to its geographic location and the ideational dimensions within its 
regional environment. Corroboration of this argument comes in the form of a British 
document released during the Kuwaiti independence crisis with Abdul Karim Qasim in 
1961, when British forces faced trouble in Kuwait due to the unfavourable public reaction 
of Kuwaiti nationalists to such a military presence.54   
 
As  a  consequence  of  this  invasion,  the  notion  of  ‘pan-Arabism’  and  ‘nationalism’  has  lost  
its potency in Kuwait. This was evident when some Kuwaiti nationalist groupings, which 
belonged to the Arab Nationalist Movement, changed the names of their blocs after the 
liberation of Kuwait in 1991, due to the pan-Arab   movement’s   support   of   the   Iraqi  
invasion. I will return to this aspect of the literature below when dealing with writings on 
the aftermath of the invasion. 
 
Against the ideational argument in regional politics, there stands the material factor of 
power, size, capability, and geostrategic position. These factors too, feature in the lijmited 
literature on Kuwait. 
 
Geostrategic factors and the regional environment 
 
Assiri, as already seen, while recognising the role of Arab nationalism in influencing 
Kuwaiti policy, or at least policy options, does acknowledge that it is geography, strategic 
location, and relative military capabilities that remained uppermost – including in the 
Kuwaiti-Iraqi crisis in,   and   that   this   forced   Kuwait   to   pursue   a   ‘neutral   policy’   in   the  
region until the outbreak of the Iraq-Iran war (1980-1988). This is reflected also in a secret 
telegram of the US Embassy in Kuwait in 1975, which noted: ‘Kuwait’s  foreign  policy  is  
determined by the geopolitical fact that it is small, vulnerable and of great strategic and 
economic  importance’.55  
 
                                              
53  Ibid, p.8. 
54  Burdett, Anita L.P., ( ed.) , Records of Kuwait 1961–1965, Archive Editions, 1997. p.274. 
55  WikiLeaks,  ‘Kuwait’s  foreign  policy  - A  Tightrope  Philosophy’,  Reference  ID;;  1975KUWAIT00546_b, 
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Sulaiman Al Shaheen56 along the same lines argue that the foreign policy of Kuwait in 
general, from its independence in 1961 until the Iraq-Iran War in 1980, was characterized 
by  ‘neutrality’  to maintain its security and entity against regional and international powers 
due to its small population and its geographical location. He maintains that the Iranian 
revolution with its explicit threats forced Kuwait and the GCC states to support Iraq in its 
war with Iran. Nonneman57 lends support to this argument, noting that the regional 
environment, especially in the shape of the Iranian revolution of 1979, constituted a threat 
to the political regimes in GCC states, due to the attempt of the new Iranian regime to 
export   the   revolutionary   ‘Shi'ism’   to the region. This forced Kuwait to provide material 
and political support to Iraq in its war against Iran (1980-1988) due to its sensitive 
geographical   location   and   its   Shi‘a   population,   partly   of   Persian   origin.   Assiri   and  
Nonneman’s   work, in particular, shows that the regional factor, combined with the 
geography and domestic social and political factors, are significant in understanding the 
dynamics of Kuwaiti foreign policy. This thesis will argue that the regional environment 
continued to play a significant role in Kuwaiti policy towards Iraq since the fall of Saddam 
Hussein’s  regime.  
 
One special area of interest   is   the   extent   to   which   the   Arab   arena   affected   Kuwait’s  
security policy – something showcased right from the beginning of independence, 
following the 1961 threat from Iraq. 
 
The Kuwaiti former Secretary General of the GCC, Abdullah Bishara (2007)58 argues that 
Kuwait was able successfully to use the concept of pan-Arabism to form strong 
relationships with the Arab world – for purposes of security and politics – against Iraqi 
ambitions, when it was able to gain Arab support in the Arab League against Iraqi threats 
during the political crisis from 1961 to 1963. This resulted in the isolation of Iraq from the 
Arab world and strengthened both Kuwaiti independence and its foreign relations with 
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Arab states. Bishara shows that   the   ‘Arab   factor’   was   essential   in   strengthening the 
independence of Kuwait in 1961.   He goes beyond this, however, by delving back into the 
genesis  of   the  conflict,  which  he  suggests  must  also  be  sought  outside  Kuwait’s  borders.  
He contends that the poor economic situation in Iraq, following the political and military 
disorder experienced by Iraqis since the collapse of monarchy in 1958, is crucial in 
explaining the crisis between Kuwait and Iraq during the period 1961-1963, arguing 
specifically, and plausibly, that the Iraqi president created a political crisis with Kuwait to 
turn the attention of the Iraqi people from their dire internal situation.  
 
A similar point is made for a somewhat longer period, by Mohammad Al-Anzi59 who 
agrees that the political disruptions and economic problems within Iraq in the period 1961-
1973 were among the main reasons for the successive crises and violations of Kuwaiti 
borders by Iraq in 1961, 1966, 1967 and 1973. These analyses also arguably point us to 
potential dynamics in the later period – including the 1990 invasion and occupation.  
 
However, while Bishara demonstrates that the Kuwait-Iraq crisis in 1961 was solved 
within  the  ‘Arab  framework’,  in  contrast  with  the  UN  Security  Council’s  failure  to  address  
the crisis due to the Cold War context, one cannot escape the observation that the Arab 
League could not solve the 1990 crisis.   
 
That puzzle was addressed by Youssef Ahmed60 and Ahmed Al-Rashidy61 in 1991; they 
blame the failure on the position taken by some Arab states that in effect supported Iraq, 
even if they did not approve of the invasion, on the grounds that the presence of foreign 
troops was unacceptable to them.  Attya Afandi62 argues that the UN Security Council, by 
contrast, was able to impact the crisis   due   to   the   collapse   of   the   ‘bipolar’   system in the 
world  and  the  emergence  of  a  ‘unipolar’  system  led  by  the  US,  which  enabled  it  to  form  
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international coalition forces to liberate Kuwait under the UN resolutions. The above 
analysis shows that the   ‘international   environment’   was   crucial   in   solving the Kuwaiti-
Iraqi crisis in 1990-1991. This analysis not only shows that in various periods different 
external dynamics bot at the regional and global level can have a different impact on a 
country’s  international  relationds  and  foreign  policy  – and did so quite clearly in the case 
of Kuwait and Iraq -  but also helps explain why the Kuwaiti method of dealing with Iraq 
after the invasion was based on UN resolutions related to the Iraqi invasion, rather than on 
Arab reference points. As a consequence, the UN organization became a key element in 
Kuwait’s  behavior towards Iraq after 1990. 
 
The economic factor 
 
The economic factor, the literature shows (as would be expected from the wider literature 
already surveyed) is one that plays both domestically – feeding into both strength and 
vulnerability – and as a regional effect. It also, of course, intertwines with the regional 
environment, as well as wth the global environment. This was recognized by Bishara, as 
cited above. Assiri and Partrick both note that Kuwait’s   oil   wealth   and   its   ‘small  
population’ – as internal factors – increased Iraqi ambitions to control Kuwaiti oil 
resources, which encouraged Kuwait, after its independence crisis in 1961, to use the 
policy  of   ‘Dinar  diplomacy’   (Assiri’s   term) to utilize its financial capabilities to provide 
assistance to Arab countries in order to protect its independence and its existence among 
Arab states by the establishment of the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development 
(KFAED) in 1961. As Assiri notes, after this crisis,  Kuwait’s  leadership  realized  that  ‘the  
security   and  stability  of   Iraq  was  an   important   factor   for  Kuwait   security’.63 Both Assiri 
and Patrick argue that Kuwait utilized oil money and western defense partnerships to deter 
what was primarily conceived of as an external threat in the region, despite its regional 
‘non-alignment  policy’.  They imply Kuwait believed its aid to Arab states would act as a 
‘deterrent   policy’   against   Iraqi   territorial   ambitions.   Clearly, though, the 1990 invasion 
showed this policy to be a failure, at least in part: it did arguably help build support among 
those that supported Kuwait after the invasion.  It certainly played a role in the invasion 
itself, as the literature surveyed in the section on the invasion below, shows. 
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The economic factor, of course, remained important after the invasion – not least in that 
Kuwait was able to maintain its existence extra-territorially. It also remained an issue in 
post-Saddam relations with Iraq, as we will see later. 
 
These various factors also feature in varying ways in the analyses produced of the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait, and indeed of subsequent periods.  
 
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 
 
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait inevitably affected Kuwaiti policy in general, and 
particularly, but not only, in terms of its behaviour towards Iraq. This invasion became the 
cornerstone of Kuwaiti policy. Therefore, this study also seeks to clarify what led Saddam 
Hussein to invade Kuwait in 1990.  The literature feature a range of explanations. And 
observations. 
 
Both Richard Schofield64 and a panel of specialists’  studies  in  199365 and 199466 argue that 
the   ‘strategic   location  of  Kuwait’  next  door   to   Iraq  was  one  of   the  main   reasons   for   the  
Iraqi   invasion   of  Kuwait;;   In   1990,   Iraq   used   the   issue   of   the   ‘common  border’   between  
both states to invade Kuwait by accusing Kuwait of violating the Iraqi border and stealing 
Iraqi oil. Schofield contended that after the Algeria agreement in 1975 between Iraq and 
Iran, in which Iraq ceded its international waters to Iran at Shatt al-Arab, and after the 
Iraq-Iran  war,   Iraq’s  ambition  to  own  Kuwait’s  Warba  and  Bubiyan islands increased, as 
that  could  counter  Iran’s  position  due  to  their  geographical  position  at  the  head  of  the  Gulf  
region. Schofield also argues that the maritime  border  decreed  by   the  UN’s   Iraq-Kuwait 
Boundary Demarcation Commission would cause problems in the future given that much 
of  Iraq’s  navigation  channel  in  the  Khor  al-Abdallah then came under Kuwaiti sovereignty 
and Iraq became a landlocked state.  
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The Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait,67 by contrast, argues that Iraq possessed 
six ports overlooking the Arabian Gulf - three merchant ports and three oil terminals - and 
it was shown through maps, diagrams, satellite images and statistics that Iraq’s  sea  front  
measured 235 km, thus at first sight countering   Iraq’s   claim   that   it   had   become   a  
landlocked state due to the work of the UN Commission. The counter-argument advanced 
by Schofield and others, is that that coastline is largely unusably shallow even where it is 
not  hemmed  in,  and  that  Iraq’s  main  exit  remains  via  the  Kuwait-bordered Khor Abdalla. 
 
Hassan Shoukri68 and Gregory Gause69 argue that the reason behind the Iraqi invasion was 
the   ‘Iraqi   ambitions’   in   building  marine  military   bases   in   the   Gulf region by using the 
strategic geographical location of Kuwait to counter Iran.  Parasiliti70 supports the 
argument of Shoukri, Gause, and Schofield, namely, that Saddam  Hussein’s  decisions   to  
invade Iran and Kuwait were a result of his ambitions to play a prominent role in the 
region’s   hegemony   in   the  Middle   East   and  Gulf   region   after   Iraq’s   war  with   Iran.   It is 
impossible not to agree that the strategic location of Kuwait next to Iraq was a major factor 
in our understanding the Iraqi invasion.  
 
In the final  analysis,  it  is  the  ‘geographic’  factor  combined  with  the  economic  element  that  
is shown to be crucial. These approaches are important in conceptualizing the role of the 
‘geographic  factor’  in  the  Gulf  crisis  in  1990 but also afterwards. This played a major role 
in Kuwaiti foreign behavior towards Iraq during the time frame of this study, especially 
after the terrorist attacks of 9/11-2001 in the US and their impact on the global political 
scene, which resulted in the occupation of Iraq in 2003 and affected Kuwait due to its 
geographical location.  
 
                                              
67  Centre for Research and Studies on Kuwait, Manāfith il-ʽirāq il-baḥrīyah,  ‘Iraq  Navigational  Outlets’,  3rd 
edition, Centre for Research and Studies on Kuwait, Kuwait, 2000. 
68  Shoukri, Hassan ,    ḥakāʼik  lit-tarīkh  fī  azmat  il-khalīj  il-ʽarabī,  ‘Facts  for  History  on  the  Arabian  Gulf  
Crisis’, 2nd edition, Madbouly El-saghir Bookshop, Cairo, 1991. 
69  Gause, Gregory, ‘Iraq’s  decision  to  go  to  war,  1980  and  1990’,  Middle East Journal, Vol 56. No 1, 
Middle East Institute, 2002. 
70  Parasiliti,  Andrew  T.,    ‘The  Causes  and  Timing  of  Iraq's  Wars:  a  Power  Cycle  Assessment, International 
Political Science Review, Vol. 24, No. 1, SAGE Publications, Ltd, London, 2003. 
25 
 
The  ‘economic  factor’   in the Iraqi invasion, is also stressed in the work of Khadduri and 
Edmund Ghareeb (1997)71 and Omar Ali (1993)72, who argue that the reason behind the 
Iraqi invasion was this controversial claim that Kuwait   destabilized   Iraq’s   economy   by  
flooding the oil markets during and after the Iraq-Iran war (1980-1988); they classed this 
policy  as  ‘economic  aggression’ and suggested it led Iraq to invade Kuwait in 1990. They 
contend that Iraq had to invade Kuwait to protect its interests. In contrast, Ali Bin Ghanim 
Al-Hajri (1997)73 argued   that  Kuwait  did  not  wage  ‘economic  war’  against   Iraq  and   that  
the Iraqi claim came as a justification to occupy Kuwait due to its poor economic situation 
as was being experienced by Iraqis after the war with Iran. Al-Hajri goes on to say that the 
claim that Kuwait demonstrated economic aggression towards Iraq could be proved to be 
‘false’  and  ‘baseless’  in  international  law  and  added  that  the  record  of  conduct  before the 
invasion  proves  that  Kuwait’s  policy  was  not  economic  aggression,  but  rather  Kuwait  had  
adopted a policy based on national interest, which every state is allowed to pursue.  
 
One more specific question has been how and to what extent the economic consequences 
of the Iraq-Iran war played a role in the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Kamran Mofid,74 seven 
months before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, argued that the economic loss of both Iraq and 
Iran would lead to the risk of chaos inside these countries and bring instability and peace 
to the region. Abbas Alnasrawi (1992)75 lent  support  to  Kamran’s  prediction  that  the  Iraqi  
invasion   of   Kuwait   could   be   seen   in   the   context   of   ‘economic   factors’   represented   by  
Iraq’s  weak   economic   situation   after   the   end  of   the Iraq-Iran war, which led it to fiscal 
bankruptcy. 
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Similarly, Ehteshami and Nonneman (1991)76 argued that the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait 
was  related  to  Iraq’s  need  to  strengthen  its  ruling  regime  and  increase  stability  during  this  
invasion to guard against any coup in order to control Kuwaiti oil resources and meet 
Iraq’s  economic  needs,  as  a  result  of  the poor economic and political situation suffered by 
Iraqis after the war with Iran.  
 
A Wikileaks document indicates that 1990 during the meeting between Saddam Hussain 
and US ambassador April Glaspie on 25 July 1990, Saddam did not explicitly accuse 
Kuwait   of   stealing   oil,   but   said   that   Iraq’s   problems   were   related   to   its   poor   internal  
economy,  commenting,  ‘But  how  can  we  make  them  (Kuwait  and  UAE)  understand how 
deeply we are suffering? The financial situation is such that the pensions for widows and 
orphans  have  to  be  cut’.77  Certainly, there is no disagreement within the studies mentioned 
above  that  the  ‘bad  internal  situation’  of  Iraq,  along  with  Iraqi  hegemony ambitions in the 
region, played a role - as explanatory factors in understanding the nature of Kuwaiti-Iraqi 
relations during the time frame of this study. 
 
The Impact of the invasion of Kuwaiti foreign policy 
 
Clearly this invasion had a major impact on Kuwaiti foreign policy at both regional and 
international levels. Kuwaiti foreign policy – as this thesis argues – towards Arab, 
regional, and key global players has significantly changed since the liberation of Kuwait in 
1991. The Iraqi invasion convinced the key decision makers in Kuwait that the Kuwaiti 
policy toward superpowers needed to be reconsidered. Terrill has commented: ‘The 1990 
Iraqi   invasion   left   an   indelible   mark   on   Kuwaiti   attitudes   about   the   country’s  
vulnerability’.78 He argues that this invasion was the main reason behind the concept of 
‘military security agreements’  between  Kuwait  and  a  number  of  other  powerful  countries  
after 1991 due to a number of difficulties within Kuwaiti national defense and its small 
population. Terrill’s  analysis suggests, then, that the emergence of the US-Kuwaiti alliance 
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since 1991 was a reflection of the implication of the Iraqi invasion – something for which 
further corroboration is required, which this thesis will explore. 
 
Abdullah Al-Enezi79 agrees that Kuwait, after its liberation, for the first time depended on 
foreign protection when it signed security agreements with the five permanent members at 
UNSC to protect itself, particularly from Iraqi threats. He contends that Kuwait, and also 
the GCC states, believed that the international umbrella was crucial for the stability of the 
region due to the aggressive policies and conduct of Iraq and Iran. Al-Enezi shows that the 
liberation of Kuwait by foreign troops led six   GCC   states   to   sign   the   ‘Damascus  
Declaration’  with  Egypt  and  Syria  in  1991  due  to  the  incompetence  of   the  Arab  security  
system.  However, Gerges80 argues that the Damascus Declaration proved to be useless 
due to the dissatisfaction of Egypt and Syria with the amendments of the Declaration 
supporting cooperation in security issues instead of permanent Arab military forces in the 
Gulf.  Both authors, however, plausibly suggest that one of the key changes resulting from 
the   invasion   was   the   concept   of   forging   a   strategic   ‘alliance’   with   superpowers, which 
made its first appearance in Kuwaiti policy during the time frame of this study, as result of 
the futility and incompetence of the Arab security system in deterring the Iraqi occupation.  
 
Ghanem Sultan81 argues that the Iraqi invasion caused a clear division in Kuwaiti–Arab 
relations after the liberation of Kuwait due to the stance of some Arab states towards the 
Iraqi invasion, and caused a major impact at a humanitarian, environmental and economic 
level for Kuwait and the Arab states. Ibrahim Abdul Kareem82 argues that  the  ‘Palestinian 
issue’  was   the  most   affected  by   the   Iraqi   invasion   after   the   expulsion   of   the  Palestinian 
people from Kuwait and other GCC states due to the position of the PLO regarding the 
                                              
79  Al-Enezi, Abdulla,  ‘ʼamn  il-khalīj  il-ʽarabi:  dirāsah  fil  ʼasbāb  wal  muʽtayāt’,  ‘The  Arabian  Gulf  Security:  
Reasons  and  Results’,  Journal of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula studies, Vol.21, No. 83, Kuwait 
University, Kuwait, 1996.  
80  Gerges,  Fawaz  A.,  ‘Regional  Security  after  the  Gulf  Crisis:  The  American  Role’,  Journal of Palestine 
Studies, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Summer, 1991). 
81  Sultan, Ghanem, Al-ghazw il-ʽirāqi  lil  Kuwayt:  Kiraʼah  muwjazah  fī  Jawānib  min  ʼishkālīyat il-ʼazmah,  
‘The  Iraqi  invasion  of  Kuwait:  A  Brief  Reading  of  the  Problematic  Aspects  of  The  Crisis’,  1st edition, AL-
Wazzan  International Printing  Press, Kuwait, 1994. 
82  Abdul Kareem, Ibrahim, ‘Al-inʽiqāsāt  il-iqtisādīyah  li  ʼazmat  il-khalīj  ʽala  al-filastīnīyīn  fiḍ-ḍiffah  wal  
qitāʽ’,  ‘Economic  Implications  of  Gulf  Crisis  on  the  Palestinians  in  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  Strip’,  
Cooperation Journal, issue No. 29, Secretariat General of GCC States, 1993. 
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invasion.  Abdullah Al-Enezi and Abdullah Saher83 support Ghanem’s  argument   that the 
Iraqi invasion caused a relationship crisis between Kuwait and some of the Arab states that 
did  not  support  Kuwait  during  this  invasion,  and  which  were  classified  as  “duwal  aḍ-ḍidd” 
(Opponent States) in Kuwaiti's foreign policy after 1991. The two authors contend that one 
of reasons that prompted Kuwait to reorganize its tense relationships with these Arab states 
was to contain Iraq and not to isolate Kuwait from its Arab and regional environment. 
However, their study focused on a survey of Kuwaiti students at Kuwait university from 
the   renormalization   of  Kuwaiti   relations  with   “duwal   aḍ-ḍidd”,  when   this   issue   became  
controversial in Kuwait, while the analysis of Kuwaiti-“duwal  aḍ-ḍidd”  relations  or  even  
the role of the Kuwaiti parliament regarding this issue was not discussed.  It can also be 
deduced from Abdullah Al-Enezi  and  Abdullah  Saher’s  analysis  that  the  ‘Arab  factor’  was  
significant in Kuwaiti foreign policy after its liberation during the time frame of this study 
in order to gain Arab support against Iraqi threats.  
 
The few authors listed above do contribute  to our understanding of the impact of the Iraqi 
invasion and the changes in the concept of Kuwaiti foreign behavior at Arab, regional, and 
international  levels,  and  not  only  in  terms  of  Kuwait’s  behaviors  towards  Iraq  during  this  
study's time frame. This is in addition to the impact of this invasion in recalibrating 
Kuwait’s   foreign   relations  with  other   states   in   light  of   the  stances   they   took   towards   the 
invasion.  But they leave us guessing about the detail and dynamics of how this happened. 
 
Although Kuwaiti foreign policy towards Iraq since its liberation in 1991 became a 
controversial issue at Arab, Gulf and regional levels, few studies have undertaken to 
analyze this policy and those that have done so are limited and unsystematic. Fattou Abu 
Dahab (2001)84 analyzes the  shift  in  Kuwait’s  foreign  policy  for  the  first  time  concerning  
the  ‘Iraqi  file’  during  the  Arab  summit in Amman in 2001. He argues that Kuwait entered 
into  negotiations  with  the  Iraqi  regime  at  the  Arab  League  and  accepted  the  ‘Conciliation  
Formula’  in  2001,  which  was  rejected  by  Iraq,  due  the effects of the economic embargo in 
increasing the suffering of the Iraqi people, which created Arab and international sympathy 
                                              
83  Al-Enezi,  Abdullah  and  Saher,  Abdullah,  ‘Al-kuwayt wa  ʽalakātiha  maʽ  “duwal  iḍ-ḍid”:  Dirāsah  
maydanīyah’,    ‘Kuwait  and  Its  Relations  with  Opponent  States:  Field  Study’,  Al Mustaqbal Al Arabi 
Journal , issue No. 245, Centre for Arab Unity Studies , Beirut , July 1999. 
84  Abu  Dahab,  Fattouh,  ‘At-taḥaruk  ad-diblumāsi  al-Kuwayti: ad-dalālāt  wal  nataʼij’,  ‘Kuwait  Diplomatic  
Movement:  Indications  &  Results’,  Sho'oun Khalijia Journal , No. 26, The Gulf Centre for Strategic 
Studies ,London, Summer 2001. 
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for the Iraqi people on the one hand, and on the other, led to the weakness of the 
‘international  coalition’  that  was  formed  following  the  liberation  of  Kuwait  in  1991.  Abu  
Dahab contends that Iraq successfully used the issue of the suffering of the Iraqi people to 
hold Kuwait and some of the Arab Gulf States responsible for the miserable situation of 
the   Iraqi   people   under   the   ‘economic   embargo’. However, he limited his study only to 
Kuwaiti behavior towards Iraq at the Amman Summit in 2001.  He does, though, draw our 
attention to the combination of  the international environment and  the  ‘Arab  factor’  during 
this study's time frame as explanatory factors of Kuwaiti foreign policy towards Iraq. 
However, the objective of this thesis is to survey Kuwaiti policy since the 1990s in order to 
fill the gap in the literature.   
 
The political system and the decision-making context. 
 
It is clear from the wider literature, and especially also that on the Gulf states, that the 
political system and the decision-making context is a critically important factor in 
understanding foreign policy, and there is every reason to assume this is true for the case 
of Kuwait.  
 
Although the Kuwaiti parliament played a key role in Kuwaiti foreign relations, 
particularly  with   Iraq  and  with   regard   to   the  ‘outstanding   issues’  since   its   return   in  1992  
through to  what   is  called  ‘popular  diplomacy’  with  other  states,   its  role  in  the  making  of 
foreign policy is not readily ascertainable: there is a dearth of studies regarding the role of 
the National Assembly in foreign affairs, on the one hand, and on the other, foreign policy 
is entrusted to the executive authority represented by the Amir and the government in 
accordance with the Kuwaiti political system – which tends to be extremely opaqe and 
reluctant to share deep insight into its workings. Most of the studies regarding the Kuwaiti 
political system have focused on the functions of the executive, legislative, and judicial 
authority only. However, it is important to note the limitations of the academic studies 
discussing the role of the Kuwaiti National Assembly in the making of foreign policy. Dr. 
Abdullah Al-Nafisi commented in an article in 1993 on the role of National Assembly 
before the Iraqi invasion as follows:  ‘Foreign  policy  has  always  been  the  prerogative  of  the  
executive power [...] the legislative authority did not have a clear impact in determining 
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foreign  policy  and  guidance’.85 This point has credibility due to the fact that the National 
Assembly was dissolved unconstitutionally from 1976 until 1981, and once again from 
1986 until 1992. But to what extent can this analysis be applied to Kuwaiti foreign policy 
after  Kuwait’s return to democracy immediately after the liberation in 1992?  
 
Abdullah Al Edwani (2006)86 argued that since the revival of the constitution and of 
parliament itself in 1992, which was also a result of the invasion and its aftermath, the 
National Assembly began to play a role in Kuwaiti foreign relations via what are called 
‘Parliamentary  friendship  committees’  with  other  states  and  became  an  influential  factor  in  
restricting the decision makers in Kuwait. It can be said that Al Sabah family was forced to 
respect the country's constitution of 1962 after the Kuwaiti liberation in accordance with 
the agreement between the Kuwaiti government in exile and the Kuwaiti political blocs at 
Jeddah Conference in October 1990. Hence, Al Edwani contends that  ‘despite  the  Kuwaiti  
constitution entrusting the prerogative of foreign policy to the executive authority, the 
National Assembly has a reasonable role in foreign policy through its supervisory role and 
tools’,87 since its return in 1992. He emphasizes that the Amir of Kuwait is the first circle 
in the process of decision making, while the Kuwaiti cabinet is the second circle and the 
National Assembly is the third circle in the decision-making hierarchy through its 
supervisory role on foreign-policy decisions. However, Al Edwani does not explain how 
the Kuwaiti National assembly is involved in a practical way in devising foreign policy, 
and focuses in a very general way on the role of the National Assembly in issues of 
international peace and security, democracy and human rights, the Palestinian issue, and 
counterterrorism. Meanwhile, neither the role of the National Assembly in the 
renormalization   or   the   blocking   of  Kuwait’s   relationship  with   “duwal   aḍ-ḍidd”,   nor   the  
outstanding issues with Iraq are discussed. With regard to the Iraqi-Kuwaiti issues, he 
limited discussion to the role of the National Assembly from 1992 until 1998 in 
challenging the Iraqi threats and garnering support for Kuwait issues under the UN 
resolutions.  
 
                                              
85  Al Watan Information and Studies Center, Classification No. 5-6, dated 13/2/1993, Kuwait 
86  Al Edwani, Abdullah Mutlaq,  ‘Dawr  Majlis  il-ʼumma  fis-siyāsah  al-khārijīyah  al-Kuwaytīyah’  , ‘Role  of  
the  National  Assembly  in  the  Foreign  Policy  of  Kuwait’,  Jordanian University, unpublished Masters 
Degree thesis, 2006. 
87  Ibid.p.131. 
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In contrast, Assiri argues,88 without explaining, that foreign policy is entrusted to the 
executive authority represented in Ministry of foreign affair and the character of the 
foreign  minister,  while  the  role  of  the  legislative  authority  is  ‘secondary’  and  restricted  in  
the supervisory role. He restricts himself to discussing the functions of the executive 
authority, legislative authority and judicial authority in the Kuwaiti political system.  The 
foreign making decision or its process in the Kuwaiti political system has not been 
discussed. He contends the role of National Assembly can be seen in the enforcement of 
democracy, political socialization, domestic issues and its supervisory role on the external 
and internal decisions. However, he does not explain the role of National Assembly in the 
foreign relations or even its role in the blocking the Kuwaiti- duwal aḍ-ḍidd relations.  
 
Othman Al- Saleh89, a legal expert, argues that the Amir of Kuwait is the head of the 
‘supreme   executive   authority’   in   the   state   in   the   decision-making process in Kuwait, 
followed by the Council of Ministers. He contends that the role of the Kuwaiti National 
Assembly could be seen through its own method of influence in supervising the 
government’s   decisions,   such   as   interpellations,   parliamentary   questions,   discussing  
internal and external issues, enacting laws, and ratifying international treaties and 
agreements. However, he limits himself as a legal rather than a political expert, and so 
does not discuss the functions of the Kuwaiti political system in the making of foreign 
policy or even its process.  
 
It can be seen from Al-Saleh’s   and  Al Edwani’s   analyses that the Amir and the ruling 
family in Kuwait play a major role in making foreign policy, and indeed, members of the 
ruling family hold essential posts in the executive authority as foreign policy is made 
under this authority. This point is supported by Hamdan Al-Alkim90, who argues that GCC 
foreign policy decisions (as applied in Kuwait) can be placed into three categories: the first 
                                              
88  Assiri, Abdul Reda, An-niḍām  as-siyāsi  fil-Kuwayt:  mabādi’  wa  mumārasāt,‘Political  System  in  Kuwait:  
Principles  &  Practices’, Kuwait university, Kuwait, 1996. 
89  Al-Saleh, Othman Abdul-Malek, An-niḍām  id-dustūrī  wal- mu’assasāt  il-siyāsyah fil- kuwayt:  derāsah  
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92 Patrick, Neil,  ‘Kuwait's  Foreign  Policy  (1961-1977): Non-Alignment, Ideology and the Pursuit of 
Security’,  unpublished  Thesis  (Ph.D.),  University  of  London,  2006. 
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includes the role of the ruling families and their close elite associates, the second 
comprises the members of the council of ministers, and the third includes the bureaucrats 
who formulate and execute the policies. Thus, Archie Lamb, British ambassador to Kuwait 
in the mid-1970s, described the process of making foreign policy in Kuwait as the 
‘unquestioning  maintenance  of  key   assumptions   among  a   tiny   coterie  of   leaders’.  While 
these studies show something if the relative importance of these components of the 
Kuwaiti political system in foreign policy decision-making, and especially demonstrate the 
overwhelming importance of the Amir and the top royal elite in such matters, much detail 
is lacking, and little if anything is provided that relates to the specific subject and period of 
the present thesis.    
 
Some notes on policy output patterns 
 
The policy outcomes of the factors covered in the foregoing sections have shown a 
fluctiating pattern – some of which we have already touched on. Pragmatism, 
‘omnibalancing’,   and   ‘managed   multi-dependence’   – if not outright neutrality - were 
always in evidence. Ideational factors entered into policy as both modest drivers and 
significant constraints, as has also already been illustrated in the literature surveyed. 
 
Assiri emphasises that the main feature of Kuwait's foreign policy has been a ‘non-
regional alignment policy’ until the outbreak of the Iraq-Iran war (1980-1988) which 
changed the concept  of  the  ‘policy  of  non-alignment’  in  Kuwait’s  foreign  policy  towards  
support for Iraq. (The  author  also  introduces  the  term  ‘Dinar  diplomacy’91, to refer to the 
economy as a   tool   in   Kuwait’s foreign policy to achieve its national and international 
interests – a clear pattern throughout). 
 
The   title   of   Partrick’s   study   - Kuwait's Foreign Policy (1961-1977): Non-Alignment, 
Ideology and the Pursuit of Security,92 sums up the intertwining of factors in producing 
certain policy patterns well. He argues  that  Kuwait’s  leaders  from  1961-1977 maintained a 
foreign policy that reflected the country's regional vulnerabilities; therefore, he emphasises 
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Kuwait's crucial need to counterbalance its international security element with, as far as 
practicable, a regional non-alignment stance and adherence to Arab policy norms during 
that time. He argues that Kuwait utilized a regional ‘non-alignment  policy’  as well as Arab 
ideology, oil money, and western defence partnerships to deter what was primarily 
conceived of as an external threat in the region. Thus, he maintains that Kuwait in that 
period sought to extend Islam and Arab nationalism by supporting the Palestinian issue, 
and has used foreign aid as a means to achieve its national and international interests. This 
matches the evidence, and is a useful startying point for analyzing the post-invasion policy 
patterns. As already suggested, since the Invasion the Arab ideational factor has largely 
fallen away since the invasion – something that is noted not only by Partrick. 
 
Sulaiman Majed Al Shaheen, a former Minister of Foreign Affairs,93 somewhat 
implausibly claims that Arab and Islamic values have been the most important influences 
in  Kuwait’s  foreign policy. But he also joins other authors discussed here in showing that 
the appearance of international and regional competition in the Gulf region during the 
1960s and 1970s led Kuwait to adopt the policy of non-alignment to secure itself – even if 
the invasion led to a turn to security alliances with major powers due to Iran's policy 
towards Iraq. 
 
Alduehis’s  work   has   already   been   noted.94 He makes the complementary argument that 
Kuwait's regional non-alignment enabled it to exercise some autonomy from the 
constraints of external power structures in the 1960s and 1970s till the outbreak of the 
Iraq-Iran War (1980);;  he  also  examines  the  effects  of  the  aftermath  of  the  war  on  Kuwait’s  
foreign policy. He reaches the same conclusion as Assiri’s  study, specifically, that Kuwait 
initially adopted an Arab nationalist foreign policy that focused mainly on external 
legitimacy in order to offset regional threats, and occasionally used the appeasement of its 
opponents in the region, due to its strategic location and vast oil assets. The author asserts 
that Kuwait has played a key role in inter-Arab disputes, using its mediating position and 
aid policy as a tool in its foreign policy to achieve its national and international interests. 
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The impact of the Iraqi-Iran War on   Kuwait’s   behavior   is   also   examined   in   Gerd  
Nonneman’s  ‘The  Gulf  States  and  the  Iran-Iraq  War:  pattern  shifts  and  continuities’.95 He 
analyses   in   detail   the   attitudes   of   the   GCC,   including   Kuwait’s   attitude, towards Iraq 
during this war and its its aftermath. He also argues that the assessment of trends in 
relations during the Iran–Iraq war itself is an indispensable part of any effort to understand 
post-1988 outlines, from the ceasefire through to the 2003 Iraq conflict and its aftermath,  
and he stresses, precisely, the patterns of pragmatic, security-oriented adjustment. This 
relates to he same sort of long-term pattern he identified for the GCC states as a whole – 
i.e.  that  of  pragmatic  sheikhly  pursuit  of  security  through  assuring  a  hegemon’s  protection 
without burning bridges with others, which, he shows, even Kuwait did after its invasion 
trauma. We will examine this in greater depth in this thesis. 
 
5.3. Historical background literature on Kuwaiti-Iraqi relations 
 
Some of the long-term factors and dynamcis referred to above, are drawn from the 
historical record. As this thesis, too, will rely in part on a historical background, it is worth 
briefly noting some of the works that delve into this background. A number of Kuwaiti 
authors have provided excellent   historical   treatments   of   Kuwait’s   early   history   and   its  
relations with other powers. Not surprisingly, these authors tend to stress – perhaps overly 
so – Kuwait’s  autonomy  from  the  Ottoman  Empire,  whereas  other  authors  tend  to  be  more  
nuanced. Abu-Hakima’s  Tareekh Al-Kuwait Al-Hadeeth, (The Modern History of Kuwait 
1750 – 1965),96 is a historical study of the political history of Kuwait from 1750 to 1965. 
The decision was taken to employ this study as a historical resource when referring to the 
emerging political state of Kuwait in the 18th century and its relations with international 
powers. The author traced the history of Kuwait in the 17th century and its relationships 
with international powers, such as the Ottoman Empire, Germany and Britain, during the 
19th and 20th century. He argues that the significant location of Kuwait was the main 
reason that led these powers to complete railway projects in Kuwait during the 19th and 
20th century. For this reason, the Ottoman Empire raises the issue of Ottoman supremacy 
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G. Sick (eds.), Iran, Iraq and the Legacies of War, (New York, Palgrave, 2004). 
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over Kuwait during that time. He asserts that Kuwait had never been actually affiliated to 
the Ottoman Empire or to any Ottoman state in Iraq; rather, Kuwait largely used to manage 
its internal and external affairs itself from the time when it emerged as a political entity in 
the 17th century when what is now the state of Iraq was under the Ottoman regime. This 
can   be,   and   has   been,   questioned   in   other  works,   not   least   Schofield’s   and  Anscombe’s  
where the degree of autonomy the local rulers could carve out is recognised but where that 
autonomy was often circumscribed and threatened – and constantly needed to be defended.  
That nuance is not, however, icked up by other Kuwaiti authors. 
One of these is Walid Alazami, in The Political History of Kuwait through British 
Documents 1752-1960,97 examines  the  history  of  Kuwait’s  foreign  relations  with  regional  
and international powers (the UK, Russia, Germany and the Ottoman Empire, now known 
as Turkey) from the 18th century until the mid-20th century through British documents 
released in 1991. The author relied on British, Ottoman (Turkish) and Iraqi archives and 
reports,  which  traced  the  history  of  Kuwait’s  independence  from  the  17th century until the 
20th century and its relations with Britain and the Ottoman Empire. He too, emphasises that 
Kuwait was not substantively part of or even reliant upon the Ottoman Empire, which led 
the Ottoman officials in Basra to express their discontent about this situation during the 
time of Ottoman sovereignty in Iraq. He comments that following the increase in the 
economic and geographic importance of Kuwait, during the 18th and 19th centuries, the 
Ottoman Empire raised the issue of Ottoman supremacy over the country due to the 
empire’s  desire  to  construct  a  railway  line connecting Berlin and Baghdad and ending in 
Kuwait. 
 
The collective study Al-kuwayt  wujūdan  wa  ḥudūdan:  ḥaka’ik  mawḍūʽīyah  wal  id-diʽāʼāt  
al-ʽirākīyah   (‘Kuwait   Statehood   and   Boundaries:   Objective   Facts   and   Iraqi   Claims’)98 
offers a complete introduction to the Kuwaiti origin and its evolving policy through the 
documents on its boundary and sovereignty and its relation with the Ottoman Empire 
during the 19th century. The study analyses the Ottoman position towards the 1899 British-
Kuwaiti treaty and the 1913 British-Ottoman agreement, in addition to their legal status in 
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the eyes of international law. It also argues that during the Ottoman period, Kuwait was 
not a part of or even ruled by Ottoman officials in Iraq, and its status as a qaza was a 
nominal link rather than an actual relationship. It is also emphasized that the Ottoman 
Empire acknowledged the independent situation of Kuwait in the 1913 treaty and accepted 
that the Kuwaiti ruler is independent from any Ottoman state, either in Iraq, or anywhere 
else. 
 
In the same context, a study conducted by Al-Ghunaim, Yacoub Yousef entitled Al-kuwayt 
tuwajih al-,atmāʽ,   (‘Kuwait  Faces  Avidity’)99 focuses on the historical relations between 
Kuwait  and   Iraq,  discussing   the   reasons  behind   the  Ottoman  Empire’s  attempts   to  annex  
Kuwait during the 19th century. The author uses a collection of maps and documents to 
explain relations between Kuwait, as an autonomous entity, and both the Ottoman Empire 
and its vilayet (province)   of   Basra.   He   refutes   the   Ottoman   Empire’s   Basra   claims  
regarding  Kuwait  through  the  UN  resolutions’  demarcation  of  the  Iraqi-Kuwaiti borders in 
1993 as well as referring to the 1899, 1913 and 1963 conventions.  
 
Bondarevsky’s  Kuwait’s International Relations in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth 
Centuries100 provides  historical  background  on  Kuwait’s  relationships  with  powers  such  as 
Russia, Britain, Germany and the Ottoman Empire. The author analyses British, Russian, 
Indian and German archives and systematically considers the strife and struggle among 
these super powers to control the Gulf region, especially Kuwait, which had a great impact 
on international relations in the Gulf and Middle East region. He argues that Kuwaiti 
control  of  the  best  port  in  the  region  was  a  major  concern  for  the  Ottoman  Empire’s  Basra  
officials, who complained that Kuwait was practically independent and was ruled by its 
own sheikhs. He also shows how Sheikh Mubarak (1896-1915) struggled to protect 
Kuwait as an independent emirate at that time.  
 
Richard  Schofield‘s  Kuwait and Iraq: Historical Claims and Territorial Disputes101 offers 
a detailed discussion of the Kuwait-Iraq border question up until 1991. It is systematic and 
                                              
99   Al-Ghunaim, Yacoub Yousef, Al-kuwayt tuwajih al-,atmāʽ,  ‘Kuwait  Faces  Avidity’, 1st edition, Centre for 
Research and Studies on Kuwait, Kuwait, 1998. 
100  Bondarevsky, G., Kuwait’s  International  Relations  in  the  Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries, 1st 
edition , Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait, Kuwait, 1994. 
101  Schofield, Richard, Kuwait and Iraq: Historical Claims and Territorial Disputes, Royal  Institute of 
International Affairs, London, 1991. 
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focuses on the events and developments involved in resolving the border disputes between 
the two sides from the late 19th century to 1991. He surveys the border crises, the signing 
of the Algeria agreement in 1975 between Iraq and Iran, and the Iraq-Iran war, and own 
Kuwait’s  Warba  and  Boubyan  islands,  with  a  view  to  converting  both  islands  to  military  
bases as they have an advantageous geographical position in terms of confronting Iranian 
threats. Therefore, he argues that the historical border disputes stem from a geostrategic 
situation and the issue of access to the Gulf, ever since the borders were drawn by Britain. 
He   also   argues   that   the   maritime   border   decreed   by   the   UN’s   Iraq-Kuwait Boundary 
Demarcation  Commission  holds  problems  in  store  for  the  future  given  that  much  of  Iraq’s  
navigation channel in the Khor al-Abdallah now comes under Kuwaiti sovereignty. 
 
Useful  analyses  of  primary  documents  relating  to  Kuwait’s  borders  were  also  produced by 
the Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait. One of these  is  a collective study,102 
including   accounts   of   Kuwait’s   international   borders   since   the   beginning   of   the   20th 
century   and   the   Iraqi   regime’s   position   towards   Kuwait’s   sovereignty;;   in   addition, it 
examines the final report of the UN Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission of 
1993. The authors of this book provide transcripts of historical documents from published 
records that describe the geographical and political confines of Kuwait to explain the 
evolution of Kuwait and its recognised boundaries in the past.  
 
The   Center   also   published   a   study   by   a   panel   of   specialists,   discussing   the   UN’s  
Demarcation of the International Boundary Between Kuwait and Iraq.103 The authors of 
this study include facsimiles of letters, memoranda, reports, resolutions, charts and maps 
from sources housed at the UN Security Council pertaining to the demarcation of the 
international boundary between Iraq and Kuwait, and discuss the conditions and 
justifications behind the resolutions. It is worth putting this next to the second edition of 
Schofield’s  landmark  study,  for  different  emphases,  but  togeteher  these  volumes  provide  a  
rich set of data. 
                                              
102  Panel of Specialists, Tarsīm al-ḥudūd  il-Kuwaytīyah  al-ʽirāqīyah:  al-ḥak  at-tarīkhi  wal  idārah  ad-
duwalīyah,  ‘Kuwait-Iraq  Boundary  Demarcation:  Historical  Rights  and  International  Will’,  3rd edition, 
Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait, Kuwait, 1994. 
103  Panel of specialists, Takhtīt  al-ḥudūd  id-duwalīyah  bayn  dawlat  al-Kuwayt  wa  jumhūrīyat  il-ʽirāq kamā  
akaratha al-ʼummam  al-mutaḥidah,  ‘Demarcation of the International Boundary Between The State of 
Kuwait  and  the  Republic  of  Iraq  By  the  UN’, 1st edition , Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait, 
Kuwait, 1993. 
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Conclusion 
 
The literature review overall, demonstrates that, while a considerable amount has been 
written on various aspects of the Iraq-Iran war, the Iraqi invasion; a good deal less on GCC 
foreign policies;  and even less on Kuwaiti foreign policy, there remains a huge gap of 
empirical and analytical knowledge,  especially with regard to the research questions of the 
present thesis. None of the abovementioned studies discuss in any detail the impact of the 
invasion on Kuwaiti foreign behavior towards Iraq and on the recalibration of Kuwaiti 
foreign relations during the period from 1990 to 2010, the explanatory factors and the 
determinants  of  Kuwaiti   foreign  policy   towards   Iraq   in   this  period,   and   the   ‘outstanding  
issues’  between  Iraq  and  Kuwait  and  the  Kuwaiti  vision  for  Iraq  after  the  fall  of  Saddam  
Hussein’s  regime  from 2003 until 2010.  
 
Thus, this study is intended to fill the gap in the literature by analyzing Kuwaiti foreign 
policy for the first time via documents released by Wikileaks, the UN and Britain, and by 
interviews with key players in Kuwait and the Arab world.  
 
 
6. Structure of the study 
The study has been divided into ten chapters and organized as follows: Following the 
current chapter, Chapter 1, Chapter 2 offers a review of the relevant concepts and 
approaches in Foreign Policy Analysis, with special reference to the case of developing 
and Middle Eastern states.  
 
Chapter 3 sheds light on the political origin of the state of Kuwait in the 17th century and 
its relations with Iraq to inform the reader of the background to the relationships and issues 
between two countries through documents and maps.  
 
Chapter 4 is divided into four sections discussing the factors affecting Kuwaiti foreign 
policy, including the internal and external factors. The first section discusses the political 
system in Kuwait and how foreign political decisions are made. The second includes the 
geographical location, the population and societal factors, and the economic factors. The 
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third comprises the Gulf, Arab and International environments. The tools of Kuwaiti 
foreign policy and their  impacts on realizing the foreign objectives of Kuwait are also 
examined in this chapter.  
 
Chapter 5 discusses the Iraqi invasion and the regional and international response, and 
surveys the position of the international, Arab and Islamic communities and how they have 
been affected by the invasion of Kuwait.  
 
Chapter 6 surveys key official Kuwaiti positions towards Iraq after the invasion; in this 
chapter will shed lights on the principles  of  Kuwait’s   foreign  policy   towards   Iraq  during  
the period from 1990 to 2010. 
 
Chapter 7 analyses Kuwait’s  foreign policy towards Iraq from 1991-2001 and includes the 
movements   of  Kuwaiti   foreign   policy   towards   the   ‘Iraqi   file’   during   this   period   and   the  
issue of the Kuwaiti-Iraqi reconciliation.  
 
Chapter 8 examines Kuwait’s   foreign  policy   towards  Iraq  from  2001-2003, including the 
Kuwait’s stance on the reconciliation with the Iraqi regime and the official and popular 
stance of Kuwait on the US mobilization of forces to attack Iraq and on the American 
occupation of Iraq.   
 
Chapter 9 discusses  Kuwait’s   foreign   policy towards Iraq from 2003-2010 and includes 
Kuwait’s vision towards Iraq since the collapse of the Iraqi regime as well as the 
outstanding issues between the two countries after the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s  
regime.  
In Chapter 10, the conclusions of this study are put forward, along with a summary of the 
main findings and interpretations of those findings, answering the research questions, 
noting the limitations of the study and setting out some recommendations. 
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Chapter II    
 
Conceptual framework and analytical approach 
 
 
1. Concepts of foreign policy analysis 
The definition of the concept of foreign policy, and hence of the discipline of foreign 
policy analysis (FPA), still has clear differences among political scientists as a sub-field of 
International Relations (IR),1 which, of course, reflect on the use of different approaches in 
political science.2  Kubálková  states   that   ‘According  to  most  definitions,  FPA  refers   to  a  
complex, multilayered process, consisting of the objectives that governments pursue in 
their relations with other governments and their choice of means to attain these 
objectives’.3 Rosenau   refers   to   this   problem   as   follows:   ‘foreign   policy   analysis   lacks   a  
comprehensive system of testable generalizations that treat societies as actors subject to 
stimuli which produce external responses. Stated more succinctly, foreign policy analysis 
is  devoid  of  general  theory’.4  One  starting  definition  of  the  foreign  policy  of  a  state  is  ‘an  
area of governmental activity concerned with relationships between that state and other 
actors  within   the   international   community.’5  Some scholars point out that the study of 
foreign   policy   is   ‘a   variety   of   activities,   dedicated   to   understanding   and   interpreting   of  
foreign policy  and  behaviour  of  actors  in  world  politics’.6 Joseph Frankel identified foreign 
policy   as   ‘decisions   and   actions   which   involve,   to   some   appreciable   extent,   relations  
                                              
1    Hudson, Valerie M., Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory, Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, Inc, Maryland, USA, 2007. pp. 4-6. 
2   Marsh, D. and Gerry Stoker (eds.), Theory and Methods in Political Science, 2nd edition, Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2002. pp.10-12.  
3    Kubálková, V. (ed), Foreign Policy in A Constructed World, M. E. Sharpe, Inc, Armonk, New York, 
2001. p.17. 
4    Rosenau, James N, The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy, The Free Press, New York, 1971. p. 99. 
5    White,  Brain,  ‘Foreign  Policy  and  Foreign  Policy  analysis’,  In  Clarke,  Michael  and  Brain  White  (eds),  An 
Introduction to Foreign Policy Analysis: The Foreign Policy System , G.W.& A. Hesketh, Ormskirk & 
Northridge, 1981.  p.1. 
6    Neack, L., et al. (ed),  Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and Change in its Second Generation, 
Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, USA, 1995.  p1.  
 
 
41 
between   one   state   and   others’.7 Peter Calvert claims that foreign policy also includes 
‘relations   between   the   state   and   external   non-governmental   organizations   (NGOs)’.8 
Rosenau   defines   the   unit   of   analysis   in   foreign   policy   as   follows:   ‘An   undertaking   is  
conceived to be a course of action that the duly constituted officials of a national society 
pursue in order to preserve or alter a situation in the international system in such a way that 
it   is   consistent  with   a  goal  or  goals  decided  upon  by   them  or   their  predecessors’.9 Brian 
White   refers   to   foreign   policy   as   that   ‘area   of   politics   which bridges the all-important 
boundary between the nation-state and its international environments. Foreign policy is 
made within the frontiers of the state but is directed at and must be implemented within the 
environment  external  to   the  state’.10 Christopher  Hill  views  foreign  policy  as  ‘the  sum  of  
official external relations conducted by independent actors (usually a state) in international 
relations’.11 Holsti   defines   foreign   policy   as   ‘actions   of   a   state   toward   the   external  
environment and the conditions under  which  these  actions  are  formulated’.12 According to 
Charles   Hermann,   foreign   policy   ‘consists   of   those   discrete   official   actions   of   the  
authoritative decision makers of the nation's government, or their agents, which are 
intended by decision makers to influence the behaviour of the international actors external 
to  their  own  polity’.13  
From these various definitions, three main approaches may be summarized:  
-  ‘What  the  State  does  beyond  its   territorial   limits  in  pursuing  its  objectives,  and  
how it does so’:  that is, an approach that observes or attributes objectives, observes 
resultant actions and relations, takes into account constitutionally determined powers, 
and describes the means and tools employed. 14          
                                              
7    Frankel, J. The Making of Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Decision Making, Oxford University Press, 
London, 1963. p.1. 
8    Calvert, P., Op. Cit. p.1. 
9    Rosenau, James N, Op. Cit. p.50. 
10   White, Brian, Op. Cit. p. 4. 
11   Hill, Christopher, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, New 
York, 2003. p.3. 
12   Holsti, K.J,  International Politics: A Framework for Analysis , Prentice-Hall, Inc. Englewood Cliffs, 
New Jersey, 1967.  p.21.  
13  Charles  F.,  Hermann,  ‘Policy  Classification:  A  Key  to  the  Comparative  Study  of  Foreign  Policy’,  In  
James N, Rosenau. et al. (eds),  The Analysis of International Politics , The Free Press, New York, 1972.  
p.72.  
14  Al Sayed Selim, Mohammed, Tahleel_Alsiyasah Alkharijiyah,  ‘Analysis  of  Foreign  Policy’, 2nd edition, 
Al-Nahda Al-Masriya Bookshop, Cairo, 1998.  p.8. 
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- The  ‘Systems’  approach:  Prominent here is David Easton, who focuses on analysing 
the inputs - external or internal environmental pressures and their impacts - in the 
political  system  as  indicating  the  ‘Demands  or  Needs’  and  the  outputs  via  the  decisions  
and actions (Response), which determine the gains distribution system; he also points 
to the importance of feedback between inputs and the system.15 Another very important 
thinker  in  this  field  is  Modelski,  who  defines  foreign  policy  as  ‘the  system  of  activities  
evolved by communities for changing the behaviour of other States and for adjusting 
their  own  activities   to   the   international  environment’.16  Brecher sums up the foreign 
policy   system   as   comprising   ‘a   set   of   components   which   are   classified   as   inputs,  
process   and   outputs’.17  Michael Clarke adds:   ‘the   environment   is   the   domestic   and  
external setting which provides inputs to the foreign policy process. Outputs are 
foreign policy behaviours which can be defined not only as decision, but also more 
broadly as actions. These outputs feed back into the environment and contribute to 
other  sources  of  inputs’.18  
- The decision-making approach: this concentrates on the process of decision-making 
in explaining the foreign policy of the State, and emphasises the wide cluster of 
motivational, role, organizational and nongovernmental variables that work within the 
government or among policy makers as determinants of foreign policy.19  The central 
concepts of the decision-making approach are divided into the three components:  ‘the  
decision, the decision maker and   the   decision  making   process   or   system’.20 Foreign 
policy is seen as ‘a  series  of  decisions  made  by  a  group  of  people  who  can  be  labelled  
decision-makers. Foreign policy decisions do not simply emerge in response to 
external stimuli; they are processed through  an  identifiable  system  within  the  state’.21 
This approach was initially applied to the study of foreign policy analysis by Snyder, 
                                              
15   Makled,  Ismail  Sabri,  ‘Systems  Analysis  and  Theorization  about  International  Politics’,  Journal of the 
Social Sciences, Vol.9, No.1, Kuwait University, Kuwait, 1981. pp.27-34.   
16   George, Modelski,  A Theory of Foreign Policy , Frederick A, Praeger Publisher, New York, 1962.  p. 7. 
17   Brecher.  Michael,  ‘Research  Findings  And  Theory-Building  in  Foreign  policy  Behaviour’,  In  Patrick  J.  
McGowan (ed.), Sage International Yearbook of Foreign Policy Studies, Vol 2, Sage Publication, Inc., 
1974. p.50. 
18   Clarke,  Michael,  ‘The  Foreign  Policy  System’,  In  Clarke,  Michael  and  Brain  White  (eds.),  An 
Introduction to Foreign Policy Analysis: The Foreign Policy System, Ormskirk & Northridge, G.W.& A. 
Hesketh, 1981.  p. 15. 
19   Rosenau, James N, Op. Cit. p. 97. 
20  White, Brian, Op. Cit. p. 7. 
21  Ibid. p. 7. 
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Bruck and Sapin during the 1950s.22 The focus, then, is on specific decisions (at 
various levels) and the decision-making process as a whole.  
- The bureaucratic politics approach is a variant of the above, focusing on the nature 
of bargaining within the policy-making bureaucracy, and seeing outcomes (policies, 
decisions) as the outcome of such bargaining rather than necessarily   of   ‘rational’  
analysis of costs and benefits23. This approach was initially developed to the study of 
foreign policy decisions by Graham T. Allison and Morton H. Halperin in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s.24  
 
Foreign policy analysis, in fact, arguably has gone through two phases: 
- First Phase:  this  is  called  the  ‘first  generation’ (1954-1973),25 and focuses on 
comparative foreign policy (CFP); the first generation of scholarship was 
typically   labelled  ‘comparative  foreign  policy’,  while   the  second  generation is 
referred  to  as  ‘foreign  policy  analysis’.26 The first generation was influenced by 
all issues surrounding international relations following World War II and the 
resultant  spread  of   the   realist  paradigm  and  ‘power  politics’   that   reinforce   the  
role of the State and its impact and power on international relations. Therefore, 
during that time, the study of comparative politics was dominated by scholars 
who had learned to fear mass politics from both ends of the political 
spectrum.27  This generation of analysis of comparative foreign policy (CFP) 
had, as one of its primary goals, a desire to move away from non-cumulative 
descriptive case studies and to construct a parsimonious explanation of what 
drives the foreign policy behaviour of states. Therefore, the scholars of this 
                                              
22  Hudson,  Valerie  M,  ‘The  History  and  Evolution  of  Foreign  Policy  Analysis’,  in  Smith,  Steve  et al. (eds.), 
Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases, Oxford University Press, 2008. p.12. 
23  Eben  J.  Christensen  and  Steven  B.  Redd,  ‘Bureaucrats  versus  the  Ballot  Box  in  Foreign  Policy  Decision  
Making: An Experimental Analysis of the Bureaucratic Politics  Model  and  the  Poliheuristic  Theory’,  The 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 48, No. 1, 2004. p.70. 
24  J. Garry Clifford,  ‘Bureaucratic Politics’,  The Journal of American History, Vol. 77, No. 1 (Jun., 1990). 
p.161. 
25  Hudson, Valerie M. Op. Cit. p.17. 
26  Neack, L., et al. (ed), Op. Cit. p.2. 
27  Ibid, p.5. 
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generation adopted quantitative (data collection), positivist (scientific) models 
of theory building and methodological experimentation.28 
 
Second Stage:  this  is  called  ‘the  second  generation’ (1974-1993).29 Those who adopt this 
approach mainly   focus  on   the   ‘quantitative’   and   ‘qualitative’   research   approaches.  Thus,  
second generation foreign policy analysis can be summarised into the following points:  
 
- Second-generation   scholarship   is   ‘conducted  using  a  wide  variety  of  methodologies  
embracing a  diversity  of  quantitative  and  qualitative  research  techniques’. 
- Second-generation  scholarship  draws  from  ‘as  many  critical   theoretical  perspectives  
as  it  draws  from  methodologies’. 
- Second-generation  scholarship  rejects  ‘simple  connections  and  considers  contingent, 
complex  interaction  between  foreign  policy  factors’. 
- Second-generation  scholarship  ‘accountings  of  the  domestic  sources  and  processes  of  
foreign policy draw heavily upon insights generated by comparativists and area 
specialists and more systematic and consistent attention is given to non-American 
cases’. 
- Second  generation  scholars  are  ‘conscious  of  the  contextual  parameters  of  their  work  
and explicitly seek to link their research to the major substantive concerns in foreign 
policy’. 30  
 
Clearly the second generation built upon the first, reacting to, but also incorporating many 
features of the latter.31 For the purpse of this thesis, once again, it is important to be aware 
of the nuances and linkages pointed out by second-generation approaches, while trying to 
present a comprehensive analytical picture taking in all the explanatory factors summed up 
at the beginning of this section. Below, therefore, I briefly survey those types of factors. 
  
                                              
28 Ibid. p.3. 
29  Hudson, Valerie M, Op. Cit. p.17. 
30  Neack, L., et al. (ed), Op. Cit. pp.11-12. 
31  Korany,  B  &  A.  E.  Hilal  Dessouki,  ‘Al-tahleel al-‘ilmi  li-l-sitasa al-kharijiya min khilal al-manzur al-
‘arabi’,  [Scientific  Analysis  of  foreign  poloicy  from  an  Arab  perspective’],  Jourbal  of  Arab  Strategic  
Thought, Issue 40, Beirut, 1992, p. 162. 
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2.   A pragmatic approach: the determinants and environments shaping foreign 
policy 
For the practical purposes of this thesis – and indeed arguably or the purposes of any 
realistic and comprehensive analysis of what actually shapes particular policies as well as 
patterns of foreign policy (the outputs) – it is worth stepping back and extracting from the 
above and the literature in general, the main categories of factors that are likely to be at 
work and that have some explanatory force. 
These factors, in line with was discussed above, fall essentially into (i) the external 
environment;, (ii) the internal environment;  and (iii) the decision-making process, 
including the relevant institutions. In all of this, material factors (economy, manpower, 
physical   features,   etc.)   and   ‘ideational’   factors   (identity,   ideology, perceptions, etc.) 
feature side by side, and in interaction, although different approaches give different weight 
to them.  In this thesis, and in studying the Kuwaiti case, I am interested in each of these 
categories. However, the precise way in which various scholars have approached these has, 
again, varied. Before proceeding to drill down into these three high-level categories, I 
summarise the particularly useful ways in which Calvert, Rosenau, Brecher and Holsti 
have done so. 
 
2.1. Calvert, Rosenau, Brecher and Holsti 
Peter Calvert refers to the three stages of policy-making as follows: 
1. The initiation of policy-making  comprises  a  ‘set  of  demands  for  action  with  which  the  
policy maker is confronted, and an inventory of political support, labour, land, 
equipment  and  finance’.  This  stage  commences  with  the  receipt  of  these  demands,  and  
the generation of alternative policy proposals to deal with them. 
2. The   formulation   of   policy:   this   stage   includes   ‘a   choice   between   these   policy  
alternatives and the condensing of the policy into a set of the specific proposals for 
action’. 
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3. The   implementation   of   the   chosen   policy,   which   includes   ‘the   carrying   out   of   those  
proposals’.32   
Rosenau identified three stages in foreign policy making: 
1. The initiatory stage includes the ‘activities,   conditions,   and   influences   – human and 
nonhuman – that stimulate national actors to undertake efforts to modify circumstances 
in  their  external  environments’.   
2. The  implementive  stage  consists  of   the  ‘activities,  conditions,  and   influences   through 
which the stimuli of the initiatory stage are translated into purposeful actions directed 
at  modifying  objects  in  the  external  environment’. 
3.  The  responsive  stage  denotes  the  ‘activities,  conditions,  and  influences  that  comprise  
the reactions of the objects  of  the  modification  attempts’.33  
He added that the three stages comprise three variables in foreign policy analysis: 
a. The independent variables are divided into two major types: internal and external. 
Internal  independent  variables  include  ‘any  human or non-human activities, conditions, 
and influences operative on the domestic scene that stimulate governmental officials to 
seek, on behalf of the national actor, to preserve or alter some aspect of the 
international system. Some examples of these variables are elections, groups, conflicts, 
depleted oil reserves, geographic insularity, demands for higher tariffs, historic value 
orientations, a lack of societal unity, executive-legislative frictions and the diverse 
factors  that  contribute  to  national  life’.  External  independent  variables  include  ‘human  
or non-human activities, conditions, and influences [that] occur abroad and operate as 
foreign policy stimuli by serving as the objects that officials seek to preserve or alter 
through their undertakings, such as diplomatic incidents, deteriorating economic, crop 
failures, military build-ups,  elections,  and  historic  enmities’. 
b. The   intervening   variables   include   ‘not   only   attitudes,   procedures,   capabilities,   and  
conflicts that shape the way in which governmental decision-makers and agencies 
assess the initiatory stimuli and decide how to cope with them, but they also embrace 
any and all of resources, techniques and actions that may affect the way in which the 
                                              
32 Calvert, P., Op. Cit. pp. 1-2. 
33 Rosenau, James N, Op. Cit. p.80. 
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decisions designed to preserve or modify circumstances in the international system are 
carried  out’. 
c. The   dependent   variables   comprise   ‘the   responsive   stage,   including   the   activities,  
attitudes, relationships, institutions, capacities, and conditions in the international 
system that are altered (or not altered) or preserved (or not preserved) as a result of the 
foreign   policy   undertakings   directed   towards   them’.34  Therefore,   Rosenau’s   ‘Pre-
Theories’   confirm   that   the   behaviour   of   foreign   policy   officials   is   a   response   to   the  
requirements and demands of five types of system, each of which contains some 
variables that reinforce those of other systems and some that oppose them, as follows: 
1. Interaction   of   individual   variables:   are   those   related   to   the   ‘values,   talent   and  
experience   of   the   decision   maker’   that   distinguish his behaviour from any other 
decision maker.  
2.  Role   variables:   are   those   related   to   the   ‘external   behaviour   of   the   official   that   is  
generated by the roles they occupy and that would be likely to occur irrespective of the 
individual characteristics of the  role  occupants’.   
3.  Governmental  variables:   are   those   related   to   the   ‘government's   structure  or   systems’  
that would affect the choices made by decision makers. 
4. Societal   variables:   are   those   related   to   the   ‘nongovernmental   aspects   of   the   society’  
that would influence external behaviour.  
5. Systemic   variables:   are   those   related   to   any   nonhuman   aspects   or   ‘external  
environment  or  any  actions  occurring  abroad’  influencing  the  decision  of  the  decision  
maker such as geographical and ideological challenges from potential aggressors.35  
Brecher, as mentioned above, describes the process of policy making in three stages: 
inputs, process and output. He refers to three sequential stages of the decision-making 
process: 
1. The pre-decisional  phase,  which  comprises  ‘the  cumulative events which, by their 
gestation over time, create the need, opportunity, or occasion for (foreign policy) 
choice’. 
2. The  decisional  phase,  which  begins  with  ‘the  (formal  or  informal)  consideration  of  
known alternative options and terminates with a formal  choice  (decision)’. 
                                              
34 Ibid, pp.80-81. 
35 Ibid, p. 108. 
 
 
48 
3. The   implementation   phase,   which   refers   to   ‘action   by   which   a   decision   is  
affected’.36  
 
In  Brecher’s  words,   the   foreign  policy   system   is   ‘a  dynamic   flow   in  which   international  
actors respond, with policy choices, to stimuli from their   environment’37. This flow of 
stimuli consists of a set of boundaries for decision-making options from two 
environmental clusters, including:  
1. The external environment: This cluster is divided into five elements, as follows: 
a. The Global system, which comprises   ‘the   total   web   of   relationships   among   all  
actors  within  an  international  system’.   
b. A   subordinate   system,   which   comprises   ‘the   intermediate   level   of   interaction  
between any two actors. The primary stress is on a geographic region at six 
subordinate systems of regional types, namely American, East European, Middle 
East, Southern Asian, and Sub-Saharan  African’. 
c. A  second  subordinate  system:  ‘states  may  be  members  of  one  subordinate  system,  
or none at all. When pressures emanate from a system other than one's own, they 
are  classified  as  foreign  policy  inputs  from  another  subordinate  system’. 
d. Dominant   Bilateral   Relations,   which   represent   ‘the   total   pattern   of   interactions  
between  any  state  and  a  superpower’. 
e. Bilateral  Relations,  which   represent   ‘the   total  pattern of interactions between any 
state  except  for  those  involving  one  of  the  superpowers’.38 
2. The internal environment: This cluster is divided into five elements as follows: 
a. Military   Capability:   ‘an   ability   to   wage   war   or   to   deter   other   states   from  
attacking’.   
b. Economic   Capability:   this   is   defined   as   ‘the   total   resources   available   for   the  
pursuit  of  foreign  policy  objectives’.   
c. Political   Structure:   this   combines   ‘the   political   institutions   and   the  
constitutional matrix in which foreign policy decisions are made’. 
                                              
36 Brecher, Michael, Op. Cit. p.64. 
37 Ibid. p.59. 
38 Ibid. pp.60-61. 
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d. Interest  Groups:   this   source   is   classified   into   four   types:   ‘institutional   interest  
groups, associational groups, no associational groups, and status or class 
groups’. 
e. Competing   Elites:   these   are   parties   in   the   ‘Opposition   in   the   competitive  
political  system.’  39   
 
Holsti refers to three general types of illustrative variable that can shed light on the 
national role:  
1. External  conditions:  these  include  ‘perception  of  threats  and  major  shifts  in  conditions  
abroad’. 
2. National   attributes:   these   include   ‘weak or strong capabilities, public opinion and 
attitudes,  economic  needs  and  ethnic  composition  of  the  state’. 
3. Ideological  and  attitudinal  attributes:  these  include  ‘traditional  policies  or  roles,  public  
opinion and attitudes, humanitarian concerns, ideological principles and identification 
with  region;;  compatibility  of  values  with  other  states’.40  
 
 It is clear, then, that in   order   to   understand   a   state’s   foreign   policy   behaviour,   both  
domestic and international factors have to be taken into consideration;41 It   is,  after  all,  ‘a  
reaction   to   both   external   and   internal   stimuli’.42 Steven   David’s   concept   of  
‘omnibalancing’, picked up also in  Nonneman’s  analytical  framework  for studying Middle 
East foreign policies, explains that governments  or  policy makers  endeavour to tackle all 
threats and domestic and external demands, in a decision framework shaped by the major 
location of threats and opportunities.43 These factors, Nonneman points out, can be divided 
into internal and external ones, but also into material and ideational ones. The basic 
material factor of geography straddles the internal and external, and for the purposes of 
this thesis, that is where I propose to begin. I will follow this with a review of the factors in 
                                              
39  Ibid. pp.61-62. 
40  Holsti, K..J , Op. Cit. pp.356-357. 
41 Alons,  Gerry  C.  ‘Predicting  a  State’s  Foreign  Policy:  State  Preferences  between  Domestic  and  
International  Constraints’,  Foreign Policy Analysis, Vol.3, No.3, 2007, pp.211-213. 
42   Rosenau, James N, Op Cit. p. 98. 
43  Nonneman,  Gerd,  ‘Analyzing  the  Foreign  Policies  of  the  Middle  East  and  North  Africa:  A  Conceptual  
Framework’.  In  Nonneman, Gerd (ed.), Analyzing Middle East Foreign Policies and the Relationship 
with Europe, Routledge, 2005.p.13. 
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the external environment,  before turning to the internal environment. The decision-making 
system is of course internal, but merits viewing as a separate category – the mechanism 
through  which  the  ‘inputs’  – both material and ideational – are translated into policies and 
actions. This system is of course fundamentally shaped by the internal political system. 
 
2.2. Geographical factors  
There is often a close association between national interests and objectives of the state and 
geographical facts and considerations. Other scholars have suggested   that   ‘geographic  
patterns   determine   the  workings   of   the   foreign   policy   system’;;   44 or   that   ‘foreign   policy  
can   be   seen   as   being   determined   by   geographical   elements’.45 Borders are one critical 
factor. It has been argued that states that share long frontiers with several other states will 
be liable to be engaged in a great number of international disputes and wars compared with 
those that do not.46 More broadly, proximity is an obviously relevant factor in disputes.47 
In addition, geographic location also has a wider strategic aspect, such as natural resources 
of states, supervising seas, important ports and channels or canals of international 
transportation.48 Accordingly, the geographic features of the state affect its strength and 
security as well as its ability to achieve the demands of foreign policy and to resist 
pressure by other countries.49  Thus,  ‘Geopolitics’,  as  a  science,  represents  one  of  the  most  
important components in analysing the effect of geographic elements on the policy of 
states, as it constitutes an essential pillar for estimating the might of the state and its role in 
international relations.50  Then, there are basic features, such as size, landscape, mountains 
and rivers, which may provide greater or lesser protection or strategic depth to a country. 
                                              
44  Farrands,  Chris,  ‘The  Context  of  Foreign  Policy  Systems’,  In  Clarke,  Michael  and  Brain  White  (eds),  An 
Introduction to Foreign Policy Analysis: The Foreign Policy System, Ormskirk & Northridge, G.W.& A. 
Hesketh, 1981.  p.36. 
45 Ibid.  p.46. 
46  McGowan, Patrick and Shapiro, Howard (eds.), The Comparative Study of Foreign Policy: A Survey of 
Scientific Finding , London, Sage, 1973.  p.163. 
47  Lloyd, Jensen,   Explaining Foreign Policy, Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice -Hall,1982, p. 223. 
48  Hill, Christopher, Op.Cit. p.167 
49  Makled, Ismail Sabri, Al-ʽalākāt  us-siyāsīyah  ad-duwalīyah,  ‘International Political Relations: Study on 
Assets  and  Theories’, 5th edition, That Al -Salasil Publications, Kuwait, 1987. p. 176. 
50  The most prominent thinker in this field is Friedrich Ratzel; see Taha Badawi, Mohammed and Morsy, 
Leila, Madkhal  ‘ilm  us-Siyāsah, ‘An  Introduction  to  Political  Science’,  Alexandria Center for Books, 
Egypt, 2010. p.202. 
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 2.3. External factors 
The importance of external factors (or the external environment) for foreign policy 
decision-making differs according to the capabilities of the state and its geographic 
location within territorial and international conduct.51 In  this  respect,  Nonneman’s  analysis  
of   the  FP  of   the  Middle  East   and  North  Africa  States’   (MENA),  as  applied  on   the  GCC  
countries, refers to three factors as determinants of their policies, namely the domestic, 
regional and international environment.52  He divides the variables related to the external 
environment into two parts:  
1. International environment  
2. Regional environment. 
 
 2.3.1. International Environment 
The effect of the international environment – itself a very broad category encompassing 
many elements – will,  Nonneman  points  out,  differ  from  one  state  to  another,  ‘depending,  
among   other   things,   on   the   state’s   location’53. Chris Farrands provides four sources of 
influence on the behaviour of foreign policy in the international system, as follows: 
1. The structure of international society. 
2. The position of the state in the international hierarchy (international position). 
3. The pattern of alliance. 
4. The commitments the state has undertaken.54  
Those who study foreign policy almost all agree that the ability of the small countries to 
achieve independent political movement within the international environment will increase 
once the variable character within this environment increases, i.e. there are variant blocks 
in the world. However, this is not a straightforward rule; nor does independence of action 
(autonomy) equate with security. Even so, increased competition among several great 
                                              
51  Al Sayed Selim, Mohammed, Op. Cit., p.150. 
52  Nonneman, Gerd, Op. Cit.  pp.11-13. 
53 Ibid. p.12. 
54  Farrands, Chris, Op. Cit. pp. 47-50. 
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powers   seems   likely   to   increase   smaller   actors’   room   for   manoeuvre.55 Some scholars 
believe   that   ‘interdependence’   and   intergovernmental interaction or what is known 
‘Globalization’56 has become the main feature that distinguishes the current international 
environment, arguing specifically that the volume of international transactions has 
increased and that the degree of sensitivity and the tendency for some countries to be 
affected by each other has redoubled.57 The   term   ‘interdependence’   has   raised   major  
debate. Some scholars believe that the essential feature of the international system 
environment is to distribute capabilities  and  that  ‘international  inter-dependence’  occupies  
only a very limited space.58 However, others believe that the dominant feature of this 
system, particularly in the economic field, is that developing countries are subordinate to 
industrially developed countries. Therefore, interdependence is no more than an ideology 
that is designed to hide the subordination relations within this system.59 Further, the 
international environment is also associated with the phenomenon of alliances, such as 
NATO (1949), Warsaw (1955), the Rio Pact (1947), SEATO (1954), the Baghdad Pact 
(1955) etc., which is one tool adopted by the states as a framework to coordinate their 
activities in order to achieve objectives that may not be individually realized.60 However, 
researchers have different opinions about the best ways to determine the impact of these 
alliances on the safeguarding of peace in the international environment,61 particularly in 
the  period  of  the  ‘Cold  War’  between  the  Western  and  Communist  countries,  which  urges  
most small and Third World states to adopt the policy of non-alignment as a form of group 
solidarity to enhance their collective independence away from the policy of the 
superpowers. 62 
 
                                              
55  Al Sayed Selim, Mohammed, Op. Cit, p. 277. 
56  Al Sayed Selim, Mohammed,   Tatawwur as-siyāsah  ad-duwalīyah, ‘The  Evolution  of  International  
Politics’ ,  3rd edition, Dar AlFajr for Publication, Cairo, 2008. p.13. 
57  Sundelius, Bengt, ‘Interdependence  and  Foreign  Policy’,  Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 15, No. 4, June 
1980. p. 187. 
58  Ibid, pp.190-191. 
59  Al Sayed Selim, Mohammed (1998), Op. Cit.  p. 344. 
60  Nassif, Mustafa, Op.Cit. p.8. 
61   Calvert, P., Op. Cit. pp.48 -143. 
62   Susan Aurelia  Gitelson,  ‘Policy  Options  for  Small  States:  Kenya  and  Tanzania  Reconsidered’,  Studies in 
Comparative International Development, Vol. 12, No. 2, 1977.  pp.29-30. 
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There are also other actors in the international system environment, including 
governmental organizations (GOs) or so-called  ‘Non-State  Actors’,63 such as international 
governmental organizations (IGOs); the United Nations (UN), the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC), the European Union (EU) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).64 
At   the   same   time,   there   are   also   ‘nongovernmental   organizations’   (NGOs)   or  
‘nongovernmental  groups’   in   the   international   system  environment,  which  constitute  one  
of  the  elements  that  impact  on  states’  foreign  policy.65  
 
Ideational  factors  such  as  ‘ideology’,  ‘intellectual  structure’  and  ‘enemy  images’  also  play  
significant roles in shaping the international system. This was clear in the period of the 
Cold War between the USA and the Soviet Union.66 It was also illustrated in the 
confluence of economic interest with neoconservative ideology in Washington under 
George   W.   Bush.   The   ‘Washington   Consensus’   on   economic   liberalisation   also   fed  
through into global perceptions regarding international economic policy. Similarly, 
intellectual and political/ideological fashions that counter such globalising trends at times 
also have an impact on popular and elite opinions, hence potentially influencing policy. 
 
 In recent years, religion, as an ideational factor, has become an influential element in the 
international politics, but its role has received relatively little attention in the formal study 
of foreign policy. For example, the policies of Iran and Afghanistan, the religious conflicts 
in the World (like Kosovo case) and Arab-Israeli conflict are at least influenced by 
religious aspects. Jonathan Fox claims that the main reason behind the ignorance of the 
religious  role  in  IR  is  that  ‘the social sciences, including international relations, have their 
origin in the rejection of religion’.67  
 
 
                                              
63   Calvert, P., Op. Cit.p.31. 
64  Mingst,  Karen  A.,  ‘Uncovering  The  Missing  Links:  Linkage Actors and Their Strategies In Foreign 
Policy  Analysis’,  In  Neack,  L.  et  al.  (ed.),  Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and Change in Its Second 
Generation, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, USA, 1995. pp.234-238. 
65   Rosenau, James N, Op. Cit. p.203. 
66   Murray,  Shoon  Kathleen  and  Cowden  ,  Jonathan    A.  ,  ‘The  Role  of  “Enemy  Images”  and  Ideology  in  
Elite  Belief  Systems’,  International Studies Quarterly, Vol.43, No. 3, 1999.  pp. 456-461 
67   Fox’s  well-presented study on this subject. See Fox, Jonathan,  ‘Religion  as  an  Overlooked  Element  of  
International  Relations’,  International Studies Review, Vol. 3, No. 3, 2001. pp.53-68. 
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 2.3.2. The Regional Environment 
The  concept  of  the  region  is  ‘a  flexible  one,  its  referent  depending  on  whether  geographic,  
cultural,  religious,  or  historical  variables  are  used  as  the  basis  of  delineation’.68 A region is 
defined  broadly  as  being  ‘marked  not  only  by  certain  boundaries of some salience but by 
discernible   similarities   within   these   boundaries’.69 Countries are affected by the foreign 
political activities of the surrounding states, particularly if there are ideological,70 social, 
cultural, national or historical backgrounds, economic and financial relations among them. 
The interaction between these backgrounds will influence the decision-makers on one hand 
and public opinion on the other.71  This factor plays an important role and is derived from 
the widespread post-war tendencies toward the institutionalisation of regional relationships 
in a variety of federations, confederations and common markets.72  
 
A state can of course be part of more than one regional environment – whether such 
environments overlap like Venn diagrams or sit within each other. Within the Arab and 
Middle  Eastern  environments,  for  instance,  Nonneman  identifies  ‘sub-environments’  such  
as the Gulf sub-system, the Maghreb and the Nile Valley. These elements and 
transnational issues influence decision-makers.73  This could be illustrated in the 
widespread  proliferation  of  the  ‘Arab  Revolutions’  or  ‘Arab  Spring’,  which  resulted  in  the  
dethroning of some of the Arab regimes or governments since its outset in Tunisia in 
December 2010 and then spread to the Middle East and North African Arab countries in 
2011 such as Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, Syria, Morocco and Jordan as regional 
environment impact.74   At the base of this system, several issues can be identified, such as 
the relationship between the components of the system and the levels of interaction 
                                              
68  Rosenau, James N, Op. Cit. p.236. 
69  Hansen,  Peter,  ‘Adaptive  Behaviour  of  Small  States:  The  Case  of  Denmark  and  The  European 
Community’,  In  Patrick  J.  McGowan  (ed.),  Sage International Yearbook of Foreign Policy Studies, 
Vol.2, Sage Publication, Inc., 1974.  p .153. 
70  Nonneman, Gerd, ‘The  Three  Environments  of  Middle  East  Foreign  Policy-making’,  op.  cit. p.23. 
71  Braillard, Philippe and Djalili, Mohammad-Reza, Op. Cit., pp.96-98. 
72  Rosenau, James N, Op. Cit. p.236. 
73  Nonneman, Gerd, ‘The  Three  Environments  of  Middle  East  Foreign  Policy-making’. p.12. 
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between its units and public trends and contradictory issues on the internal or external 
level of the territory.75 
 
2.4. Internal factors 
The internal factors include both material and ideational elements. These include 
population, social, economic and cultural (value, religion, ideas) structure, in addition to 
the military element, the nature of the political system and non-government organizations 
(such as political parties, lobbies and public opinion).76 Political culture, both in society at 
large and at the elite level, is also part of the picture. These elements interact with each 
other to create their impact on the foreign policy makers and influence the foreign 
behaviour of the state.77    
 
 2.4.1. Ideational factors  
 
Many studies have engaged in analysis of influences of the ideational and cultural 
elements through ideologies, identities, ideas, norms, beliefs and values etc. on the 
behaviour of states.78 The accumulated study of these subjects has produced the so-called 
‘constructivist’   approach,   with   its prominent thinker, Alexander Wendt in International 
relations theory,79 which   assumes   that   the   ‘constitutive   role   of   socially   constructed  
identities   and   the   importance   of   shared   ideas   and   practices’,   as   determinants, shape the 
structure of the international system. 80 Some scholars argue that the change in the basis of 
identity may reflect fundamental changes in the political behaviour of states and the 
                                              
75  Braillard, Philippe and Djalili, Mohammad-Reza, Op.Cit. pp.109-120. 
76  Braillard, Philippe and Djalili, Mohammad-Reza, al-ʽalākāt  id-duwalīyah,  ‘International  Relations’, 1st 
edition, Dar Elhilal, Beirut, 2009. pp.80-83. 
77   Rosenau, James N, Op. Cit. p.96. 
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published by Centre For Strategic Research and Analysis ( CESRAN), UK. Online; available at:  
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Security Policy, Vol.29, No.2, August 2008. p. 338. 
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concepts of allies and adversaries in international politics.81 Scholars in the constructivist 
conception share the concept of the relationship between the identity functions and the 
actor’s   behaviour,   as   a   source,   in   international   relations.82 Thus, the concept of the 
‘national   identity’   of   states,   which   is related to other descriptions such   as   ‘nationalism,  
citizenship and nation-state’,  has  its  impact  on  political  actions.83 Goldstein and Keohane 
argue   that   ‘ideas   (defined   as   beliefs)   as   well   as   interests   have   causal   weight   on  
explanations  of  human  actions’.84  Some scholars within the field of European studies shed 
light  on  the  impact  of  ‘intersubjectivity’  and  ‘social  context’,  as   ideational  factors,   in   the  
process of European integration (EU).85 It is also illustrated in the formation of the Arab 
League (1945), the Gulf Cooperation Council (1981) and the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference (1969) based on Arab and Islamic identity as the collective solidarity of the 
Arab and Muslim world.86 For example, in the Arab region, the pan-Arab and Islamic 
identities and norms have significant impacts on the behaviour of these states. Thus, the 
policy makers are motivated, sometimes, to legitimise these elements (Arabism, Islam) in 
terms of the norms and identity of their population as policy options, especially in times of 
crisis with external threats.87 The ideational factors, such as the perceptions of the leaders 
or individuals - defined  as  ‘constructions  of  reality  in  which  decisions  are  taken’88 - play a 
key  role  in  the  behaviour  of  the  states.  The  perceptions  of  the  ‘relative  power,  other  states’  
intentions  and  degree  of  cultural  distance  between  one’s  own  state  and  others’   shape   the  
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strategic decisions of the leaders. For instance, neo-realists   claim   that   the   leaders’  
decisions   are   built   on   ‘their   perceptions   of   an   adversary’s   intentions’.89 Thus, the 
personalities and the perceptions of the leaders with their own identity among the states 
play a significant role in the nature of the regional and international systems.90  
 
 
 2.4.2.  Demographic factors  
The size of the population   and   what   is   called   the   ‘local   demographic   structure’   of  
proportions of ethnic or religious groups enables or constricts what each group can 
accomplish in politics at the local and external level’.91 There are some political scientists 
who associate the might of any state with the size of its population.92 Some scholars have 
argued  for   the  ‘theory  of  demographic  pressure’  as  a  main  cause  of  revolutions  and  wars  
between states, such as the events of the French revolution in 1789 and its impact on 
Europe due to the increased numbers of people, which reflected on the economic 
situation.93 However, at present, a very large or very small population is considered as a 
burden rather than a privilege for any state. Thus, development processes at all levels may 
be impossible in countries that do not have sufficient numbers of inhabitants unless an 
expatriate labour force is recruited,94 as in the case of the GCC States, whose small 
populations complicate their defence and development planning.95 However, over-
population in some countries constitutes a burden on the state to equalise the distribution 
of economic resources and this is far more commonly the case in Third World countries,96 
in which case, the state may come to depend on external finance and consequently it will 
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be involved in international associations that may affect its foreign policy.97 The 
recruitment of a large expatriate labour force involves serious risks: consequently, 
immigrants will be a problem due to their relations with their homelands, and they will 
form effective lobbies against the foreign policy of the country where they live. This 
practice will have consequences for the present and future of this country.98 With respect 
to various minorities and ethnic and religious groups within the state, the results of the 
same will be greatly visible. Therefore, the significance of  these  ‘group’  sizes is magnified 
in democratic states, particularly those with a great authority in local levels of 
government.99 Thus, most of these states are suffering from racial and religious problems, 
such as the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990)100 and  the  2005  ‘riot’  of  the  Arab  community  
in France101 as well as the ethnic and religious problems in some European countries, 
which  prompted  Britain  to  enact  the  ‘Racial  and  Religious Hatred  Act’  in  2006.102 All of 
these factors have an impact on international politics. This latter observation once again 
reminds us of the importance of ideas and identity – and  of  people’s  perceptions  of  them  – 
as factors in the interactive mosaic from which foreign policy patterns emerge. 
 
 2.4.3. Economic factors  
The economic situation of a state is considered as one of the main pillars forming its 
national strength. Consequently, the economic ability of the state may be utilized to 
support the objectives of this policy, whether these objectives are related to economic, 
humanitarian, political and military or propagandist aspects, etc. Such economic 
assistance, provided by rich countries to developing countries, represents an important tool 
of foreign policy of such countries, which usually have political objectives that we will 
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point out later.103 The economic position of the state reflects the extent of its ability to 
fulfil the requirements of its citizens from the components of the basic economic 
infrastructure, agriculture, industry and services etc. Further, it will determine whether the 
country will depend on assistance and aid provided by other countries or will mitigate its 
dependence on external resources.104 Often, this assistance is used as a tool for   ‘political  
pressure’  or  ‘political  carrots’  in  some  cases,  such  as  threats  to  sever  or  reduce  assistance,  
or to oblige the receiving country to change specific political approaches and trends in 
return for support.105 Some scholars believe that the economic factor of the state has 
precedence   over   other   factors   based   on   the   fact   that   ‘economic   instability’   is   one   of   the  
main elements in wars and revolutions within and between states.106 This could be 
analysed   in   the  widespread   proliferation   of   the   ‘Arab  Revolutions’,   known   as   the   ‘Arab  
Spring’,  across  the  Arab  countries  in  2011,  which  affected  the  stability  of  the  Middle  East  
region   due   to   the   ‘corruption’   and   ‘economic   instability’   of   these   states,   among   other  
reasons.107 Both Benjamin and Edingar point out that countries whose Gross National 
Product (GNP) is very low are most likely to experience military control over their foreign 
policy and decision-making.108 Therefore, Moon, referring to the significance of the 
economic  role,  states  that  ‘the  economic  arena  will become a more central priority of state 
policy while economic considerations will come to dominate other goals, especially in the 
foreign  policy  realm’.109 
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2.4.4. Military factors 
As  Clausewitz  asserted,   ‘the  use  of   force   is   always  political’,  which   implies that foreign 
policy almost always carries with it the implicit threat of force.110 Many authors argue, 
however, that this claim might have witnessed an essential change during the last decades. 
Consequently, military force has not been able to grant the foreign policy of the country 
the impact or the profile of a major country, because the ‘use of violence is evidence of the 
failure of foreign policy, even where it succeeds, and it may have long-term consequences 
that are both harmful and unforeseeable’, according to Christopher Hill.111  However, some 
countries  use  this  ‘tool’  to  influence  the  behaviour  of  other  states  by  the  threat  to  use  their  
military arsenal or violence.112 Therefore,  the  maintenance  of  a  state’s  sovereignty  and  the  
protection of its national security constitute the most prominent objectives for the state. 
Thus, a state endeavours to achieve this objective by several means, including: enhancing 
the military capability, establishing territorial and international coalitions and gatherings 
and signing non-aggression agreements with other states to protect its interests.113 In this 
context, Christopher Hill, in his examples of the use of force between states in the post-
1945 era, reached the following points: 
1. The overwhelming, decisive and short-term use of force can work. 
2. Force is only an option for the already powerful, but even then success is far from 
guaranteed. 
3. The use of military force is gradually more seen as risky and intolerable by the 
international community. 
4. Force is more likely to work when the target is already vulnerable.114  
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2.4.5. Political System  
The nature and structure of the political system is also crucial in understanding foreign 
policy.  The political system includes the essence of the executive and legislative power, 
the party system, the nature of the political system (i.e. whether it is closed or open)115 and 
the available resources, as well as the nature of interactions within the regime and the 
community.116 In addition, it includes the structure of political parties in the state and the 
roles played by political opposition and lobby groups, as well as other institutional arenas 
such as legislature and ruling party factions under this regime.117 Some scholars have 
pointed out that there is a relationship between the political stability of the regime and 
foreign policy making. Once the elements of legitimacy and support for this regime are 
available, the country will be more able to implement its foreign policy.118 Further, 
political pluralism arguably renders the political system more powerful and stable, which 
might be positively reflected in the making of external policies, as it may grant the state 
wider abilities to achieve its objectives and protect its interests.119 It is true that autocratic 
regimes may be quite resilient, and in the more secure such systems, the leaders may have 
fewer constraints in deciding policy options. But even an autocratic regime will generally 
have an eye open for the societal acceptability of policies.  This still leaves the importance 
of legitimacy – in whatever type of system –as has been argued in various ways by such 
authors as Clapham, Ikenberry and Nonneman: a secure, legitimate regime often has more 
room for manoeuvre in implementing its foreign policy than does one that is less secure, 
which  will  often  feel  constrained  to  seek  foreign  protection  or  ‘cover  its  flank’  politically  
at home.120 
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On the other hand, the form of the political system affects the ability of the political elite to 
influence the foreign policy, as this elite has its impact on such policy and these impacts 
will be increased once the strength of the political system is improved, i.e. whenever 
effective political institutions are available to make decisions. The political elite or 
opposition that occupy key positions in such institutions and have major resources can 
restrict the role of the political leader, as they will play an effective role in the formulation 
of the foreign policy.121 In this respect, Hagan investigated the impact of the domestic 
opposition to foreign policy behaviour in a cross-national analysis of thirty-eight countries 
during the 1960s and concluded that domestic opposition is a significant influence in the 
overall substance and style of foreign policy for a wide variety of countries, not only those 
with democratic systems.122  
 
 2.4.7. Lobby and interest groups 
There are several definitions of the concept of lobby or interest groups. Anne Therese 
Gullberg defines   lobbying   as   ‘interest   groups contact with—and activities directed at—
decision makers in an attempt  to  influence  public  policy’.123 Another definition states that 
these groups represent each organized or non-organized group of individuals who have an 
interest or link and are concerned with developing their interests and protecting the same 
via influencing the public opinion and practising pressure on government decision makers 
without any attempt to control the power.124 To achieve their interests, these groups adopt 
different techniques, such as contacting government decision makers and trying to 
influence them by means of convention and pressure. Further, these groups endeavour to 
affect the public opinion using various mass media, advertisements, researches and leaflets 
to gain the support of the public in order to convince the government to adopt the decisions 
implementing their interests.125 The impact of the interest group or lobby is still limited 
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unless they can convince the government of their point of view. Whereas these groups can 
influence foreign policy, governments will influence these groups, as the government has 
more information, particularly during times of crisis.126  
 
 2.4.8. Public opinion  
The impact of public opinion on foreign policy is variable, due to the differences among 
the existing political systems and the scope of influence or movement available to them. 
Public opinion plays a greater role in foreign decisions in democratic countries compared 
with autocratic societies or some developing countries where the political regime is one-
sided and the mass media are controlled by decision makers who influence the people 
according to their own approaches.127 The relationship between foreign policy and mass 
opinion is not entirely clear and often appears to be contradictory. Thus scholars argue 
about whether public opinion determines foreign policy or is irrelevant to it, or whether 
public opinion follows the chief executive on the foreign policy matters rather than 
influencing decision-making. In democratic states, the public opinion has considerable and 
effective impact on decision-making centres via laying out specific restrictions on foreign 
policy makers to select specific alternatives.128 In addition, the public opinion prevents the 
political leader from adopting a specific policy more than inciting him to adopt an 
alternative policy.129 In this   respect,   Chris   Farrands   refers   to   the   impact   of   the   ‘social  
structure  and  cultural  types’  on  the  foreign  policy  behaviours:  he  states  that  ‘Governments  
in open societies may, to some extent, be able to manipulate public opinion or the media, 
but public opinion and the openness of liberal societies is often seen as a constraint on 
foreign  policy’.  130 
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2.5. The foreign policy decision making process 
 
The  framework  of  a  country’s  political  system  shapes  not  only  the  extent  to  which  public  
opinion and lobbies may influence foreign policy, it also shapes both form and dynamics 
of the decision-making system. It is possible, Hermann points out, to identify ‘decision  
units’   in   the  stages  of   the  foreign  policymaking  process, such as the Executive Authority 
and its ancillary systems, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of 
Defence or main political organizations (whether political parties or otherwise), as well as 
the legislative and judicial authorities.131  The actual policy outcome will be the conclusion 
of the interaction of these units with each other in the process of decision-making 
according to the nature of the political system.132 The most important institutions or 
entities that contribute to the process of making the external decisions of the State are as 
follows: 
 
 2.5.1. Executive authority and the Head of State: 
The Executive Authority or head of the government is considered as the authority having 
the greatest influence in the field of foreign policymaking, while other authorities practice 
a supervisory role over the functions of this authority with respect to policymaking. The 
nature of foreign policy is characterized by a state of uncertainty and rapid fluctuation in 
political systems that render the executive authority central in making such policy in order 
to address international crises and variable circumstances created by the same.133 This 
authority is assisted in playing this role by the fact that it is dedicated to this mission and it 
is organized and equipped with information on international problems as well as updates 
via technological communications. Accordingly, the executive authority can actively 
interact with the issues of foreign policy on account of the role that may be practised by 
other institutions.134 The executive authority differs from one political system to another. 
Under the political parliamentary system (as is the case with the UK), executive authority 
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means   ‘the  Council   of  Ministers’   in   the   field   of   foreign   policy  making. The role of the 
Prime Minister is similar to that of the President under presidential regimes. However, 
under the political presidential system (as is the case with the USA), the executive 
authority   means   ‘the   head   of   the   State’,   while   the   council   of   ministers,   ‘executive  
departments’,   is   no   more   than an authority assisting the President. 135 It is worth 
mentioning that in some states in developing countries or the Third World, such as GCC 
states,  ‘the  head  of  state’  means  the  leader  of  these  states  who  has  the  main  role  in  the  field  
of foreign policy making.136 Thus, according to the political system of GCC states, the role 
of   leaders’   perceptions   remains   the  main   factor   in   the   foreign   policy-making process.137 
The executive authority comprises a set of institutions from different political systems, 
including: 138 
A- Ministry of Foreign Affairs: This ministry will take part in laying out and 
implementing foreign policy as well as supervising international relations with the 
external world, including the exchange of diplomatic and consular representation 
with foreign countries and international organizations. Thus, the relationship 
between the chief executive and foreign ministers is of vital importance.139 
B- Ministry of Defence: This ministry takes part in making foreign policy, 
particularly with respect to the security and defence aspects of such policy. Further, 
the intelligence department has its role in making foreign decisions via whatever 
information is collected and analysed to serve this policy.  
C- National Security Councils or National Security Bodies: These councils are 
available in some countries and they maintain direct coordination and cooperation 
with a number of vital ministries. Their functions are to give advice and 
recommendations. Examples of such councils include the National Security 
Council (NSC) in the USA. The USA pioneered the idea of the National Security 
Council on foreign and defence matters between 1947 and 1950, boosted by the 
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Korean War. 140 In   Kuwait   it   is   called   the   ‘Kuwait   National   Security   Council’,  
which was established in 1997.141 
 
  
2.5.2. Role of sub-national territorial units 
In some states, territorial units have a competence in aspects of foreign policy. In Canada, 
for example, provinces have direct and independent roles in the field of Canadian foreign 
policy, as they enjoy international functions (such as their control over natural resources), 
which qualify them, under the constitution, to deal with foreign countries. The same 
applies to Germany, as its provinces have direct relations with foreign countries and 
behave as if they were independent states.142  The pattern of this system has also appeared 
in  the  Middle  East,  particularly  in  Iraq.  The  Kurds’  case  is  good  example  of  ‘sub-national 
territorial   units’   in   Iraq.   After   the   fall   of   Saddam   Hussain’s   regime   in   2003,   Iraq  
recognized that ‘Iraq   shall   be   republican,   federal, democratic,   and   pluralistic’   in  
accordance with Article 4 of Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), signed in March 
2004 by the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC), until a permanent constitution emerges from 
the transitional National Assembly elected no later than 31st January 2005.143 The TAL 
recognized the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) as the official government of the 
three Iraqi governorates, Erbil, Suleimaniah and Dohuk, and the Kurdish forces, 
peshmerga, were allowed as internal security and police force in the KRG zone.144   
However, the Iraqi permanent constitution, which was approved through referendum by 
the Iraqi people on October 15th, 2005, provides that: 
1. The Republic of Iraq is ‘a single federal, independent and fully sovereign 
state’ in accordance with Article 1; 
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2. The ‘federal system in the Republic of Iraq is made up of a decentralized 
capital, regions and governorates, as well as local administrations’, in accordance 
with Article 112. 
3. This ‘Constitution, upon coming into force, shall recognize the region of 
Kurdistan, along with its existing authorities, as a federal region, and shall affirm 
new regions established in accordance with its provisions’, in accordance of Article 
113.  
4.  Each region shall adopt ‘a constitution of its own that defines the structure 
of powers of the region, its authorities, and the mechanisms for exercising such 
authorities, provided that it does not contradict this Constitution’, in accordance 
with Article 116. 
5. The ‘regional powers shall have the right to exercise executive, legislative 
and judicial powers in accordance with this Constitution, except for those 
authorities stipulated in the exclusive authorities of the federal government, and 
offices for the regions and governorates shall be established in embassies and 
diplomatic missions, in order to follow cultural, social, and developmental affairs’ 
in accordance with Article 117. 145 
 
These   developments   urged   the   Kurds   to   step   towards   the   concept   of   the   ‘sub-national 
territorial  units’  represented in the following ways: 
1. The Iraqi Kurds set up an autonomous administration in their region and held 
several parliamentary elections for the Kurdistan National Assembly (KNA) in 2005 and 
2009, of which the first was in 1992; 
2. The creation of an elected regional Kurdish government, Kurdistan Regional 
Government (KRG) as a federated region in Iraq, which has the right to amend the 
application of national laws, to maintain internal security forces; and to establish 
embassies abroad;146 
3. The creation of the Kurdistan Region Presidency (KRP), which was promulgated 
as an institution by the Kurdistan Parliament in 2005. The President of the Kurdistan 
region has the highest executive authority; 
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4. The Kurds have their own militias, the Kurdish peshmerga, as a police force in the 
KRG zone; 
5. The  Kurdistan  Region’s  laws  were  enacted by the Kurdistan Parliament.147 
 
Elsewhere in the region, sub-state territorial autonomy is not much in evidence, arguably 
because it would threaten the generally autocratic central control, and in part because some 
states are themselves already territorially very limited.  
 
 
 2.5.3. Legislative Authority: 
 
The role of the legislative authority in making foreign policy differs from one political 
system to another in accordance with the essence of this system. Despite the fact that the 
political parliamentary system is based on the principle of the supremacy of parliament and 
amalgamation of the legislative and executive authorities, in practice, some countries grant 
the Council of Ministers a decisive role in making foreign policy, thanks to the fact that the 
Council of Ministers controls the majority of MPs, as is the case in the UK and Canada.148 
The presidential political system grants the legislative authority a more factual role 
regarding foreign policy-making due to the fact that this system is based on flexible 
separation between the two authorities in addition to the principle of balance and control. 
For example, the US congress enjoys independent functions in the field of foreign policy 
making. In this regard, it has the right to declare war, ratify conventions and approve 
candidates put forward by the executive authority to be appointed to diplomatic posts, in 
addition to regulating foreign trade and defence, etc.149 
 
 2.5.4. Judicial authority: 
Judicial authority plays an indirect role in the process of foreign policy making via 
nullifying some laws or treaties pertaining to this policy on the grounds that they are 
contradictory to the constitution. It has been established under judicial jurisprudence, in 
                                              
147 The website of the Kurdish Regional Government: 
http://web.krg.org/articles/detail.asp?anr=32349&lngnr=12&rnr=93&smap=04020000  
148  Al Sayed Selim, Mohammed (1998), Op. Cit. p.458. 
149  Ibid. p. 460. 
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most countries, that issues of foreign policy are outside the control of the judiciary. 
Further, the judiciary cannot influence the acts of the state in the field of this policy.150 
Consequently, the process of foreign policy making is a complicated one wherein many 
institutions, having different roles, act together in accordance with the nature of the 
political system. Some of these institutions have effective and remarkable roles and they 
have their impact on the internal and external environments of the state, while other 
institutions play very limited and inconspicuous roles. 
 
 
 3.  Foreign Policy Tools  
 
Countries employ different means to realize the objectives of their foreign policy. In this 
regard, they may employ the military, the economy or the media, for example. Further, the 
state may employ one means or a set of means together. However, repeated employment of 
a specific tool in the foreign policy will distinguish this policy with a specific character. 
For example, the foreign policy of one country might be characterized by military 
character due to the repeated employment of military tools.151 The tools employed by these 
countries in their foreign policy include:  
 3.1. Diplomatic tools 
Diplomacy  is  considered  as  ‘an  instrument  of  statecraft.  It  was  originally  an  instrument  of  
states to deal with   other   states’.152 It is used to manage the goals of foreign policy by 
diplomats and delegates of countries and via diplomatic institutions that are governed by 
rules, protocols and practices for communication.153 In this respect, analysts of 
international relations claim that the foreign policy effort towards the state is at the level of 
the embassy, which is considered as the diplomatic instrument of relations between the 
states. Diplomacy represents the main tool for maintaining international peace and security 
and preventing wars and disputes. The most prominent functions of diplomacy are 
                                              
150  Ibid. 
151  Ibid.  
152 Kleiner,  Juergen  ‘The  Inertia  of  Diplomacy  ’,  Diplomacy & Statecraft, Vol. 19, No. 2, Routledge, 
2008.p.321. 
153  Ibid. pp. 322-325. 
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communication, negotiation, participation in multilateral institutions and the promotion of 
economic goods.154 Foreign policy and diplomacy are considered as correlated concepts: 
diplomacy is the application of the foreign policy, which is different from the process of 
policy-making. It provides decision makers with the information that enables them to 
perform their functions, i.e. implementing resolutions.155  
  
3.2. Economic tools 
Economic tools are defined as the use of the economic capabilities available to the state in 
order to influence other countries with respect to their approaches, conduct or situation in a 
manner that conforms to realizing foreign objectives of the state and protecting its 
interests.156 The importance of this type of tool increased considerably following World 
War II and added a new dimension to foreign policy and the study of international 
relations,157 such   as   the   ‘Marshall   Plan’,   which   was   provided   by the USA to non-
communist Western Europe in order to prevent communist pressure and endorse European 
integration.158 Other examples of the use of aid as a tool in foreign policy include the 
economic aid provided by the Soviet Union to several African countries, in particular 
Ethiopia and Tanzania, during the Cold War, which led these nations to nationalize their 
economies   and   enter   a   period   of   close   relations   with   the   USSR   as   a   ‘change-seeking 
policy’.159 Economic tools are used for unlimited purposes such as to support political 
stability in one state or to change situations or bring about improvements in their domestic 
human conditions, or to influence the behaviour of recipients through voting with the 
donor in the UN for political, economic and security reasons.160 Therefore, many countries 
are endeavouring to limit or restrict economic dependence on specific states or other 
countries, as they doubt this assistance and believe that it is designed by the donating 
                                              
154  Hill, Christopher, Op. Cit. p.139. 
155  Martin  Griffiths  and  Terry  O’Callaghan, il-mafahīm ʼasāsīyah  fil  ʽalākat  id-duwalīyah,  ‘International    
Relations:  The  Key  Concepts’, 2nd edition, Gulf Research Center, UAE, 2008.p.203.  
156  Makled, Ismail Sabri, Op. Cit. p.473. 
157  Palmer,  Glenn,  et.al  (ed.),  ‘Give  or  Take:  Foreign  Aid  and  Foreign  Policy  Substitutability’,  Journal of 
Peace Research, Vol. 39, No. 1, 2002. p.6. 
158  Hill, Christopher, Op. Cit. p.149. 
159  Palmer, Glenn, et al. (eds).  Op. Cit.  p. 12. 
160 Ibid. p.7. 
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countries to exploit the state. Thus, external political dependence may be the price paid by 
subordinated countries to enjoy economic benefits from the countries granting these 
donations.161 
 
 3.3. Information 
The information tool constitutes one of the most effective tools employed by states to 
implement their foreign policy objectives on all levels.162 The impact of this tool on the 
public opinion trends and states, as means of pressure and propaganda, merged after World 
War II in the USA against the Soviets. The development of this tool has been assisted by 
several factors, the most important being the revolution in telecommunication systems, 
which has resulted in the development of different mass media in addition to the prominent 
role of ideology in foreign policies, which has constituted an effective weapon used by 
superpowers to polarize states to their side. 163   
  
3.4. Military tools 
Military force is considered as a tool employed by decision makers to protect their 
interests and realize their foreign objectives or to improve their public standing when the 
economy is performing poorly.164 In  this  respect,  a  ‘weak’  state  or  a  ‘smaller’  state  is  one  
that does not have the ability to defend its existence itself, looking for foreign protection or 
alliance from the powerful states and accepting the consequences for its political decisions, 
particularly if these states receive economic aid from the major powers.165 The 
employment of the military tool has two aspects, as follows:  
 
A- Threatening to use force to oblige other countries to accept the requests of the state.  
                                              
161  Makled, Ismail Sabri, Op.Cit. p.481. 
162 Ibid. p.381. 
163  Ibid. p.447.  
164  Fordham,  Benjamin  O.,  ‘A  Very  Sharp  Sword:  The  Influence  of  Military  Capabilities  on  American  
Decisions to Use Force, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 48, No. 5, Oct. 2004. p.644. 
165  Nassif, Mustafa, Op. Cit. p.8. 
 
 
72 
B- Actual employment of force to defend the interests of the state and achieve the 
objectives of its foreign policy. 166 
 
Despite the fact that military action will always remain as a main tool for foreign policy, it 
is impossible to know whether or not it will achieve its objective. In particular, as 
mentioned above, the use of armed force has become unacceptable by the international 
community in the post-1945 era.167 
 
 
 4. The case of the Gulf states  
 
The generic discussion above is relevant for, and is explicitly or implicitly applied in a 
number  of  variants,  in  the  literature  on  the  Gulf  states’  foreign  policies  that  we  surveyed  in  
the previous chapter. While it is not the place here to restate those findings, it is worth 
recapitulating the essence of the analytical framework that can be derived from it for the 
purposes of this thesis: we will in fact broadly follow in our own analysis the sequence set 
out in the previous section of chapter, as this chimes well also with what emerges from the 
limited existing work on the Gulf states. That is in fact the approach followed by 
Nonneman, who in his analysis of Middle East foreign policies – including those of the 
GCC -  starts from the domestic environment, then moves to the regional and international 
environments environment.168 While I will follow a different sequence, substantively I 
follow the same categories. He takes the decision-making system as one part of the 
domestic environment – which of course it is – but, like Al-Alkim, I propose to treat it in 
practice   as   a   distinct   ‘funnel’   through  which   the   other   inputs   (geographic,   exeternal   and  
internal) are translated into policy and action, although it is of course fundamentally 
determined by the domestic political system. 
                                              
166  Makled, Ismail Sabri, Op. Cit. p. 509. 
167  Hill, Christopher. Op. Cit. p. 145. 
168  Nonneman, Analyzing Middle East Foreign Policies, op. cit. 
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Some specificity has been injected into thjs broad-brush framework by people such as 
Baabood169  and Al-Alkim, 170 alongside Nonneman himself: while confirming the primacy 
of  state  and  regime  security  as  drivers  for  these  states’  foreign  policies,  and  while  noting  
the impact of the immediate regional ideational and security environment, they also draw 
our attention more particularly, at the domestic level, to the importance of the tribal 
structure of the population dominating political and social life; the nature of the local 
rentier state; the predominant role, within this, of the ruling families and the perceptions 
(and role perceptions) of the leaders; the personal and local/regional style of decision-
making; the particular components and contributions of different lower-level components 
of the decision-making system – from political elites to the relevant ministries and the 
limited but not negligible input and impact of the bureaucracy and the legislature: as Al-
Alkim sums it up,  decision making in GCC states takes place within three circles: the 
heads of state, the members of the royal families and their close associates from the 
political elite and the members of executive authority.171 
They also draw our attention to the combination of vulnerability and rich hydrocarbon-
derived resources; the specific regional environment combining fluctuating ideational 
pressures and material security threats from the surrounding big regional powers; and the 
resources – not just pressures - available to the rulers of these states in the international 
environment, stemming  from  outside  powers’  interest  in  the  region’s  strategic  importance  
and energy resources, alongside ideological considerations that intertwine with regional 
and global competition. Indeed, as already noted in the previous chapter, the work of such 
authors as Anscombe, Troeller and Nonneman, has demonstrated that these states have 
been anything but passive players in the regional and global system, having carefully and 
pragmatically endeavoured to carve out and maintain a significant measure of autonomy, 
displaying  effective  ‘agency’.  Indeed  Kuwait,  from  the  days  of  Sheikh  Mubarak  the  Great  
around the turn of the 19th/20th centuries, has been identified in these works as one of the 
pioneers of this ability and these tactics. 
 
                                              
169  Baabood, Abdulla, Op. Cit.  pp. 148-154. 
170  Al-Alkim, Hassan Hamdan, The GCC States in An Unstable World: Foreign-Policy Dilemmas of the 
Small States, 1st edition, Saqi Books, London, 1994. pp. 28-31 and 156. 
171 Ibid.  p. 156. 
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Drawing on all of the above, I will adopt a pragmatic framework for analysing of Kuwaiti 
foreign policy which I lay out in the concluding section below. 
 
  
7. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, we have shed light on the definition of foreign policy and the concept of 
foreign policy analysis and its framework to understand and explain the external behaviour 
of states.  We have also suggested the key variables to consider when trying to understand 
the shaping and outcomes of the foreign policies of a state such as Kuwait. All these 
variables, indeed, have their impact on the Kuwaiti decision makers and on the process of 
Kuwaiti decision-making.  In turn, Kuwaiti decision-makers have employed the usual 
range of tools in giving effect to their decisions.   
 
This  study  will  consider  Kuwait’s   foreign policy behavior in light of the variables in the 
domestic, regional and international environments mentioned above, as well as the Kuwaiti 
decision-making  apparatus  involved  in  the  shaping  the  Kuwait’s  external  behavior. 
 
We will need to take into account   Kuwait’s   status   as   a   constitutional   emirate   with   a  
parliamentary system of government, albeit with a large amount of autonomy for the ruling 
family’s  key  foreign  policymakers,  and  as  an  integral  part  of  the  Arab  and  Islamic  world.  
Kuwait is member of many institutions such as the Arab League, the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC), the United Nations (UN), the Organization of the Islamic Conference 
(OIC) and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). We will need to address its domestic 
constraints and resources, material and ideational; its geographical situation; its regional 
material and ideational environment; and the challenges and resources to be found in the 
international environment. 
 
Drawing, then, on the insights surveyed in this chapter, the thesis will proceed to analyse 
the formation and the dynamics of Kuwaiti foreign policy in the period through the impact 
of three main sets of variables: 
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1.  The role of geographic factors 
 
2.  The domestic environment:   
a. The political system of Kuwait as a constitutional emirate; the decision-making 
apparatus; the role of successive Kuwaiti leaders within this;  
b. Economic factors; Social factors including popular perceptions,  
c. Demographic, tribal and ethno-religious  characteristics. 
 
2.   The regional environment:  
a. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait; 
b. The other components of the Gulf security mosaic, including the role of Iran; 
c. The  Arab  and  Islamic  ideational  factor  as  a  constraint  on  Kuwait’s  FP  behaviour. 
d. The role and functions of the GCC as an organisation. 
 
3.   The international environment:  
The international environment is, as we have seen, the overarching context within 
which states react, adjust, and draw on opportunities. It also interacts with the regional 
environment. Crucially, this environment evolves and changes, offering state 
leaderships different pressures, challenges and opportunities at different times. For the 
period and players this thesis focuses on, this includes most significantly the 
emergence  of  the  ‘New  World  Order’  under temporary US hegemony, coinciding with 
the period of the Iraqi invasion and its aftermath, and generating the concept of ‘close  
alliance’   in   Kuwaiti   foreign   policy. Under tis category also come  the roles of 
international organizations such as, primarily, the UN, whose functions and room for 
action were dramatically transformed by the overall global shift in Zeitgeist. The 
international environment is where Kuwait, like other GCC states, has been both 
forced   and   enabled   to   play   its   game   of   pragmatic   ‘managed   multi-dependence’   – 
ensuring great power protection while also constructing a web of actual and potential 
support as wide as possible.  
 
The adoption of the above framework, drawn in large measure from Foreign Policy 
Analysis literature, makes clear practical sense for this thesis since, after all, it is the 
output and dynamics of Kuwaiti foreign policy we are interested in examining. But it 
should be clear that this   is   not   simply   the   ‘old-school’   or   narrowly-defined FPA 
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approach that blithely privileges agency and decisions made within the state over other 
factors in IR:  indeed, the approach adopted here, following authors such as 
Nonneman, is precisely that, while the state and its decision-makers do have agency, 
the extent, nature and outcomes of that agency can only be understood in a context not 
only of domestic politics, society and economy, but in the wider, international and 
regional context within which the state and its leaders are embedded. At times the 
pressures from that framework will be overwhelming – if never all-determinant – while 
at others decision-makers will be able to deploy less fettered agency. With Halliday,172 
Hinnebusch173 and Nonneman, however, this thesis does assume (and shows through 
the evidence that will be provided) that states and their leaderships are never simply 
pawns in a determinant international system, or states billiard balls in the anarchical 
world of traditional realists. 
  
  
                                              
172  Halliday, Fred, The Middle East in International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2005). 
173  Hinnebusch, Raymond, The International Politics of the Middle East (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2003). 
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Chapter III 
 
 
Kuwait:   Origins, evolution,  
and history of relations with Iraq 
 
  
 
1. Political origin of the State of Kuwait and its relations with Iraq 
 
The  word   ‘Kuwait’   is   the   diminutive   of   the  word   ‘Kout’, which  means   ’fort’   or   ‘small  
castle’.1 The fort in question was built by Barak Bin Uray’ir (1669-1682), the leader of the 
Bani Khalid tribe, which controlled the area at that time.2 Before that, Kuwait was known 
by  the  name  ‘Kazima’, 3 and  then  ‘Qurain’  or  ‘Grane’,  which  was  established  in  16134 and 
settled by fishermen from Al-Awazim tribe.5  
Kuwait and the Al-Hasa region were under the rule of the sheikhs of the Bani Khalid tribe 
during the 16th century; their territory of influence extended from Qatar in the south to 
Basra in the north. They were on good terms with the Ottoman Empire, which conquered 
Iraq from the Persians, and established many provinces in Iraq during the first quarter of 
16th century. In 1555, the Ottoman Empire occupied the Kuwait and Al-Hasa regions; 
these were geographically and economically distinct and were subject to the rule of the 
                                              
1  Hussain, Abdulaziz, Al-mujtamaʽ  al-ʽarabī  fil  Kuwayt,,  ‘Arabian  Community  in  Kuwait’, 2nd edition, Dar 
Qurtas for Publication and Distribution, Kuwait , 1994. pp.23-27.  
2  Abu -Hakima, Ahmad Mustafa,  Tārīkh  il-kuwayt il-ḥadīth,  ‘The Modern History of Kuwait: 1750 – 
1965’,  1st edition, That Al -Salasil for Publication and Printing, Kuwait, 1984. pp.18-19.  
3  Al-Tamimi, Abdul Malek Khalaf, Abḥāth  min  tārīkh  il- kuwayt, ‘Researches  from  Kuwait  History’, 2nd 
edition, Dar Qurtas for Publication and Distribution, Kuwait, 1999. p.11.  
4  Rasheed, Abdulaziz,  tarīkh  al-kuwayt,  ‘Kuwait  History’, Dar Maktaba Al-Hayat for Publication, 
Lebanon, 1978.  p.31; Also see the information collected by Colonel Pelly, Political Resident at Bushire, 
Arabian Gulf,  in 1863 in  Rush, A.de L. (ed.),  Ruling Family of Arabia : Kuwait The Ruling Family of 
Al-Sabah, Archive Edition, An Imprint of Archive International Group, 1991. p.35; Centre for Research 
and  Studies  on  Kuwait  (CRSK),  ‘Kuwait  in  History’;;  on  the  website  of  CRSK;;  
http://62.150.86.180/PageModule.asp?Module=10031 
5  Alazami, Walid, Op. Cit. p. 23. 
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Bani Khalid tribe at that time.6 The Ottoman Empire controlled the whole region from the 
second half of the 16th century until the end of the second half of the 17th century, when 
this region became the subject of a dispute between the Ottomans and Portuguese from the 
outposts in the Hormuz, coastal Oman and Bahrain.7 In 1669, the chief of the Bani Khalid 
tribe, Barak Bin Uray’ir,8 took the opportunity of the Ottomans’ preoccupation with its 
wars   with   the   ‘Iranians’9  around Iraq and launched an offensive against the Ottoman 
garrisons to wrest Al-Hasa and Kuwait from the control of the Ottoman Empire. This 
spelled the end of Ottoman control in east Arabia.10  Ten years later Sheikh Barak Bin 
Uray’ir built a small fort   or   ‘Kout’   (diminutive   form   of   ‘Kuwait’)   as   a   small   military  
outpost,  hence  the  current  name  ‘Kuwait’.11  
During 1700-1710, groups of Arab families belonging to the Utub tribe (Al-Sabah, Al-
Jalahma, Al-Khalifa), migrated from the interior of the Arabian Peninsula to the north-east 
and settled in Kuwait during the reign of the Bani Khalid. 12 In the middle of the 18th 
century, the rule of the Bani Khalid tribe over the area weakened due to internal 
differences over the authority of leadership, in addition to the attacks of the Saudi Wahhabi 
movement. These factors resulted in the de facto independence of Kuwait’s  Al-Utub tribes 
from the Bani Khalid.13 Henceforth, in a consensual distribution of roles among the key 
families of the Utub of Kuwait, the administrative leadership would be held by the Al 
Sabah – who seem to have had good relations with the tribes of the area -  while the Al 
Jalahima controlled maritime affairs, and the Al Khalifa commerce. In 1752, Sabah bin 
Jaber was selected by the Utub families of Kuwait as the first ruler.14 This year also 
                                              
6   Al-Tamimi , Abdul Malek Khalaf, Op.Cit. p. 20. 
7  Salibi, Kamal S., A history of Arabia, Delmar, N.Y.: Caravan Books, 1980. p.142. 
8  Bondarevsky, G., Kuwait’s  International  Relations  in  the  Nineteenth  and  Early  Twentieth Centuries, 
Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait, 1st edition, Kuwait, 1994. p. 21.  
9  I  refer  to  ‘Iranians’  due  to  the  fact  that  power  in  Iran  had  passed  through  several  different  ethnic  groups,  
such as the Persians, Zands, Mongols, Qajars (Turks), and Safavids (Azeris) from 14th century until 20th 
century. For more details see Nasrallah Falsafi, ʼīrān  wa  ʽalāqatiha  fil  ʽasr  iṣ-ṣafhawi , ‘Iran and its 
Foreign  Relations  in  Safavid  Period’, Dar Althgafa for publication, Cairo, 1989. pp. G-N.; Ervand, 
Abrahamian, Iran between two revolutions, Princeton University Press, New Jersey,1982. pp.14-55. 
10  Salibi, Kamal S. Op.Cit. pp. 142- 149. 
11  Bondarevsky, G.,Op.Cit. p. 21.  
12  Alazami, Walid, Op. Cit. p. 24. 
13  Abu -Hakima, Ahmad Mustafa, Op.Cit. p.27. 
14  Ibid.p.60 and Ismael, Jacqueline, Kuwait: Social Change in Historical Perspective (Syracuse: Syracuse 
University Press, 1982), p. 27. 
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witnessed the emergence of the modern principality system of Kuwait with the building of 
the first  wall (sur) in 1760 to protect Kuwait from other forces in the area.  
From this time, ‘Kuwait’ was able to a significant extent to manage its own internal and 
external affairs, exploiting its geographic location, which made it the focus of disputes 
during the 18th and 19th centuries among major German, British, Russian, French and 
Turkish powers in addition to local tribes.15 Hence, the political emergence of Kuwait as 
separate from, or at least autonomous from, the Ottoman province of Basra occurred 
during the 17th century, while what became Iraq itself was disputed over between the 
Ottomans and Persians.16 Thus, the occupation of Ottoman Basra by Iran (1775-1779) was 
the main factor behind the first chance for official Kuwaiti-British communications when 
Britain officially requested from Kuwait the relocation of the Eastern Indian Company 
(UK) from Basra to Kuwait on a temporary basis due to this occupation. Following the 
relocation of this company, British overland mail and trade were transferred from India, 
the Mediterranean Sea and Europe to Kuwait on a temporary basis.17 This followed 
repeated harassment by the Ottoman authorities of the UK Company in 1793 and 1821, 
which incited the Ottoman ruler to ask Britain to remove the company from the Ottoman 
territories.18 Accordingly, Britain decided to relocate the company's headquarters to 
Kuwait on a permanent basis in 1821.19 The departure of this company resulted in the 
emergence of Kuwait as an economic and trading region to other countries due to its 
geographic location and led Kuwait to enhance its relations with the local and international 
powers.20 Thus, Kuwait became a more tempting target, and indeed a target for envy, not 
least for Ottomans or local powers. Therefore, these powers tried to subjugate Kuwait such 
as the attacks launched by the Bani Kaab tribe in 1783, the Iraqi al-Muntafiq tribe in 1786, 
and the Wahhabis movement by Ibn Saud in 1793, 1795, 1797 and 1804.   
                                              
15  For more details, see Al-Tamimi , Abdul Malek Khalaf, op.cit. pp.44-47. 
16  Salibi, Kamal S, Op.Cit. p.148. 
17 Aidaroos, Mohamed Hassan, Tarīkh  il-kuwayt il-ḥadīth  wal- moʽasir,  ‘The  Modern and Contemporary 
History  of  Kuwait’, Dar al-­Kitab al-Hadith , Kuwait, 2002. pp.19-20.  
18  Public Records, Iraqi Claims to Kuwait,  F.O. 371/156854, File No. 1083, National Archives, UK, 1961.  
19  R.  V.  Pillai  and  Mahendra  Kumar,  ‘The  Political  and  Legal  Status  of  Kuwait’,  The International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol.11, No.1, 1962. p. 109. 
20  Panel of Specialists, Al-kuwayt  wujūdan  wa  ḥudūdan:  ḥaka’ik  mawḍūʽīyah  wal  id-diʽāʼāt  al-ʽirākīyah,, 
Op.Cit. pp. 61-63.  
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The story   of   Kuwait’s   fortunes   and   policies   in   the   complex   regional   and   international 
environment it found itself in, as a small and vulnerable entity with, however, a strategic 
position, very much follows the pattern laid out in the previous two chapters, and observed 
variously by Anscombe21 and Nonneman, amongst others, for the Gulf states as a whole 
and Kuwait in particular:  proactively exploring options and resources in the regional and 
international environment in ways that maximised the combination of their own and their 
territory’s  security and autonomy, by playing on different external actors simultaneously, 
recognising where the balance of power lay among those and acting accordingly, without 
ever locking themselves into  a  position  of  ‘mono-dependence’,  and  always  ready  to  adjust  
to external shifts.  
Kuwaiti-British relations improved after the signing of the first agreement in 1841 for one 
year to combat piracy activities in the Gulf region, the so  called  ‘Anglo-Kuwaiti Maritime 
Truce’, which proved the independence of Kuwait from Ottoman Iraq. 22 In 1863, during 
his first visit, Pelly, as the British resident at Bushire,   classified  Kuwait   as   ‘one   of   the  
territories   nominally’   under the Ottoman supremacy,   but   ‘practically   independent   under  
their   own   chiefs’.23 However, following the increase in the economic importance to 
colonial powers in the 19th century of the Arabian Gulf, particularly after the opening of 
the Suez Canal in 1869, the Ottoman Empire intended to regain control of the Al-Hasa 
region, which added to British concern.24 Therefore, in 1871, Medhat Pasha (Governor of 
Baghdad) launched a military expedition and recovered the Al-Hasa region, through 
Kuwaiti assistance, which was intended to gain the friendship of the Ottomans. After the 
success of his military expedition, Medhat Pasha issued a decree proclaiming Kuwait to be 
an  ‘autonomous  entity’  under  the  administration  of  Basra’s  Ottoman  empire, and exempted 
Kuwait  from  paying  financial  expenses  for  the  Ottoman’s  authority  due  to  his  appreciation  
of Kuwait’s assistance, and the Kuwaiti ruler  was  given  the  title  of  ‘Qaimmaqam’. Kuwait 
                                              
21  Anscombe, The Ottoman Gulf,  op.  cit.;;    Nonneman,  ‘Saudi-European  Relations’,  op.  cit.;;  Nonneman,  
Analyzing Middle East Foreign Policies,  op.  cit.      Another  valuable  work  is  James  Onley’s  The Arabian 
Frontier of the British Raj: Merchants, Rulers, and the British in the Nineteenth Century Gulf, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007), which makes a related argument based on the case of Bahrain, and which 
confirms  the  ‘agency’  the  local  rulers  had  in  the  politics  of protection. 
22  Centre for Research and Studies on Kuwait, Kuwait and Britain: A Historical Friendship, Kuwait, 2007. 
p.12. 
23  Public Records, Iraqi Claims to Kuwait, F.O. 371/156854, Op.Cit.  
24  Salibi, Kamal S, Op.Cit. pp.181-185. 
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remained nominally under the Ottoman supremacy until the arrival of Sheikh Mubarak on 
the throne in 1896.25  
Following the increase of the economic and geographical importance of Kuwait at the end 
of the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire raised the issue of its supremacy over Kuwait due 
to two issues. The first was that they were in favour of a German-initiated project for a 
railway line connecting Berlin and Baghdad and ending at Kuwait.26 The second was the 
increase of British influence in the Arabian Gulf, particularly after Britain concluded the 
‘General  Treaty  of  Peace’  with  the  Sheikhs  of  the  Arabian  coast  in  1820  to  combat  piracy  
and slave trafficking in the Gulf,27 followed by the protection treaty signed between 
Britain and Bahrain in 1880 and the consequent fear of the Ottoman Empire that Britain 
would gain control of the Arabian Gulf. 28  
On 23 January 1896, Sheikh Mubarak Al-Sabah came to the throne after a bloody coup 
against his brothers Mohammad (1892-1896) and Jarrah, whom he had accused of being 
unable to rule the country and of being allied with the Ottoman Empire through Sheikh 
Yousef bin Abdullah Al Ibrahim, who was accused of wanting to rule Kuwait with the 
assistance of the Ottoman Empire. Financial disputes also played a role in the coup.29 As 
Sheikh Mubarak was endeavouring to escape from Ottoman pressure to control Kuwait 
and convert its nominal suzerainty into direct government, he applied for British protection 
for Kuwait and obtained the same on 23 January 1899, after several unsuccessful attempts 
in 189730 and 1898, when he signed a treaty with Britain, taking advantage of British fears 
of German and Russian entry into the Gulf through the railway project.31 This secret treaty 
declared that Sheikh Mubarak would not assign, sell, or lease land or allow the existence 
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of foreign troops without the consent of the British government.32 Further, the treaty 
entrusted to Britain the administration of Kuwait's foreign affairs, while internal affairs 
were managed by Sheikh Mubarak. However, this treaty did not mention any protection 
for Kuwait by Britain.33 As the British document shows, Sheikh Mubarak appeared not to 
have been satisfied with this secret agreement; thus, he attempted unsuccessfully in 
October 1899 to bring Kuwait under the protection of Persia. In 1901, the Ottoman Empire 
objected to the convention and sent its military forces to Umm Qasr, Safwan and Boubyan 
Island in 1902 to occupy Kuwait, although this attempt proved a failure due to the British 
intervention. Thus, Britain appointed its first Political Agent in Kuwait, Major Knox, in 
summer 1904, and intervened to settle Kuwait’s differences with the Ottoman Empire 
about Kuwait and the Gulf region through negotiations from February 1911 to July 1913,34 
which discussed the following issues:  
1.  the Baghdad Railway Project 
2.  the interests of Britain and the Ottoman Empire in the Arabian Gulf region 
3.  the increase of Turkish custom duties in the province of Baghdad. 35 
At the end of these negotiations in   1913,   both   parties   signed   the   ‘Anglo-Ottoman Draft 
Convention’.  Under  Articles  1, 5, 6, 7 of this convention, the Ottoman Empire recognized 
all treaties concluded between the Sheikh of Kuwait and Britain and recognized Kuwait as 
an  ‘autonomous  entity’, with the Ottoman Empire committing itself not to interfere with 
the internal affairs of Kuwait or place any garrisons in Kuwait. The Kuwaiti frontiers were 
demarcated from the Ottoman Empire,36 with the inner zone (red line) to be under the 
direct   rule  of  Kuwait  while   the   tribes   in   the  outer  zone  (green   line)  recognized  Kuwait’s  
authority.37 However, this agreement was not ratified due to the outbreak of World War I 
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between both parties in 1914. Yet Britain, in its letter of 3 November 1914, explicitly 
recognised Kuwait as an independent state under its protection in return for Kuwaiti 
assistance against the Ottomans.38 Figure (1) shows the demarcation of the Kuwaiti -
Ottoman frontiers under the above-mentioned convention.  
The agreement with Britain did more than settle a boundary and give Kuwait a basis for 
reciognition as an autonomous entity.  It secured to the sheikhdom the sort of external 
protection which completely changed its regional position.  Additionally, it also changed 
the role and power of Sheikh Mubarak and the Al Sabah internally, as this protection and 
external recognition was channelled through him, and would continue to be so for his 
successors. So would other kinds of assistance, not least financial.  At this point, therefore, 
both Kuwait and the Al Sabah acquired a much enhanced role, and became bound into 
regional and international politics in a new way.  
The   sheikhdom’s   early   relations  with   Iraq,   too,  must be seen in this light: indeed, they 
emerged   from   the   very   same   events   in   which   the  Ottoman   empire’s   disappearance  was  
accompanied with the introduction of external powers – including Britain – into the region 
in  ways  that  went  beyond  Britain’s  role  in  the  Gulf  itself  during  the  previous  century. 
 
2.  Early Kuwaiti-Iraqi Relations 
World War I ended in 1918 with the defeat of the Ottoman Empire, and resulted in the 
signing  of  the  ‘Lausanne  treaty’  on  24  July  1923  whereby  the  Ottoman  Empire  gave up all 
the territories it controlled in the Islamic world, including Iraq and Syria, the so called The 
Fertile Crescent. Hence,   Iraq   emerged   as   a   ‘unified   political   entity’   under monarchical 
regime for the first time in August 1921 under the British mandate, with unclear 
boundaries in the north with Turkey and northwest with Syria, until the decision was made 
by League of Nations in late 1925 to annex Mosul province to Iraq.39 Previously, Iraq had 
been three states (Basra, Baghdad and Mosul), while Kuwait remained under British 
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influence as per the 1899 convention.40 Following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, 
Britain, as a mandate authority, was concerned and preoccupied in arranging the Iraqi 
external and internal affairs. Thus it endeavoured to demarcate the Kuwaiti – Saudi and 
Iraqi – Saudi frontiers through the Al-Uqair Conference in 1922,41 and Kuwaiti – Iraqi 
frontiers via an  ‘Exchange  of  Letters’  among  Iraq, Kuwait and Britain from 1923 to 1932. 
In 1932, as Iraq, according to the 1930 British- Iraqi treaty, endeavoured to gain both its 
independence and membership at the League of Nations, which required a state’s  borders 
to be clearly delineated, Nuri al-Said, the prime minister of Iraq at that time, sent a letter to 
Britain and Kuwait confirming  the Kuwaiti – Iraqi frontiers as follows: 
From the intersection of the Wadi el Audja with the Batin and thence northwards along the 
Batin to a point just south of the latitude of Safwan; thence, eastwards passing south of 
Safwan wells, Jebal Sanam and Um Qasr leaving then to Iraq and so on to the junction of 
the Khor Zubeir with the Khor Abdullah. The islands of Warbah, Bubiyan, Maskan (or 
Khashjan), Failakah, Auhah, Kubbar, Qaru, and Um el Maradim appertain to Kuwait.  
This was accepted by Ahmed Al Jaber Al Sabah, the Kuwait ruler (1921-1950) in his letter 
dated 10 August 1932.42 (For more details, see Exchange of Letters, Appendices 1, 2, 3 & 
4).  These frontiers were the same frontiers that had been adopted by the Ottoman Empire 
and Britain under the 1913 Convention mentioned above.   
Following the demarcation of the frontiers between Kuwait and Iraq, Iraq declared 
independence and joined the League of Nations, and there was no frontier problem with 
Kuwait.43 Kuwaiti - Iraqi relations witnessed a new era with few problems until the end of 
the 1930s, due to the bad internal political situation witnessed by Iraqis since 1932, such as 
the massacre of the Assyrians in 1933, the rebellion of Arab tribes in the south (1934-
1936), the political collision between Shiites and Sunnis, and the first military coup against 
the government of Yasin al-Hashimi by General Bakr Sidqi in October 1936. These 
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circumstances of political instability led to 12 Iraqi government changes between 1932 and 
1941.44  
However, in 1939, relations between the two countries were disturbed when King Ghazi of 
Iraq asked to annex Kuwait to Iraq in an attempt to establish a Fertile Crescent Country, 
taking advantage of the Kuwaiti merchants rebellion inspired by Iraqi leaders, after the 
dissolution of the first majlis al-tashri'i (Legislative Council) in December 1938,45 to ask 
for Kuwaiti unity with Iraq.46 Most analysts point out that the main reason for this attempt 
was the  discovery  of  oil   in  Kuwait   in  1938  and  Iraq’s  ambition to control this wealth, in 
addition to smuggling operations that were taking place at that time. This problem, 
however, ceased to be an issue following the murder of King Ghazi on 4 April 1939. 47  
Over the period 1938-1941, the question of the modification of the Kuwaiti-Iraqi frontier 
was raised by Britain and Iraq due to the Iraqi incursions into Kuwaiti territory at south 
Safwan in the one hand, and on the other, the Iraqi plan to build a port at Umm Qasr 
instead of on the Shatt al-Arab waterway, due to the fear that Iran might obstruct the traffic 
in the Shatt, which would effectively cripple the port of Basra. Thus, Iraqis sought to find 
an alternative subsidiary access to Basra, which would not be subject to Iranian threats. 
The Khor Abdullah was considered as the most suitable alternative outlet. Therefore, 
during the visit of the Iraqi Foreign Minister, Tawfiq al-Suwaidi in 1938 to London, Iraq 
sought territorial concessions from Kuwait to cover the approaches to Umm Qasr by 
obtaining Warba and Bubiyan, two islands that had been Kuwaiti territory since 1913.  
British documents show that in 1938, Iraq claimed that Kuwait must properly be integrated 
in Iraq as the ‘successors to the Turkish Vilayet of Basra’, in which Kuwait was 
autonomous   ‘qaza’   since the 1913 convention was never ratified, after the rejection of 
Britain to the Iraqi proposal.  
The issue was temporarily eclipsed due to the aftermath of World War II on the one hand, 
and on the other hand, the unstable external and internal political situation – including the 
1941 Iraqi coup d'état by Rashid Ali Al-Keilani. 
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In 1947, after the end of World War II, Britain was concerned about the non-demarcation 
of terrestrial frontiers between Kuwait and Iraq, which was probably due to the discovery 
of oil in that region. In May 1955, Iraq suggested to have Warba Island and 4 km strip in 
the northern Kuwaiti territory at Umm Qasr in return for the demarcation of terrestrial 
frontiers between Kuwait and Iraq. However, some British officials in Iraq were  in favor 
of leasing Warba for long time (99 years) to Iraq, so that would be acceptable to Kuwait, 
instead of its outright cession, (see figure.5), due to the fact that British realized, after 
World War II, the construction of this port was consistent with British commercial and 
defence interests in Iraq. A British document of  24 May 1955 noted that ‘the  economic  
development of Iraq, to which the port at Umm Qasr would substantially contribute,’ was 
acknowledged as aligned with British  interests’.48  
Kuwaiti rulers were hostile to any idea of concession to Iraq.49 However, throughout the 
1950s, Iraqi-Kuwaiti relations were characterised by relative tranquillity. This was in part 
related to the troubled internal situation in Iraq, which led to a change of 22 Iraqi 
governments between 1946 and 1958. 50  Moreover, after the 1952 revolution in Egypt, the 
Arab Cold War also played a role, ranging monarchies led by Iraq against republican 
regimes led by Egypt.51 Therefore, on 12 February, 1958, the Hashemite Arab Union (AU) 
was established between Jordan and Iraq as a response to the formation of the United Arab 
Republic (UAR) between Egypt and Syria on 1 February, 1958.52 Although, Iraq in its 
note of 6 June 1958 to Britain, after the establishment of AU, repeated its claim as 
‘successor state’ to Turkey in Kuwait,53 Nuri al-Said, the prime minister of Iraq, was 
vehement that Kuwait would join the Union as an independent state for political and 
economic reasons. Hence, in 1958, he officially asked Britain to declare the independence 
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of Kuwait and for Kuwait to join the Hashemite Union.54 The main reasons behind this 
request for Kuwait to join this Union were as follows:  
1. The importance of Kuwait joining the union stems from the fact that its rulers were 
not blood relatives of the Hashemite family, so the Union would be more acceptable in the 
region, especially as it is known that at that time, there was a dispute between the royal and 
republican regimes in the region. 55 
2. The economic importance of Kuwait was significant given its ability to support the 
Union in providing for the budget deficit of the other countries and to benefit from Kuwaiti 
funds to reduce the budget of the Union, as Iraq was to afford 80% of this budget, after 
Jordan and other relatively poor countries, compared with Iraq, and had joined.56  
Sheikh Abdullah Al-Sabah (1950-1965), the ruler of Kuwait, expressly declared that his 
country was not ready to join the political axis between the royal and republican regimes 
and played a mediating role between the two groupings.  
 
3. Kuwaiti-Iraq relations after the 1958 coup in Iraq 
In fact, the AU proved a failure due to the military coup in Iraq on 14 July, 1958 by Abdul 
Karim Qasim, which ended the monarchy, established a republican regime; this resulted in 
the dissolution of this Union.57 Since the success of the 1958 military coup in Iraq, Kuwait 
considered this coup as an internal Iraqi affair. Thus, over the period 1958-1961, the 
relations between the two countries were good. This was evident, when Iraq had asked 
ruler of Kuwait, on 19 December 1958, to agree to the exchange of consular representation 
between Iraq and Kuwait,58 but this request had been always denied by Britain due to the 
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fact that the number of Iraqi residents did not exceed 30 nationals,59 as well as the new 
Iraqi regime was deemed a threat to British interests in the Gulf.   
Throughout the 1940s and 1950s, Kuwait focused on supporting the pillars of the modern 
state as a prelude to independence, either on the internal or external level, depending, 
primarily, on the economic factor that was represented in the financial surplus after the 
exportation of oil in 1946. On the internal level, Kuwait focused on the administrative and 
organizational structure of the facilities of the state and formed committees to reform the 
government departments in 1946. Further, over a decade and a half, it gave due care to the 
promotion of the medical, economic and educational levels of citizens. Moreover, it 
formed the Supreme Council in 1956 from the heads of the government departments 
accompanied by the formation of local councils such as the Municipal Council, the Awqaf 
Council and the Information Council. This was accompanied by the complete arrangement 
of the security and defence affairs, the regulation of the judicial authority and the 
promulgation of the nationality law in 1959.60  
On the external level, Kuwait endeavoured to carve out some independence from Britain in 
its external policy by cementing its ties with Arab countries in different economic, cultural 
and political fields. For instance, Kuwait signed a Joint Defence Treaty with Saudi Arabia 
in 1947,61 and it was behind the establishment of the Israel Boycott office, similar to the 
office of the member countries in the Arab League. 62 In addition, Kuwait joined several 
organizations, including the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the 
International Telecommunication Union (ITU) in 1959 and the Universal Postal Union 
(UPU), the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the World Health 
Organization (WHO), the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO) and OPIC in 1960. On 13 June 1961, six days before independence, Kuwait 
joined the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the Food and Agriculture 
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Organization of the United Nations (FAO).63 During the 1940s and 1950s, Kuwait sought 
to demarcate its terrestrial frontiers with Iraq upon the ‘Exchange of Letters’ of 1932 
mentioned above, yet the Iraqi authorities were not interested in the demarcation of 
frontiers for the above mentioned reason.64 
In 1958, there were conflicting but unsubstantiated reports from Cairo that Kuwait had 
applied for full membership of the Arab League, which was both a great surprise and 
concern for Britain,65 as such membership would affect British influence over Kuwait66 
and indicated the possibility that Qatar, Bahrain, Oman and the Trucial states would take 
similar steps. However, Sheikh Abdullah Al Sabah officially applied to Britain to obtain 
its  agreement  to  Kuwait’s  joining  the  Arab  League in August 1958, which added to British 
concern.67 To this were added the increasing sentiments against the British presence in 
Kuwait and the Arab region during the 1950s by Arab nationalists and Nasserites, 
especially after the ‘Suez Crisis’ or so-called ‘al-ʿUdwān  al-Thulāthī’ in 1956, which in 
July 1958, prompted Britain, in connection with US, after the military coup in Iraq on 14 
July, 1958 by nationalists against the monarchy, to discuss a recommendation to occupy 
Kuwait, and of course,   the   oilfields   in   the  Arab  Gulf   emirates,   and   run   it   as   a   ‘Crown  
Colony’.68 The concept of pan-Arabism, nationalism, self-determination and 
decolonization that swept the Arab and Third World during the 1950s and 1960s played a 
main role in Kuwait; it had an ideational and regional impact, which incited the Kuwaiti 
leadership to take this opportunity to apply for independence from Britain in 1961 by 
terminating the 1899 treaty.69   
In April 1961, Britain concluded that its fundamental interests would be best served by 
granting Kuwait full independence with a policy that was not dominated by Iraq, Saudi 
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Arabia and UAR or any other powers through allowing the ruler of Kuwait to make his 
own decisions in external affairs with the assistance of Britain, if requested. Thus, Britain 
hoped to avoid possible hostility from Arab nationalists in the case of a request for military 
protection. This is reflected in paragraph (4) in exchange of notes between Kuwait and 
Britain in 1961.70 On 19 June 1961, Kuwait gained independence from Britain and the 
treaty of 1899 was terminated and replaced with a friendship agreement in the form of an 
exchange of notes in accordance with the following terms:71 
1. The agreement of the 23rd of January, 1899, shall be terminated as being 
inconsistent with the sovereignty and independence of Kuwait. 
2. The relations between the two countries shall continue to be governed by a 
spirit of close friendship. 
3. When appropriate the two Governments shall consult together on matters 
which concern them both. 
4. Nothing in these conclusions shall affect the readiness of Her Majesty's 
Government to assist the government of Kuwait if the latter request such assistance.  
 
Six days after the independence of Kuwait, Abdul Karim Qasim (1958-1963), the Iraqi 
President at that time, alleged during a press conference held in Baghdad on 25 June 
1961,72 that Kuwait was subject to the control of the Ottoman Empire and that Iraq had 
inherited this empire, including Kuwait. Thus, he declared that Iraq would not recognize 
any  ‘fabricated  treaty’  imposed  on  Kuwait  by imperialist Britain, as Sheikh Mubarak had 
signed the 1899 treaty for Rupia (money). He affirmed: ‘A decree will be issued 
appointing Abdullah Al Salem, the Governor of Kuwait, as a ruler of Kuwait province 
affiliated to Iraq and the boundaries of Iraq extend  from  Kuwait  to  the  South’.73 Thus, in 
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late June 1961, Iraq sent its army to a point 26 miles from the borders of Kuwait from 
which troops could cross the border within an hour.74  Al-Mayyal suggests that the key 
motives behind the Qasim claim were a desire to seize Kuwait’s oil wealth, the unstable 
external and internal political situations of Iraq,   and   Iraq’s   desire   for   extended   sea  
outlets.75 Al-Rashidy adds to this the political conflict between Iraq (communist) and UAR 
(Nasserites) over the Arabian Gulf region and, of course, Arab regional politics.76 Kuwait, 
subsequently benefitted from the conflict between UAR and Iraq to bolster its 
independence in 1961.  However, Qasim may well not have really intended to invade at 
all, instead using the grandstanding in order to bolster his domestic position. 
Kuwait promptly denounced the claims and made a statement affirming that these 
allegations were groundless and had no historical foundation. Kuwait asserted that the 
country had never been a subject of the Ottoman Empire, and that the latter did not have 
any representative in Kuwait. The Iraqi and Kuwaiti governments published documents 
supporting their different points of view: the government of Kuwait published a book in 
Arabic  entitled  ‘The  Reality  of  the  Crisis  between  Kuwait  and  Iraq’,  which  contained  the 
correspondence and documents confirming that Iraq had accepted Kuwait as an 
independent country while Iraq  published  a  book  entitled  ‘The  Reality  of  Kuwait’.77  As 
British documents have shown, the Iraqi threat was a fundamental challenge to the British 
interests in the region due to the following three main reasons: 
a.  Kuwait represented a valuable insurance for oil supplies due to its vast oil reserves 
and through its good friendship with Britain; 
b.  its role in supporting the British balance of payments through the operations of the 
British companies which were working in Kuwait;  
c.  its membership of the sterling area and its willingness to accept payment for oil in 
sterling currency, as well as the considerable amounts of sterling it held.78  
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Therefore, Britain issued a statement on 26 June via the Foreign Office that Britain would 
support Kuwait and immediately sent its troops, along with Saudi Arabian troops, to 
Kuwait at the request of the Kuwaiti ruler on 30 June 1961. Britain was cautious in 
sending  urgent  military   help  before   it   had  been   able   to   assess   the  Arab   states’   stance   to  
avoid the traditional Arab target of British imperialism; therefore, it put its forces under the 
orders of the Kuwaiti ruler to gain political support from the Arab states.79 However, at the 
beginning, the British forces faced some troubles in Kuwait due to the unfavourable public 
reaction of Kuwaiti nationalists to such a military presence. This reaction was  influenced 
by UAR propaganda claiming that British forces had come to occupy Kuwait.80  
At  Kuwait’s  request,  the Arab League (AL) convened an urgent meeting on 20 July 1961 
to discuss Iraqi threats, in which the AL issued a statement rejecting the Iraqi threats and 
admitting Kuwait as the eleventh member state, in return for the withdrawal of British 
forces from Kuwait and their replacement with Arab forces, if Kuwait so requested.81 
Consequently, Iraq withdrew from the AL and declared the severance of relations with any 
state that recognised the independence of Kuwait. 82  In a similar approach, Kuwait raised 
the Iraqi threats with the UN Security Council (UNSC), which held four meetings from 2 
July to 7 July 1961 to discuss this crisis. However, the UNSC failed to tackle this crisis 
due to the Cold War between the ‘communist’  Eastern  and  ‘capitalist’  Western blocs. This 
affected the admission of Kuwait to the UN due to the Soviet Union using its veto as a 
demonstration of support for its Iraqi communist ally.83  After the arrival of Arab forces in 
September 1961, Britain began to accelerate the withdrawal of its forces to avoid any 
pressure  on  the  Kuwaiti  ruler  that  might  possibly  damage  Britain’s  relations  with  Kuwait.84 
However, Britain remained concerned that Kuwait would turn out to be under Arab 
influence, which might lead to the change of regime and have an effect on British interests 
in the Gulf region,85  similar to what happened in Iraq in 1958 and Egypt in 1952.  
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On 8 February 1963, there was a military coup against the regime of Abdul Karim Qasim 
in  Iraq  by  Ba’thists.86 Kuwait, after this coup, sought to have a legal recognition from Iraq 
according to its frontiers already stated in 1932 correspondences. This is what actually 
happened, when the new Iraqi government, under the presidency of Abdul Salam Arif 
(1963-1966), recognized the independence of Kuwait as per the convention that was 
signed between both parties on 4 October 1963 and also recognized the Kuwaiti-Iraqi 
frontiers specified in the 1932 exchange of letters.87 The agreement was as follows:  
1. The Republic of Iraq recognizes the independence and complete sovereignty of the 
State of Kuwait with its boundaries as specified in the letter of the Prime Minister of Iraq 
dated 21.7.1932 and which was accepted by the ruler of Kuwait in his letter dated 
10.8.1932. 
2. The two Governments shall work towards reinforcing the fraternal relations 
subsisting between the two sister countries, inspired by their national duty, common 
interest and aspiration to a complete Arab Unity. 
3. The two Governments shall work towards establishing cultural, commercial and 
economical co-operation between the two countries and the exchange of technical 
information.88 (See Appendix 5). 
In order to achieve all the aforementioned objectives, the two nations immediately 
established diplomatic relations at the level of ambassadors. Under this agreement, the 
political crisis between Kuwait and Iraq was over, but the frontier demarcation issue was 
still pending in accordance with the contents of Article 1 of the agreement. Immediately 
after the signing of the agreement by both parties, Kuwait provided a $30 million loan to 
Iraq, which fell within the business of the KFAD, in addition to a $2 million gift to the 
families of victims of the 1963 military coup.89 As a consequence of these new variables, 
Kuwait reapplied to join the United Nations as the Soviet Union had blocked the Kuwaiti 
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application from 1961 to 1963, and the UN Security Council unanimously recommended 
admitting Kuwait to the UN Organization on 7 May 1963. On 14 May 1963, the UN 
General Assembly adopted a draft resolution to admit Kuwait to membership of the UN 
Organization and Kuwait became member No. 111 of the UN.90 
From 1963 to 1990, the demarcation of the terrestrial borders as per Article 1 of the 1963 
treaty remained a key factor in the disruption of relations between the two countries until 
the outbreak of the Iraq-Iran war, i.e., the First Gulf War (with notable crises in 1966, 1967 
and 1973), due to the fact that the Iraqis, over this period, did not want to put an end to the 
demarcation issue of borders with Kuwait, until the decision was made concerning the 
Iraqi demands in the two Kuwaiti islands.91  
 
4. Kuwaiti-Iraqi relations during the Iran-Iraq war 
Following a brief period of participation in government in 1963, the   Iraqi   Ba’ath party 
seized power through a military coup. Subsequently the party the sole party governing Iraq 
until 2003. It adopted radical Arab ideology based on a philosophy that focused on the 
notion of pan-Arabism, nationalism, struggle and socialism, whilst the Kuwaiti regime 
adopted Arab ideology, rather than radical policy, and has always been conservative and 
derived its legitimacy from the Kuwaiti people and the 1962 Kuwaiti constitution. Thus, 
Kuwait had always faced political problems with Iraq due to the internal political disorder 
of Iraq on the one hand, and on the other, the  Ba’ath party’s  policy  towards  Kuwait since 
1968, based on pacifying relations, but without the demarcation of the frontiers between 
the two countries.  
In the period 1971-1973, especially after the treaty of friendship and cooperation signed 
between Iraq and the Soviet Union in 1972, whereby the Russians pledged to develop the 
Iraqi Navy, Iraq insisted on solving the demarcation issue of borders and pressed Kuwait 
to accept the 1972 Iraqi initiative, which provides territorial concessions in favour of Iraq 
and joint defence and economic cooperation between the two countries.  The then minister 
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of foreign affairs, Sheikh Sabah Al Ahmed Al Sabah, during his visit to Iraq from 
26/2/1973 to 1/3/1973,   insisted   to   the   Iraqi   officials   that   ‘Kuwait  will   never   assign   one  
single   inch   of   its   territories’   although Kuwait appreciated the Iraqi needs for the 
navigational channels at the north of the Gulf region; therefore, Kuwait was ready to enter 
negotiations with Iraq to facilitate the use of these channels, but after the demarcation of 
borders. The Kuwaiti stance resulted directly in the third frontier crisis with Iraq in March 
1973, the so-called Al-Samitah incident.92  
Kuwait employed its economic tools against Iraq during these Kuwaiti-Iraqi crises. In 
addition   it   played  on   Iraq’s   economic   need by giving aid, in the hope of containing the 
Iraqi pressure. Kuwait gave an estimated KD 25 million during the 1967 frontier crisis, 93 
and KD 11.6 million in the 1973 crisis.94 
Following the signing of the Algiers agreement in 1975, where Iraq ceded half of the 
International waterway of the Shatt al-Arab to Iran, Iraq sought to compensate this loss by 
acquiring Warba and at least long-term leasing of Bubiyan. 95 The main reasons behind the 
Iraqi claims to these islands was the Iraqi ambition to divert them for military bases that 
could counter Iran and thus become a powerful state in the Middle East and Gulf region.96 
This was the main obstacle in the demarcation of the border between Kuwait and Iraq. 
This was evident, when Saddam Hussein in July 1981 pointed out in an interview with the 
Kuwaiti Al-Anba newspaper,  that  ‘demarcation  of  frontiers  between  both  countries  is  one  
of its most important personal interests […]   it   is   important   that Kuwait accepts the Iraqi 
proposal’97, concerning the leasing of Warba and Bubyan for long time to Iraq.   
During the period from 1978 to 1980, the Arabian Gulf region experienced political 
disorder represented by the Iranian revolution in 1979, the coup in Iraq by Saddam 
Hussein against president Ahmed Hassan Al –Baker in 1979 and the growing hostilities 
between Iraq and Iran. There was a severe propagandist war between Iraq and Iran 
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following the  arrival  of   ‘Shia   Islamism’   to   the  power   in   Iran.  This  was  evident  when  an  
Iranian broadcast   described   Saddam   Hussein,   the   new   Iraqi   President,   as   the   ‘devil’s  
puppet’   and   ‘mentally   ill’,   whilst   Iraq   described   the   new   Iranian   regime   as   a   ‘Persian  
racialist   regime’.   98 The Iranian revolutionaries raised concerns in the west due to the 
collapse of  the  west’s  ally,  the  regime  of  the  Shah.  Iran,  after  its  revolution  in  1979,  tried  
to   export   the   revolutionary   ‘Shi'ism’   to the world and dethrone the monarchical Gulf 
regimes, which affected Kuwait due to its geographic location and had a regional impact 
on its small Shia population. Thus, the new Iranian regime was a source of fear for Iraq 
and GCC states due to the seriousness of the Iranian revolution against the political system 
of the Arab Gulf states. The success of the Iranian revolution raised fears among the 
Kuwaiti political leadership from the Kuwaiti Shia of being courted to this revolution and 
concerns that it might affect its internal security situation through sectarian violence 
between  Sunni   and  Shi’ite   in  Kuwait,  which  could  drive   Iran   to exploit this situation to 
destabilize Kuwait. In addition, the new Iranian regime considered itself as a main 
supporter   of   the   ‘Palestinian   issue’,  which   raised   the   concern   of  Kuwait   that   this  might  
drive  a   ‘local   tripartite   alliance’   among   the  Palestinians,   Iranians   and  Shi’ites   in  Kuwait  
against the Kuwaiti regime.99 Therefore, the issue of the Kuwaiti–Iraqi frontiers lost its 
importance due to these events, especially after the outbreak of the Iraq-Iran war in 
September 1980.  
This war placed Kuwait into a position with two critical options: either to maintain its old 
policy  of  ‘neutrality’  in  the  region  or  to  support  Iraq.  However,  Kuwait  and  the  GCC  states  
supported Iraq from the beginning of its war against Iran in order to curb the seriousness of 
the Iranian revolution in the region.  Despite the fact that Kuwait officially announced its 
neutrality towards this war, in practical terms, it was the main supporter of Iraq. This was 
made evident when Kuwait submitted economic assistance to Iraq during this war (1980-
1988) estimated at $ 13.2 billion, as well as political and media support for Iraqi demands 
to stop this war. Kuwait paid 10% of Iraq's financial obligations to the British companies 
during this war. This was in addition to the free transport of military equipment and 
commercial items to Iraq through Kuwaiti ports and terminals and allowing the Iraqi jet 
fighters to use the Kuwaiti air space in order to attack Iran.100 For example, after the 
                                              
98   Wright, Robin, Op.Cit. p.84. 
99   Assiri, Abdul Reda, Op.Cit. p.173. 
100   Al-Rashidy, Ahmed el.at (ed.), Op.Cit. p. 636. 
 
 
97 
occupation of the Iraqi Al-Faw Peninsula, near the Kuwaiti borders, in 1986 by Iran, 
Kuwait asked Arab states to support Iraq in public and supported the imposition of 
economic  sanctions  against  Iran.  Most  notably,  the  ‘Arab  identity’  played  a  role  in  Kuwait  
during the Iraq-Iran War, when Kuwaiti media used the  notion  of  ‘nationalism’  as  a  pretext  
for supporting Iraq against Iran.101 This urged Iran, and of course Iraq, to attack Kuwaiti 
interests internally and abroad through terrorist operations in Kuwait and the bombardment 
of Kuwaiti oil and merchant vessels in the Gulf region (Tanker War) as reprisal for the 
Kuwaiti stance in this war. Therefore, Kuwait experienced an unstable internal and 
external situation due to the fallout of this war, as will be discussed in Chapter 4.102    
 
5. Iraqi-Kuwaiti relations 1988-1990 
Following the issuance of the resolution of UNSC 598 on 20 July 1987,103 the war between 
Iraq and Iran ended in August 1988, after both states accepted this resolution. However, 
this war drove out of Iraq as a regional military power with an increased number of trained 
troops and military arsenal. Thus, Iraq looked forward to playing a role in the Middle East, 
which the Kuwaiti decision-makers had not taken into consideration and which might have 
had nothing to do with the fact that Iraq would be the real threat, with its expansionist 
ambitions   and   its   economic   weakness   after   the   end   of   its   war   with   Iran   and   Kuwait’s  
inability   to   counteract   Saddam     Hussein’s   ambitions   towards  Kuwait   due   to   its  military  
weakness  compared with Iraq, its small population and Saddam Hussein’s  popularity   in  
the Arab world after the end of the Iraq-Iran War.  
Some of the consequences of this war, in particular the political and economic instability 
and a major financial crisis in Iraq due to the huge amounts of debt owed to Kuwait and 
Saudi Arabia, helped lead to the Second Gulf War, which shifted from economic issues to 
frontier ones and ended with the occupation of Kuwait on August 1990.104  
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Some sources estimated that the costs of reconstructing Iraq were as high as $230 billion at 
that time.105 Out of Iraq’s total estimated debt of $80 billion, it was estimated that Iraq 
owed $40 billion to the Arab Gulf States.106 Furthermore, there was an increase in 
unemployment and a shortage of consumer articles and services in addition to internal 
social problems.107 Despite these problems, the Iraqi regime did not reduce military 
expenditure after the war: rather, it expanded its military manufacturing and armament 
program  with  Soviet  and  ‘Western’  assistance.108 Therefore,  Iraq’s  economic  burdens were 
aggravated.109  
Kuwait foreign policy towards Iraq during this time rested on two important principles:  
1. Demarcating the Kuwaiti-Iraqi frontier: Kuwait’s   leadership believed that its 
support to Iraq during its war with Iran would be an incentive for Iraq to demarcate its 
frontier with Kuwait in accordance with the treaties already signed. 
2. Avoiding any political problems with Iraq: In this respect, the Kuwaiti government 
rejected any criticism of Iraq for using chemical weapons against Iran during the war and 
against the Kurds in 1988.110  
In an attempt to address some of the consequences of the war, Saddam Hussein, in 1990 
sent an Iraqi delegation to Kuwait, presided over by Dr. Sadoun Hammadi, the Deputy 
Prime Minister, to apply for a financial loan and to offer the concept of defence and 
security arrangements between the two countries. However, Kuwait rejected these 
conventions in the letter sent from Sheikh Sabah to Hammadi on 18 March 1990 because 
the provisions of these treaties contradicted   Kuwait’s   sovereignty   and   its   constitution; 
Kuwait also reiterated the importance of resolving the issue of the demarcation of borders 
before discussing anything else.  
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Consequently, relations between the two parties were tense following the Baghdad summit 
in May 1990 when the Iraqi president attacked some Arab oil-producing countries for 
lowering the international oil prices; he claimed that some Arab states had not observed 
OPEC resolutions, and that this had resulted in massive losses in Iraqi revenues. During 
his attack, Saddam Hussein did not mention any names, but he looked at the Amir of 
Kuwait   and   the   President   of   the   United   Arab   Emirates   and   said,   ‘You are launching 
economic  war  against  my  country’.111 This was the beginning  of  Iraq’s  construction of a 
set of justifications for its eventual invasion of Kuwait, which in many ways was a direct 
consequence of the economic and political impact the war had had on Iraq and its regime – 
as chapter 5 will discuss in greater detail.  
The  Iraqi  invasion  proved  that  the  notions  of  ‘pan-Arabism’  and  ‘nationalism’,  which  had  
been the most influential factors in Kuwait up until 1990, were just slogans for external or 
internal  purposes,  after  the  ‘negative’  public  and  formal  Arab  stands  in supporting the Iraqi 
invasion and its demands from Kuwait.112  As a consequence of this invasion, the notions 
of  ‘pan-Arabism’  and  ‘nationalism’  lost  their  potency,  at  least  in  Kuwait.  This was made 
evident when some Kuwaiti nationalist groupings, such as the Movement of Kuwaiti 
Democratic Progressives, which belonged to the Arab Nationalist Movement, changed its 
bloc’s  name  after  the  Iraqi  invasion  of  Kuwait  to  the  Democratic  Forum  in  1991,113  due to 
the pan-Arab  movement’s  support  of  the  Iraqi  invasion.  This also applied to some Islamic 
blocs, such as the Islamic Constitutional Movement, which formed in 1991 and belonged 
to the Muslim Brotherhood Movement, due to the stance of the leadership of the 
Brotherhood toward the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.114  Most of these Kuwaiti political 
groupings started to reorganize their political orientation and principles based on the Arab 
public  and  Arab  organizations’  stance  from  the  Iraqi  invasion.  Clearly, the invasion was a 
major shock for the Kuwaiti political blocs.  
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Thus, the Iraqi invasion has become a constant backdrop in the minds of the Kuwaiti 
people since the liberation of Kuwait in 1991. As a result, Kuwait, after its liberation in 
1991, has become more pragmatic in its foreign policy based on the fact that it is a small 
state surrounded by three big regional powers with a different ideology. Kuwaiti decision-
makers realized that good relations with the great powers, particularly with the US, were 
essential for Kuwaiti security, Thus, the Iraqi invasion in 1990 changed the concept of 
Kuwaiti foreign policy at the international and regional levels, as we will discuss in more 
detail in Chapters 4 and 5.  
 
6. Conclusion  
Since its inception in 1613, the settlement that became known as  ‘Kuwait’ and the political 
entity that grew from it, faced external risks; this is particularly true after the appearance of 
international competition in the Gulf region during the 18th and 19th centuries, such as the 
threat of the Wahabi Movement and tribes, and threats from the Ottoman Empire from the 
18th century until the outbreak of the First World War. Under  Sheikh  Mubarak  ‘the  Great’,   
while nominal suzerainty of the Porte needed to be acknowledged, de facto autonomy was 
carved out, gradually consolidated by British protection. Following the collapse of the 
Ottoman Empire after World War I, Iraq appeared for the first time as an integrated state 
with clear boundaries in 1921. In late 1922, Kuwaiti-Saudi borders were demarcated at the 
Al-Uqair Conference, in whichthe sheikh of Kuwait lost 160 square miles of the territories 
he had claimed. The Kuwaiti-Iraqi borders were again demarcated pursuant to 
correspondence among Iraq, Kuwait and the UK in 1932.  From the time of its emergence, 
the state of Iraq has constituted a real threat to Kuwait, especially during certain periods in 
the 1930s until the fall of Abdul Karim Qasim’s regime in 1963. The unstable political and 
economic situation of Iraq was a major factor in this. From 1963 until 1990, the non-
demarcation of territtorial frontiers between Iraq and Kuwait in accordance with the agreed 
‘Minutes  of  1963’  signed  between  the two countries, and the unstable internal and external 
situation of Iraq, became a dilemma for Kuwaiti security through the subsequent frontier 
crises (in 1966, 1967 and 1973), as regards gaining territorial concessions and financial 
aid. The Iraqi attempts to obtain territorial concessions from Kuwait in Warba and 
Bubiyan, two Kuwaiti islands, in addition to its poor internal situation after the Iraq-Iran 
War, which negatively reflected on Kuwait and resulted in the appearance of the warning 
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signs of the Second Gulf War. However, the implication of Iraq-Iran War was realised on 
2 August 1990, when Iraq occupied Kuwait on the basis of several assumptions (see 
Chapter 5).   
The story to this point has been one where the rulers of a small, vulnerable player, initially 
only being able to count on its strategic location as a resource – which was simultaneously 
a source of pressure – and which from the 1950s acquired increasingly rich material 
resources – sought continuously to adjust alliances and relations based on the shifting 
regional and international resources available to them, notable securing great power 
protection without becoming beholden to this protector, indeed keeping open multiple 
channels in readiness to shift again as power balances changed. Taking account of the 
immediate regional ideational environment was imperative – especially given the 
shikhdom’s   position   next   to   an   irredentist   and   Arab   nationalist   Iraq.   But   that   careful  
balancing and search for security was dramatically cut across by the invasion, which at the 
same time fundamentally affected Kuwait foreign policy, not least by reducing the salience 
of the Arabism factor, and by making recourse to protection by the US more visible and 
up-front. It is this effect of thwe invasion that this thesis will be examining in greater 
detail. 
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Chapter IV 
 
 
Factors shaping Kuwaiti foreign policy  
 
 
 
This  chapter   sets  out   the  main  categories  of   factors   that  have  made  up  Kuwait’s   foreign  
policy environment. Its starts out by focusing on the  country’s  geography  – which makes it 
both vulnerable and much prized – before going on to examine, first, the external factors; 
second, the external ones; and finally, the political system and decision-making system.  
 
 
1. Geography  
 
Kuwait is located in the north-western part of the Arabian Gulf, having common frontiers 
in the south and south-west with Saudi Arabia. In the north and west, it shares frontiers 
with Iraq and its eastern maritime border separates it from Iranian waters. Its location 
makes it an access point for the north of the Arabian Peninsula.  It is also small and 
geographically vulnerable, due not just to its size but to its location between three large 
regional powers. Its terrain is largely flat desert surface and the desert climate is harsh. In 
contrast, of course, it harbours some 10% of the world’s  oil  reserves. 
 
The distance between the northernmost and southernmost points is about 200 km (124 
miles), and the distance between the eastern and western frontiers at a latitude of 29o is 
about 170 km (106 miles).1  
The length of the frontiers is about 685 km (426 miles), of which about 195 km (121 
miles) are taken up by the Gulf coast. Of the 490 km (304 miles) of shared land frontiers, 
250 km (155 miles) are with Saudi Arabia in the south and the south-west, and 240 km 
(149 miles) with Iraq in the north and northwest.2 The total area of Kuwait is 17.818 sq 
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km (6960 sq miles),3 including the Kuwaiti share of the Neutral Zone with Saudi Arabia, 
the total surface of which is estimated at 5700 sq km.4 
On 17 December 1967, an Amiri decree was issued demarcating the territorial waters of 
Kuwait by 12 miles, including the Kuwaiti islands and considering Kuwait bay as an 
absolute territorial water (Figure.3). Kuwait’s territorial waters are estimated to cover 2200 
sq miles and are divided into two parts:5 
1. the northern area, which consists mostly of shallow waters of not more than 
five meters with a muddy bottom, where Warba and Bubyan are located.  
2. the southern area, which is relatively deep, with its bottom covered with a 
mixture of sand and silica sediments. Most Kuwaiti ports have been established on 
the southern coast of the country due to the depth of the water.  
The geographical location of Kuwait has always been of great importance either to the 
surrounding countries or to major powers. This location has been built upon and added to 
due to Kuwait’s role as an airbase and as a supply and storage depot, and of course, also, 
since the 1930s, due to the  location  of  10%  of  the  world’s  oil  reserves.6 
Geopolitics and the competing objectives and ambitions  of  Kuwait’s  bigger  neighbours  in  
the region have made for a difficult foreign policy environment. Thus, the presence of Iraq 
to the north, with an unsettled border, until 1993, complicated by issues over Iraqi access 
to the Gulf, but always embedded in ideological differences as well, has resulted in 
frontier violations by Iraq, the most important of which were the 1966 and 1967 crises and 
the occupation of the Kuwaiti police post (Al-Samitah) in 1973,7 in addition to the non-
demarcation of terrestrial frontiers between the two countries in accordance with the 
agreed   ‘Minutes  of  1963’   signed  between   them,  which   resulted   in  political   disorder   and  
the construction of installations on the Kuwaiti frontiers during the Iraq-Iran War to 
                                              
3   Ministry of Information, Al- Kitāb  as-sanawī ,Op.Cit. p. 21. 
4  Middle East and North Africa 2004, Regional surveys of the world, 50th edition, Europa Publications 
Limited, Routledge, London, 2004. p. 676. 
5 Ministry of Information, YearBook, Op. Cit, p. 22. 
6   Al-Feel, M. Rashed, Aljughrāfyah  at-tarīkhīyah  lil- Kuwayt, ‘Historical  Geography  of  Kuwait’, 2nd 
edition,  That  Al -Salasil for Publication and Printing, Kuwait, 1985.  p. 32. 
7  Schofield, Richard, Arabian Geopolitics Regional 3: Documentary Studies: The Iraq – Kuwait Dispute 
1830-1994, Vol. 4, Op. Cit. p. 452. 
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support Iraq. In addition, there was the  use  of   the   ‘frontier   issue’   as   a  pretext   to   invade  
Kuwait in 1990 (see Chapter 5).  
Designs on Kuwaiti territory and autonomy have been a hallmark of Iraqi (and before that 
Ottoman) regimes – ranging from attempts to secure northern parts of the country on land 
and at sea, to full-scale  annexation.  Following  Iraq’s  creation  as  a  state,  this  was  clear  in  
the statements of King Ghazi in the 1930s and the regime of Abdul Karim Qasim in the 
early 1960s. Iraq long endeavoured to control Warba and Bubyan8 due to their 
geographical location,9 which prompted Rafsanjani, the Iranian President, during the Iraq-
Iran War, in 1984, to warn Kuwait regarding territorial concessions in the two Kuwaiti 
islands in favour of Iraq; he stated, ‘I am just telling the rulers of Kuwait to not play with 
fire [...] I say now to Kuwait and the Gulf Co-operation Council member countries and 
others if we were to capture the islands from Iraq tomorrow, Kuwait would have no 
territorial  claim  there’.10  However, during the regime of Saddam Hussain, Iraq occupied 
Kuwait in 1990 for many reasons, the most important of which was the strategic value of 
Kuwait’s   geographical   location   for   economic   and   military   bases   (see   Chapter 5).11 
Between 1991 and 2003, the Gulf region witnessed several events and hostilities between 
Iraq and the US that affected Kuwait due to its geographical location, the most important 
of which was the outbreak of war in 2003, which resulted in the occupation of Iraq and the 
fall  of  Saddam  Hussein’s  regime  in April 2003. The implications of this war, which Iraq 
chose to enter into, were foreign interventions and the spillover of sectarian violence; this 
affected Kuwait and the whole region as ideational factor, as will be discussed later in 
Chapter 9.12 
Iran, after its revolution in 1979, tried   to  export   the  revolutionary  ‘Shi'ism’ to the world 
and dethrone the monarchical Gulf regimes. Khomeini declared: ‘We shall export our 
revolution to the whole world; until the cry, ‘There is no God but God’ resounds over the 
                                              
8  For more details see AL-Mayyal, Ahmad Y.A, Op.Cit. pp.80-89. 
9  Partrick, Neil,  ‘Kuwait's  Foreign  Policy  (1961-1977): Non-Alignment, Ideology and the Pursuit of 
Security’,  unpublished, Thesis (Ph.D.), University of London, 2006. pp.170-175. 
10  Schofield, Richard, Arabian Geopolitics Regional 3: Documentary Studies: The Iraq – Kuwait Dispute 
1830-1994,Vol.4, Op.Cit.p.473. 
11  Panel of specialists 1995, Op.Cit, p.99. 
12  For more details; see chapter VII and VIII.  
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whole   world,   there   will   be   struggle’,13 and to this were added sabotage and military 
harassment by Iran during the Iraq-Iran war.14 This war directly affected the internal and 
external situation of Kuwait due to its geographic location, as the war arena was just 150 
kilometres away from Kuwait City.15 This war took the shape of attacks on Kuwaiti 
installations and Kuwaiti and international oil tankers: an estimated 353 oil tankers and 
merchant vessels were bombarded by both parties between 1984 and 1987, in what 
became  known  as  the  ‘Tanker War’.16 Thus, Kuwait asked for assistance from US in 1987 
to protect its vessels by hoisting US flags on the Kuwaiti vessels. The US accepted this 
offer due to its consequent fear against Soviet existence in the Arabian Gulf should it 
refused this offer. The total number of tankers attacked from 1981 to 1988 was 542: 329 
by Iraq and 213 by Iran. Kuwaiti shipping suffered 6% of all attacks (1981-1987),17 with 
attacks taking place on 48 tankers bound for Kuwait.18 In addition, acts of violence, 
explosions, terrorist operations and assassination attempts occurred in Kuwait during the 
1980s by tapping the Kuwaitis and residents for terrorist operations; these have been 
estimated at 28 explosions; 2 hijackings of Kuwait Airways jets and 21 assassinations;19 
the most important of which was the assassination attempt on the Amir of Kuwait on 25 
May, 1986 due to the fallout of this war.20 Iran and, of course, Iraq used Kuwait as a 
‘battlefield’  in  supporting  these  attacks,  resulting  in  violence occurring in Kuwait or GCC 
states, such as the coup attempt by 73 Gulf Shi'a citizens to overthrow the Bahraini regime 
in December 1981 as discussed below.21 In addition, the unsettled maritime border 
                                              
13  Wright, Robin, The Name of  God : The Khomeini Decade, ( London : Bloomsbury Publishing Limited), 
1990. p.108. 
14  Alduehis , Ahmad Hammoud, ‘Siyāsat  al-Kuwayt il-khārijīyah  min  1961  ʼilā  1990’,    ‘Kuwait’s  Foreign  
Policy from 1961 – 1991’  ,  unpublished  master’s  thesis,  Jordanian  University,  Amman,  1992. p. 32.  
15  Assiri, Abdul Reda, 1992, Op.Cit., p.179. 
16 Cordesman, Anthony H. and Abraham R. Wagner,  ‘The  Iran-Iraq  War’,  in  Cordesman,  Anthony  H.  and  
Abraham R. Wagner (eds.), The Lessons of Modern War, Vol. II. Henceforth referred to as Lessons, 
Boulder: Westview Press, 1990. pp. XIV – 17- 18. 
17  Kelley, Stephen  Andrew,  ‘Better  Lucky  Than  Good:  Operation  Earnest  Will  as  Gunboat  Diplomacy’,  
Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey,California, 2007, pp.30-64. 
18 Al-Shaheen, Sulaiman Majed, Ad-diblumāsīyah  al-kuwaytīyah  bayn  al-miḥnah  wal  mihnah, ‘Kuwait  
Diplomacy  between  the  Crisis  and  Professionalism’, 1st edition, National Library of Kuwait, Kuwait, 
2001.p.294. 
19  Awadh  ,  Sami  ,  ‘Islamic  Political  Groups  in  Kuwait:  Roots  and  Influences’,  unpublished Thesis (Ph.D.), 
University of Portsmouth, UK, 1999.p.43. 
20   AI-Zamat  ,  Khalid  Hamed  S.  ‘    The  Basis  for  Cooperation  in  the  Gulf  Region:  An  Assessment  of  the  Gulf  
Cooperation  Council’,  unpublished Thesis (Ph.D.), University of Glasgow, UK, 1998.p.83. 
21  Boghardt, Lori Plotkin, Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution,  St  Antony’  Series,  2006.  p.54. 
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between Kuwait and Iran embroiled the two countries in disputes over the exploitation of 
the Continental Shelf in Durra (Arash) oil field.22 Nonetheless, since 2006, after the 
UNSC sanctions (Nos. 1737, 1747 and 1803) on Iran over its nuclear program, the main 
concern of Kuwait has been the potential environmental impact of its Bushehr nuclear 
plant, and of course, the political and military aspects, due to its near location on the 
opposite shore to Kuwait, and the outcome if it is damaged or suffers any leak due to 
natural causes.23 Wikileaks documents show that concern was expressed several times by 
Kuwaiti   officials,   who   were   surprised   to   learn   from   the   Russian   ‘contractor’   that   the  
Bushehr reactor is not threat to the region.24 The Kuwaiti concern was aggravated after 
tension between Iran and the international community on the one hand, and with Israel on 
the other hand, concerning the possibility of a military strike against Iran or on its nuclear 
reactors given what the impact would be on Kuwait and any effects of this war on the 
internal and external situation of the Arab Gulf states from Iran as happened in Iraq-Iran 
War. Thus, Kuwait and the GCC states were concerned and were hesitant as to whether to 
challenge Iran over its nuclear program due to the fear that Iran might classify them as 
pro-Israeli and use this as propaganda to justify reprisals.25 Therefore, Kuwait set up an 
emergency plan since 2007 to tackle any possible hostile acts or any incidents of 
radioactive pollution from   Iran’s   nuclear program due to its sensitive location and the 
possibility of attacks by Israel or any other state. 26 
Saudi Arabia had also posed some risks to Kuwait since the emergence of the Wahhabi 
movement in the 18th century when members of the movement tried to subjugate Kuwait 
in 1793, 1795 and 1797, although these attempts proved futile.27 The most important of 
these were the last three battles against Kuwait by the Ikhwan, a religious military force of 
the Ibn Saud, in the Hamdh area (Battle of Hamdh) in May 1920, Jahra city in October 
                                              
22  Gulf News,  ‘Kuwait  rejects  Iran’s  threats  over  gas  field  development’,  January 4, 2012, UAE. 
23  Arab Times ‘Kuwait concerned over Iran's Bushehr nuclear  plant’,  24 Auguest, 2010. Kuwait. 
24  Wikileaks,  ‘Parade  of  Foreign  Ministers  Talk  Iran  in  Kuwait:    No  Great  Ideas  Emerge’,  Reference ID: 
06KUWAIT1921, CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN, Embassy Kuwait,  2006-05-24.  
25  Ibid,  ‘Scenesetter For Counselor Zelikow's Feb. 28 -March 1 Visit to Kuwait’,  Reference ID: 
06KUWAIT594, CONFIDENTIAL, Embassy Kuwait,  2006-02-21. 
26   James Calderwood,  ‘Kuwait unveils plan to tackle possible radiation accidents’,  The  Natioanl,  30  
Auguest 2010. 
27  Aidaroos, Mohamed Hassan, Op.Cit. pp.40-44. 
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1920, the so-called  ‘Battle  of  Jahra’28, and the ‘Battle  of  Injair’  in  1929,  which  ended  with  
Britain  intervening  and  taking  responsibility  for  Kuwait’s  security  as  per  the  1899  treaty.29 
The Saudi military threat became a historic fundamental moment for Kuwaiti nation-
building with the construction of the second Sour ‘Wall’ in 1814, after Wahabi attacks, 
and the third in 1920, after Hamdh battle, around Kuwait City to deter any threat.30 
However, Saudi Arabia succeeded in reducing Kuwait’s territories at the Al-Uqair 
Conference in 192231 to demarcate the frontiers between Kuwait, Iraq and Saudi Arabia; 
when Kuwait lost approximately two-thirds (160 miles)32 of its territories in favour of 
Saudi Arabia and a neutral zone was created between the two countries.33 This was 
expressly declared by Sir Percy Cox at the Al-Uqair Conference34 to placate Ibn Saud, 
because Iraq was given a large area in Najd (see Figure 1 and 2).35  
Kuwait’s geographic location among three major powers, then, forced its leaders to adopt 
a regionally neutral policy until the end of the 1970s to avoid a collision with these 
powers.36 However, the threats the Iranian revolution posed to the monarchical Arab Gulf 
(as   well   as   Saddam’s   regime   in   Iraq),   and   the   outbreak of the Iraq-Iran war that soon 
followed, obliged Kuwait and, of course, the other monarchical states of the Gulf, to 
abandon their non-aligned regional stance and support Iraq against Iran despite retaining, 
formally, a neutral policy.37 The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was a reflection of the disorder 
                                              
28  Captain D.M Fraser report on Kuwait Crisis and Battle of Jahra, 18 November 1920  in Rush, A.de L. 
(ed.), Op.Cit. pp.198-199. 
29  The Ikhwan attack in 1929 came after their rebellion against the command of Ibn Saud. See; Martin 
Asser (ed.), Kuwait Political Agency: Arabic Documents 1899–1949, Vol.2, Archive Editions, 1994. 
pp.228-231. 
30  Al-Mayyal, Ahmad Y.A, Op.Cit. p.95.  
31  The conference was held under the supervision of Sir Percy Cox, the British High Commissioner for Iraq. 
The Saudi side was represented by Ibn Saud. The Iraqi side was represented by Sabih Beg, Minister of 
Communications and Works. The Kuwaiti side was represented by J.C.More, the British Political Agent 
in Kuwait. See AL-Mayyal, Ahmad Y.A, Op.Cit.p.100. 
32   Sultan, Ghanem, Al-ghazw il-ʽirāki  lil  Kuwayt:  Kiraʼah  muwjazah  fī  Jawānib  min  ʼishkālīyat  il-ʼazmah,  
‘The  Iraqi  invasion  of  Kuwait:  A  Brief  Reading  of  the  Problematic  Aspects  of  The  Crisis’,  1st edition, 
AL-Wazzan  International Printing  Press, Kuwait, 1994. p.50. 
33  Kuwait  lost  the  area  of  the  ‘Green  Line’  to  Saudis  which  demarcated  between  Kuwait  and  Ottoman  
Empire in accordance of Anglo-Ottoman  Draft  Convention’  of  1913  mentioned  in  the  Chapter  3.  (see  
Figure 1 and 2 for the space of Green Line). See the Kuwaiti-Najd Boundary Convention-1922 in Rush, 
A.de L. (ed.), Records of Kuwait 1899–1961, Op.Cit. p.366. 
34  Al-Feel, M. Rashed, Op. Cit, p.42; AL-Mayyal, Ahmad Y.A, Op.Cit.pp.102-109. 
35  Sluglett, Peter, Op.Cit. p.800. 
36  Partrick, Neil, Op.Cit. pp.58-64. 
37  Ibid. pp.192-193. 
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that resulted from this change of formula via the establishment of ‘security  treaties’  with  
major powers to enable Kuwait maintain its integrity.38  
Kuwait’s   history   of   obtaining   great   power   protection   to   guard   against   such   regional  
challenges resulting from its location, had to be adjusted again following the UK's 
announced withdrawal from the Gulf region in January 1968.39 In the immediate aftermath 
of the announcement, a major delegation representing all sectors of the state, presided 
over by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah, visited the 
countries of the region in 1971 with a comprehensive draft agreement covering all areas of 
the Arab Gulf countries. This draft agreement would eventually find expression in the 
formation of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) on 25 May 1981. However, the country 
simultaneously maintained and developed strong external security links.40  
Geography, then, remains one of the most important factors to shape the attitude of 
Kuwaiti decision-makers,   especially   Kuwait’s vital geographic location overlooking the 
Arabian Gulf. It does, of course, as has already been amply illustrated, blur into the 
category of the external environment, which we explore further below. 
 
2. External Factors 
2.1. The Gulf environment 
Following the UK's announced withdrawal from the Gulf region in January 1968 and the 
tension between Iraq and Iran over the Shatt al-Arab waterway in 1969, in addition to the 
occupation   of   UAE’s   islands   by   Iran   from   1971,   Kuwait   realized   the   importance   of  
coordination between the Arab Gulf countries on the issue of the security of the Gulf 
region as a key element for their continued independence, despite being small states with 
small populations surrounded by big regional countries, which complicates their defence 
and development planning.  Britain in particular represented a very important stabilizing 
factor for the entity of Kuwait against external risks, most notably Iraq and Iran as 
                                              
38  Al-Watan  Information  &  Studies  Center,  ‘Foreign  Policy:  Classification  No.  5-6’,  dated  3  April  1997,  
Kuwait. 
39  Partrick, Neil, Op.Cit. p.151. 
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mentioned above. Thus, the common idea linking the establishment of the Council 
crystallized between 1967 and 1971 by Kuwait, before the independence of UAE, Bahrain 
and Qatar, due to its sensitive location besides two regional powers; Iraq and Iran. In 
1976, Kuwait called for joint coordination between the six Arab Gulf states at all levels to 
cope with the competing objectives and ambitions of international and regional powers 
due to the absence of collective security system among these states. Therefore, the 
Kuwaiti Crown Prince Sheikh Saad paid an official visit in 1978 to the six Arab Gulf 
states to discuss this coordination. 41 Another regional concern was the outbreak of the 
Iranian revolution in early 1979, with Khomeini later describing the rulers of the Arab 
Gulf  states  as  ‘mini  Shahs’.   
There was a shifting number of material and ideational challenges to the internal situation 
of the GCC states; in addition to the exclusion of Egypt from the Arab policies after the 
Camp David Accords of 1979  and the growing hostilities between Iraq and Iran,42 Kuwait 
and its neighbouring Arab Gulf states realized the importance of establishing a collective 
security  ‘cooperation’,  not  alliance,    as  protection  against  external  threats  and,  of  course,  
the ideological clashes and changes in the region, which placed the political system of the 
monarchical Gulf states in a vulnerable position, as previously mentioned, due to the 
emergence   of   the   security   vacuum   in   the   Gulf      after   the   fall   of   the   Shah’s   regime.43 
Therefore, the foreign ministers of the six Arab Gulf states held a meeting to discuss the 
Kuwaiti proposal in October 1979, for the first time, to establish the Gulf Cooperation 
Council on the sidelines of Islamic Countries Conference in Taif, Saudi Arabia.44  
In late 1979 until the mid 1980s, Kuwait and the other monarchical Gulf  states witnessed 
internal and external challenges, such as the seizure of the mosque in Mecca by Sunni 
extremists in November 1979, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979; and 
the consequent fear of the American that soviet would gain control of the Arabian Gulf, 
the two explosions of 12 July 1980 in the office of the Kuwaiti newspaper al-Rai al-Amm, 
two explosions of 26 May 1980 at an Iran airline office and the assassination attempt on 
                                              
41  Assiri, Abdul Reda 1992, Op.Cit. p.190. 
42  Boghardt, Lori Plotkin, Op.Cit. p.29. 
43  El-Rayyes, Riad, Gulf Winds: The Beginning of Gulf Cooperative Council, 1980-1990, Riad El-Rayyes 
Books S.A.L, Beirut, January 2012. pp.44-46. .   
44  Ibid. p41.  
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the Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ghotbzadeh, in April 1980 in Kuwait.45 In 
addition, feelings were running high amongst the Shia citizens in the Gulf states due to the 
Iranian revolution and the outbreak of the Iraq- Iran War in September 1980; the aftermath 
posed internal and external challenges to the Arab Gulf states and so accelerated the 
establishment of the Gulf Cooperation Council on 25 May 1981 at the first summit held at 
Abu Dhabi.46 Therefore, the two concerns of the GCC states that can be explained in 
terms of their regional foreign policy are external and domestic security47 as follows:  
1. the outbreak of the Iranian revolution in 1979 which threatened the Gulf region 
through the risk of exporting the Iranian revolution to the Arab Gulf48  
2. the international competition on the Arabian Gulf region between the USA and the 
West on the one hand and the Soviet Union on the other, due to the establishment of The 
Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force in 1979 by US, after the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan, to protect its interest in the Gulf region.   
3. the  Soviet  Union’s  occupation of Afghanistan in 1979 and its attempt to reach to 
the Gulf region by its allies such as South Yemen and Iraq.  
4. the instability of the region due to the Iraq-Iran War.49 
 
The   GCC   is   very   significant   in   Kuwait’s   foreign   policy,   as,   simultaneously, an 
environmental factor and a tool. It is one of the closest entities to Kuwait and its national 
interests, in terms of Gulf identity, geographic contiguity, regime similarities, and threat 
perception. It highlights the issue of integration and security in the Gulf as one of the most 
prominent issues of Kuwaiti foreign policy. Therefore, since 1981, Kuwait has called for 
close cooperation within the institutional framework among the six GCC states to confront 
the risks that threaten the region, either from the political, economic, cultural, social or 
military aspects.   
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The efforts of Kuwait within the Gulf arena have three basic foci: 
1. the active participation of Kuwaiti officials in the meetings and conferences of the 
GCC and their submission of papers discussing the issues of mutual interest 
2. focusing on Saudi Arabia in particular, due to the fact that it is the nearest country 
to Kuwait and it is interested in Kuwaiti issues at present and has been in the past. This 
issue was quite evident in 2000 when relations between the two countries witnessed a new 
turn when the difference over the maritime frontiers was settled and a final agreement was 
concluded, bringing to a close 34 years of dispute between the two countries.50 
3.    the coordination on security and  political issues.    
The impact of this circle is clear from a study conducted before and after the 
establishment of the GCC, from 1978 to 1988, regarding the diplomatic coordination of 
the ministers of foreign affairs of the GCC states via voting in the UN General assembly 
on resolutions regarding international issues. This study shows that the percentage of the 
GCC states demonstrating political coordination before the GCC was no higher than 
33.5%, but after the GCC had been established, it was 64.17%, taking into account that 
this difference was of no significance in the international issues following the 
establishment of the GCC. It is noticeable that there were significant differences in Kuwait 
before and after the establishment of the GCC: the percentage of coordination between 
Kuwait and the GCC states increased from 30% to 67.5% regarding the voting on all 
international issues.51  
Furthermore, after the Iraqi invasion, Kuwaiti coordination with the GCC states on issues 
related to the Middle East  was  enhanced,  particularly  regarding  the  UN  and  the  ‘Iraqi  file’.  
This was evident through the effective role of the GCC in the liberation of Kuwait and the 
mobilization of Arab and international opinion against the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, in 
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addition to  financial  and  military  support  for  Kuwait  through  GCC  states’  participation  in  
the coalition forces that liberated Kuwait in 1991.52 Kuwaiti foreign political movements 
on   the  Gulf   level  had  created   ‘unanimous’   support   for  Kuwaiti   issues,  particularly   those 
related to the method of dealing with Iraq. There was unity of opinion of the GCC states 
on  the  ‘Iraqi  issue’  in  all  statements  of  the  Council  from  the  liberation  of  Kuwait  till  the  
date of this study, calling upon Iraq to implement the international resolutions related to 
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, to respect Kuwaiti sovereignty and its frontiers in accordance 
with UN resolution No. 833 of 1993, to release Kuwaiti prisoners of war and to restore 
Kuwaiti property.53 This coordination was reflected in the unified political and military 
efforts in 1994 to face the Iraqi forces, when Iraq mobilized 100,000 troops on the Iraqi-
Kuwaiti frontiers in an attempt to repeat the outcome of the second Gulf crisis (see chapter 
7).54    
 
2.2. The Arab and Islamic Factors 
The Arab and Islamic identities are highly salient ideational factors in the Arab world.55 
The value of these identities is evident in Kuwaiti political and social life, as reflected in 
Article   1   of   the  Kuwaiti   constitution:   ‘Kuwait   is   an   independent   sovereign Arab State. 
Neither its sovereignty nor any part of its territory may be relinquished. The people of 
Kuwait  are  a  part  of  the  Arab  Nation’,  and  Article  2:  ‘the  religion  of  the  State  is  Islam,  and  
the Islamic Shari’a shall be a main source of legislation.’56 
Despite Kuwait’s  foreign  policy  being  characterized  by  a  ‘secular  approach’,  the  Arab  and  
Islamic identities have strong influences on the decision-makers due to political 
tendencies inside and outside Kuwait having an internal and external effect. For example, 
                                              
52  Ibid, p.305. 
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during the 1950s and 1960s, the concepts of pan-Arabism and nationalism had a stronger 
impact on Kuwaiti politics than did Islamist orientations because of the role played by 
Arab nationalists in  the Arab world on the one hand, and the large Arab immigrant 
population in Kuwait on the other, such as the Palestinian community, who were educated 
and predominantly supportive of government positions in the formation of these ideas on 
the   streets   of   Kuwait,   especially   regarding   ‘self-determination’   and   ‘decolonization’  
through Nasserism; this was also reflected in the MPs of the Kuwait National Assembly.57 
Thus, up to 1990, Kuwait was more Arabist than were other Gulf States. This was due in 
part due to the role of the Kuwaiti nationals within the Kuwaiti parliament and the large 
Arab immigrant population and their activities within the margin of freedom and 
democracy   allowed   in   Kuwaiti   society.   It   was   also   rooted   in   Kuwait’s   earlier  
development, not least educationally, as well as in its location next to Iraq – and the need 
on the part of the ruling family to react to, or pre-empt the effects of, Iraq’s nationalist 
rhetoric.  
Since the beginning of the 1980s, the Islamist orientations have had an increasing impact 
on Kuwait because of the dominance of Islamic movements in the Kuwaiti parliament, at 
the same time as regional Arabist ideology lost its potency. The Islamist tendency became 
more influential than pan-Arabism  in  Kuwait  after  1990,  due  to  the  setback  of  ‘negative’  
public and formal Arab stands regarding the Iraqi invasion and support for this occupation 
(see Chapter 5). Therefore, the Islamist orientations have played an essential role and 
drawn   attention   to   Kuwait’s   leadership,   especially   after   the   dominance   of   Islamists   in  
Kuwaiti parliament. This was expressed in the secret telegram of the US Embassy in 
Kuwait  in  2005  on  the  role  of  Islamists  in  Kuwait  as  follows  ‘Their influence has grown 
tremendously over the last three decades as Islamists have become prominent in 
Parliament and throughout  government  ministries’.58  
The significance of these identities in Kuwait can be seen through the support for the 
Palestinian, Arab and Islamic issues in the NA and the Kuwaiti press and by the Kuwaiti 
MPs whose stances drew attention to the Kuwaiti leadership.59 For example, the Arab 
identity is an essential element in the concept of Kuwaiti foreign policy, which has been 
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expressed by the Amir of Kuwait, Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah, who stated that the 
Arab  home  ‘constitutes  a  pivotal  foundation  for  the defense of the security interests of our 
great  Arab  homeland’.60  
As these identities have gained particular significance in Kuwait, it is important to explain 
the actual stand of Kuwait on issues regarding Islam and Arab solidarity in a manner that 
serves the national interests of both parties. This is the circle of national belonging, as 
Kuwait is a member of the AL and OIC, and it cannot isolate itself from Islamic and Arab 
issues, particularly those related to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the peace process in the 
Middle East, due to its identity and geographic location. For instance, since the first 
summit of the Arab League in 1964, Kuwait has started a new era of effective 
participation in the decision-making of the Arabic resolution through its commitment to 
Arab resolutions and its financial contribution (as a major contributor) to the League of 
Arab   States.   This   participation   can   be   illustrated   by   Kuwait’s   support   for   the   military  
capability of Arabs and the establishment of the Palestinian Liberation Army to liberate 
Palestine through its payment of £1,600,000 out of £150 million annually for 5 years from 
1964.61 Following the 1967 setback, Kuwait paid £55 million of the proposed £135 
million to support states affected by war and to finance the process of military 
mobilization of the affected countries so they might be prepared for any aggression62. In 
the war of 1973, at the OAPEC meeting in Kuwait on 17 October 1973, Kuwait declared 
its solidarity by its decision to reduce oil production by 5% each month until the Israelis 
had withdrawn from the occupied territories63 This was in addition to an oil embargo to 
selected countries that were supporting Israel in the 1973 war, namely, the USA and some 
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European countries, like Holland.64 In this war, Kuwait  sent  the  ‘Yarmouk  brigade’,  which  
had been stationed on the Egyptian frontiers since 1967, to fight beside the Egyptian 
troops. The Kuwaiti air force also played a vital role and transported supplies to troops 
stationed on the Arabian fronts during this war. Further, Kuwaiti armed forces contributed 
by  sending  ‘Jahra  troops’  to  the  fighting  with  the  Syrian  troops  throughout  the  conflict.65  
All of the above links back to the concept of the Arab identity and the Arab League Joint 
Defence and Economic Co-operation Treaty (JDECT), which was concluded in 1950. The 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait resulted in the collapse of the concept of the Arab Security 
System, which was based on the JDECT.  
The liberation of Kuwait by the use of non-Arab troops established the futility and 
incompetence of Arab security. Consequently, following liberation, Kuwait attempted to 
close the security gap in the Arabian Gulf, laying out new principles and features for a 
new security defence group following the failure of the previous security system to stop 
the Iraqi aggression to Kuwait and the fact that the security of the Gulf had not been left to 
foreign forces only, whose existence might be harmful to Arab interests. Therefore, 
following the liberation of Kuwait, six GCC states signed the   ‘Damascus   Declaration’  
with Egypt and Syria on 6 March 1991. This declaration was designed to set out security 
arrangements and perspectives that would meet the security needs of the GCC states by 
involving the Arab countries in the security of the Gulf region66, and to a create solid new 
base for the Arab front. This declaration was based on the JDECT, the UN Charter, and 
international conventions67. The Damascus Declaration provided a plan to establish an 
Arab peacekeeping force in the Gulf region and the Arabian Peninsula, comprising 
Egyptian, Syrian and GCC troops. However, this declaration was not a replacement for the 
security treaties that had already been signed between Kuwait and permanent member 
countries of the UNSC; rather, it was designed to involve  the  Arab  countries  in  the  Gulf’s  
security affairs.  
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On 19 July 1991, the Damascus Declaration was amended to provide greater flexibility 
and mobility to its parties and to reduce group commitment through security cooperation, 
instead of through the presence of Arab forces, due to this Declaration cannot provide the 
defence needs of six Arab Gulf states. In addition, the unified economic objectives of this 
declaration were abandoned and replaced by more humble aims in the economic field. 
Therefore, the ambitious Damascus Declaration is now defunct68 due to the dissatisfaction 
of Egypt and Syria with the amendments of the Declaration supporting cooperation in 
security issues, instead of permanent Arab military forces in the Gulf.69  However, even 
though it imposed huge material obligations on the Gulf parties, it was just a draft Arab 
integration project that provided security protection to the Gulf countries in return for 
them providing economic support to Egypt and Syria with $10 billion being allocated to 
both countries, although the final amount was reduced to only $6 billion.70 There was a set 
of territorial and international circumstances that motivated the eight Arab countries (the 
six GCC states, Egypt and Syria) to sign the Damascus Declaration:  
1. The destruction of the Iraqi military and industrial capabilities and the possibility 
of dividing Iraq into three main regions (Kurds in the north, Shia in the south and Sunnis 
in the middle) may disturb the balance of power in the region in favour of the territorially 
affected countries, i.e. Iran in the East, Turkey in the north, Ethiopia in the south and 
Israel in the middle of the Arab world.  
2. The Arab region would lose a senior comprehensive reference point following the 
collapse of the role of the Arab League.  
3. The Arab system started to collapse and become weak in favour of the concept of 
the territorial system in the Middle East. 
4. The Arab security system failed to stop the Iraqi aggression to Kuwait based on the 
JDET of 1950. 
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5. The USA emerged as a superpower and the influence of the Soviet Union 
deteriorated under the new world order.71 
On the other hand, this invasion changed the Kuwaiti concept in dealing with the Arab-
Israeli conflict. Before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Kuwaiti policy had been built on the 
‘direct’   and   ‘indirect’   economic   boycott   of   Israel   in   accordance  with   the   Israel   Boycott  
Office, founded in 1951 and affiliated to the Arab League, which bans economic dealings 
with  the  ‘Hebrew  state’  and  with  companies  that  conduct  financial or commercial dealings 
with Israel. These companies were blacklisted in Kuwait. However, Kuwait, following its 
liberation,   stopped   its   ‘indirect’   boycott   of   Israel   and   lifted   the   ban   imposed   on   the  
companies that had been previously blacklisted for dealing with Israel, although it 
maintained a direct boycott based on national interests. Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-
Sabah, Kuwaiti Minister of Foreign Affairs  at   that   time,  declared  that   ‘Kuwait  and  other  
Arab countries have lifted the indirect embargo imposed on Israel due to considerations 
related   to   national   interests’.  He   added:   ‘Some   Jeep   vehicles   had   been  boycotted   in   the  
past, but recently have been imported as this serves the national interest. Kuwait is still 
adopting a direct economic boycott that has been imposed by the Arab League for four 
decades   against   Israel   and   it   will   never   abandon   the   direct   boycott   of   Israel’,   thus  
explaining  what  is  meant  by  ‘indirect  boycott’.72  
 
2.3.  International factors 
Since   its   liberation,  Kuwait’s   foreign  policy  has been based on two main pillars: policy 
and security. Kuwait has determined a set of political objectives that include supporting 
the efforts of the international community towards international peace and security and 
adhering to a policy of international legitimacy, territorial and international cooperation 
(UN, GCC, Arab League, Organization of Islamic Conference, Non-Aligned Movement 
and other territorial and international institutions).73  
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Before the Iraqi invasion, Kuwait had refused any foreign intervention or presence in the 
Gulf region, whether military, by forming an alliance with other countries, or otherwise. 
Sheikh Saad Al-Abdullah Al-Sabah, Kuwaiti Crown Prince and Prime Minister at that 
time, pointed out,  
Major powers have their own interests and they are seeking dispersion and harm to our 
region, but good coordination among the countries of the region has become essential. The 
spirit of responsibility incites many to satisfy this atmosphere of coordination. Moreover, 
the feeling of these countries of risk will be eliminated should mutual cooperation be 
available among them to repel foreign threats and risks. 74  
He  then  reaffirmed  this  view,  saying:  ‘Kuwait  does  not  believe  in  any  parties  or  blocs  in  
the region and it does not support the same by any means whatsoever, as alliances are 
harmful to the region and it does not conform to the undeclared non-alignment policy of 
Kuwait’.75 However,   after   the   ‘Tankers  War’   in   1980s   and   the   liberation   of  Kuwait   by  
foreign troops in 1991, these conceptions changed. Thus, the GCC states believed a 
foreign military existence in the region to be essential because of the aggressive policies 
and conduct of Iraq and Iran; they also believed that the international umbrella was a very 
important factor for the stability of the region.76 Moreover, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 
established  the  ineffectiveness  of  the  ‘Peninsular  Shield’  of  the  GCC  states  that  had  been  
established in 198277 and of the security arrangements with the Arab countries under the 
JDECT. Therefore, since liberation, Kuwait has depended on several aspects to create 
security arrangements to protect itself, particularly from Iraqi threats, which constitute the 
main threat to Kuwait. These arrangements have been made on regional and international 
levels as preferable options.  
On   the   regional   level,   the   GCC   states   signed   the   ‘Damascus   declaration’,   as   already  
mentioned, while on the international level, Kuwait turned to major countries to protect it 
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and signed five security agreements with permanent members of the UN Security 
Council.78 On September 1991, Kuwait signed a joint defence pact with the US for ten 
years, automatically renewable. Under this treaty, both countries would conduct exercises 
for the Kuwait armed forces and joint manoeuvres. It also provided for defence purchases, 
the mobilization of military equipment in Kuwait to be utilized in emergency situations, 
and the provision of security cover to Kuwait that would guarantee the non-recurrence of 
the invasion.79 Furthermore, Kuwait and Britain signed a defence cooperation treaty on 11 
February 1992. This treaty provided for defence cooperation, purchase of British military 
equipment by Kuwait, and joint manoeuvres and exercises. On 22 September 1992, the 
Kuwaiti and British Defence ministers signed a treaty that was supplementary to that of 
the February regarding defence purchases. Further, Kuwait and France signed a military 
cooperation treaty and protocol organizing the purchase of weapons and military 
equipment for the Kuwaiti Army in October 1993. On 29 November 1993, Kuwait and the 
Russian Federation signed a military cooperation treaty. The term of this treaty was 10 
years whereby joint manoeuvres would be conducted between the two countries and 
Kuwait would purchase military equipment from Russia80. In addition, Kuwait and China 
signed a defence treaty in 1995. However, these treaties do not refer to any foreign troops 
staying on Kuwaiti territory; rather, the presence of these troops is restricted to conducting 
joint military exercises and manoeuvres to support the defensive capabilities of the 
Kuwaiti troops. These treaties may be terminated by either party81.  
International organizations, such as the UN, the concept of alliances and nearby 
superpowers have started to play a role in Kuwait policy due to their role in liberating 
Kuwait in 1991 (see Chapter 5). For instance, the Kuwaiti method of dealing with Iraq is 
based on UN resolutions, which has made this organization the most important element in 
Kuwaiti foreign policy due to its support for Kuwaiti demands (see Chapter 6). The 
concept of alliances has appeared in Kuwaiti policy, which reflects the emergence of the 
US-Kuwaiti alliance after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait through the designation of Kuwait 
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as  ‘a  major  US  non-North Atlantic Treaty  Organization  (NATO)  ally’  on  1  April  2004.82 
In  addition,  Kuwait  signed  a  set  of  agreements  with  NATO  allies  in  2006  under  NATO’s  
Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) of 2004,83 concerning the exchange of experiences 
and cooperation in border security, counterterrorism, crisis management, joint military 
exercises and military education and training.84 This was expressed by Sheikh Mohammad 
Al-Sabah,  who  stated  that  Kuwaiti  acceptance  of  the  ICI  ‘is  not  directed  against  anyone  or  
poses  a  threat  to  anybody’. He  added  that  ‘the  reservation  of  alliances  and  foreign  military  
bases  no  longer  exists’  and  that  ‘the  Iraqi  invasion  of  Kuwait  in  1990  and  its  implications  
for the latest qualitative change in the defence doctrine of the State of Kuwait and the 
GCC when the GCC states realized that security architecture that was prevalent then in the 
region  is  no  longer  effective  and  cannot  be  used  as  a  basis’.  He  attributed  the  reasons  to  
the lack of a balance of power within the Gulf region.85 However, as Wikileaks has 
shown, LeBaron, the US ambassador to Kuwait, commented on this issue in 2006, saying 
that  ‘the  fact  of  Kuwait  comes  at  a  good  time  - signalling to Iran small Gulf States have 
big  friends’.86  All these variables have appeared in Kuwaiti foreign policy as a result of 
the Iraqi invasion and the international circumstances and could be described as 
‘preventive  diplomacy’  for  Kuwaiti  security  and  the  GCC.87  
It is expected that these abovementioned treaties will remain in force for a long period and 
will be renewed by the contracting parties either with Kuwait or with the GCC states,88 
due to the strategic and economic importance of the Gulf region, particularly Gulf oil, 
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which is considered the most important factor for energy worldwide and for industrial 
countries in the future, due to several indicators, as follows:  
1. Major industrial states, such as the US, Canada and Britain, need external oil. For 
example, the US is the greatest consumer of oil worldwide, at 17.4 million barrels per day 
in 199889 and 20 million in 2005, although this figure was down to 18 million in 2009.90 
The oil requirements of these countries are expected to increase, with this trend having 
started in 2005, as studies have indicated. This means that the oil market will need to 
produce more oil, equivalent to the production of these three countries, that is, amounting 
to 12.6 million barrels per day, to create the required balance between production and 
consumption in the international oil market.  
2. The promotion and development of alternative energies such as solar, wind and 
thermal hydrogen are very slow, which means that alternative energy will not compete 
with the ordinary sources of energy, topped by oil and natural gas, in the near future.91  
3. Forecasts indicate that oil consumption will increase until 2020 at 2% annually, i.e. 
32.8 million barrels per day. International consumption will increase from 78.2 million 
barrels per day in 2002 to 111 million barrels per day in 2020. Further, expectations 
indicate that oil consumption by industrial countries will increase from 43.9 million 
barrels per day in 2002 to 52.2 million barrels per day by 2020.92  
This represents steadily increasing pressure on the oil countries that have significant oil 
reserves, such as the eight Gulf states, whose oil reserves are estimated at 660 billion 
barrels, i.e. two-thirds   of   the  world’s   oil   reserves.93 In particular, some sources suggest 
that the consumption level of Western countries in 2000, whose oil reserves are estimated 
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at 55 billion barrels, will provide them with enough for only five years of consumption.94 
North America and Western Europe imported about 21.5 million barrels per day in 2009.95 
While it is true that there are other territories in the world that are more willing to assist 
the West and that enjoy sufficient oil reserves, such as the oil reserves of Latin America, 
estimated at 138 billion barrels; of Western Europe, including Russia, estimated at 60 
billion barrels; and of Africa, estimated at 76 billion barrels; all these countries have been 
witnessing economic growth, which may require more local consumption and reduce oil 
exports. Thus, Gulf oil remains the most important source of energy for Western 
countries; it constituted 64 – 84%   of   the   world’s   oil   reserves   and   41%   of   the   global  
consumption of energy in 2000.96 The  GCC   states   have   45.3%   of   the  world’s   total   oil  
reserves,  which  represents  70%  of  the  Gulf’s  total  oil  reserves.97  
On the political and economic dimensions, since the emergence of New World Order led 
by US in 1991, the Gulf region has become more important to international powers, and 
particularly to the West and US in combating global terrorism and terrorist intelligence 
networks; most of the members of Al-Qaeda’s  network,  who  were  behind  the  9/11-2001 
terrorist attacks on the US, are Gulf citizens. There is also the need to contain some states, 
such as Iraq and Iran. This was evident in the role of the GCC states in providing logistical 
support by offering use of their land and airspace to the international coalition led by the 
US to contain Iraq with a no-fly zone from 1990 to 2003 and in the war of 2001 against 
Afghanistan; this is in addition to their role in the 2003 war against Iraq. For example, the 
Kuwaiti role was defined by US ambassador LeBaron in   2006:   ‘Kuwait's   extensive 
support for U.S. and coalition troops in the country is sensitive both domestically and in 
the  region’.  98  However, the US has remained concerned over the financing of terrorism 
and has been monitoring the activities of several Islamic charities in Kuwait and other 
                                              
94  Emirates Centre For Strategic Studies and Research,  Al- khalīj  al-ʽarabi:  mustakbal  al-ʼamn  was-siyāsāt  
al-biriṭānīyah,  ‘Arabian  Gulf:  The  Future  of  Security  and  British  Policy:  Energy Safety in the Arabian 
Gulf  Region’, 1st edition, UAE, 2000. p. 61 
95  Organization  of  the  Petroleum  Exporting  Countries  (OPEC),  ‘Annual  Statistical  Bulletin’.  Op.Cit.  p.57. 
96 The Emirates Centre For Strategic Studies and Research, Al-khalīj  al-ʽarabi: mustakbal al-ʼamn  was-
siyāsāt  al-biriṭānīyah,  Op.Cit. p.61. 
97  Morsi, Abdel-Aziz,  ‘ “Matha  baʽd  al-Nift?”  waḍʽ  duwal  majlis  at-taʽāwn  il-khalījī  wa  muḥāwalah  
listishrāf  āfāk  il- Mustakbal’,  ‘What  After  Oil?  ‘The  Status  of  the  GCC  States  and  an  Attempt  to  Explore 
the  Future’,  Journal of Social Sciences, issue No. 1, Kuwait University, Kuwait, 2002. p.181. 
98  Wikileaks,  ‘Kuwait:  2005/2006  Report  To  Congress  on  Allied  Contributions  To  The  Common  Defense’,  
Reference ID;  06KUWAIT407 ,SECRET  , Embassy Kuwait,  2006-02-06.  
 
 
123 
GCC states.99 Thus,   the   US   urged   Kuwait   to   enact   the   ‘terror   finance   and  
counterterrorism’  law  and  implement   its  plan  to  set  up  a  ‘rehabilitation  program’  similar  
to that of Saudi Arabia, for those who returned from Guantanamo Bay camp and for 
radical Kuwaitis. 100   
The 2000s have also seen the return in international affairs to a relatively more multipolar 
world, as the unrivalled dominance of the US was whittled away and other powers – not 
least Russia -  (re)aserted themselves. This went hand in hand with the ecomomic surge in 
Asia and the general international clout of the BRICS and Asian energy-hungry states.  In 
addition to changing the global landscape, this also further rasied the importance of the 
Gulf region to the Asian economies such as China, India and Japan. This was evident 
through the exchange trade between GCC and Asian economic states, which has risen 
rapidly from 10% in 1980 to 36% in 2009, compared to 45% with the OECD in 2009. For 
example, China and India, as major economic partners to GCC, contributed 58% of the 
GCC’s  total  trade  in  Asia  in  2010,  while  six  major  economies  of  ASEAN  made  up  35%.  
Thus,  it  is  expected  that  Asia  will  be  the  GCC’s  biggest  trading  partner  by  2017.101  
Kuwait has adapted to these shifts in international geopolitis and geo-economics, in 
dealing with its domestic interests and regional challenges and opportunities. 
 
3. Internal factors 
Among the internal factors shaping   Kuwait’s   foreign   policy, the political system is of 
course crucial. This will be discussed in detail together with the decision-making system 
that it is intertwined with, in the following section. Here, we focus on demography, social 
structure and ethno-religious factors, and economic factors.  
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3.1. Demography, social structure and ethno-religious factors 
 
Kuwait’s   small   national   population   has,   clearly,  meant   severe   limitations   on   its  military  
capacity. This has been exacerbated by aspects of local political culture – looking to the 
state as provider and the military as part of the state apparatus that provides jobs and 
income, and, at least until the invasion, a profession that at least the national population by 
and large did not see as a target of serious effort and commitment. The gradual turning to 
non-national military personnel imported for the purpose did not fully address this. As we 
will discuss military capacity in section 5, as part of the tool box for Kuwaiti foreign 
policy, we will not expand on this aspect further here, and instead turn to other aspects of 
demography and social structure. 
 
The first census in Kuwait dates back to 1957 when the total population was 206,473, of 
whom 113,633 were Kuwaiti nationals (55%) and 92,851 were non-Kuwaitis (45%). After 
the discovery of oil, there was increased demand for the different types of labour 
necessary to push forward policies for economic and social change; thus, the population 
increased dramatically and the demographic structure or demographic  transition changed 
in favour of non-Kuwaiti nationals. According to the 1989 statistics, the total population 
of Kuwait was an estimated 2,014,135, of whom 550,181 were Kuwaitis (27%) and 
1,463,954 were non-Kuwaitis (72.7%).102 Between 1930 and 1990, the population of 
Kuwait increased from 30,000 people to 2.2 million.103  
 
Following the liberation of Kuwait, many foreigners, especially Arabs, left the country 
and a degree of balance was restored between the numbers of Kuwaiti nationals and 
foreigners. At that time, the population of Kuwait was 1,484,431, of whom 642,596 were 
Kuwaiti nationals (43.3%) and 841,835 were non-Kuwaiti nationals.104 In 1998, the 
population was 2,270,865, of whom 786.010 were Kuwaiti nationals (34.6%) and 
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1,484,855 were non-Kuwaiti nationals (65.40%).105 By 2005, the population had grown to 
2,193,710 including 860,361 Kuwaiti nationals (39.2%) and 1.333.349 non-Kuwaiti 
nationals (60.8 %.).106  In 2006, legal Arab immigrants numbered 356,899, while there 
were 875,976 Asians, 24,416 Europeans and Americans and 4,588 Africans.107 This 
means that Asians represented the majority of the non-Kuwaiti population, followed by 
Arabs, Europeans and Americans, and finally, Africans due to political and security 
reasons discussed below. In 2008, the population of Kuwait was estimated at 3,328,136 
out of whom 1,038,598 were Kuwaiti nationals, while the rest were non-Kuwaiti 
nationals.108   
 
The varied social structure of the Kuwaiti population is an important factor in shaping 
Kuwaiti policy. This structure can be categorized into two main groups. The first is 
Kuwaiti nationals; this group can be divided into subgroups according to ethnic origin 
(Najedi, Persian and Iraqi), religious affiliation (Sunni -Shi'a),109 and families and tribes 
(Hadhar- Bedu). The second category is non-Kuwaiti nationals; this group also can be 
divided into subgroups along the lines of Arabs, non-Arabs and non-Muslims. This 
structure has sometimes resulted in tension between these groups for several reasons 
whether political, economic, cultural, or religious and so on,110 and especially between the 
groups such as between Sunnis and Shiites or families (Hadhar) and tribes (Bedu) in 
Kuwaiti society as discussed below.111 
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The non-Arab and non-Muslim populations have been cause for some social and cultural 
concerns among parts of the national population as representing material and ideational 
challenges to Kuwait. Concern about this was expressed by the Kuwaiti Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Sheikh Mohammed Al Sabah in 2011: ‘the  proportion  of  the  Arab  labour  
in the GCC dropped over the past 30 years from 72 percent in 1975 to 32 percent in 
2005”, something which he noted could pose challenges to the Arab and Islamic 
identity.’112 To date, however, this group has not posed any political risks to the  security 
of Kuwait except for the ideational challenges (identity or religion) and minor security 
issues represented by labour strikes, criminal incidents and public riots such as the three-
day Bangladeshi riot and the Asian workers strike on 29 July 2008 about the increase or 
nonpayment of salaries and unemployment problems113 and  the  ‘Egyptians’ riot’  in  1999  
due to a quarrel between Egyptian and Bangladeshi residents, which led to disorder and 
left Kuwaiti properties damaged.114 Thus, this group, except for the Iranian community, 
remains in the circle of minor security risks due to the fact that they are less concerned 
with and less involved in the issues and politics of the Arab and Middle East region, and 
their fears and concerns stem from their own insecure hold over jobs and residency.115   
 
In contrast, the Arab immigrants may constitute political risks to the security of Kuwait, 
especially  at  times  when  their  home  governments  were  ideologically  opposite  to  Kuwait’s 
policy.  This is demonstrated by the aforementioned acts of violence, explosions, terrorist 
operations and assassination attempts that occurred in Kuwait during the 1980s by the 
radical Arab and non-Arab immigrants (Iranians) due to the fallout from the Iranian 
revolution and the Kuwaiti stance towards the Iraq-Iran War. Iran and Iraq used Kuwait as 
a  ‘battlefield’  or  ‘proxy  war’  by  tapping the Kuwaitis and residents for terrorist operations. 
For example, Iran was the main supporter of some Kuwaiti Shi'a and Iranian residents 
who carried out terrorist and violent attacks in 1980s such as the bombings of the 
American embassy and Kuwait airport in 1983, the hijacking the Kuwaiti aeroplanes in 
1984 and 1988, the assassination attempt on the Amir in 1985 and the bombings of four 
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oil installations in 1986 that were claimed to be linked to the Iranian-supported Iraqi Al-
Dawa party and the Lebanese Hezbollah party. Iran was also linked with the weapon 
smuggling in Kuwait, with the Shiite incitement against the Kuwaiti leadership and the 
demonstrations by Kuwaitis and Iranian residents in support of the Iranian revolution and 
the capture of American hostages and the embassy in Tehran in early 1979-1980. In the 
meantime, Iraq supported the radical Arab residents who, it was claimed, were linked to 
Iraqi-backed organizations or individuals, and were responsible for acts such as the 
assassination of two Kuwaiti diplomats in New Delhi and Madrid in 1982, the bombing of 
a café, which left 11 dead in 1985, and the assassination attempt on the chief editor of the 
Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Siyassa in 1985 which were claimed to be linked with the 
Palestinian Abu Nidal Organization. To this were added the terrorist operations and 
assassination attempts against Kuwaiti and non-Kuwaiti individuals and Iranian interests 
in Kuwait during the 1980s.  
 
These internal and external challenges prompted Kuwait to deport 18,000 Arab and non-
Arab foreign residents from January 1979 to January 1980; Iranians represented 300% of 
the monthly average number of deportations (December 1979-January1980). This 
increased during the Iraq-Iran War from 50,000 to 100,000 (illegal residents) during 
1982116 but decreased to 62,125 from 1983 to 1988, of whom the Arabs (Iraqis, Lebanese 
and Jordanians of Palestinian origin) and Iranians represented the highest average 
proportion of deportations. To this is added the setting up of new restrictions on the 
awarding of visas for visits to Kuwait.117 Thus, the Kuwaiti leadership restored 
parliamentary life in February 1981 after its suspension since 1976, as the internal front to 
unite the Kuwaiti people behind their political leadership against any rebellion or threat to 
the Kuwaiti system.118 This is in addition to the exploitation of Arab immigrants in their 
important positions in the Kuwaiti bureaucracy for espionage activities, such as some 
Palestinians, of whom there were over 400,000 in Kuwait up to 1990, who, some of them 
collaborated with the Iraqi occupiers of Kuwait in 1990. This applied to some stateless 
Arab residents, known as Bidoon, 119 who, inspired by Iraq or Iran, constituted some risks 
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to the security of Kuwait through their role in the acts of violence during the 1980s, the 
collaboration with the Iraqi occupiers of Kuwait, 120 and their involvement in spying 
activities, such as the spy ring discovered in 2010121 and  Al  Qaeda’s network activities as 
discussed below. The unresolved issue of Bidoon, whose numbers, up to 2012 have been 
estimated at over 100,000, became a controversial issue in Kuwaiti society after its 
liberation in 1991, and represent major internal and external challenges to Kuwait, 
especially after the demonstrations of Bidoon that took place since 2011 during the Arab 
Spring to demand solutions to their problems.122 This   placed   Kuwait’s   reputation   in   a  
critical position before the international community and human rights watchdogs and also 
to its security.123  
On the other hand, there was little risk of political activism by non-Arab immigrants or of 
local meddling by their home governments – except, to some extent, when it came to Iran. 
Iranian citizens in Kuwait have been estimated to number between 54,000124 and 70,000 
(2009).125  As well as direct contact with its own nationals, there has also been some 
evidence of Iranian attempts to reach out to Kuwaiti Shia – even if the Kuwaiti Shia 
population for the most part has shown little interest in being courted by Iran. In two 
instances, the embassy of Iran convened with Kuwaiti Shiite individuals in 2004,126 which 
prompted the Kuwaiti Minister of Foreign Affairs to declare that the Iranian Embassy in 
Kuwait  ‘went  beyond  the  limits  granted  to  them  under  the  Vienna  Convention  governing  
diplomatic  work’,  which  led  the  Kuwaiti  Foreign  Ministry  to  summon  the  Iranian  charge 
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d'affaires.127 This  was  in  addition  to  the  claim  that  a  ‘spy  cell’,  discovered  in  May  2010  in  
Kuwait, was working with Iran's Revolutionary Guards;128 a year later, in 2011, the five 
members (2   Iranians,  Kuwaiti   citizen,   Syrian   and  Arab   stateless   ‘Bidoon’)   of   this   ‘cell’  
were convicted by a Kuwaiti court.129 The   GCC   states   condemned   Iran's   ‘flagrant  
interference’  in  regional  affairs  in  its  statement  at  the ministerial extraordinary meeting to 
discuss this issue on 3 April, 2011.130 The Kuwaiti Minister of Foreign Affairs declared 
that Kuwait ‘may  expel  three  Iranian  diplomats  over  a  spying  row  in  the  Gulf  Arab  state’ 
and that the Kuwaiti government had withdrawn its ambassador from Tehran; he also, 
accused  ‘Iran’s  elite  Revolutionary  Guards  of  being  behind  a  spy  cell  in  Kuwait’.131  This 
was linked to increasing concerns about wider Iranian influence in the Gulf region through 
the Shi'a.  Wikileaks documents have shown Kuwaiti officials were saying that ‘Iran is 
intent   upon   exporting   its   revolution   and   Shi'ism’132 in the Gulf and Yemen through 
‘supporting  Shi'a   in   the  Gulf  and  extremists   in  Yemen’,133 and were deeply worried that 
Iran  ‘would  be  more  inclined  to  meddle  in  Kuwaiti  internal  affairs  given the thirty percent 
of the nation that is Shi'a’.134 This concern expressed in the secret telegram of the US 
Embassy in Kuwait in 2007, as   follows  ‘Many Kuwaiti Sunnis fear Iranian-backed Shi'a 
ascendancy in the region and some see the Shi'a in Kuwait as a significant security 
threat’.135    
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As to other internal  challenges,  it  can  be  seen  that  ‘tribalism’ ,versus families, has played 
an essential role in Kuwait, as expressed by US ambassador, Deborah, in 2009: ‘Tribalism 
is a central factor in Kuwait's socio-political equation [...] tribalism partly fills the void 
created by the absence of official political parties’;136 she added, ‘In contrast to the rising 
influence of Kuwaiti tribal groups, Kuwaiti merchants’ sense of shared identity and once 
predominant overt  political  and  economic  power  has  waned’.137  Therefore, the political, 
economic, and ideological struggle for power among the Kuwaiti nationals (Hadhar 
‘families’   versus   Bedu ‘tribes’,   Sunni versus Shi'a) to achieve short-term political and 
economic gains, especially in Kuwaiti bureaucracy, has been a main concern of Kuwait 
since 2006. This fact was stated by US officials in Wikileaks documents:  
with rising oil revenues, the ruling Al Sabah family was able to provide - for the 
first time - health care, education and other services for its primary beneficiaries, 
the Hadhar . As such services and benefits increasingly trickled out to the tribes 
beyond the old line of the city wall […]   the traditional distinction in lifestyle 
between the Hadhar and the now settled tribes narrowed; but a fundamental 
difference of mindset continued to divide the two. That distinction never 
disappeared, and is the essence  of  Kuwait's  tribalism  ‘problem’  today.138  
Nonetheless, the struggle between the Sunni and Shi'a was exacerbated in Kuwait after the 
fall of Saddam Hussein regime in 2003 due to external and internal reasons having 
ideational and regional impacts, the most important of which was the spillover of the 
fallout of Iraqi Sunni-Shi'a sectarian violence in 2006; this divided Kuwaiti society, 
leading people to support their own ideological affiliations through demonstrations and 
protests, which threatened the ‘national  unity’ and social cohesion in Kuwait as discussed 
in Chapter 9.139 For this reason, the Amir of Kuwait has emphasized the importance of 
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‘national  unity’  among  Kuwaiti  nationals  in  all  his  speeches  since  2006  until  the  present  
time.140   
After the 9/11 terrorist attack in the US in 2001, the activities of Kuwaiti and non-Kuwaiti 
extremists in conjunction with Al-Qaeda’s  network became the main challenge to Kuwaiti 
security. This is evident through the terrorist operations that have occurred in Kuwait 
since 2002 that are claimed to be linked to Al-Qaeda, the most important of which has 
been the violent clashes between   the   Kuwaiti   security   police   and   ‘Peninsula Lions 
network’,   affiliated   to  Al-Qaeda, in January 2005,141 for which 30 of the 37 members 
(Kuwaiti, Arab, Bidoon) were convicted in December 2005 by a Kuwaiti court for 
attempting to overthrow the regime in Kuwait and for seeking to kill US troops in 
Kuwait.142  This  is  in  addition  to  the  Kuwaiti  nationals’  involvement  in  the  Jihad activities 
in Iraq since 2003, whose networks became a main concern for Kuwaiti security stability 
(see Chapters 8 and 9).  These considerations  reflect  on  Kuwait’s  security  and  ideational  
social risks that may affect the internal or external stability of the Kuwaiti national unity 
in the case of conflict or tension between these identities.143 
 
3.2.  Economic factors 
Economic factors have given Kuwait much more clout regionally and internationally than 
its size would otherwise have suggested. Thus, Kuwait has employed economic means as 
one of the tools of its foreign policy towards Iraq and other countries to protect or further 
its national interests. In the past, and before the discovery of oil, Kuwait relied on 
pearling, growing crops and keeping livestock, and trade. The importance of Kuwait at 
that time was due to its location at the top of the Arabian Gulf, which formed a link with 
the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. At that time, before the opening of the Suez Canal, the 
Arabian Gulf was the only port for European trade. Vessels and ships coming from India 
                                              
140  For all of  H.H. the Amir of Kuwait Speeches;  available online at the website of  Al-Diwan Al-Amiri; 
http://www.da.gov.kw/eng/speeches/amir_speeches_2011.php  
141  Terrill, W. Andrew, 2007, Op.Cit. p.51. 
142  Wikileaks,  ‘Peninsula Lions Verdict In: 30 Convictions Including 6 Death Sentences’,  Reference  ID: 
05KUWAIT5270, UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY, Kuwait Embassy, 27 December 
2005.   
143  Okruhlik,  Gwenn    ,  ‘  The  identity  politics  of  Kuwait’s  election’, Foreign Policy Magazine, 8 February, 
2012; http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/02/08/the_identity_politics_of_kuwait_s_election 
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and destined for Syria and Europe used to pass through the Arabian Gulf.144 Thanks to its 
location, Kuwait offered a key commercial link between the Arabian Gulf and Europe. 
This economic importance increased when the Persians occupied Basra between 1776 and 
1779, which led Britain to relocate the East India Company (UK) to Kuwait and transfer 
to there its post and trade. In addition, migration to Kuwait increased, which made Kuwait 
an economic point of transit. In 1862, the British traveller W. Palgrave visited Kuwait and 
mentioned that he preferred its port to the nearest ports on the Arabian Gulf. 145  
Following the discovery of oil in Kuwait in 1938, the economic climate in the country 
changed and most pre-oil exploration industries ceased to exist. The exploration for oil 
gave rise to international ambitions towards Kuwait, especially from Iraq. Nonetheless, 
due to the Second World War, Kuwait did not export the first shipment of oil until 1946. 
The export of Kuwaiti oil has had an impact on the social and economic lifestyle of the 
country and on its public policy after the nationalization of oil in Kuwait in 1975  (Kuwait 
Oil Company).146  
Oil is considered the main source of national income; it contributed 91.5% of the total 
revenue in 2011.147 Kuwait’s  oil  reserves were estimated at 101.5 billion barrels in 2009, 
representing 7.6% of the total oil reserves in the world (estimated at 1033.5 billion 
barrels).148 The average daily production of Kuwaiti oil was 2.051 million barrels per day 
(mbpd) in 1998.149 However, after the discovery of a new light oil and gas field with an 
estimated production capacity of 80,000 barrels of light oil per day and 110 mcfpd, in 
December 2009, Kuwait announced that its production capacity had reached 3.150 mbpd. 
                                              
144  Al-Tamimi, Abdul Malek Khalaf, Al-khalīj  ilʽarabī  wal  maghrib  il-ʽarabī:  dirāsāt  fit-tārīj  as-siyāsī  wal-
ijtimāʽī  wal  iktisādī,  ‘Arabian  Gulf  &  al-Maghrib al-Arabi Area: Studies on the Political, Social and 
Economic  History’, 2nd edition, Dar Qurtas for Publication and Distribution, Kuwait, 1999.pp.38-40.  
145  Al-Feel, M. Rashed, Op.Cit.p.393. 
146  Assiri, Abdul Reda, An-niḍām  as-siyāsi  fil-Kuwayt:  mabādi’  wa  mumārasāt  ,‘Political  System  in  Kuwait:  
Principles  &  Practices’, Op. Cit.p.266. 
147  Ministry  of  Finance,  ‘Statement of the Minister of Finance On the Economic, Monetary and Financial 
Conditions  And  the  Draft  Budget  for  the  Fiscal  Year  2011/2012’,  Public  Budget  Affairs,  Kuwait.  p.80. 
Available online on the  Ministry of Finance website at; http://en.mof.gov.kw/  
148  There are no official statistics regarding the Kuwaiti oil reserve, and most of the figures are predictions. 
See BP p.l.c.,  ‘BP  Statistical  Review  of  World  Energy’,  June  2010.  p.6.  On  the  BP  website;;  
www.bp.com/statisticalreview     
149  Ghunaimi, Zain Eldeen Abdulmaqsoud , Al-Kuwayt  wa  taḥadiyāt  al-karn il-ḥādi  wal  ‘ishrīn:  Ru’yah  
Strātījīyah  was-tishrāfīyah ,  ‘Kuwait and the Challenges of the Twenty First Century. Strategic and 
Futuristic  Vision’, 1st edition, Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait,  Kuwait, 2001. p.24. 
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Kuwait seeks to have increased its production capacity to 4 mbpd by 2020.150 However, 
oil has led the Gulf region to become an arena for international competition due to the fact 
that it estimated to have 64%   of   the  world’s   oil   reserves.151 Kuwait has diversified its 
income by investing its surplus oil revenues and avoiding a reliance on its oil resources 
through the establishment of the ‘Kuwait   Investment   Board’   in   London   in   1953,   eight  
years before its  independence.  This  was  the  first  ‘sovereign wealth fund’  in  the  world.152  
In 1982, the Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA) was established to take over from the 
Ministry of Finance the responsibility for controlling Kuwait’s   assets.   It   provides an 
alternative to oil reserves, which would enable Kuwait to cope with the uncertain 
circumstances in the fluctuating world economy. The KIA manages two funds: the 
General Reserve Fund (GRF) and the Future Generations Fund (FGF).153 In 2010, 
Kuwait’s   foreign   investment   portfolio   (GRF and FGF) was an estimated KD 80.589 
billion (equivalent to $277 billion).154  
Oil wealth also made Kuwait a more tempting target, and indeed a target for envy, not 
least for Iraq. This led Kuwaiti decision-makers to employ the economic factor to serve 
Kuwait’s   foreign   policy,   i.e.   employing   the   surplus   material   resources   for   security   and  
political objectives to gain allies and deter opponents as discussed below. Following the 
collapse   of   Saddam   Hussein’s   regime   in   2003,   the   importance   of   this   factor   has   been  
evident in Kuwaiti foreign policy in the form of the so-called   ‘economic diplomacy’,  
which first appeared in January 2004.155 Sheikh Mohammed Al Sabah, Kuwait Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, expressed the objectives of this term as follows: 
1. To utilise the geographic location of Kuwait to serve the economic objectives via a 
revival of the old project related to the route connecting China with the Arabian Gulf, 
                                              
150  Ministry  of  Oil,  ‘KOC  celebrates  its  Diamond  Jubilee’,  Inaft Magazine, 1 January 2010, Kuwait; 
http://www.moo.gov.kw/magazine/en/index.asp?More=yes&NewsID=595&mode=0&day=31&page=12  
151  Ghunaimi, Zain Eldeen, Op.Cit. p.24. 
152  Robert  M.  Kimmitt,    ‘Public  Footprints  in  Private  Markets:  Sovereign  Wealth  Funds  and  the  World  
Economy’  ,  Foreign Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 1, 2008. p.119.  
153  See keynote speech of Mr.Bader M. AL SA'AD, Managing Director Of Kuwait Investment Authority,  at 
The First Luxembourg Foreign Trade Conference, 9 April 2008. On the KIA website 
http://www.kia.gov.kw/En/About_KIA/Pages/default.aspx 
154  There are no official and accurate statistics regarding the Kuwaiti investments, and most of the figures are 
predictions.  See  Kuwait  Times  Newspaper,  ‘Kuwait Foreign  Assets  Swell  to  $277  billion’, Friday, June 
05, 2010, Kuwait. http://www.kuwaittimes.net/read_news.php?newsid=NTMzNzc4Njgx  
155  This term appeared at the opening of the Kuwaiti Fourth Conference of Heads of diplomatic missions 
abroad in Kuwait. See Kuwait Ministry of Foreign Affairs, At-takrīr  us-sanawi 2004, Op.Cit. pp.71-73. 
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known   as   the   ‘Silk   Road’,   through   building   an   economic   city   in   the   northern   part   of  
Kuwait (Silk City) with its own port, the so called ‘Mubarak Al-Kabeer  Port’, for which 
Kuwait allocated $90 billion.  
2. To realize an economic open-door policy with the external world by shifting from 
a closed system to a more open environment through changes to the laws restricting the 
flow of investments to Kuwait.156 
For these reasons, after the increasing importance of Asian economies which has made 
Asia the second largest continent in economic terms, Kuwait, and of course the GCC 
states, was wanting to enhance its economic ties with major Asian economic states. Thus, 
the Amir of Kuwait paid his first official visit (as Amir) on 11-20 June 2006 to four Asian 
states: Bangladesh, Thailand, Pakistan and India.157 This visit was followed by the official 
tour by PM Sheikh Nasser Al-Sabah to the eight Asian states in 2008 to bolster the 
economic ties. In these two visits, Kuwait signed a number of economic agreements with 
these states.158 The Asian continent, and of course, Africa, became more attractive areas 
for Kuwaiti investment, especially in the agricultural sector after the world food crisis and 
rising prices of foodstuff since 2008. Thus, Kuwait started to buy up farmland and 
establish firms such as Kuwait China Investment Company (KCIC) in late 2005 with a 
capital of 80 million KD ($278 million) to enter the Asian food and energy markets. This 
was applied in the Industrial and Commercial sector, such as the Kuwaiti stake in the 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) and the Kuwaiti plan under a joint 
venture with China to build a $9 billion refinery in China, 159  in which Kuwait would hold 
a 10% stake.160  The increase in the importance of the Asian continent is reflected in the 
exchange trade between GCC and Asian states, which grew from $67.3 billion in 2009 to 
$83.2 billion the following year in 2010. Thus, Kuwait hosted the first Asia Cooperation 
                                              
156  Key Note Speech of Sheikh Dr. Mohammad Al-Sabah, Minister of Foreign Affair,‘Lectures at 
International Institute for Strategic Studies under the title; Kuwait Foreign Policy in a Changing 
Environment’,  London, 16 November 2006, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kuwait; 
http://www.mofa.gov.kw/MOFA/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=820:--&catid=23:-
&Itemid=80 
157  Kuwait Ministry of Foreign Affairs, At-takrīr  us-sanawi 2006, Op.Cit. p.121.  
158  Food Crisis and the Global Land Grab,  ‘Several agreements signed on PM's Asian tour’,  17 August, 
2008. Available online on the  farmland grab website at: http://farmlandgrab.org/  
159  Ibid,  ‘Kuwait  firm  eyes  farmland  in  Southeast  Asia’,  10-7-2009. Available online on the farmland grab 
website at: http://farmlandgrab.org/post/view/8111    
160  Ibid,  ‘Kuwait looks to raise stake in China's ICBC’,  15 May, 2009.  
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Dialogue (ACD) summit on 15-17 October 2012 aiming for comprehensive cooperation at 
all levels among Asian states.161   
On the Arab level, Kuwait hosted the first Arab Economic Summit on 19-20 January 2009 
to reinforce economic relationships among Arab countries, enhance the role of the private 
sector, and solve the problems of the Arab world. A particular concern was that the 
volume of trade among Arab countries in 2006 was 11.04% of the total Arab external 
trade. This percentage is very poor compared with the percentage of trade with other 
blocs, such as the European Union. 162 On the European level, the Amir made his second 
economic tour in 2010, after the Asian tour in 2006, to major European economic states, 
such as Germany, Italy and the Vatican; Kuwait signed a number of economic agreements 
with these states.163  On the African and American level, the PM Sheikh Nasser Al-Sabah 
made an economic tour in 2009 to several African states, namely, Benin, Gabon, Djibouti, 
Ethiopia, Comoros and Swaziland,164 and in 2010 to nine south American states, namely, 
Antigua and Barbuda, Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, United Mexican States, Cuba, 
Guyana, Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, to enhance the political and economic 
relations between Kuwait and these states.165 Since 2008, Kuwait has invested $5 billion 
in two major US financial institutions: Citigroup and Merrill Lynch MER.166 On the 
internal level, Kuwait amended the law of the tax rate on foreign companies in 2008 by 
reducing the tax rate from 55% to 15% in order to encourage more foreign investment in 
Kuwait.167 The economic factor has given Kuwait more clout in international institutions 
and discussions through its economic aid and investment in the biggest economic states in 
the world.   
 
                                              
161  KUNA,  ‘ACD  Summit  Good  Chance  For  GCC-Asian  Trade,  Investment  Partnerships’,  15 October 2012, 
World News, Kuwait.  
162 Diplomatic  Center  for  Strategic  Studies,  ‘Economic  Summit  in  Kuwait  and  the  reality  of  Arab  
Economies’,  Issue No.3, Kuwait, dated 15 January 2009. p.10. 
163  AlWatan newspaper, Issue No. 7674/13228, Tuesday, 16 October 2012. Kuwait.  
164  KUNA,  ‘PM  Tour  to  Seven  African  States’,  14  July  2009.  Kuwait.   
165  AlWatan newspaper, on 8 July 2010. Kuwait.  
166  Wikileaks,  ‘Kuwait Investment Authority to Invest Usd 5 Billion In Citi And Merrill’,  Reference ID; 
08KUWAIT78, CONFIDENTIAL, Embassy Kuwait,  17 Jan 2008.  
167   Kuwait  Foreign  Investment  Bureau,  ‘KFIB:  Economic  performance’  ,  Ministry  of  Commerce  &  Industry, 
Kuwait. Report on its website;  http://www.kfib.com.kw/kfibclient/clientpages/Index.aspx?id=55  
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4. Political decision-making under the political system of Kuwait  
4.1. Introduction  
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the nature and features of the political system are an important 
factor   for   understanding   foreign   policy.   Kuwait’s   system   has   in   some   senses   been   a  
democratic constitutional monarchy, albeit one in which the ruling family – and within it 
particular sections, starting with the Amir – have retained a powerful position. The 
evolving balance between rulers and ruled has been shaped and tested by constant 
negotiation  in  practice,  not  least  in  the  context  of  the  changing  regional  context.    Kuwait’s  
permanent constitution was set up in 1962, and since 1963 has been stipulating free 
elections to a parliament, although this also includes the government ministers as ex 
officio members, and free media.168  It has twice been ranked first in the Arab world as 
regards freedom of the press and 60th on the international level, according to the survey 
by Reporters without Borders published in 2009.169 We will focus, for the purposes of this 
thesis, mainly on the role of the official authorities in the making of foreign policy: public 
opinion has little if no direct influence, other than through the elections for the National 
Assembly (which has relatively little impact itself, as we will see), and via the top 
decision-makers’s   awareness   of   popular   feelings.   There   are no formal lobbies, and no 
official political parties either – although there are political groupings that are represented 
in the Assembly. Certainly those studies that have examined the dynamics of Kuwaiti 
foreign policy show compellingly that the real centres of power responsible for making 
foreign-policy decisions in Kuwait are the Amir, the Crown Prince, the Council of 
Ministers, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and finally, the National Assembly: non-official 
bodies, the media and public opinion as expressed in diwaniyyas and the like, have little or 
no input. 170  
One does of course note occasional expressions of public feeling, as indeed in the case of 
the  clear  rallying  around  the  ruling  family  and  system  in  response  to  Saddam’s  invasion:  
                                              
168 Assiri, Abdul Reda, An-niḍām  as-siyāsi  fil-Kuwayt:  mabādi’  wa  mumārasāt,‘Political  System  in  Kuwait:  
Principles  &  Practices’, Kuwait university, Kuwait, 1996. p.196. 
169 For more details, see the report published for 2009 by Reporters without Borders Organization on their 
website http://en.rsf.org/report-kuwait,156.html  
170 Al Edwani, Abdullah Mutalq,‘Dawr  Majlis  il-ʼumma  fis-siyāsah  al-khārijīyah  al-Kuwaytīyah’, ‘Role  of  
the National Assembly in the Foreign Policy of Kuwait’,  Jordanian  University,  unpublished  Master’s  
Degree, Jordan, 2006. p.27.
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this was clear among other things in the refusal of almost anyone to go along with 
Saddam’s   efforts   to   find  members   for   the   supposed  Kuwaiti   republican   government   he  
claimed had invited Iraqi intervention; and in the collective agreement about the political 
future of Kuwait between exiles and the Kuwaiti leadership in the person of then Crown 
Prince Sheikh Saad in the Saudi mountain town of Taif (about which more later). It was 
also clear in the spontaneous declarations of joy in the media and on the streets after Iraq 
accepted the cease-fire at the end of the Iraq-Iraq war.171 But fundamentally, the power to 
decide foreign policy positions is in the hands of the very top state officials – in particular 
the Amir, the Crown Prince, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister.  
There is a difference between the official statutory involvement of different levels of the 
government machinery on the one hand (as above from Amir to Foreign Minister, and 
then down to the Council of Ministers, the bureaucracy and the National Assembly), and, 
on the other, the actual distribution of power and influence over the foreign policy brief, 
which depends on personalities and power balances at the very top. Below, I first describe 
the formal levels of decision-making apparatus involved.  Next, I move to a description of 
the more personal realities of power for the period under consideration. 
 
4.2. Formal levels of decision-making in foreign policy172 
The stages of decision-making  under  Kuwait’s  political  system  can formally be described 
using the following levels:  
- First level: this level is related primarily to the Amir of Kuwait. At this level, general 
plans  are  made  and  the  general  framework  of  Kuwait’s  policy  regarding  current  issues  
is drawn up. At this level, the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
inform and receive instructions from the Amir, as the Prime Minister and all other 
ministers are responsible before the Amir for the functions of their ministries as per 
Article 58 of the Kuwaiti constitution. 
                                              
171  See Nonneman, Gerd, ‘The (Geo)Political Economy of Iraqi-Kuwaiti  Relations’,  Geopolitics, Vol. 1, no. 
2, 1996, pp. 187-223. 
172  The framework of these institutions cited in Al Edwani, Abdullah Mutalq, Op.Cit.  
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- Second Level: this level is reserved for the Prime Minister and Council of Ministers 
(executive  authority)   that  draw  up   the  government’s  general  policy  and  follow  up   its  
execution   as   per   Article   123   of   Kuwait’s   constitution.   At   this   level,   the   views   and  
conclusions   of   Kuwait’s   Minister   of Foreign Affairs on any issue related to the 
external world are discussed. Further, the policy and external situations of Kuwait 
towards different issues are studied and discussed in light of whatever might be 
presented by the Minister of Foreign Affairs.  
- Third level: this level deals with the means of administering foreign policy and how 
to implement the same. This level is reserved for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
its different agencies (embassies). 
- Fourth level: this level is reserved for the Kuwait National Assembly (legislative 
authority), whose role is restricted to enacting laws supervising the performance of the 
executive authority.173  Under  Kuwait’s   constitution,   the   ‘legislative   authority’  has   a  
strong role to play in giving opinions on public policy of the state, studying 
international treaties and conventions and proposing whatever it deems appropriate as 
will be discussed later.    
 
4.2.1.  The Amir (Head of the State) 
It should be noted that members of the royal families in the GCC states (as in the case of 
Kuwait)   play   a   central   role   in   making   foreign   decisions.   The   leader’s   perception   and  
experience play a critical role in the formulation of foreign policy.174 Al-Alkim noted that 
the   ‘head  of   state’   in  GCC  states   is   one  of   the  primary  circles in making foreign policy 
decisions.175 Hence, the Amir of Kuwait, as the head of state, is the first circle in making 
foreign   policy   decisions   in   Kuwait.   He   appoints   the   Prime   Minister   as   per   an   ‘Amiri  
Order’.176 The appointed Prime Minister proposes members of the government (ministers) 
to  the  Amir,  and  after  that,  the  Amir  issues  an  ‘Amiri  Decree’  forming  the  new  Council  of  
                                              
173 Ibid. p.28. 
174  Baabood, Abdulla, Op. Cit. p.158.  
175  Al-Alkim, Hassan Hamdan. Op. Cit. p.156. 
176  Note: there  is  difference  between  ‘Amiri  Order’  and  ‘Amiri  Decree’. 
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Ministers. According to the Kuwaiti constitution, the Amir undertakes several roles and 
functions due to several considerations, which include: 
1. head of the executive supervisory system 
2. commander of the army and armed forces 
3. nominal head of state 
4. diplomatic head of state 
5. head of the legislative authority 
6. judicial prince.177 
Even   though   the  Amir   is   the   head   of      the   ‘supreme   executive   authority’   in   the   state,178   
regarding the performance of his duties and responsibilities, the Kuwaiti constitution has 
entrusted the direct executive powers of the Amir to the Council of Ministers as per 
Article 55 of the constitution,179 which provides  that  ‘the  Amir  shall  exercise  his  powers  
through  his  ministers’.180 For   this   reason,  Kuwait’s   constitution  exempts   the  Amir   from  
political responsibility181 before the people and entrusts political responsibility to the 
Prime Minister and the Ministers who are responsible to the Amir and the legislative 
authority  (National  Assembly),  which  reflects  Kuwait’s  parliamentary  system.182   
Under the Kuwaiti political system, the Amir, in his capacity as head of state, practises a 
set of separate executive and legislative functions as follows: 183 
1. The Amir appoints the crown prince, the deputy Amir and the prime minister and 
removes them from their posts in accordance with an Amiri Order.184   
                                              
177 Assiri, Abdul Reda (1996), Op. Cit. pp.73 – 80. 
178  Al- Saleh, Othman Abdul-Malek, Op.Cit. p.168. 
179 Al Tabtabai, Adel, An-niḍām  id-dustūrī  fil- kuwayt:  derāsah  mukāranah,  ‘Constitutional  Systems  in  
Kuwait:  Comparative  Study’ 3rd edition, Kuwait University, Kuwait, 1998.p.504. 
180  Constitution  of  Sate  of  Kuwait,  ‘Articles  51  and  65’,  Op.  Cit.,  pp.10  -12.  
181  Al Tabtabai, Adel, Op.Cit. p.519. 
182 Al- Saleh, Othman Abdul-Malek, Op.Cit. p.324.; Al Tabtabai, Adel, Op.Cit. p.549. 
183  Al Edwani, Abdullah Mutalq, Op.Cit. p.31. 
184  Al-Hamidah Khalifa Thamer, an-niḍām  id-dustūrī  il-kuwayti,  ‘Kuwaiti  Constitutional  System’,  1st 
edition, National Library of Kuwait, Kuwait, 2010. pp.110-111. 
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2. The Amir has the right to dissolve the Kuwait National Assembly as per an Amiri 
Decree and he can call for new elections within a period of no more than two months as 
per Article 107 of the constitution. He also has legislative powers such as the right to 
propose laws in accordance with Article 51 of constitution, which provides that 
‘legislative  power  shall  be  vested   in   the  Amir  and   the  National  Assembly   in  accordance  
with  the  constitution’  and- as per Article 65 of the constitution- ‘the  Amir  shall  have  the  
right  to  initiate,  sanction  and  promulgate  laws’.185 
3.  The Amir has  executive  powers,  under  Article  52,  which  provides  that  ‘executive  
power shall be vested in the Amir, the Cabinet and the Ministers in the manner specified 
by  the  constitution’.186 
4. The Amir has power related to the external and internal policy of the State in 
accordance   with   Article   58   of   Kuwaiti   constitution,   which   provides   that   ‘The   Prime  
Minister and the Ministers are collectively responsible to the Amir for the general policy 
of the state. Every minister also is individually responsible to the Amir for the affairs of 
his  ministry’.187 
5. The Amir concludes international treaties abroad and presents them to the National 
Assembly as per an Amiri Decree to secure the consent of the National Assembly -under 
Article 70 of Kuwaiti constitution- and practises this power personally.188   
 
Therefore, the Amir represents the first circle in the making of internal and external 
decisions. Hence, the making of foreign policy and executive power are entrusted to the 
Amir   as   per  Kuwait’s   constitution.  His   perception  and experience play a critical role in 
making foreign policy decisions in accordance with the Kuwaiti constitution.  
 
 
                                              
185 Constitution  of  Sate  of  Kuwait,  ‘Articles  51  and  65’,  Op.  Cit.    pp.10  -12.  
186  Ibid, Article 52. p.10. 
187  Constitution of Sate of Kuwait, Op.Cit.p.11. 
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4.2.2. Council of Ministers (Executive Authority) 
Al-Alkim  labels   the   ‘executive  authority’   the  second  circle   in  making  decisions   in  GCC  
states.189 The Council of Ministers is the main pillar of the Kuwaiti political structure due 
to the fact that this authority, as mentioned above, exercises the functions of the Amir on 
his behalf. Thus, its power comes from the functions of the Amir. The council formulates 
the public trends of state policy and helps the Amir to create a general perspective for the 
most  effective  policies.   In   this  respect,   ‘the  Council  of  Ministers  shall  have  control  over  
the departments of State. It shall formulate the general policy of the Government, pursue 
its  execution  and  supervise  the  conduct  of  work  in  Government  departments’.190 
The  members   of  Kuwait’s  Council   of  Ministers   are   ex   officio  members  of   the  National  
Assembly, being added to the 50 elected members but limited to one-third of the total, as 
per Article 56 of the constitution. There are 14 supreme councils affiliated to the Prime 
Mister and the ministers.191   
Under the Kuwaiti political system, the Kuwaiti government practises a set of separate 
executive and legislative functions as follows: 
1. Drawing up general government extent and internal policy and supervising 
business progress within government departments. 
2. Concluding Treaties with other states on behalf of the Amir. 
3. To issue regulations, whether executive or independent.192 
4. Proclaiming defensive war and martial law as per an Amiri decree. 193 
 
The executive authority plays a prominent role in the external affairs of the state on behalf 
of the Amir. Therefore, in accordance with Kuwaiti constitution, the executive authority is 
                                              
189  Al-Alkim, Hassan Hamdan, Op. Cit. p.156. 
190 Constitution of the Sate of Kuwait, Article 123. p.20. 
191  The website of the Kuwaiti Council of Ministers General Secretariat;  
  http://www.cmgs.gov.kw/netahtml/main.htm?frame_page  
192  Al Edwani, Op. Cit.  pp.33-34. 
193  Al- Saleh, Othman Abdul-Malek, Op. Cit. p.452. 
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granted wider powers to plan and execute many issues related to external and internal 
policy.194 In  foreign  policy  the  Amir’s  role  is  formally  even  more  pronounced. 
 
4.2.3.  Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Kuwait’s  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs is certainly important in the foreign policy process, 
but its role is really one of implementation   and   advice,   not   ‘making’   of   policy   at   the  
strategic level. The  ministry’s   task  is  officially to reinforce traditional friendships and to 
establish new relations  in  order  to  activate  Kuwait’s  role  in  the  international  arena  and  to  
serve Kuwaiti interests worldwide. The  embassies  abroad  endeavour  to  transmit  Kuwait’s  
own view of territorial and foreign events to political decision-makers in Kuwait.  
It has become a tradition that the Amir meets new Kuwaiti ambassadors, sometimes 
before they occupy their posts. In addition, the Amir sends the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
as a delegate of the state. The role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the policy process 
starts once the political leadership determines its priorities The Ministry plays a 
bureaucratic role in making and implementing foreign policy by preparing perspectives of 
the route that must be followed by Kuwait.  
The Minister of Foreign Affairs, as opposed to his Ministry, plays an important role 
regarding the creation of Kuwait foreign policy by providing advice and basic information 
to  Kuwait’s  political  decision  makers,  both   the  Amir  and   the  Council  of  Ministers.  Any  
decision related to international issues must receive the consent of the Amir, who is the 
head of state, and the head of the executive authority on how to implement this policy.195 
The Foreign Minister also plays a role in forming and implementing policy through his 
travel abroad to take part in negotiations, agreements, treaties etc. Thus, the Foreign 
Minister’s  perspective  and  recommendations  to  the  Amir  do  play  a  role  in  Kuwaiti  foreign  
policy decision-making.  
We will see later, however, that in practice, the realities of power can shape the extent of 
the  Foreign  Minister’s  role. 
                                              
194  Al Edwani, Op. Cit. p.34. 
195  Ibid. p.35. 
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 4.2.4. Legislative Authority (National Assembly) 
Under Article 51 of the constitution.196 legislative authority is shared by the head of state 
(the Amir) and the National Assembly.197  The constitution grants the legislative authority 
an essential role to control and review the external or internal policy, in addition to its 
powers to enact laws. The powers and functions of the legislative authority are stated 
under   Article   43   of   Kuwait’s   constitution   and   Articles 79 – 122 (Chapter III: Chapter 
IV),198 the  most   important   of  which   is  Article   79,  which   provides   that   ‘No   law  may  be  
promulgated unless it has been passed by the National Assembly and sanctioned by the 
Amir’  199 and  Article  6:  ‘the  System  of  Government  in  Kuwait shall be democratic, under 
which  sovereignty  resides  in  the  people,  the  source  of  all  powers’.200 Therefore, enacting 
laws and the sharing of power are the most important foundations for the functions and 
powers of the National Assembly.   
The National Assembly comprises 50 members who are elected by secret direct ballot, in 
addition to ministers as ex officio members who make up not more than one third of the 
MPs. The term of the National Assembly is four calendar years. It is provided that a 
candidate to the National Assembly must be a Kuwaiti citizen of Kuwaiti origin and 
his/her age upon the date of election must be at least 30 years. Further, he/she must be 
fluent in the Arabic language, both reading and writing.201 
4.2.4.1.  Legislative, Political and Financial Functions of National Assembly:202 
Under the Kuwaiti political system, the National Assembly practises a set of separate 
legislative functions as follows: 
1. Proposing bills.  
                                              
196  Constitution of the State of Kuwait, Article 50, Op.Cit. p.15. 
197 Al- Saleh, Othman Abdul-Malek, Op.Cit. p.465. 
198  Al Edwani, Abdullah Mutalq, Op.Cit. p.36. 
199 Constitution of the State of Kuwait, Article 79, Op. Cit. p.16. 
200  Ibid, Article 6, Op. Cit. p.2. 
201  Ibid, Article 80, 82, Op.Cit. p.22. 
202  The framework cited in Al- Saleh, Othman Abdul-Malek, Op.Cit. p.580. 
 
 
144 
2. General discussion and votes on bills. 
3. Ratifying laws. 
4. Ratifying treaties: this is perhaps the most important aspect of the National 
Assembly’s  role  in  foreign policy.   Article 70 stipulates: 
The Amir concludes treaties by Decree and transmits them to the National Assembly with 
the appropriate Statement. A treaty shall have the force of law after it is signed, ratified 
and published in the official gazette. However, treaties of peace and alliance, treaties 
concerning the territory of the State, its natural resources or sovereign rights or public or 
private rights of citizens, treaties of commerce, navigation and residence, and treaties that 
incur additional expenditure not provided for in the budget or which involve amendment 
of the laws of Kuwait shall come into force only when made by a law.203 
 The political authority of the National Assembly comprises the following:  
1. The right to ask a question in any issues related to external or internal issues.  
2. Proposing general subjects or any issue whether internal or external for discussion. 
3. Formation of investigation committees for the internal or external issues.  
5. Expressing wishes and opinions concerning public issues or external issues.   
6. Interpellation and Vote of No-Confidence: the interpellation can be directed 
against the Prime Minister or any minister  under Article 100 of the constitution. This 
questioning may end with an express accusation against the minister and it may lead to a 
‘question   of   no-confidence’   of   the   minister   who   is   the   subject   of   the   interpellation.204 
Should the Prime Minister be interpolated,  the  ‘question  of  confidence’  in  him  would  not  
be raised before the National Assembly; rather, it would be stated that no cooperation 
would be extended to the Prime Minister, as per Article 102 of the constitution.205  In this 
case, the matter is submitted to the Amir (head of state) for an appropriate resolution, i.e. 
                                              
203  Constitution of the State of Kuwait, Article 70. p. 14. 
204  Al-Moqatei,  Mohammad  A.  A.,  ‘Study  OF  The  Kuwaiti  Constitutional  Experience  1962-1986’,  
unpublished Thesis (Ph.D.), University of Warwick , UK, 1987. p.258. 
205  Constitution of the State of Kuwait, Articles 100, 101 and 102, Op. Cit. p.21.; Bylaws of the Kuwait 
National Assembly, Articles 133, 134 , 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141 and 142, Op.Cit. pp.48-51. 
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either to relieve the Prime Minister of office and appoint a new Cabinet or to dissolve the 
National Assembly and call for elections within a period of not more than two months.206  
The NA practises a set of separate financial through control, discussing and approving 
budgets of state each year. The financial year starts in Kuwait on 1 April and ends on 31 
March of the next year.207  Added to this, there is an authority entitled the State Audit 
Bureau of Kuwait, which is affiliated to the National Assembly, to supervise the expenses 
and revenues of government. This bureau always forwards periodic reports to the NA 
regarding the details of contracts, violations and expenses of government. Thus, it is 
described  as  the  ‘eye  of  the  people’.208  
  
4.2.4.2. The role of the Foreign Affairs Committee and MPs 
The Foreign Affairs Committee is a permanent committee in the National Assembly. It 
consists of five members to be elected either by casting a vote or by recommendation at 
the beginning of each constitutional session.209   The most important functions of the 
external affairs committee are as follows: 210 
1. to study the external issues referred to the committee by the National Assembly 
and submitting a report to the National Assembly summarising their business and 
indicating its recommendations for external issues, international treaties and foreign 
policy. 211   
2. to hold periodic meetings between the committee and the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, to discuss new issues in the political arena, on either local, regional or 
international levels.   
                                              
206  Ibid.  p.21. 
207  Bylaw of the Kuwait National Assembly, Articles -159-168, Op.Cit.pp.55-58. 
208  Al Edwani, Op. Cit.p.41.; Assiri, Abdul Reda, (1996), Op. Cit. p.76. 
209  Bylaw of the Kuwait National Assembly, Article 43, Op.Cit. p.20. 
210  Kuwait National Assembly,  ‘Permanent  Committees;;  Foreign  Affairs  Committee’,  on  its  website;;  
http://www.majlesalommah.net/clt/run.asp?id=62  
211  Ibid.  
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3. to meet ambassadors and parliamentary personalities and delegations visiting 
Kuwait to discuss relations and international affairs, and in order to reinforce and support 
bilateral relations and form parliamentary friendship committees with other states.  
 4. to follow up the issues discussed in international conferences and in reports from 
Kuwaiti embassies.212 
5. to issue National Assembly statements on foreign policy. 
 
4.3. The practice of power relations and influence in foreign policy making in the 
Kuwaiti system. 
It is striking how little is in fact known about the detail of the policy process, beyond the 
official, formal format outlines above. Indeed, even senior figures in the National 
Assembly, including in the Foreign Affairs Committee, appeared to be quite genuine in 
their professions of ignorance about how certain policies had emerged – generally 
pointing to the fact that this was decided by Sheikh Sabah (or, when it came to the pre-
1997 period, also Sheikh Saad). Nor did there seem to be any particular urgency in trying 
to question this.213 
Below, however, I attempt to offer a picture of the actual evolution of influence among the 
key players – for the period in question in essence then Crown Prince Saad together with 
then Foreign Minister Sheikh Sabah,  and from 1997 the latter virtually alone, as Sheikh 
Saad   was   sidelined   by   illness.   Sheikh   Sabah’s   elevation   as   Amir   in   2006   merely  
formalised the reality of the concentration of power in his hands, when it comes to Foreign 
policy in particular.  The previous Amir, Sheikh Jaber, was obviously still an important 
voice in the 1980s, but certainly from the time of the invasion he increasingly withdrew, 
and his footprint becomes difficult to discern.  In the narrative and analysis of events and 
policies in the chapters that follow, the effects of these power realities will become 
evident, but is worth setting them out here in some detail. Of particular interest also is 
that,   while   Sheikh   Sabah’s   dominance   of   the   foreign   policy   process   has   been  
overwhelming, the National Assembly remained not wholly without impact: his eclipsing 
                                              
212  Al Edwani, Op. Cit. pp.45 – 46. 
213  Confidential  author’s  interviews with senior MPs in Kuwait, 2010-2012. 
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of the other two senior figures of state in this area from 1997, which would be evidenced 
in some key policy changes, in fact also roughly coincided with a change in the 
composition of the National Assembly, which became more sympathetic to his policy 
preferences.  
 
4.3.1. Key Officials 
Sheikh Saad Al Abdullah Al Sabah 
Given the distribution of power within the ruling family in terms of foreign policy, Sheikh 
Saad Al-Abdullah Al Sabah (1978-2006) was one of the key decision makers in Kuwait 
after he became Crown Prince and Prime Minster in 1978.  He played an essential role in 
the establishment of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in 1981 through his official 
visit in 1978 to the six Arab Gulf states to convince them of the need for the coordination 
of the GCC. As the head of the Kuwaiti government, he was in charge during the critical 
years with Iraq, especially after the end of the Iran-Iraq war, as a representative of the 
Amir in negotiations with Iraq and as head of the Kuwaiti delegation in the Jeddah 
Conference the day before the Iraqi invasion.  Sheikh Saad played a crucial role in 
building the international coalition and Arab League alliance with Arab states through his 
official visits around the world to liberate Kuwait in response to the Iraqi invasion. For 
example, he signed a contract with the PR company Hill and Knowlton, which launched 
the   ‘Free   Kuwait’   campaign   to   gain   public   support   for   Kuwait   in   the   US   against   Iraq  
during the Iraqi invasion;  he established an Arabic daily newspaper, Sawt al Kuwait 
‘Voice  of  Kuwait’,  and  the  English-language  ‘New  Arabia’  in  the  UK,  to  explain Kuwaiti 
issues on Arab and international levels in order to counter Iraqi propaganda. He also 
chaired the meeting in Taif while in exile, where an understanding was reached withthe 
leading Kuwaiti fellow exiles including political activists that while Kuwaitis would 
gather round the Al Sabah as their ruling family, the government would restore the 
constitution and democratic practice. Thus, after the liberation of Kuwait, he was seen by 
many in Kuwait as a national hero.214   
                                              
214  See, among others, Gerd Nonneman, ‘Sheikh  Saad  Al-Abdullah  Al  Sabah,’  Obituary,  The Guardian, 17 
May 2008 (accessed http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/may/17/2);  Telegraph newspaper,  ‘Sheikh  
Saad Al-Sabah: Leader of Kuwait's government-in-exile  during  the  Iraqi  occupation’,  14  May  2008.     
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From the liberation of Kuwait until 1996, Sheikh Saad was the key voice rejecting – and 
hence in effect blocking – blocking the restoration of Kuwaiti relations with Arab states 
that had not supported Kuwait during the Iraqi invasion, which Kuwait referred to as 
“duwal aḍ-ḍidd”  (Opponent States). This led to a collision with Sheikh Sabah Al Ahmad 
Al Sabah, the powerful and pragmatic former Kuwaiti foreign minister (1963-2003), who 
supported the policy of the renormalization of the Kuwaiti relationship with these “duwal 
aḍ-ḍidd”  in  order  to  contain  Iraq and not isolate Kuwait from the Arab environment. This 
issue was highlighted in a cable from US ambassador Chester Crocker in 1996, revealed 
by  Wikileaks:  ‘The  Kuwaiti  foreign  minister  Shaykh  Sabah  Al-Sabah remains in Morocco 
following his confrontation  with  the  crown  prince  on  the  eve  of  the  Cairo  summit  […]  The  
rift  between  Kuwait’s  second  and  third  ranking  officials  will  continue,  and  may  be  more  
pronounced’.  The  cable  added:  ‘while  the  immediate  cause  of  this  latest  flare  up  was  the  
ongoing feud over relations with Jordan, the tension between the foreign minister and 
crown  prince  is  rooted  in  fundamental  differences  in  personality  and  style’.215   
 
Sheikh Sabah Al Ahmad Al Sabah 
While Amb. Crocker correctly described Sheikh Saad and Sheikh Sabah as respectively 
the  ‘second’  and  ‘third’  ranking  officials,  this  balance  would  shift  dramatically  from  1997.  
Sheikh Sabah Al Sabah became the key person in the process of making foreign policy 
since 1997, even in effect if not officially eclipsing the Amir (who had been increasingly 
frail and withdrawn since the invasion), due to the deterioration of Sheikh Saad's health, 
which forced him to spend a long time abroad in order to receive medical treatment. When 
Amir Jabir died in 2006,  
Sheikh Saad, along with his supporters in the family, remained determined to take his 
place, partly to ensure the position of the al-Salem branch. But his obvious disability gave 
those preferring a transfer of power to Sheikh Sabah - seen as more effective and with a 
better relationship with parliament - the upper hand. 
Parliament insisted that the official swearing in of the emir should happen, with the emir 
pronouncing the oath in person. It was clear that Sheikh Saad would be unable to do this. 
                                              
215  Wikileaks,‘The  Rift  Between  The  Crown  Prince  And  Foreign  Minister’,  Reference  ID;;   96kuwait4046, 
Confidential, EmbassyKuwait, 1996-06-30 .   
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Eventually he conceded and wrote a letter agreeing to abdicate, but it did not arrive until 
after parliament had formally, and in keeping with the constitution, agreed that he was 
unfit to rule and adopted Sheikh Sabah as the new emir.216 
Even before this accession to the post of Amir, since 1997 Sheikh Sabah, in practical 
terms, became the central person in Kuwait in foreign policy decision making. This 
quickly became evident evident when Kuwait started to restore its relations with “duwal 
aḍ-ḍidd”  starting  in  1997,  leading  to  the  establishment of full diplomatic representation in 
1999:  that  had  very  much  been  Shaikh  Sabah’s  policy  preference  all  along.  He was able to 
convince  the  majority  of  MPs  in  a  ‘closed  session’  in  1996  of  the  importance  of  restoring  
Kuwaiti relations with these Arab states.217  After becoming Amir in 2006, this de facto 
control of foreign policy in the hands of Sheikh Sabah became official in every sense.  
US ambassador to Kuwait, Richard LeBaron,  writing   in   2006,   called   him   ‘the   de   facto  
ruler  of  Kuwait  since  2001’.218   
Sheikh Sabah, then, has served as the minister of foreign affairs from 1963 until 2003 (40 
years), as Prime Minster from 2003 until 2006, and as Amir since 2006. In effect, this has 
meant an extraordinary concentration of power with regard to foreign policy-making in 
the hands of one man at least since 1997 – following a period of divided power between 
him and Sheikh Saad before that:  while Amir Jaber was also a significant voice until the 
1980s, subsequently his seems by all accounts to have played a limited direct role since 
1990.  
Over the years since 1963, then, he has played a major role in the internal and external 
issues through his conciliatory and mediatory roles during regional and Arab conflicts, 
especially in the critical times with Iraq. He forged strong relationships with key global 
states as well as helping to forge the international coalition during the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait.  US   ambassador   to  Kuwait,  Ambassador   Jones,   commented   in   2008:   ‘His   role  
may in fact be larger but simply not visible to us; his nickname within family circles is 
“the  Crocodile”  because  of  his  tendency  to  come  up  quietly  smiling  and  then  “whack  with  
                                              
216  Nonneman,  ‘Sheikh  Saad...’,  op.  cit.    See  also  The Independent newspaper,  ‘Sheikh  Saad  al-Abdullah al-
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218  Wikileaks,  ‘Amir's  Death:  The  Political  Fallout’,  Reference  ID:  06KUWAIT97, CONFIDENTIAL, 
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his   tail”   anyone   who   gets   out   of   line   [...]   and   remains   the   bottom   line   of   leadership  
authority  in  Kuwait’.219  He played an essential role in Kuwaiti issues with Iraq before and 
after   the   fall   of   Saddam   Hussein’s   regime.   This   was   evident   when   he   successfully  
contained Iraq after his rapprochement policy with “duwal aḍ-ḍidd”   from 1997 until 
2003, and supported US-UK  troops   in   toppling  Saddam  Hussein’s   regime   in  April  2003  
by hosting these troops in Kuwait. He has also played a major role in supporting Iraq 
politically and economically since the fall of Saddam Hussein’s   regime   and   in   solving  
most   of   ‘outstanding   issues’   with   Iraq.220 Iraqi PM Nouri al-Maliki noted that Sheikh 
Sabah’s  role  regarding  Iraq  was  ‘appreciated’.221    
 
Sheikh Dr. Mohammed Al Sabah 
Given the domination of most of the ministries in the foreign policy process, Sheikh Dr. 
Mohammed Al Sabah was one of the most influential figures in Kuwaiti foreign policy 
due to the fact that he served as Kuwaiti ambassador to the US from 1993 to 2001, as 
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs in 2001, and then became the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs from 2003 until 2011. He became responsible for and engaged in Kuwaiti foreign 
relations, especially in the case of the Iraqi issue, before the Kuwaiti parliament after 
Sheikh Sabah became Prime Minister in 2003 and then Amir in 2006. His role in the 
process of foreign policy has been significant over the 18 years since 1993 as expressed 
by  US  embassy  to  Kuwait  in  2006:  ‘Shaykh  Dr.  Mohammed,   is a notable exception […]  
the leading figure among the younger generation of Al-Sabah is considered by many to 
have the experience and vision necessary to lead Kuwait in the twenty-first  century’.222   
 
 
 
                                              
219  Wikileaks,  ‘(C/Nf)  Response  To  Request  For  Information  on    Kuwaiti  Leadership  Dynamics  (C-NE8-
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220  See Chapter 9. 
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Sheikh Saud Nasir Al Sabah 
One other official from the Al Sabah family is Sheikh Saud Nasir Al Sabah. His role was 
significant as he served as Kuwaiti ambassador to Britain from 1975 to 1980, to US from 
1981 to 1992, and then held many ministerial posts from 1993 until 2000. He played an 
essential role in explaining Kuwaiti issues to the American public in order to counter the 
Iraqi propaganda during the Iraqi invasion, as  noted  by  Richard  H.  Curtiss:  ‘The  Kuwaiti  
envoy's dramatic press conference took place before most Americans were even aware of 
the invasion. It touched off a period of sustained American public attention to the Middle 
East [...] Being a member of Kuwait's ruling Al Sabah family, with 21 years of experience 
in Kuwait's foreign ministry, Sheikh Saud did not hesitate to speak out forcefully and 
sometimes  without   the   constraints   a   less  well   placed   diplomat  might   have   felt’.223  But 
clearly, Sheikh Saud was not the prime definer and designer of policy – other than perhaps 
in  this  very  area  of  ‘propaganda’  as  a  key  tool  in  Kuwait’s  rescue. 
 
Sheikh Sabah Al-Khalid Al Sabah 
Sheikh Sabah Al-Khalid Al Sabah is another significant figure. He played a role in the 
formation of Kuwaiti foreign policy due to the fact that he held several posts in Kuwaiti 
apparatus, such as Kuwaiti Ambassador to Saudi Arabia from 1995 until 1998, and then 
Chairman of Kuwait's National Security Bureau from 1998 until 2006; he has been the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs since 2011.224 Published Wikileaks documents have made 
evident  his   role   in  Kuwait’s   security  and   foreign   issues,  especially   in  critical   times  with  
Iraq during his presidency of Kuwait's National Security Council.225  But his role was 
never more than, in effect, advisory. 
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Other figures 
The other senior figures in the making of foreign policy are Suleiman Majed Al Shaheen, 
Khaled Al-Jarallah and Mohammed AboualHassan. They played important advisory and 
implementation roles in the policy process, including advocacy, persuasion of players 
outside Kuwait, and negotiation, but were simply not visible to the public.  Suleiman Al 
Shaheen served as undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1985 until 1999 
and then was Minister of State for Foreign Affairs until 2001. He was one of the senior 
Kuwaitis during the critical times in the Iraq-Iran War and was a member of the Kuwaiti 
delegation in Jeddah Conference before day one of the Iraqi invasion; furthermore, he was 
engaged in Kuwaiti–Iraqi issues during the 1990s. At the time of writing, he is a member 
of  the  ‘Advisory  Committee’  for  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs.226  
Mohammed AboualHassan served as permanent representative of Kuwait to the United 
Nations from 1981 until 2003 and then as political advisor to the Amir of Kuwait from 
2003. He played a major role during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in convincing the states 
to support Kuwait and to challenge the Iraqi threats at the UN during the 1990s.227 His 
role  was  described  as   ‘the  voice  of  Kuwait   to   the  outside  world  on   the  first  day  of   Iraqi  
invasion’.228   
Khaled Al-Jarallah has been undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs since 1999 
and   is  a  member  of   the  ‘Advisory  Committee’  at   the  Ministry of Foreign Affairs.229 His 
role in   Kuwait’s   foreign   issues is evident through published Wikileaks documents, 
especially in critical times with Iraq. For much of this thesis, he has been one of main 
sources, via Wikileaks, regarding the outstanding issues between Kuwait and Iraq and 
Kuwait external issues.230   
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4.3.2. The  National  Assembly’s  role  in  practice 
As already noted above, the fact that senior members of the National Assembly However 
– often key persons in senior positions related to foreign affairs – often asserted not to 
know about key processes or origins of policies, gives some indication of the relative 
peripherality of the Assembly in foreign policy – especially  seen  against  Sheikh  Sabah’s  
centrality.  
Its official functions, though, so lend it some potential and – depending on the conjuncture 
of politics and personnel, and indeed on the subject at hand,  its role in the foreign policy 
process  cannot  be  ignored  altogether.  It  can,  after  all,  formally,  ‘supervise’  foreign policy 
decisions, it can lend strength to, or detract from, particular foreign relations through the 
use or non-use of parliamentary delegations; it can facilitate or block international 
agreements with states; and it can, of course, discuss Kuwaiti foreign relations in public 
sessions or in the Foreign Affairs Committee.   
Given the powers formally granted to the National Assembly, such as interpellation and 
parliamentary questions, Kuwaiti decision makers must take some account of the opinions 
of the MPs on international and regional issues.  
There is no doubt that the Kuwaiti parliament has played a significant role in Kuwait since 
the liberation of Kuwait through what   is   called   ‘popular   diplomacy’, but its role in the 
process of foreign policy is largely invisible – and indeed almost never conclusive:  
foreign policy is entrusted to the executive authority represented by the Amir and the 
government. Abdullah Al-Nafisi commented in 1993 on the role of the National Assembly 
before   the   Iraqi   invasion   as   follows:   ‘Foreign  policy  has always been the prerogative of 
executive power [...] The legislative authority did not have a clear impact in determining 
foreign  policy  and  guidance’.231  
As a result of the Taif agreement that followed the Iraqi invasion, as already mentioned, 
the National Assembly returned in 1992 and began to play a limited role in foreign 
relations. This was evident when the National Assembly decided in 1994 to form 
‘Parliamentary   friendship   committees’   with   other   states   in   order   to   enhance   Kuwait’s  
diplomatic relations around the world, and to counter Iraqi threats by explaining Kuwaiti 
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issues  and  the  country’s  outstanding  issues  with  Iraq.232 However, the role of the National 
Assembly is restricted to its supervisory role on foreign-policy decisions on the one hand, 
and to its own methods of influence on the other hand, such as interpellation, 
parliamentary questions, forming investigation committees, and studying international 
treaties and conventions. 
The role of the National Assembly was explored in interviews conducted by Al Edwani 
with MPs in 2006. The former speaker, Ahmed Al-Sadoun (opposition), commented: 
‘There  is  a  role  for  the  National  Assembly  through  the  objective  of  forming  conventions  
with other countries, but its role is not related to the daily work of the foreign affairs [...] 
The role of the National Assembly became clearer after the liberation in Kuwaiti relations 
with  states’.  This  argument  is  supported  by  former  MP  Hassan  Jawhar  (opposition),  who  
adds  that  ‘after  the  collapse  of  Saddam  Hussein’s  regime, the National Assembly began to 
focus   on   foreign   affairs’.   In   contrast,   former   MP   Mubarak   Al   Duwailah   (Islamist)  
commented   on   this   issue:   ‘The  National   Assembly   does   not   intervene   in   the   details   of  
foreign policy due to it being the prerogative of the executive power; however, through 
the Foreign  Affairs  Committee,  the  MPs  get  all  the  information  in  detail  about  this  policy’.  
Former MP Musallam Al-Barrak  (opposition)  commented:  ‘There  is  an  attempt  (from  the  
government) not to give a role in foreign affairs to the National Assembly. This will affect 
the  role  of  the  National  Assembly  in  supervising  this  policy’.  233 
Even so, there have been a number of striking interventions – although, as the above 
responses suggest, this was mainly after 1992. For example, Sheikh Sabah was 
temporarily removed from his position as Foreign Minister in 1992 after the liberation of 
Kuwait  due  to  concerns  over  the  usage  of  ‘interpellation’  against the Kuwaiti government 
as a repercussion of the Iraqi invasion. The Assembly also saw the formation of an 
investigation   committee   related   to   the   Iraqi   invasion   of   Kuwait’   in   1992,   the   so   called  
‘Fact-Finding   Commission   on   the   Causes   of   the   Iraqi   invasion   of   Kuwait’,234 which 
summoned the Kuwaiti officials who were in office to question them regarding the 
circumstances that led to the invasion.  
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The role of the National Assembly in Kuwaiti decision-making was of course explicit in 
2006, when MPs intervened to remove the Amir Sheikh Saad Al Sabah from his position, 
due to ill health, and nominated Sheikh Sabah Al Sabah as the Amir of Kuwait, after 
differences and rifts between ruling family members on succession issues.235      
MPs can play a significant role in blocking foreign policy initiatives. This was 
demonstrated when MPs blocked the Kuwaiti  Government’s  endeavor   to   renormalize   its  
relations with “duwal   aḍ-ḍidd”   (Opponent States)236, after the liberation of Kuwait (see 
Chapter 5).237 It is worth noting though, that this happened at a time when the top of the 
regime was also divided, with Sheikh Saad objecting to normalization, and Sheikh Sabah 
in favour. At the same time, it would be just two years into the increasingly obvious 
process   of   Sheikh   Saad’s   being   eclipsed   through   illness   by   Sheikh   Sabah,   that   an  
(admittedly differently constituted) Assembly in 1999   went   with   Sheikh   Sabah’s  
preference.  
The duwal  aḍ-ḍidd, prior to the 1999 turn-around, sent their envoys to the Kuwaiti MPs, 
in an attempt to persuade them to restore relations. The former MP, Saleh Al-Fadhala, 
who opposed the restoration of relations with these states, commented on the role of the 
Kuwaiti Parliament by saying: ‘After  the  liberation  of  Kuwait,  Yemeni  delegation  came  to  
Kuwait’  in  order  to  meet  MPs  ‘to  talk  about  the  resumption  of  relations  [...]  I  refused  this  
delegation permission to enter the hall of Kuwait National Assembly and the MPs also 
refused   all   the   agreements   between  Kuwait   and   these   states’.   He   added,   ‘The   Tunisian  
President, Zine el Abidine Ben Ali, sent a negotiator to me in 1994 in order to convince 
me to repair the relations between two countries. I asked him to present an official written 
apology  to  the  Kuwaiti  people  in  order  to  restore  relations’.   
The  MPs’   role  was  noted also by the President of Palestine, Mahmoud Abbas, when he 
attributed the reason for the slow return of Kuwaiti-Palestinian  relations  to  ‘some  political 
parties  and  MPs  at   the  Kuwait  National  Assembly’   and  added,   ‘those  have   impeded   the 
                                              
235  Wikileaks,  ‘Freedom  Agenda  And  The  Kuwaiti  Succession:    Something  To  Cheer  About’,  Reference  ID:  
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Kuwaiti Foreign Minister, Sheikh Sabah Al Sabah, in the re-opening of the Palestinian 
embassy  in  Kuwait’.   
Kuwait did restore its relations with the duwal   aḍ-ḍidd from 1999 after the majority of 
MPs expressed satisfaction with the orientation of the Kuwaiti government, but in the 
process supported what Sheikh Sabah had always argued for. Saleh Al-Fadhala 
commented on the reasons that influenced the resumption of relations with these countries  
later, when   he   stated   that   ‘The   MPs   and   Foreign   Affairs   Committee   at   the   National  
Assembly played a prominent role in restoration of relations with these states after 
government   pressure’   to   change   the   stance   of   Kuwait National Assembly towards this 
issue.  This applied to the different opinions of MPs, when it came to relations with Iraq. 
Before the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003, the MPs played an essential role in the crises 
experienced by Kuwait with Iraq through the formation of foreign parliamentary 
delegations   to   mobilize   global   and   regional   public   opinion   about   Kuwait’s   outstanding  
issues against Iraq.238  
Some MPs have played a more prominent role in foreign affairs than others, even if that 
role is generally not very visible. Ahmed Al-Saadoun (opposition) is the most influential 
figure, having been a member of the National Assembly from 1975 until 2012 and elected 
speaker for the parliament in 1985, 1992, 1996, and 2012.239 He played a role in the 
critical times experienced by Kuwait during the Iraqi invasion by supporting the 
legitimacy of the Al Sabah family. After the liberation of Kuwait, his role was evident 
during the 1990s through chairing parliamentary delegations on visits to countries in order 
to enhance Kuwaiti foreign relations and to mobilize international support for the Kuwaiti 
case against Iraqi threats.240  
Abdulaziz Al-Adsani is another MP who played an important role, especially during 
decisive   moments   in   Kuwaiti   relations   with   “duwal aḍ-ḍidd”,   after   the   liberation of 
Kuwait, due to the fact that he served as a member from 1992 until 1999 and was 
chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee at the Kuwait National Assembly.241 He was 
                                              
238  For more details about the outstanding issues, see Chapter 9. 
239  Michael  H.,  ‘Kuwait  Politics  Database:  Elections’.  Available  online  at: 
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one of the members who were hesitant about the restoration of Kuwaiti relations with 
“duwal aḍ-ḍidd”.  Thus,   in  1997,  he  urged  the  Kuwaiti  foreign  minister  ‘not   to  rush  into  
the resumption of relations with these Arab states until there had been a full assessment of 
the negative popular stance of these states  from  the  Kuwaiti  issues’.242 Clearly, however, 
his voice carried no weight once Sheikh Sabah had eclipsed the ill Sheikh Saad.  That is in 
contrast with the case of Mubarak Alkhurainej (pro-government)243 is another MP who 
has been significant in Kuwaiti relations  with  “duwal aḍ-ḍidd”  and  other  states.  He  served  
as member in the parliaments of 1992, 1996, 1999, 2006, 2009 and 2012 and was a 
member of the Foreign Affairs Committee during these terms. He played a major role in 
supporting Kuwaiti endeavors to restore Kuwaiti relations  with  “duwal aḍ-ḍidd”  through  
his chairing of the Jordanian-Kuwaiti Friendship Committee and the exchange visit of 
parliamentary delegates between two counties to improve their acquaintance. He 
commented  on  this   issue  saying:  ‘We  must  close  the  previous page and start a new page 
together  and  open  the  windows  for  anyone  who  wants  to  step  towards  us’.244  
One other influential MP from the National Assembly is Mohammad al-Sager (Liberal 
and from a merchant family). He played a significant role in Kuwaiti foreign relations as 
he served as a member and chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee at the National 
Assembly from 1999 until 2012.245 This is in addition to his presidency of the Arab 
parliament from 2005 until 2009.246 He engaged with Kuwaiti-Iraqi issues and Kuwaiti 
foreign relations, as chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, after the collapse of 
Saddam  Hussein’s  regime  through  official  meetings  with  US  officials.  He  was  one  of  the  
members who supported the relief of Iraqi debts and who, according to Wikileaks 
documents, supported any such measure when it reached his Foreign Relations 
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Committee.247  A telegram  of   the  US  Embassy   in  Kuwait   in  2005  notes:   ‘Al-Sager is a 
senior official and a well-respected  and  valuable  contact  for  Embassy’.248 
After the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime in April 2003, the MPs played a role in 
supervising Kuwaiti policy regarding its demands of Iraq with reference to outstanding 
issues. Thus, after the restoration of relations between Kuwait and Iraq from 2004, some 
MPs threatened   to   use   their   constitutional   power   of   ‘interpellation’   against   the  Kuwaiti  
Government should there be any attempt to relieve Iraqi debts or reduce compensation 
payments without the consent of the Kuwait National Assembly (see Chapter 9). 249 To 
this were   added   many   ‘parliamentary   questions’   sent   by   MPs   to   the   Kuwaiti   Foreign  
Minister after 2003 regarding outstanding issues with Iraq.250 The role of the Kuwaiti 
parliament in foreign issues with Iraq led the US ambassador to Kuwait, LeBaron, to meet 
with some MPs in 2005 to discuss the issue of Iraqi debt relief (see Chapter 9). 251  
The National Assembly also had a hand in blocking some regional and international 
treaties such as the GCC Security Agreement, the GCC Counterterrorism Treaty, the Arab 
League Counterterrorism Treaty of 1998, OIC Counterterrorism Treaty of 1999, and the 
extradition treaty of 2004 for the Criminal Court between Kuwait and US until 2009.252   
The objections of MPs to such treaties stem from their fear that these treaties might affect 
Kuwait’s  cultural  identity  and  its  freedom  to  form  a  democratic  system  as  distinct  from  the  
rest of the Arab Gulf and other states. For example, this concern was expressed by a 
former Speaker of the National Assembly, Ahmed Al-Sadoun, in 2012 when he said,  ‘the  
Convention (GCC Security Agreement) violates the sanctity of the Constitution and 
affects  the  freedom  and  sovereignty  of  Kuwait  in  some  of  its  clauses’.253 This shows the 
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significant role of the Kuwait National Assembly can on occasion have in Kuwaiti foreign 
relations with states.  In recent years, parliament has issued many resolutions (as 
recommendations and wishes) in the field of foreign affairs, such as calling upon the 
Kuwait government to help the Palestinians in Gaza and reconstruct what Israel destroyed 
in its war with Hamas in 2008, and allocating $34 million for UNRWA.254 On 7 
November 2006, boycotting diplomatic relations with Denmark due to the publication of 
cartoons of the Islamic prophet Muhammad was suggested.255  
It has also convened several times with the Kuwaiti Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. 
Sheikh Mohammed Al-Sabah, to discuss international issues related to Kuwait, such as: 
1. 10 January, 2007: to discuss the official and popular stand of the states 
sympathetic  to  Saddam  Hussein’s  execution  
2.  9 May, 2007: to discuss the Kuwaiti preparation on all levels in case of military 
confrontations in the Gulf region due to the Iranian nuclear programme  
3. 13 November, 2007: to discuss the latest developments on the regional and 
international arena256 
4. 17 January, 2008: to discuss the latest regional and international political situation 
5.  24 January, 2008: to discuss the fate of the three Kuwaiti citizens included in the 
UN enlisted Penalties Committee, Kuwaiti citizens arrested in Guantanamo and Kuwaiti 
citizens imprisoned abroad257 
6. 6 June, 2009: to discuss the escalation of Iraq against Kuwait.  
7.  25 August, 2009: to discuss the latest regional and international political 
situation.258 
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In the final analysis, the National Assembly may discuss, and occasionally block or 
complicate aspects of policy, and it can also play a supportive role, and it can have 
relatively greater impact when the senior reaches of the ruling family are themselves 
divided, but certainly since the late 1990s, the central locus of power and policymaking 
has lain with Sheikh Sabah, and the individual views of other decision-makers or senior 
functionaries, other than as expressed by the MPs quote above, have been kept firmly 
behind closed doors. 
 
 5.  Tools of Kuwaiti Foreign Policy  
 5.1.  Diplomatic Tools 
Kuwait has always depended on diplomatic formulae to protect its independence and 
security. Some researchers have commented on how Kuwaiti foreign policy is fairly well 
balanced, depending on diplomacy to deal with both internal issues and those relating to 
Arab and Islamic countries. In this respect, Kuwait has firmly believed in the Arab 
intentions and Arab will and it had strong belief that force could not be used in the Arab 
relations before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.259 However, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 
created new dimensions for Kuwaiti diplomatic tools for supporting its supremacy and 
independence and addressing demands from Iraq. After liberation, Kuwait endeavoured to 
reinforce its diplomatic relations with all countries, particularly major countries that 
influenced the international order, through intensification of its diplomatic presence 
worldwide. In 2006, Kuwaiti diplomatic missions abroad numbered 71 embassies, 
consulates and permanent delegations. In 2011, this figure had increased to 90, distributed 
as follows: 50% in Europe, 31.8% in Asia, 13.6% in North and South America and 4.5% 
in Arab world. Kuwait hosted 115 foreign permanent diplomatic missions and consulates 
in addition to the offices and organizations accredited by Kuwait until 2011.260 This 
extensive diplomatic representation reflects the importance of Kuwait and the Gulf region 
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worldwide. These embassies  constitute  what  may  be  called  the  ‘political  security  fence’  to  
achieve Kuwaiti objectives as follows: 261 
1. maintaining the independence, security and territorial safety of Kuwait in 
accordance with its historical frontiers demarcated as per UNSC Resolution No. 833 of 
1993, as well as reinforcing the relationship between Kuwait and the UN to solve the 
outstanding issues between Iraq and Kuwait  
2. promotion of the relationship with the GCC to achieve external, defensive and 
economic policies and strengthen the principle of security integration between the Gulf 
states and security worldwide 
3. construction of a regional system based on an understanding with neighbouring 
countries and grounded on the pillars and principles of international law  
3. emphasising the principles included in the Arab League Charter as restrictions for 
future Arab systems and how the Charter of the Arab League should be reconsidered on 
the principles of respect for the supremacy of the states and their territorial and 
international legitimate interests and natural resources 
4. encouraging participation in global economic institutions and international 
development programs and strengthening the economic interests of Kuwait with those 
countries that have the greatest impact, and reinforcing the principle of interest exchange 
5. maintaining the strategic relationship between Kuwait and international coalition 
countries led by the US, including the development of security agreements with the 
permanent members of the UN security council. 
These principles are not restricted to embassies abroad, but extend beyond that to what is 
called   ‘popular   diplomacy’,   represented   by   the   Kuwaiti   National   Assembly,   non-
government organizations, Kuwait syndicates in press associations, and the charitable and 
humanitarian donations that form the political and security fence of the state of Kuwait.262 
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5.2. Economic tools  
 
Economic means have been among the most important tools employed in Kuwaiti foreign 
policy since independence in 1961, with the surplus funds from oil revenues being used 
for political and humanitarian objectives. Following the discovery of oil in Kuwait, the 
Kuwaiti decision-makers realized at the beginning of the 1960s that Kuwait had become 
rich, but it had limited military powers and a small population compared with the 
territorial powers of the region. Thus, Kuwait felt that it was liable to external and 
territorial ambitions, especially after the attempt by Abdul Karim Qasim in 1961 to annex 
Kuwait. For this reason, from the 1960s, Kuwait endeavoured to utilize part of its 
financial surplus to provide assistance to foreign countries in order to gain friends, deter 
opponents and protect its safety, security, independence and existence among Arab 
states263 through the establishment of the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development 
(KFAED) on 31 December 1961 to provide easy loans in order to implement economic 
and social development programs in Arab, Islamic and other friendly countries.264 Kuwaiti 
Aid is characterized by several official and non-official institutions; however, this study 
will examine only official institutions, such as the Ministry of Finance and other ministries 
and institutions, KFAED, the General Board for the South and Arabian Gulf, and Kuwaiti 
contributions to specialist Arab, territorial, Islamic and international organizations. 265 
5.2.1. KFAED Activities 
KFAED is one of the official institutions of Kuwait that provides easy loans to Arab, 
Islamic and other friendly countries; it is one of the Kuwaiti foreign political tools to 
achieve foreign objectives and is currently under the chairmanship of the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs. Until 1974, the business of KFAED was restricted to the Arab countries. 
However, its business was later expanded to include all  developing countries. Thus, the 
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capital of KFAED was increased from KD 200 million in 1966 to KD 1 billion in 1974. 
Then, in March 1981, the capital of KFAED was doubled to KD 2 billion.266 From the 
establishment of KFAED in 1961 until 2011, the total number of loans provided by 
Kuwait to all countries amounted to 798 loans provided to 102 countries with a total value 
estimated at KD 4.54 billion, i.e. $16 billion. Of these loans, 304  were  provided to 16 
Arab countries, with a total value estimated at KD  2479.621  million, (equivalent to $8.7 
billion) at 54.57%, while the number of African states benefiting from these loans was 246 
loans provided to 40 African countries at 17.08 % of the total value, estimated at KD 776 
million (equivalent to $2.7 billion). The Asian and European countries that benefited from 
these loans numbered 35 countries, which obtained 209 loans at 25.7% of the total value, 
estimated at KD 1176.648 million (equivalent to $3.5 billion). Latin American and 
Caribbean States obtained 39 loans, i.e. 1.27%, with a total value estimated at KD 111.343 
million (equivalent to $394 million). The average term of loans is around 22 years and the 
average grace period is about 4 years at 3.2% interest annually( see Table 1).267 
Thus, the KFAED is considered one of the most important tools employed by Kuwait in 
its foreign policy as a humanitarian and political tool. For this reason, after being under 
the chairmanship of the Minister of Finance from 1961, it then came under the 
chairmanship of the Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2003; his task was to assess any 
financial   loans   based   on   ‘political   interests’.   This   fact   was expressed by Sheikh 
Mohammad Sabah, Kuwaiti Minister of Foreign Affairs, when he discussed the role of the 
KFAED  at  the  National  Assembly  session,  saying,  ‘The granting of loans to five countries 
has been suspended as we have some remarks on these states and the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs considered that these states did not have a positive stand towards Kuwait. This is a 
political situation and a political message but we do not fear, hesitate or make 
compliments on any issue relating to the interests of  Kuwait’.268 This fact was emphasized 
by  the  Kuwaiti  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  in  one  session  at  NA  when  he  stated,  ‘KFAED  
                                              
266  The fund was born with a capital of KD 50 million and after two years, its capital was doubled to KD 100 
million. See Kuwait Funds for Arab Economic Development, Maʽlūmāt  ʼasāsīyah,    ‘Basic  Information’, 
Kuwait, June 2005-2006;;  Ibid,  ‘Kuwait Fund Activities Throughout 48 Years, Op.Cit. pp. 1-3. 
267  Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development, Forty Nine Annual Report 2010 /2011, Op.Cit.pp.73-79. 
268  Kuwait  National  Assembly,  ‘Muḍbatat  jalsat  Majlis  il-ʼumma  al-Kuwayti al-khāṣah  al-‘alanīyah:  al-fasl 
at-tashrīʽī  al-ḥādi  ‘ashar:  dawr  al-ʼinʽikād  athanī,  yawm  al-ʼithnayn  17  min  jamādah  al-ʼakhirah  sanat  
1428 h, al-muwāfik  2  min  yūlyo  sanat  2007  m’,  ‘Minutes  of  the  special  Public  Session  of  Kuwait  
National Assembly, 11th  legislative term: second session, Monday, 17 Jumada II, 1428 A.H. 
corresponding to 2 July 2007. Kuwait. 
 
 
164 
is considered as an important tool that serves the objective of Kuwaiti foreign policy. It is 
worth mentioning that the assistance given by KFAED is provided within the framework 
of this policy and in accordance with the approaches of the Government to guarantee the 
continuous provision of loans and assistance by KFAED conforming to the supreme 
interests of Kuwait, and serves its foreign policy according to the text of KFAED Articles 
of  Association’.269 
Therefore, the KFAED   is   considered   as   a   ‘mobile embassy’   in   countries  where  Kuwait  
does not have diplomatic representation. During the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the KFAED 
played an active role in gaining friends and mobilizing support as well as international and 
Arabic opinion to support Kuwait in its capacity as a peaceful state. Thus, following the 
liberation of Kuwait, the policy of the KFAED was revised based on the results of the 
Iraqi invasion, and accordingly, Kuwait stopped all loans that had previously been granted 
to the countries that did not support Kuwait or whose positions had fluctuated towards the 
Iraqi   invasion   of   Kuwait.   These   countries   were   called   ‘opponent   states’   under Kuwaiti 
foreign policy (see Chapters 5 ). However, starting from 1999, this approach changed after 
the resumption of relations with these countries that did not support Kuwait, due to 
fundamental changes in Kuwaiti foreign policy to counter the Iraqi threat (see Chapter 7). 
It is worth mentioning that despite Kuwait cutting its economic aid to the countries that 
did not support it during the invasion; it maintained its assistance to the Palestinian people 
as per the resolutions adopted by Arab summits based on absolute humanitarian factors. 
The resolutions adopted by Arab summits concerning the provision of support to the 
Palestinian National Organization created obligations for Kuwait estimated at 
$554,400,000 from the Beirut summit in March 2002 until the Damascus summit in 2008. 
Kuwait had already paid an estimated $196 million of this amount at intervals from 2002 
until 2009. On 17 December 2007, Kuwait promised to provide $300 million to support 
development projects in the Gaza Strip and West Bank during the Paris donors' conference 
to support the Palestinian Authority. This amount is nearly equivalent to the outstanding 
                                              
269  The Key Note Speech of His Excellency Sheikh Mohammed Sabah Al Sabah, Kuwait Minister of 
Foreign  Affairs,  ‘  On  the  Occasion  of  Graduating  Trainee  Engineers  at  Kuwait  Fund  for  Arab  Economic  
Development  in  2007’,  Kuwait  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affair  .  On  the MOFA website; www.mofa.gov.kw. 
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obligation of Kuwait under the resolution already adopted in the abovementioned Arab 
summits.270 
 
5.2.2. The General Authority for the South and Arabian Gulf  
 
The Authority, established in 1966, is affiliated  to  Kuwait’s  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs.  It 
was designed to manage social and economic development projects, such as the 
construction of schools, hospitals, residential projects, mosques, health projects, etc., 
primarily in the Arab Gulf and Arabian Peninsula. Despite criticism, the assistance 
provided by this Authority did not have any political objectives.271 It has been 
incorporated into Kuwait based on humanitarian responsibility and sympathy with the 
friendly states in the Arab Gulf. The Board played an effective role in helping those states 
who were considered the poorest. The role of the Authority was explained by the Sheikh 
Jaber Al Ahmed Jabber Al Sabah, the Crown Prince and Prime Minister at that time (Amir 
of Kuwait, 1977 – 2006),  when   he   stated,   ‘We cannot accept that we benefit from the 
donation of God to our territories only for ourselves; rather we believe that reinforcing the 
economy of these states will support all Arab nations, of which we are considered as an 
integral  part’.272 Kuwait started humanitarian dealings in North Yemen in the 1960s, and 
then expanded its humanitarian acts to Bahrain, UAE, South Yemen, South Sudan and 
Oman. This humanitarian, social and educational aid was opposed by some regional 
states. For example, Iran was not satisfied with the Kuwaiti penetration into the UAE, as 
Kuwait spread Arab ideology and beliefs via the Egyptian and Palestinian teachers who 
supported the supremacy of Tehran over this State. Meanwhile, Oman, Saudi Arabia and 
Iran objected to the Kuwaiti aid provided to socialists in South Yemen, as they believed 
this aid would reinforce these parties. The Kuwaiti assistance provided to Sudan for the 
settlement of refugees in South Sudan was the only Arab obligation under the resolutions 
adopted by the Arab summits. Kuwait reconstructed many areas affected by the Zufar War 
in Oman. The Authority constructed more than 191 schools and 55 hospitals and clinics, 
                                              
270  Text of the Reply of Sheikh Mohammed Sabah Al-Sabah, the Kuwaiti Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the 
question directed by MP Waleed Al Tabtabai; See Al Rai Newspaper, Issue No. 10835 dated 1 March 
2009, Kuwait. p.4. 
271  Assiri, Abdul Reda, 1992, Op. Cit. p.87. 
272  Ibid, p. 87. 
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as well as 23 educational projects and many other civil projects from 1963 to 1990. The 
budget of the Authority was KD 210 million (equivalent to $730 million). This aid was 
distributed as follows: for North Yemen the proportion was 54.7%, for South Yemen 
18.9%, for Bahrain 32.6%, for Sudan 1% and for Oman 1.8%.273 
Following the liberation of Kuwait, this Authority was dissolved due to the infeasibility of 
its projects, and its functions were entrusted to the KFAED due to the reaction to the 
position of Yemen and Sudan on the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. It is noticeable that all 
Kuwait aid provided either by the Authority or the KFAED, whether direct financial 
contributions or those provided by unofficial institutions, was directed to states that did 
not support Kuwait during the Iraqi occupation.274 
 
5.2.3. Financial Aid 
 
Kuwaiti financial contributions through the Ministry of Finance and other institutions to 
support Arab and Islamic issues have been made primarily for political reasons, although 
some contributions have been for national and sympathetic reasons, such as the liberation 
war in Algeria and relations with states having common frontiers with Israel and the PLO. 
It is worth mentioning that most of these contributions are confidential, non-restricted and 
sometimes undeclared and beyond popular control. Further, these contributions and aid 
provided by Kuwait always take the shape of immeasurable grants, such as foodstuffs and 
medications. Therefore, the total of monetary contributions provided by Kuwait for Arab 
political issues to Arab governments from 1963 to 1990 is estimated at $26.5 billion. The 
share of this aid that went to countries that did not support Kuwait during the invasion, i.e. 
‘duwal  iḍ-ḍid’  or  ‘opponent  states’ was $21.6 billion (81.5%); out of this, Iraq received 
$15.3 billion (57.7% of the total amount of contributions); before 1979, Egypt received 
$2.4 billion (8.9%); while Syria received $2.5 billion, (9.6%) and Jordan obtained $1.96 
                                              
273  Ibid, p.113. 
274  Ibid, p. 114. 
  The  concept  of    ‘duwal  iḍ-ḍid’  or    ‘opponent  States’  was  used  to  describe  the  states  that  did  not  condemn  
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait during the Arab summit that was held in Cairo on 8 – 10 August 1990 or 
who supported Iraq. These states comprised Jordan, Yemen, Algeria, PLO, Sudan, Mauritania, Libya and 
Tunisia. This concept was adopted by the Kuwait Ministry of Foreign Affairs only after the invasion. 
However, this concept stopped being used in Kuwaiti foreign policy after the resumption of relations with 
these countries (for further information, see Chapter 5).  
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billion (7.3%). The PLO received $920 million (3.4%). In addition, $3.24 billion (12.2% 
of these contributions) was distributed among these states and organizations.275 
 
Assiri described Kuwait’s   financial  contributions  as   ‘Kuwait  Dinar  diplomacy’   in that it 
earns Kuwait and Kuwaiti citizens respect throughout the third world countries and 
worldwide due to the humanitarian and economic contributions provided to all countries. 
This diplomacy has become a protective shield for Kuwait.276 
 
Kuwait decided to cancel the debts of more countries during the speech of Sheikh Jaber Al 
Ahmed jabber Al Sabah, the Amir of the State of Kuwait, at the UN General Assembly on 
28 September 1988. The initiative included several elements, such as inviting permanent 
members of the UN Security Council to a meeting to discuss the interest due on the debts 
and to cancel the debts of the poorest states, to suggest that the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund should reconsider the standard conditions applicable to 
countries that require the assistance of loans and to increase technological and technical 
assistance provided by states of the North to those of the South. This initiative was 
resubmitted in the Non-Aligned Movement meeting that was held at Belgrade in 
September 1989. The percentage of the assistance provided by Kuwait to its GNP is 
generally more than 8%, but sometimes less. Upon comparing the percentage of Kuwaiti 
aid to the total GNP of the industrial states (that is, states represented by OCED), the 
percentage of Kuwaiti assistance was 27 times that provided by developed countries in the 
1970s, but occasionally decreased to 15 times. However, due to the decline in oil revenues 
in the 1980s, there were a decrease to 11 times and then to 1.58 times in the assistance 
provided by Kuwait. However, it jumped to 18.7 times in 1990.277 Thus, Kuwait is 
considered as one of the ten greatest donors worldwide. In this respect, it allocated 3.81% 
of its GNP to assistance in 1984, which was the greatest percentage among donor states at 
that time.278 Further, the percentage of Kuwaiti aid granted to developing countries and to 
                                              
275  Assiri, Abdul Reda 1992, Op.Cit. p.116.  
276  Ibid. p.117. 
277  Al-Sharrah, Ramadan Ali and Al Fakeer, Husain Taha, Al-kuwayt wat-tanmiyah al-ʽarabiyah,  ‘Kuwait  
and  Arab  Development’, Center For Research and Studies on Kuwait, Kuwait, 1994. pp.30 – 33. 
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the states that showed lesser growth during the last three decades was 2% of the total 
GNP, i.e., three times the internationally agreed percentage of 0.7%.279  
 
Kuwait allocated $300 million to the Islamic Development Bank in 2007 to combat 
poverty in Africa. Under an initiative from Sheikh Sabah Al Ahmad Al Jaber Al Sabah, 
the  Amir  of  Kuwait  in  2008,  Kuwait  established  a  ‘Decent  Living  Fund’  at  $100  million  to  
assist developing countries to face the soaring price of food and improve their capability 
to increase agricultural production as a result of the international food crisis280 as well as 
$500 million in 2009 to establish a $2 billion Arab fund to support enterprises in the Arab 
world.281  In addition to this, Kuwaiti contributions to the international, Arab, territorial 
and Islamic specialist organizations and entities during the period from 2005 – 2006 were 
KD 299.887 million282. Kuwait increased its voluntary contributions to UN agencies 
fivefold in 2010.283 Kuwait supports these entities for the following reasons: 284  
 
1. to   affirm   Kuwait’s   membership   of   the   Arab,   Islamic   and   humanitarian  
world by avoiding any political conditions upon granting assistance to different 
countries 
2. to reinforce international cooperation by supporting peace processes and 
international development processes from different UN organs  
                                              
279  The Keynote Speech of His Excellency Sheikh Mohammed Sabah Al Sabah, Kuwait Minister of Foreign 
Affairs,  ‘Before  the  Third  International  Conference  of  the  Faculty of Administrative Sciences: Kuwait 
University’,  Kuwait  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs,  2008.  On  the  MOFA  website;;  www.mofa.gov.kw  
280  The Keynote Speech of His Excellency Sheikh Mohammed Sabah Al Sabah, Kuwait Minister of Foreign 
Affairs,  ‘The Sixth Ministerial Meeting of Forum for the Future: Morocco, 2-3  November  2009’,  
Ministry of Foreign Affair. Kuwait. 
281  WikiLeaks,    ‘MFA  U/S  Defends  Kuwaiti  Arab  Economic  Summit  Objectives;;  PA  Support;;  GTMO;;  
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284  Centre for Research and Studies on Kuwait, Kuwait and Social Development. Leadership, Planning, 
Popular Participation and Humanitarian Orientation, 1st edition, Kuwait, 1995.pp.164 – 176.  
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3. to establish deeply rooted cooperative relations and mutual interests with all 
friendly developed and developing countries to ensure that they will not have a 
biased role in international relations 
4. to support contemporary humanitarian issues to promote the humanitarian 
civilization 
5. to make an effective contribution to tackle urgent problems that may be 
faced by friendly states, particularly those resulting from natural catastrophes, such 
as earthquakes, floods, rains, etc.  
The economic tool proved  one  of  the  most  important  ones  on  Kuwait’s  toolbox  during the 
crises with Iraq. Kuwait provided a KD 30 million loan when Iraq recognised Kuwait in 
1963,285 although some sources have pointed out that this loan had nothing to do with the 
issue  of  Iraq’s  recognition  of  Kuwait.  To help solve  the frontier crisis with Iraq in 1967, 
Kuwait provided KD 25 million to support developmental projects in Iraq following its 
withdrawal from the Kuwaiti territories.286 The same approach was applied during the 
third frontier crisis in 1973 (the Al-Samita crisis) when the Kuwaiti Ministry of Finance 
provided KD 11.6 million to Iraq.287  During the Iraq-Iran war, Kuwait provided financial 
support to Iraq to the tune of $15.3 billion to counter the Iranian threat.288 
It is worth noting that since the   collapse   of   Saddam   Hussein’s   regime   in   2003,   the  
economic tool has again played an important role in Kuwaiti foreign policy through 
Kuwait submitting $1.6 billion of economic aid to reconstruct Iraq based on the purely 
political objectives set at the Madrid Conference in 2003.289 Kuwait, as one of the 
countries that provided facilities to the US to occupy Iraq, has  an  ‘ethical  obligation’   to  
support the stability of Iraq. Sheikh Mohammed Al Sabah, Kuwaiti Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, stated during the Madrid Conference regarding the reconstruction of Iraq in 2003 
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287  Partrick, Neil, Op. Cit. p.175. 
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that   ‘the  main   reason   behind   such   assistance   is   to   regain   stability   in   the   region   and   to  
support Iraq to resume its  natural  role’ (see chapter 9).290  
 
5.2.4. Oil policy 
Since the discovery of oil in 1938, with production starting in 1946, Kuwait has become 
increasingly influential state in global energy politics due to the fact that oil and natural 
gas have become the main global sources for energy; for example, in 2011, oil supplied 
about 33.1% of the global energy consumption and accounted for 70% of global trade.291 
As  mentioned  above,  Kuwait’s oil reserves were estimated at 101.5 billion barrels in 2009, 
representing 7.6% of the total oil reserves in the world, which has led to Kuwait playing a 
key role in global politics and the global economy. Oil wealth has allowed Kuwait to play 
a significant role in creating a stable global energy market through its membership, as a 
founding member, in OPEC (1960) and AOPEC (1968). This is in addition to its 
participation in and membership of the International Energy Forum since 1991 and the 
Asian Oil and Energy Round-table meetings since 2005 to discuss issues related to oil and 
the stability of the world market for energy. Kuwait and the Middle East region have been 
seen as the most significant factor for creating a stable global energy market as this region 
produces  37%  of  the  world’s  oil  and  18%  of  all  natural  gas  and  supplies,  22% of US oil 
imports,  36%  of  OECD’s  oil   imports,  40%  of  China’s   imports,  60%  of   India’s   imports,  
45%  of  Canada’s   imports,   and   80%  of   Japan’s   and  South  Korea’s   oil   imports.292 Thus, 
after the shutdown of Libyan oil production in 2011, due to the Arab Spring that took 
place in that country, Kuwait and some other oil producing countries, such as Saudi 
Arabia, UAE and Qatar, increased their oil production to offset the loss of Libyan oil 
supplies in order to keep the prices of the global energy market at a reasonable level.293  
Kuwait’s  official objectives for its oil and energy policy are the following:  
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1. to guarantee supplies in the energy markets and development of international trade 
and investment in energy resources and technology 
2. to reduce differences among the producing states and consuming states and 
promote a dialogue between producers and consumers  
3. to discuss views and exchange information related to the interdependent relations 
between energy, environmental issues, economic growth and development 
4. to address and tackle any subjects related to the transfer of oil and gas that may 
have an effect on oil market stability and world energy security.294 
In international  politics,  Kuwait  has  used  oil  as  a  ‘political  weapon’  on  several  occasions,  
in its own or in Arab interests. This can be illustrated by  Kuwait’s   support   for   the   oil  
embargo imposed upon states that supported Israel, such as the UK, the US, and West 
Germany, following the Six-Day War in June 1967 between Arab states and Israel, a ban 
which proved to be ineffective due to Western states having sufficient oil stocks and the 
desire of Iran and Venezuela to increase their output.295 However, the oil embargo became 
an effective weapon in the 1973 war, when Kuwait, once again, declared its solidarity 
with oil-producing Arab states (OAPEC) to reduce oil production by 5% each month until 
the Israelis had withdrawn from the occupied territories. This is in addition to the cut in oil 
production and in the sale of oil to the US and Holland due to their military support of 
Israel.296 This had a significant economic impact on the oil-importing Western states that 
led to the soaring of oil prices for the first time in the history of the oil industry. This was 
evident, for example, when the state of Oregon in the US banned the use of Christmas 
lights and commercial lighting so as to reduce energy consumption, and 90% of gas 
stations in the US were closed on Sundays and Saturday evenings until 1974 for the same 
reason.297 The 1973 oil crisis led the oil-importing countries (the majority of which were 
from the West) to establish the International Energy Agency (IEA) in November 1974 to 
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discuss issues related to oil and energy and particularly the risk of a major disruption to oil 
supplies.298   
The use of oil policy to influence or contain other states has also caused discussion among 
observers and those percceiving themselves as targeted in this way. It is debatable – and 
Kuwaiti official circiles would dispute - whether this was ever used as a  ‘weapon’ in the 
true sense.  Saddam  Hussein  claimed  that  Kuwait’s  oil  policy  in the late 19080s and early 
1990 was   ‘waging   economic   war’   against   Iraq   after   1988,   through   flooding   the  
international oil markets with quantities exceeding its prescribed share of OPEC, which 
led to a reduction in the price of oil and a decline in Iraqi oil revenues. It also of course 
reduced Kuwaiti oil revenues, but arguably Kuwait was better able to absorb this. The 
accusation remains unsubstantiated, but was among the reasons Iraq invaded Kuwait in 
1990, as we will discuss in Chapter 5.   
At any rate, both in fact and in potentiality, oil has been an important tool in Kuwait’s 
foreign policy toolbox since the 1950s.   
 
5.3.  The information tool 
 
Before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Kuwait had no interest in the foreign media and it 
had never intensified its presence to address Arabic and public opinion due to the fact that 
it had no enemies that would require it to focus on foreign media to protect itself. Rather, 
Kuwait published informational press releases in Arab and foreign newspapers during 
official occasions. However, the propagation of inaccuracies by the Iraqi media and those 
of some countries supporting Iraq during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait necessitated the 
existence of foreign Kuwaiti media to coordinate with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to 
reflect the reality of the events in the region and to create a media that could counter the 
Iraqi media, which had gained great experience during their eight-year struggle with Iran. 
The Kuwaiti political leadership felt that it was necessary to explain the Kuwaiti issues 
abroad,  given  the  Iraqi  leadership’s  successful  use  of  the  media  as  an effective tool during 
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, which had sparked a great popular response in many Arab 
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countries, particularly as regards the issues raised by Iraq concerning the redistribution of 
wealth, the liberation of the Holy territories in Saudi Arabia from foreign forces, and 
countering the major powers supporting Israel.299 For these reasons, after liberation, 
Kuwait established information offices worldwide, particularly in those countries where it 
would have a significant impact, such as the US, Britain and India and some Arab 
countries, such as Egypt, Lebanon, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Syria, to propagate the 
political objectives of Kuwait and to counter the Iraqi media.300 Kuwait’s   information  
policy focused on the social and essential principles and objectives in the internal, 
territorial, Islamic and international fields, as follows:301 
1. belief in and commitment to Islam as a religion and faith to construct 
thinking and high values within the individual and the community  
2. to defend Kuwait, including its territory, citizens, regime, values, religion, 
entity, supremacy and security; further, to reinforce the national unity and 
cooperation between the people and their leaders using all available informational 
tools 
3. to  affirm  Kuwait’s  membership  of  the  Arab  and  Islamic  nations  and  its  will  
to enhance its relationship with the GCC, Arab, Islamic and international countries 
4. to adhere to Kuwait’s obligations towards the humanitarian community and 
enhance awareness of being part of this world 
5. to remain committed to the principle of open-door policy and constructive 
dialogue in resolving disputes  
In this respect, Kuwait made a constructive initiative to countries that held negative 
attitudes as a result of the Iraqi invasion via observing the following principles: 
- denouncing the Iraqi aggression and rejecting the resort to power as a means for 
solving disputes and rejecting the principle of threats 
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- calling for Iraq to implement the resolutions of the UN Security Council related to the 
liberation of Kuwait 
- calling Iraq to release prisoners of war and reveal the locations of Kuwaiti missing 
persons and other nationals as well as returning property looted from Kuwait 
- claiming compensation for the crimes committed by the Iraqi army in Kuwait. 
The   Kuwaiti   Cabinet,   represented   by   the   Prime  Minister,   determines   Kuwait’s   foreign  
media policy. However, the Ministry of Information coordinates with the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs to determine how this policy may be implemented. Given the importance 
of the media in confronting Iraq, Kuwait invited many political, informational, economical 
and scientific personalities to visit Kuwait in 1996 to become acquainted with its most 
important features and to learn about its issues with Iraq. The number of journalists 
visiting Kuwait from the US alone was more than 300.302 From  1991   to  1994,  Kuwait’s  
media policy focused on convincing the world of the importance of exerting pressure on 
Iraq to implement international resolutions, particularly UN Security Council Resolution 
No. 833 of 1993 on demarcating the Kuwaiti - Iraqi frontiers. At that time, the 
international community was preoccupied by the issue of Iraqi weapons of mass 
destruction. Consequently, Kuwait intensified its diplomatic efforts and placed the issue of 
the Kuwaiti - Iraqi frontiers at the top of the list of priorities threatening the security in the 
region until it achieved official recognition from Iraq and the frontiers were demarcated 
under UN Security Council Resolution No. 833 of 1993.303 After that, the mass media 
started to tackle certain issues and points propagated by the Iraqi media, including:  
1. the starvation of the Iraqi people and the relationship between the economic 
embargoes imposed on Iraq and the Kuwait issue. In this respect, Kuwait argued that 
lifting the economic embargo depended on Iraq itself implementing the international 
resolutions related to the situation between Kuwait and Iraq and affirmed that Kuwait and 
other Arab countries had called for a lifting of the economic sanctions imposed on Iraq 
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and respect for the supremacy of Iraq during the Arab submit that was held in Oman in 
2001304 (see Chapter 7). 
2. the presence of foreign troops in the Gulf region, linking this with Kuwait. In this 
respect, Kuwait affirmed that it had rejected any foreign presence in the Gulf before the 
Iraqi invasion. However, since the Iraqi invasion, the security concept had changed. 
Therefore, according to Kuwaiti media, the presence of foreign troops in the Gulf region 
was due to the Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait rather than to Kuwaiti wishes. 
3. foreign media propagating the view that financial compensation payable to Kuwait 
or other countries was the property of the besieged Iraqi people. Kuwait affirmed that, on 
the contrary, this compensation was not payable to Kuwait; rather, it was compensation 
for the damage caused by Iraq to other countries, for which Kuwait was claiming in 
accordance with the provisions of international law and international principles regarding 
war.  
The Kuwaiti media remained insufficiently developed to explain Kuwaiti issues on the 
Arab and international levels, and the information offices in Arab and international 
countries needed strengthening. However, these offices were closed in 2007 after the 
collapse  of  Saddam  Hussein’s  regime  in  2003,  as  they  were  no  longer  needed  because  the  
Iraqi threat had ceased to exist.305 
 
5.4. The military tool 
 
As  noted  before,  Kuwait’s  military   capability   is   very   limited,   as  was   shown   in   the   Iraqi  
invasion,  when  it  proved  not  even  to  have  any  effective  deterrent  or  delaying  and  ‘trigger’  
function. In theory Kuwait could and can draw on the GCC as a whole, but there, too, there 
are sever limitations both on indigenous capacity and, especially, coordination.  
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The Kuwaiti constitution has organized the use of the military in Article 68, which states, 
‘The Amir declares defensive war by decree. Offensive   war   is   prohibited’.306  For this 
reason, the  Kuwaiti   constitution   draws   the  military   doctrine   of  Kuwait   in   the   ‘defensive 
war’  only,  which  is reflected in the Kuwaiti armaments since its independence in 1961.  
 
The military power of the countries surrounding Kuwait has been a key factor that has 
influenced its military strategy. Thus, Kuwait has always had to cope with the presence of 
three regional major powers: Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia. It is surrounded by states of 
greater population, geographic area and military might, which places Kuwait in a 
vulnerable position and emphasized the need to strengthen its military capabilities since 
the 1960s and to increase them further in the 1970s due to the ongoing Iraqi threats to 
Kuwait, especially after the Abdul Karim Qasim crisis in 1961 and the occupation of the 
Kuwaiti police post (Al-Samitah) in 1973. Therefore, Kuwait began to build up its military 
capabilities from the 1970s on through 
  
1.   the application of a conscription programme  
2.   the development of Kuwaiti armaments through the allocation of the first program 
for the purchase of arms in 1976 worth KD 400 million ($1.5 billion)  
3.   the establishment of air and naval military bases.   
 
In the 1970s and 1980s, the Iraqi threats, the Iranian revolution in 1979 and, of course, the 
fallout of the Iraq-Iran War (1980-1988) with its aftermath complicated the Kuwaiti small 
defence and development planning. Therefore, the need to reinforce the Kuwaiti military 
capabilities became essential in order for Kuwait to protect its security.  As a result of 
events in the region during the 1980s, Kuwaiti military expenditure increased from KD 
147 million in the budget of 1980 to KD 390 million in 1988. The total value of Kuwaiti 
military expenditure from 1961 to 1992 reached KD 4.980 billion ($17.810 billion).307  
 
However, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait completely changed the Kuwaiti military doctrine 
after the failure of the Kuwaiti military strategy and of the GCC in repelling this 
occupation. This has been through the appearance in Kuwaiti policy for the first time in 
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public  of  an  ‘alliance’  concept  with the superpowers, after its liberation, as a reflection of 
the ‘imbalance   equation’   in  Kuwaiti   strategy   in  order   to  protect   its security from threats 
from both Iraq and Iran. Therefore, Kuwait, since its liberation, has focused sharply on the 
military expenditure to offset its security. For example, arms imports increased by over 
50% between 1994 and 1995 in comparison with 1987-1990 due to the fallout of the Gulf 
crisis. The total arms purchase agreements of Kuwait with major exporter states was 
estimated at $3.5 billion between 1987 and 1990 and increased after its liberation to $5.7 
billion during the period of 1991-1994 and decreased to $5.5 billion from 1994-1997.308  
 
Despite the reinforcement of the Kuwaiti military force after the Iraqi invasion with 
modern technology from the exports of major states such as the US, Russia and China 
valued at $3.1 billion from 1997 to 2004,309 and $4.2 billion from 2004 to 2011,310 Kuwaiti 
military power is still very limited compared to that of the surrounding countries. In 2011, 
Kuwait’s military forces were estimated at 15,500, while Iran had 350,000, Iraq 271,400, 
and Saudi Arabia 233,500. Given the balance of power in the Middle East, as a regional 
extension to Kuwait and the Gulf region, the military power of Israel was estimated at 
176,500, Egypt 438,500,311 and Turkey 510,600.312  As of 2011, Kuwait had 293 tanks, 66 
aircraft and 11 patrol and coastal combatants (navy) and 1 logistic and support; Saudi 
Arabia had 565 tanks, 296 aircraft, 30 patrol and coastal combatants, 7 principle surface 
combatants, 7 mine countermeasures and 17 logistic and support and 8 landing ships and 
landing crafts (navy); Iran had 1,663 tanks, 336 aircraft, 23 submarines, 68 patrol and 
coastal combatants, 5 mine countermeasures, 43 logistic and support (navy), 13 landing 
ships and 10 landing craft; Iraq had 336 tanks, 3 aircrafts, 28 patrol and coastal 
combatants; Israel had 480 tanks, 440 modern aircrafts, 6 sophisticated Dolphin 
submarines (3 to be delivered from 2012), 59 patrol and coastal combatants, 1 landing 
craft and 3 logistic and support (navy); Egypt had 2,412 tanks, 589 aircraft, 4 submarines, 
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51 patrol and coastal combatants, and 8 principle surface combatants. 313 Turkey had 4503 
tanks, 338 aircraft, 14 submarines, 18 principle surface combatants, 52 patrol and coastal 
combatants and 27 mine countermeasures, 5 landing ships and 45 landing crafts.314  
 
Therefore, Kuwait’s   military remains too small to counter any real threat from its 
neighboring countries, which is reflected in the value of the Kuwaiti military spending 
with Kuwait ranking ninth in the Middle East in 2011 ‘$4   billion   annually’   (see Table 
2).315 Thus,  the  ‘imbalance’  of  Kuwaiti  military capabilities in the region urged Kuwait to 
rely on the US on the one hand and GCC states on the other, to close any gaps in its 
military strategy and in order to protect its security against any external risks through 
continued military coordination.  
 
As a result of the Iranian ambitions in the Gulf region after the fall of Saddam Hussein’s 
regime in 2003, through its interference in Iraq, Yemen, and Syria, and the development of 
Iran’s  supposedly  peaceful  nuclear program, Kuwait and, of course, the Arab Gulf states, 
have focused on strengthening their air, naval, and missile defence systems’   military 
capabilities to counter any risk, especially since these six Arab states do not share a land 
border with Iran, which is reflected in their military expenditure and conventional military 
capabilities. For example, Saudi Arabia ranked first in the developing world in purchasing 
arms valued at $75.7 billion and UAE ranked third, spending $20.3 billion on arms from 
2004 to 2011.316 Thus, the conventional military capabilities of the GCC became more 
sophisticated and advanced than those of Iran except for naval power.317  In 2011, the 
military forces of the GCC countries were estimated at 362,100 soldiers, 1,656 tanks, 651 
aircraft, 93 patrol and coastal combatants, 9 principle surface combatants, 9 mine 
countermeasures, 35 logistic and support (navy) and 52 landing ships and landing craft318 
while Iran, as mentioned above, had 350,000 soldiers, 1663 tanks, 336 aircraft, 23 
submarines, 68 patrol and coastal combatants, 5 mine countermeasures, 43 logistic and 
support (navy), 13 landing ships and 10 landing craft. This is in addition to the military 
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superiority of the six Gulf States over Iran in air capabilities and modern technology. This 
superiority can be illustrated in the value of the military expenditure of the six Arab Gulf 
states estimated at $68.1 billion in 2011, while Iran’s expenditure amounted to $11.9 
billion in the same year.319 Therefore, the Iranian conventional military capability does not 
represent a real threat to the six Arab Gulf states except regarding its naval capability; it 
was   this   that   urged   Iran   to   offset   this   ‘gap’   through   the development of its nuclear 
program, which is believed to be for military purposes in order to counter external threats, 
especially from Israel’s nuclear power.  
 
Despite the theoretical superiority of the GCC states, the problem of coordination among 
the six Gulf states is that it is still limited to the establishment of a framework of collective 
security and effective military cooperation until 2010, due to internal and not external 
factors concerning the sovereignty of each country, the fear of Saudi Arabia becoming 
dominant and a lack of confidence in the effectiveness of collective military action.  
However, as a result of the events of the Arab Spring in Bahrain in 2011, and the 
subsequent Iranian interventions to support these events in Bahrain, the GCC states in 
November 2011 set up ‘a marine security coordination centre’ in Bahrain due to a fear of 
Iran’s intervention in that country. 320 This followed by setting up a unified military 
command for their land, navy and air forces in late 2012 to be under one umbrella for the 
existing GCC forces deployed in six member states.321   
 
The concept of military strategy is determined by Kuwait on the following basis:  
1. retain military capabilities to be able to deter threats temporarily until it is possible 
to provide full protection to the state.  
2. keep the diversity of sources of arms purchases to win the political and military 
support from the major sponsors of arms suppliers.  
3. not to engage in regional conflicts with the states as the purpose of the Kuwaiti 
Army is defensive rather than offensive. 322 
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4. maintain good relations with the surrounding countries regionally and 
internationally for political cover to protect Kuwait against military risks. 
5. establish closer relationships between Kuwait and military blocs, such as GCC 
states, NATO and superpowers as a military strategy to protect Kuwait.  
 
     
 
6. Conclusion 
 
 
This chapter has, in line with the framework laid out in Chapter 2, surveyed the main  
geographic, internal and external factors that have in varying combinations shaped Kuwaiti 
foreign policy. Small and vulnerable, without natural defences, located next to three 
regional powers – each presenting territorial and ideological challenges – the rulers of this 
entity from the beginning strove pragmatically to secure external protection while 
maintaining room for manoeuvre and flexibility to adjust to changing circumstances. This 
search for security was complicated by its small population and aspects of the domestic 
socio-ethnic and religious make-up, which tied into regional, cross-boundary cleavages 
that could be exploited by neighbouring regimes and which even without such intent 
created possible vulnerability to spillover effects:  since 2006, Kuwait has witnessed 
Sunni-Shiite conflict in Kuwait due to the transmission of sectarian violence in Iraq and 
the effect of the Arab Spring on the one hand, and the conflict between families and tribes 
(Hadhar-Bedu) attempting to achieve short-term political and economic gains, on the 
other. Foreign policy thus becomes concerned also with the domestic. immigration of 
foreigners to Kuwait, especially Arabs since the 1950s, which exposed Kuwait to internal 
and external challenges by those immigrants and their affiliation and ideas, such as the 
activities of Arabs, non-Arabs (Iranians) and Bidoon in a number of terrorist operations in 
Kuwait during the 1980s. This also applied to a small number of Kuwaiti Shia who, 
inspired by Iranian revolution, became involved in the terrorist operations. Concern was 
aggravated during the Iraqi invasion by some Palestinians and Bidoon collaborating with 
the Iraqi occupiers whilst, non-Arab and non-Muslim populations represent some social 
and cultural concerns and a minor security challenge among parts of the national 
population as material and ideational challenges to Kuwait.  Thus, the alignment of 
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Kuwaitis, Arabs and non-Arabs with foreign states or networks such as Al-Qaeda’s  
network became a main concern for Kuwait after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US.   
 
The   regional   security   theatre   and   regional   ideational   constructs,   be   they   ‘Arabist’   or  
Islamic, produced another complexity, bringing potential pressures and constraints, as well 
as occasional opportunities and, in the GCC, a forum of support in crisis situations such as 
the Iran-Iraq war and the Iraqi invasion. The regional environment also presented other 
threats, not least the Iranian revolution in 1979. Against this background it was not 
surprising that the Kuwaiti leadership would pursue outside protection from the global 
hegemon, the US – although initially this had to be circumscribed by caution over the 
regional theme of Arab identity. It is only when the latter lost much of its potency in 
Kuwait due to the Iraqi invasion, that this external protective alliance could become more 
explicit and thorough – something we will explore in greater detail in the chapters that 
follow. As already suggested, shifts in the global environment were an important part of 
his picture:  especially in the shifting baance of who the main hegemon was, and how 
canging relationships between the key external powers shaped possibilities – as in the end 
of th Cold  War’s  effect  on  the  UN’s  ability  to  act. 
 
As part of its toolbox, in addition to the use of such external protection, Kuwait also had 
recourse to both diplomatic, propaganda and economic means. Diplomacy could be 
exerted directly, often by the top leadership itself, sometimes by key ministers from the 
ruling   family,   sometimes   via   the   National   Assembly.   Propaganda   or   ‘PR’   was   used  
extensively especially after the Iraqi invasion, and proved successful. And economic tools 
– not least aid – were used extensively since the 1950s. The economy, of course, was also 
a factor shaping foreign policy in the first place, both directly – in the need it created to 
serve  the  country’s  global  place  in   the  oil  market,  and  in  the  clout   that   it  provided  – and 
indirectly, through way it shaped the domestic political economy as well as the attention, 
good and bad, that it brought to Kuwait from the 1950s especially. 
 
Militarily, however much Kuwait bought by way of arms – something that was sharply 
increased after 1992 – it remained unable to defend itself – or even to provide serious 
deterrence. This, again, added to the need for external protection and goodwill. 
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The decisions that were made on the basis of all this, were generally arrived at not through 
a complex bureaucracy or even the Foreign Ministry or the National Assembly, but 
through the interpretations and perceptions of the leading members of the ruling family – 
especially the Amir, the Crown Prince and Prime Minister, and the Foreign Minister. Other 
individuals and parts of the foreign policy apparatus might have an advisory or 
implementation role, and the national Assembly might at times similarly raise questions, 
obstruct particular agreements, support a particular policy thrust, or indeed be useful as a 
relationship tool with some countries, but the core of policy and diplomatic stances was 
always in the hands of the top three. But the way in which this happened in practice was 
influenced as much by the particular personalities and intra-ruling family balance of 
power, as it was a mere function of their formal position. It became even more 
pronounced, when in the 1990s Amir Jaber became increasingly withdrawn, and with the 
eclipsing of Crown Prince Sheikh Saad from 1997: this effectively concentrated control of 
foreign policy in the hands of foreign minister Sheikh Sabah, a state of affairs that was 
officially sealed when he himself acceded as Amir in 2006.  Indeed, it is remarkable that, 
during this period since 1997, few others, whether in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the 
National Assembly, even seem to have known exactly how policies were crafted. The 
National  Assembly’s   role,   however,   retained   some  potency,   shifting   in   conjunction   both  
with its internal orientation, and with the shifts in internal Al Sabah politics: the most 
striking example is the shift in policy towards restoring relations with the so-called 
‘opposition   states’   in   1999,   something   that   had   been   opposed   by   Sheikh   Saad   and   key  
parts of the Assembly, and supported by Sheikh Sabah: the change came when Sheikh 
Saad had effectively become incapacitated, and when a new assembly had been formed – a 
story that will be picked up in Chapter 7. It is worth noting also that detailed comment on 
the formation of policy, especially since then, is made difficult both by the relatively small 
role played by other persons and institutions, and by the veil of secrecy that envelops any 
such discussions – or at least reluctance on the part of such parties to discuss these matters 
with researchers, other than to refer to official positions and the conclusion that it is really 
the domain of Sheikh Sabah. Certainly it is not possible to ascertain – other than the 
obvious disagreement on the policy towards the duwal aḍ-ḍidd between Sheikh Saad and 
Sheikh Sabah – the individual views of particulat decision-makers and officials: with the 
exceptions of some limited views expressed by MPS quoted in this chapter, this has 
remained behind closed doors. In this chapter, it is hoped that at least some of the 
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dynamics and roles have been outlined in ways not done before, in a way that will 
underpin the narrative that follows. 
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Chapter V 
 
The Iraqi Invasion and the Regional and International Response 
 
 
1. Introduction   
 
The Iraqi invasion is obviously at the centre of this thesis, so it is important, if we are to 
understand the pattern of relations between Kuwait and Iraq, to examine the factors that 
shaped the Iraqi decision to invade Kuwait in 1990 and its aftermath. From the framework 
set out earlier, we will concentrate on the set of factors that appear to have been the most 
important in this instance.  
 
1.1. Geography 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the geographic location of countries and common borders are 
one critical factor shaping the foreign policy of states. Therefore, the geographic factor is 
considered to have played a significant role in the nature of relations between Kuwait and 
Iraq, since they were always likely to become engaged in a great number of disputes as 
they have a common border with non-demarcation of terrestrial frontiers in accordance 
with   the   agreed   ‘Minutes   of   1963’   until   1993. This border has been disputed by both 
countries since Kuwait's independence in 1961, which has resulted in many border 
violations, with notable crises in 1966, 1967 and 1973. There has been pressure on Kuwait 
to submit territorial assignments in favour of Iraq, namely two Kuwaiti islands, Warba and 
Boubyan, due to their strategic location for economic and military bases, as mentioned in 
Chapter 4. During the Iraq-Iran War (1980-1988), Iraq started to build military 
installations on the Kuwaiti borders to protect Umm Qasr seaport in order to deter any 
Iranian threats. With the end of this war in 1988, Iraq's ambition to obtain territorial 
concessions from Kuwait was renewed. After the Kuwaiti refusal to grant any concessions 
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or economic assistance to Iraq,  Iraq   used   the   issue   of   the   ‘border’   between   the   two  
countries as a pretext to occupy Kuwait in 1990, by accusing Kuwait of violating the Iraqi 
border and stealing Iraqi oil from the southern common oil wells between the two 
countries. Thus, due to the  strategic  value  of  Kuwait’s  geographical location, and common 
borders between the two countries, the geographic factor is one of the main reasons behind 
the Gulf crisis in 1990.   
 
1.2. The domestic environment 
Exceptionally, we must dioscuss here two domestic environments:  that in Iraq and that in 
Kuwait.  As regards the latter, before the Iraqi invasion, Kuwait witnessed an internal 
political crisis from late 1989 due to the demands of the Kuwaiti political blocs and the 
return of parliamentary life, suspended since 1986. These demands led to violent 
confrontations between the Kuwaiti people and their government.  Saddam Hussein 
believed that the Kuwaiti people would support Iraq in any action, even against the 
Kuwaiti  government,  due  to  the  people’s  discontent  with the Kuwaiti political leadership.  
Thus, in July 1990, two weeks before the Iraqi invasion, Saddam Hussein invited some 
Kuwaiti political individuals to visit Baghdad to consolidate its relationship with them. 
However, after the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, Saddam did not draw support or 
collaboration from any Kuwaiti individuals for the invasion, which prompted Iraq to 
appoint  a  ‘Provisional  Free  Government  of  Kuwait’  – although only one was subsequently 
confirmed as indeed Kuwaiti. Iraq claimed the new republican regime had carried out a 
coup   d’état against the Kuwaiti regime and had requested assistance from Iraq. The 
domestic  politics  of  Kuwait,  therefore,  clearly  had  influenced  Saddam’s  perception;;  at  the  
same time, the deeper, underlying dynamics of the Kuwaiti polity – with its close-knit, in 
part kinship-derived, in part based on neo- or post-traditional mechanism and ethos, and in 
part on a rentier political economy,1 meant that a neighbouring regime perceived as brutal, 
and ideologically alien by most Kuwaitis, never stood a chance of being a welcome 
annexing or controlling power, nor of Kuwaiti independence being sacrificed, not least 
given the dramatic loss in per capita wealth this would bring with it for Kuwaiti citizens. 
                                              
1  Compare  e.g.  Nonneman,  Gerd,  ‘Political Reform in the Gulf Monarchies: From Liberalisation to 
Democratisation? A Comparative  Perspective’,  in  A.  Ehteshami  &  S.  Wright  (eds.),  Reform in the Middle 
East Oil Monarchies (Reading: Ithaca Press, 2008), pp. 3-45. 
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The evidence would come not only in the shape of the refusal of any significant numbers 
to be co-opted by Saddam, and in the spontaneous and effectibe grassroots organiusation 
of resistance, but also in the mass gathering of exiles in Taif mentioned earlier, and the 
consensus worked out with the regime in the person of Sheikh Saad, whereby the 
reptresentatives of the exiled Kuwaiti population and activists confirmed their adherence to 
the principle of rule by the Al Sabah under a resuscitated constitution. 
In Iraq, the key aspects of the domestic situation were the dire economic situation 
following the Iran-Iraq war;  the effect this had, actually and potentially, on domestic 
political  stability  and  attitudes   towards  Saddam’s  regime;;     and   the  nature  of   the  political  
system and decision-making, which shaped the way in which the regime perceived its 
interests, and the blinkered fashion in which key policies – including the decision to invade 
Kuwait – were taken. 
 
1.3. The economic factor 
In line with the generic findings in chapter 2, and as already note above, the economic 
factor played a central role in the Kuwaiti crisis in 1990. After Kuwait's discovery of oil in 
1938, Iraqi ambitions turned towards this natural oil resource: this has been the case since 
the regime of King Ghazi in the 1930s and became acute during the regime of Abdul 
Karim Qasim in the early 1960s, as already outlined in Chapters 3 and 4. 
In the course of the Iran-Iraq war, Kuwait became a logistical and financial life-line for 
Iraq, but this left substantial outstanding debts. After the end of that war, Iraq witnessed 
political and economic instability and a major fiscal crisis, arguably preparing the ground 
for the Gulf crisis in 1990: the huge amounts of debt owed to Kuwait and the GCC states, 
the bankruptcy of Iraq's treasury, unemployment, the soaring price of foodstuff and the 
destruction of infrastructure, all placed the Iraqi political leadership in a critical position in 
front of its people.  As a result, Iraq sought to obtain huge financial assistance from GCC 
states to reconstruct its country, and warned the GCC countries not to refuse such  
requests. When the GCC countries were less than forthcoming, Iraq adopted an escalation 
policy after the Baghdad summit in May 1990 by accusing Kuwait and UAE of flooding 
the oil market and not observing their prescribed share of oil. This resulted in the 
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deterioration of oil prices and gave Iraq a pretext to occupy Kuwait and control its rich 
natural oil resources in order to solve Iraqi economic problems.  
 
1.4. Ideational factors at home, in the region and beyond 
Both in the domestic and the external environment, ideational facyors were at work. In the 
region, outside the GCC, the perception of rich small states that had a disproportionate 
share of Arab wealth, was one that had not wholly disappeared. Allied with the persistent 
sense among many in Iraq, that Iraq should have been properly constituted by including 
what was now Kuwait, this was perhaps more potent here than anywhere else. It clearly 
helped  drive  Saddam’s  thinking,  both  directly and in the sense that he knew he could tap 
into a popular Iraqi view. As the thesis demonstrates elsewhere, the irredentist theme in 
Iraqi foreign politics towards Kuwat is as old as the creation of the Iraqi state. 
The ideational element in international affairs is evident also in the sea-change that had 
been taking place at the global level: the end of the Cold War brought with it a new 
Zeitgeist that assumed there was a new world order emerging, with greater clout for the 
UN, and, at last, new ways of dealing with conflict.  In this context it may be possible to 
find a part-explanation both for the Kuwaiti assumption that a blatant invasion had become 
less likely, and for the subsequent reaction of the international community when that 
invasion did occur:  it was clearly perceived as a direct challenge to the hoped-for new 
world order, then still seen with a good deal of euphoria. 
 
1.5. The decision-making  environment  and  leaders’s  perceptions 
 
All of this, of course, must be filtered through the decision-making environment: 
perception and calculation by the decision-makers is what matters, ultimately. Here, too, 
we must consider both the Iraqi and the Kuwaiti side of the coin.  
In the case of Kuwait, already the key decisions in the shaping of policy were being made 
by Sheikh Sabah and Sheikh Saad, with the Amir in the background. The common 
denominator in any case – not effectively countered by any other voices in the process – 
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was   that  Kuwait’s  sovereignty  was  not   for  sale;;   that   Iraq  under  Saddam  was  not trusted; 
that some economic pressure on the country might be useful as a policy tool; and that 
Kuwait was safe from an imminent real attack given the support from the Arab League 
and, most importantly, the internationally acknowledged position of Kuwait as an 
important pro-Western player of importance for the economy of the West and with the 
implied protection of the US. 
There were, of course, some voices outside Kuwait arguing that the threat might more 
acute than it appeared to these top leaders,2 and indeed advice was forthcoming from 
Kuwait’s   own   military   intelligence   to   that   effect.   But   as   we   will   see,   but it is the 
assessment of the top that mattered: the cabinet took its cue from Arab visitors and decided 
not to prepare militarily. There was no public  opposition  to  the  leaderrship’s  stance  at  the  
time. 
 
In the narrative that follows, these above factors will be seen to play out in the way events 
and policies developed. 
 
2. Background and lead-up to the Iraqi invasion 
After the end of the Iraq-Iran War in 1988, the economy of both parties was exhausted, 
having lost some 1.97 trillion dollars.3 The  war   depleted   Iraq’s   economic   and   financial  
resources. Before the war, Iraq had a financial portfolio estimated at $ 36 billion.4 
However, by the end of the war, its direct economic losses were estimated at $452.6 
billion,5 and Iraqi debts reached between $80 and $120.2 billion.6 Further, the costs of 
                                              
2  Ehteshami, Anoushiravan and Nonneman, Gerd, War and Peace in The Gulf: Domestic Politics and 
Regional Relations into the 1990s (Ithaca Press, Reading, 1991)., Chapter 3. 
3  This  amount  includes  direct  and  indirect  costs:  Mofid,  Kamran.  ‘Economic  Reconstruction  of  Iraq:  
Financing  the  Peace’, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 1, 1990, p.53. 
4  Alexander, Justin and Rowat,  Colin,  ‘A  Clean  State  in  Iraq:  From  Debt  to  Development’, Middle East 
Report, No. 228, 2003, p.33. 
5  Mofid, Kamran. Op.Cit. p.53. 
6  Note: Iraq did not report its debt to the World Bank Debtor Reporting System, leading to many questions 
about what actually  constitutes  Iraq’s  foreign  indebtedness.  See  Elali, W.,  ‘Note:  Dealing  with  Iraq’s  
Foreign  Indebtedness’,  Thunderbird International Business Review, Vol. 42, No.1, 2000, p.67; 
Alnasrawi,  Abbas,  ‘Iraq:  Economic  Consequences  of  the  1991  Gulf  War  and  Future  Outlook’, Third 
World Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 2. 1992, p.337.; Paris  Club,  ‘Press  Release  :    The  Paris  Club  And  The  
Republic  Of  Iraq  Agree  On  Debt  Relief’  ,  November  21,  2004.  Available  on  the  Paris  Club  website  at;;    
http://www.clubdeparis.org/  
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reconstructing Iraq were estimated at $230 billion. 7 Therefore, on 19th November 1989, 
Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi President, sent Dr. Sadoun Hammadi, Deputy Prime Minster, to 
Kuwait to task him to: 
A. Provide financial help;  
B.  Write off the Iraqi debts; 
C.  Offer the concept of defence and security arrangements between the two countries. 
During the visit of Sheikh Sabah Al Sabah, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Iraq on 18th 
February 1990 to discuss the issue of the demarcation of frontiers, which had lasted four 
decades, Dr. Hammadi proposed two conventions, security cooperation and defense, to be 
signed between the two sides, in addition to the suggestion to bring the Kuwaiti Islands of 
Bubiyan and Failaka under effective control by Iraq; because Hammadi alleged later that 
Kuwait recognized Warba island as a part of Iraq and it had to be excluded from the 
discussion. Kuwait rejected these conventions in the letter sent from Sheikh Sabah to 
Hammadi on 18th March 1990, because the provisions of these treaties contradicted 
Kuwait’s   sovereignty   and   its   constitution,   and   reiterated   the   importance   of   resolving   the  
demarcation of borders before discussing anything else. Al Shaheen commented these 
treaties required Kuwait to waive its sovereignty to Iraq.8 Due to the economic destruction, 
Iraq needed a huge financial loan to overhaul its damaged internal economy.9 Thus, on the 
first anniversary of the Arab Cooperation Council on 23rd February 1990, in Jordan,10 
Saddam Hussein delivered an aggressive speech regarding US domination of the Middle 
East and the Gulf area due to the deterioration of the Soviet influence and pointed out 
Iraq’s  dire  need   for  $30  billion   in   financial   support   from  Arab  Gulf   countries  due   to   its  
economic crisis, and asked that Iraqi debts to GCC states be written off.11 These debts, 
estimated at between $37 and $40 billion ($17 billion from Kuwait alone), were provided 
                                              
7  Long, J. M, Op. Cit. p.10. 
8  The most important provisions of the two treaties are freedom of military movement of the two countries 
in their land, opening the military and civilian airports in the case of confrontation with a third party and 
standardization of military procurement. See Sulaiman Majed Al Shaheen, Op.Cit. pp.14-.39. 
9   Haykel, Mohammed Hussain, Harb al-khalīj:  ʼawhām  al-quwwa wan-nasr ‘Gulf War: Illusions of Power 
and  Victory’, 1st edition, Pyramids Translation and Publishing Center, Cairo, 1992. p.302. 
10 The Arab Cooperation Council was established in 1989, comprising Iraq, Jordan, Egypt and North 
Yemen, and dissolved after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. 
11   Salinger,  Pierre and  Eric Laurent , ḥarb  al-khalīj:  al-malaf us-sirrī ,  ‘Secret Dossier: The Hidden 
Agenda  Behind  the  Gulf  War’, All Prints Distributors & Publishers s.a.l., Beurit,  1991. p. 14.
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by  GCC  States  during  Iraq’s  war  with  Iran. 12 In this meeting, Saddam Hussein warned the 
GCC  countries  about  refusing  economic  support,  saying  ‘let the Gulf regimes know that if 
they  do  not  give   this  money   to  me,   I  know  how  to  get   it’.13 Hence, he requested several 
items from GCC States, such as:  
1. Settlement of the frontier issue between Iraq and Kuwait.  
2. Agreement to lease the Kuwaiti islands of Warba and Boubyan to Iraq. 
3. Settlement of the issue of Iraqi accumulated debts to Arab Gulf countries. 
4. Provision of financial support to Iraq. 14 
The GCC countries ignored the Iraqi demands and there was no official reaction to the 
Iraqi rhetoric. Thus, Iraq adopted an escalation policy starting from April 1990 based on 
two approaches: first; escalating the propaganda war against Israel and pointing out that 
there  was   a   ‘Western   plot’   arranged   against   Iraq,   and   second,   the   creation   of   a   political  
crisis with Kuwait.15 In  response  to  Sheikh  Sabah’s  letter  on  18th March 1990, mentioned 
above, Hammadi replied on 30th April   1990,   stating   that   ‘the   two   countries   have   not  
reached  an  agreement  around  the  demarcation  of  their  marine  and  land  borders’.16 On 26th 
May 1990, two days before the Extraordinary Arab Summit in Iraq, Dr. Hammadi revisited 
Kuwait to discuss the concept the suggestions of security cooperation and defense 
convention, mentioned above, and ask Kuwait to write off the Iraqi debts, despite the fact 
that  ‘Kuwait  has  never  asked  Iraq  to  repay  its  debts’,  as  Majed Al Shaheen said, and added 
on this visit, ‘Iraqis   asked   to   cancel   the   Iraqi   debts   and   provide   them  with   the   financial  
assistance. They (Iraqis) did not specify the value of the loan needed, but they (Iraqis) 
asked  Kuwait  to  help  them  in  order  to  rebuild  Iraq  due  to  the  war’.17  
                                              
12  Different sources have attempted  to determine the true value of Iraq's debt to the Gulf States. Some 
sources  estimated  the  amount  between  $37  and  $45  billion;;  Adam,  Patricia,  ‘Policy Analysis: Iraq's 
Odious Debts’,  Cato  Institute, Washington DC,  September  2004,  p.  8;;  Nonneman  Gerd,  ‘The  Gulf  States  
and the Iran-Iraq War: Pattern shifts and continuities’,  Op.  Cit.  p.  180. 
13  Long, Jerry.M, Op. Cit. p. 16. 
14  Salinger, Pierre and Eric Laurent, Op. Cit. p. 18. 
15  Panel of Specialists 1997, Op.Cit, p.16.  
16  See the text of the letter in Sulaiman Majed Al Shaheen, Op.Cit. pp.20.21. 
17  Author’s  interview with Suleiman Majed Al Shaheen, former Kuwaiti Minister of State for Foreign 
Affairs, in Kuwait City, on Thursday 16th June, 2011.  
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On 30th May 1990, in a confidential closed meeting at the Extraordinary Arab Summit in 
Baghdad to discuss the Soviet Jewish emigration to Palestine (150,000 migrants during 
1990),18 Saddam  Hussein  pointed  out  Iraq’s  economic  problems  and  the  chaos  prevailing  
in the international oil markets that resulted in the deterioration of oil prices worldwide. He 
claimed that the deterioration of prices was due to some Arab countries failing to observe 
OPEC resolutions that resulted for  ‘every  one  dollar  drop  in  the  price  of  a  barrel of oil, the 
Iraqi  loss  amounted  to  1  billion  dollars  a  year’. Saddam considered this economic policy as 
‘a  kind  of  war  against  Iraq’  and  added  ‘we have reached a point where we can no longer 
withstand  pressure’.19   
On 15th July 1990, Tariq Aziz, the Iraqi Foreign Minister, sent a memorandum to Chedli 
Klibi, the Secretary-General of the Arab League, claiming that Kuwait and UAE had 
‘implemented   an   intentional   scheme   to   flood   the   oil   market   with   quantities   of   oil   that  
exceeded  their  quotas  fixed  by  OPEC’. Iraq claimed that this policy had led it to lose $89 
billion  from  1981  to  1990.  In  its  memorandum,  Iraq  accused  Kuwait  of  ‘stealing  Iraqi  oil’  
since  1980  through  ‘setting  up  oil  installations  in  the  southern  section  of  Iraqi  Al-Rumaila 
oilfield and siphoning  oil  from  it’.  Iraq  estimated  the  ‘stolen  oil’  at  a  total  value  of  ‘$2.4  
billion’.  Further,  Iraq  accused  Kuwait  of  ‘setting  up  military  establishments,  police  posts,  
oil   installations  and   farms  on   the   Iraqi   territories’  during   the   Iraq-Iran War.20 Thus, Iraq 
determined the following demands: 
1. Raising the oil prices to over $25 per barrel. 
2.  Kuwait   must   stop   ‘looting   the   oil’   from  Al   Rumaila   Iraqi   oilfield   and   return   the  
‘stolen  oil’  amounting  to  2.4  billion. 
3. Cancelling the Iraqi debts, which were obtained from Arab Gulf countries during the 
Iraq-Iran War.  
                                              
18  Bulloch, John and Harvey Morris, Saddam's war: The Origins of the Kuwait conflict and the 
International Response, Faber and Faber Limited, London, 1991. p. 97.  
19  Keynote Speech of the President of Iraq, Saddam Hussein, dated 30th May 1990 at the Arab Emergency 
Summit Conference in Baghdad, in Sulaiman Majed Al Shaheen, Op.Cit. p.425; Moore, Fred (Comp.), 
Iraq Speaks: Documents on the Gulf Crisis: Iraq Speaks Saddam Hussein, Taha Yasin Ramadan, Tariq 
'Aziz, Dr. Sa'dun Hammadi, Latif Jasim and Saadi Mahdi Salih, DIANE Publishing, 1993. p.3.  
20 The text of the Iraqi Memorandum, to Chedli Klibi, the Secretary General of the Arab League, from 
Tariq Aziz, the Iraqi Foreign Minister, dated 15thJuly 1990, in Sulaiman Majed Al Shaheen, Op.Cit. pp. 
413-424; Moore, Fred (Comp.).Op.Cit.pp.5-8. 
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4. Formulating  an  ‘Arab  Plan’  similar  to  the  ‘Marshall  Plan’  to  compensate  Iraq  for  its  
losses during its war with Iran.21 
 
On the same day as this memorandum, Iraq mobilized its forces on the Iraqi-Kuwaiti 
borders with 35,000 troops from the Republic Guard in addition to 300 tanks.22 On 17th 
July 1990, Saddam Hussein delivered an aggressive speech against Kuwait and some GCC 
States in the region and mentioned that the new oil policy adopted by rulers of Gulf States 
depended on reducing oil prices without any economic justification, which had resulted in 
Iraq’s  losing  $14  billion  annually,  and  that  this  act  could  not  be  tolerated.23 
On 18th July 1990, Kuwait responded to the Iraqi memorandum of 15th July 1990, via 
Sheikh Sabah Al Sabah, to the Secretary-General of the Arab League, rejecting all these 
claims.24 In  its  memorandum,  Kuwait  claimed  that  ‘Iraq  has  a  long  record  of  transgressions  
on   Kuwaiti   territories’.   Thus,   Kuwait   called   for   the   formation   of an   ‘Arab   league  
arbitration  panel’  within  the  framework  of  the  Arab  League  to  verify  all  Iraqi  accusations  
and   to   ‘demarcate   the   borders   on   the   basis   of   concluded   treaties   and   documents   signed  
between   Kuwait   and   Iraq’.   Moreover,   it   claimed   that   ‘part   of   the Rumaila oilfield is 
located in the Kuwaiti territory. Accordingly, Kuwait has extracted oil from the wells 
located within its territory south the line of the Arab League at a sufficient distance from 
international borders and in accordance with international   standards’.   Kuwait   reiterated  
that the deterioration of oil prices was a global problem involving many parties, producers 
and consumers, from inside and outside OPEC, and that Kuwait was suffering in the same 
way as Iraq. Kuwait pointed out that it has observed its prescribed share to maintain 
international  oil  prices.  Finally,  it  supported  the  Iraqi  proposal  to  ‘set  up  a  fund  for  aid  and  
Arab   development’.25 On the same day, Kuwait sent a memorandum to UN Secretary 
                                              
21  Khadduri, Majid and Edmund Ghareem, War in The Gulf 1990-91: The Iraq-Kuwait conflict and its 
implications, Oxford University Press, New York, 1997. p. 107; Bulloch, John and Harvey Morris, 
Op.Cit. p.101. 
22   Al Tayyar, Loai Baker, Op.Cit.  p. 22. 
23  Long, Jerry M, Op. Cit. p. 20. 
24  Ehteshami, Anoushiravan and Nonneman, Gerd, War and Peace in The Gulf: Domestic Politics and 
Regional Relations into the 1990s (Ithaca Press, Reading, 1991). p. 74. 
25  The text of the Kuwaiti Memorandum, to Chedli Klibi, the Secretary General of the Arab League, from 
Sheikh Sabah AlSabah, the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister, dated 18thJuly 1990, in Sulaiman Majed Al 
Shaheen, Op.Cit. pp. 429-433. 
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General, Javier Perez de Cuellar (Peru), wherein it outlined the development of the 
Kuwaiti-Iraqi crisis.26 
On 21st July 1990, Iraq responded to this Kuwaiti memorandum via Tariq Aziz, wherein 
Iraq   repeated   its  claims  and  accused  Kuwaiti  officials  of   ‘looting   the   Iraqi  wealth’,   and  
‘indirectly’   rejected   the   Kuwaiti   proposal   to   form   ‘an   Arab   arbitration   panel’   for  
verification of the Iraqi accusations against Kuwait. Iraq claimed that the two counties 
‘have  not  yet  reached  an  agreement  on  the  demarcation  of  the  borders’,  in  addition  to  the  
claim  that  Iraq  had  tried  to  solve  the  problem  of  demarcation  of  borders  through  offering  ‘a  
set   of   agreements   (as  mentioned   above),  which  were   rejected   by  Kuwait’.  However,   on  
24th July   1990,   Tariq   Aziz   declared   Iraq’s   rejection   of   the   ‘Arab   arbitration   panel’  
suggested  by  Kuwait  and  stated  that,  ‘The  disputes  on  the  border  between  the  Arab  states  
should be resolved by the States concerned, not by committees formed from Arab 
States’.27 Meanwhile, Kuwait responded to the latest Iraqi memorandum, dated 21st July 
1990, with its own memorandum to the Arab League, rejecting the Iraqi claims and 
reiterating   that   ‘the   demarcation   of   the   borders   is   governed   by   conventions   and   treaties  
signed  between  two  countries’  and  the  ‘agreements  proposed  by  Iraq  lack  the  principle  of 
equal   cooperation   in   substance’   and   Kuwait   ‘does   not   want   to   publish   drafts   of   these  
agreements  a  commitment  to  the  ethics  of  political  action’.28  
On 24th July, Hosni Mubarak, the Egyptian President, visited Baghdad in an attempt to 
solve the dispute between the two countries;29 however, the official spokesman of the Iraqi 
ministry   of   foreign   affairs   declared   that   ‘the   visit   was   made   within   the   framework   of  
bilateral relations and it has nothing to do with the current crises.30 After the meeting 
between Saddam and the US ambassador April Glaspie on 25th July 1990, Glaspie met the 
Kuwaiti ambassador to Iraq on 27th July, Ibrahim Al-Bhoh,   and   told  him   ‘There  will   be  
                                              
26  Ibid. pp. 455-457. 
27  Kuwait  National  Assembly,‘Takrīr  lajnat  takasī  il-ḥaka’ik  fī  mawdū’  il-ghazw il-‘irākī  ‘alā  dawlat  il-
kuwayt’,  ‘Report  of  the  Fact-Finding  Commission  on  the  causes  of  the  Iraqi  invasion  of  Kuwait’  ,  
unpublished  Report,  Secretariat General,  Kuwait, VII legislative Chapter, 16 August , 1995.  
28  The text of the Kuwaiti Memorandum to Chedli Klibi, the Secretary General of the Arab League, from 
Sheikh Sabah AlSabah, the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister, in Sulaiman Majed Al Shaheen, Op.Cit. pp.445-
452. 
29  Wikileaks,‘ Kuwaitis Calm, Confident,  And  Unified  (For  The  Moment)  In  The  Face  Of  Iraqi  Threats’,  
Reference ID:  90KUWAIT4267; CONFIDENTIAL, Embassy Kuwait; 1990-07-26 . Available online at   
http://www.wikileaks.org/origin/117_0.html 
30  Panel of Specialists 1997, Op. Cit. p. 18. 
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military  action’  against  Kuwait.31 On the same day, as Iraq intensified its military forces 
on the Kuwaiti-Iraqi frontiers, 32 OPEC decided to reduce the oil production and raise the 
price of a barrel of oil to $21 in light of Iraqi demands.33 On 29th July, Kuwait issued a 
statement   rejecting   ‘All   forms   of   –arm-twisting, intimidation and the use of force’   and  
welcomed the OPEC decision to raise the oil prices.34 However, the crisis did not calm 
down. Therefore, it was agreed on 31st July 1990 to hold a meeting between Kuwait and 
Iraq in Jeddah, Saudia, under the auspices of King Fahd to solve their problems.35 This 
meeting  ‘took  place  on  the  evening  of  that  day’,  according  to  Suleiman  Al  Shaheen,  one  of  
the  members  of  the  Kuwaiti  delegation,  who  added,  ‘at  the  meeting  we  did  not  discuss  any  
issue...The Iraqis did not discuss any issue with us (Kuwaitis)... Izzat Ibrahim said to us, 
we (Iraqis) came to this meeting in response to the invitation of King Fahd only...if Kuwait 
(Izzat said) wants to discuss any issue related to Kuwait and Iraq, it is better to hold the 
meeting  in   Iraq’.  Al  Shaheen  continues,  ‘We were surprised that the Iraqi delegation left 
Jeddah in the early morning of 1st August,  without  continuing  the  meeting’.36  
 
 
3. The Iraqi invasion 
 
Following the Jeddah meeting, Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwait on 2nd August 1990. In 
an emergency Security Council session on 2nd August 1990, Iraq alleged that it had 
occupied  Kuwait  because  the  ‘Provisional  Free  Government  of  Kuwait’  had  carried  out  a  
coup  d’état against the regime in Kuwait and requested assistance from Iraq to establish 
                                              
31  Kuwait National Assembly, ‘Tagrir LjnhTagasi Alhagiga An Asbab AlGazo AlIraqi LiDwatat 
AlKuwait’,  ‘Report  of  the  Fact-Finding  Commission  on  the  causes  of  the  Iraqi  invasion  of  Kuwait’.  
Op.Cit.  
32  Ehteshami, Anoushiravan and Gerd, Nonneman. Op. Cit. p.76. 
33  Alnasrawi, Abbas, Op.Cit.p.343. 
34  Wikileaks,‘Kuwaiti  Cabinet  Rejects  ‘Arm-Twisting’  As  Talks  With  Iraq  Begin  July  31',  Reference ID; 
90KUWAIT4364 ,  CONFIDENTIAL, Embassy Kuwait, 1990-07-31 . Available online at   
http://www.wikileaks.org/origin/117_0.html 
35  The  Kuwaiti  delegation  was  presided  over  by  Sheikh  Sa’ad  Abdullah  Al  Sabah,  the  Crown  Prince and 
Prime Minister and the Iraqi delegation was presided over by Mr. Izzat Ibrahim, Ibid.  
36  Author’s  interview with Suleiman Majed Al Shaheen, former Kuwaiti Minister of State for Foreign 
Affairs, in Kuwait City, on Thursday 16th June, 2011. 
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security and order,37 and Iraqi forces would be withdrawn from Kuwait on 5th August 
1990.38 However, Iraq declared the annexation of Kuwait to Iraq on 8th August 1990, 
claiming to UNSC that  Kuwait  had  been  ‘separated  from  Iraq’  by  colonizers.39 During the 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Iraq pursued on several objectives, as follows:40  
1. Expediting annexing of Kuwait, changing the Kuwaiti demographic structure of 
population and frontiers. 
2. Discussing outstanding Arab issues, such as the Arab-Israeli conflict and the 
Lebanon crisis, to distract attention from the main issue of occupation of Kuwait. 41 
3. Insisting on solving the issue among Arab countries rather than the international 
community to remove any justifications for the existence of foreign intervention in 
the region.  
4. Reaffirming that the issue has nothing to do with occupation: rather, it deals with 
confronting imperialists who wanted Arab wealth. 
5. Neutralizing   the   Iranian   threat   through   the   Iraqi  President’s   initiative   to  solve   the  
conflict between Iran and Iraq on 15th August 1990. This initiative included three 
principles: first; Iraq recognizes the 1975 Algiers Accord with the principles and 
basis  contained  in  the  same  to  demarcate  the  frontiers  and  divide  Sha’at  Al  Arab.  
Second, withdrawal of the Iraq troop from Iranian territories unilaterally from 
16/8/1990. Third: prompt exchange of all Prisoners of War on the same day. Iran 
                                              
37  Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council 1989-1992, ‘Items relating to the situation between Iraq 
and  Kuwait’,  Supplement 1989-1992, Security Council, Department of Political Affairs, United Nations, 
New York, 2007. pp. 586-587. Available online on UN website at:   
http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/89-92/CHAPTER%208/MIDDLE%20EAST/item%2022_Iraq-
Kuwait_.pdf 
38  Security Council, ‘Letter Dated 3 August 1990 from the Permanent of Representative of Iraq to the 
United  Nation  Addressed  to  Secretary  General’,  S/21436,  3  August  1990,  United  Nations,  New  York.  
Available online on UN website at: 
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N90/181/06/IMG/N9018106.pdf?OpenElement 
39  The  text  of  the  speech  of  Iraq’s  representative  to  UNSC,  Mr.  Al-anbari; Security Council, ‘Provisional  
Verbatim Record of The Two Thousand Nine Hundred and Thirty-Fourth  Meeting’, S/PV.2934, United 
Nations, New York. pp.43-45. 
40  Shoukri, Hassan, Hakaek Liltareekh Fi Azmat Al-Khaleej Al-Arabi,  ‘Facts  for  History  on  the  Arabian  
Gulf  Crisis’, 2nd edition, Madbouly El-saghir Bookshop, Cairo, 1991. p. 39.  
41 Ali, Omar, Crisis in The Arabian Gulf: An Independent Iraqi View (Praeger Publishers, West Port, CT. 
1993). pp. 56-64. 
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accepted this initiative, and asked Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait and implement 
international resolutions.42 
The Kuwaiti leadership turned to Saudi Arabia and formed a Kuwaiti government-in-exile 
to  liberate  Kuwait.  Al  Shaheen  comments  ‘After  the  Kuwaiti  support  for  Iraq...We  did  not  
expect   any   invasion   from   Iraq   or   even   borders   to   be   overrun’.43 In contrast, Saleh Al-
Fadhala, the Chairman of the Fact-Finding Commission on the Causes of the Iraqi 
Invasion of Kuwait, said that ‘the  Kuwaiti  Army  (units  of   intelligence   in   Iraq)   informed  
the government that the Iraqi Army was on the borders and took the position of openness 
(i.e. attack), but the political side overcame the military thought because cabinet officials 
blocked military preparations due to the visits to Kuwait made by the Arab presidents and 
officials, who confirmed that Saddam would not use force against Kuwait and asked it not 
to provoke   Iraq’.  He  added   that   ‘Dhari  Al-Ottoman, former Minister of Justice, after the 
end of Jeddah Conference, predicted the occurrence of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait at the 
meeting  of  the  Council  of  Ministers  and  told  the  council  that  ‘Iraq  will  invade  Kuwait and 
it  is  supposed  to  act’.  Al-Fadhala  added  that  ‘the  Council  of  Ministers  unanimously  did  not  
agree with the Al-Ottoman’s   opinion’,   and   that   ‘the   invasion   was   the   mistake   of   the  
Kuwaiti officials in foreign policy, so the Fact–Finding Commission should take 
responsibility.’44 
Some Arab countries supported the initiatives mentioned above, but the international 
powers, except for France, denied the linkage between the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and 
other issues that had nothing to do with the current crisis.45 Thus, several Arab and 
international resolutions were adopted calling for prompt Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait 
and reinstating the pre-1/8/1990 situation.46  
 
  
                                              
42  Panel of Specialists 1997, Op.Cit. p. 20.  
43  Aurthor’s  interview with Suleiman Majed Al Shaheen, former Kuwaiti Minister of State for Foreign 
Affairs, in Kuwait City, on Thursday 16th June, 2011. 
44  Author’s  interview with Saleh Al-Fadhala,  former  MP  and  Chairman  of  the  ‘Fact-Finding Commission 
on  the  Causes  of  the  Iraqi  Invasion  of  Kuwait’  at  the  National  Assembly,  in Kuwait City, on Wednesday 
7th September, 2011. 
45  Menos, Dennis, Arms over Diplomacy: Reflection on the Persian Gulf War,Praeger, Westport, CT, 
1992.pp1-7. 
46  Mal-Allah, Hussein Issa, The Iraqi War Criminals and Their Crimes During the Iraqi Occupation of 
Kuwait , 1st edition, Centre for Research and Studies on Kuwait, Kuwait, 1998. p. 29.  
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4. Iraqi Justifications of the Invasion  
 
Al Shaheen notes that ‘with  respect  to  invasion  and  its justifications, to date, the question 
remains without answer...We hope to find one justification to give Saddam the right for 
invasion...I think the Iraqi justifications were to distract the Iraqi Army abroad to ward off 
any   coup   against   Saddam’s   regime’.47 Nimer Hammad, political advisor to President 
Mahmoud  Abbas,  comments  on  this   issue,  saying  that  ‘before  the  US  occupation  of   Iraq  
for a short time in 2003, I met with the Tariq Aziz and asked him why Saddam Hussein 
occupied Kuwait. Tariq Aziz replied that  ‘three  days  before  the  Iraqi   invasion,   if  anyone  
said  to  Saddam  Hussein  ‘why  we  should  occupy  Kuwait’,  it  is  likely  he  would  have  been  
executed’.48 
The Iraqi justifications include the following: 
 
 4.1. Historical allegations  
During this occupation, Iraq claimed that Kuwait was a part of Basra province during the 
Ottoman Empire and it was separated in World War 1 by Britain.49 However, this claim 
made Kuwait aware that the dispute with Iraq was not restricted to political and economic 
issues only, but also encompassed intellectual and scientific issues. Therefore, after the 
liberation   of  Kuwait,   it   established   the   ‘Centre   for   Research   and   Studies   on  Kuwait’   in  
1992, which is entrusted to undertaking research related to the emergence of Kuwait based 
on historical documents, maps and practical studies.50 Kuwait claimed that its previous 
relationship with the Ottoman Empire was   a   ‘nominal   link’   rather   than   an   actual   one  
because the Ottoman Empire represented the Islamic nation at that time.51 Sluglett cites an 
archival study of Ottoman documents by Anscombe which concluded that ‘The Iraqi claim 
to historical rights over Kuwait is very weak: on the fundamental issue of political status, 
Kuwait was indeed Ottoman but was neither integrated into, nor dependent upon, Ottoman 
                                              
47  Interview by the researcher with Suleiman Majed Al Shaheen, former Kuwaiti Minister of State for 
Foreign Affairs, in Kuwait City, on Thursday 16th June 2011. 
48  Interview by the researcher with Nimer Hammad, political advisor to the Mahmoud Abbas, President of 
the Palestinian National Authority, in Ramallah City, Palestine, on Monday 5 March, 2012. 
49  Sluglett, Peter, Op. Cit. p. 783. 
50  Website of Centre for Research and Studies on Kuwait: http://62.150.86.180/HomeA.asp  
51  Pillai R.V and Mahendra Kumar, Op. Cit. p. 116. 
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Iraq’.52 From the earlier discussion in Chapter 3, it will be clear that while there was indeed a real 
link between the Ottoman Empire and Kuwait, it was for the most part one of patchily applied 
suzerainty at most, accompanied with a very large degree of autonomy – an autonomy which the 
rulers of Kuwait from Mubarak the Great onwards tried to protect and consolifdate by reaching out 
to Britain.53 
 
The evidence employed by Kuwait as evidence of its pedigree as an independent entity is 
as follows: 
1. The link between the empire and another territory outside its domains entails the 
existence of military forces and the existence of applicable laws to manage the security in 
this territory, as is the case with territories that were subject to the Ottoman empire, 
including the three Iraqi provinces. In the case of Kuwait, there were no Ottoman military 
forces: Ottoman administrative provisions or the Ottoman law was applied in Kuwait as in 
the  case  of  Iraq’s  provinces.54 Moreover, Kuwait imposed customs duties on the Ottoman 
vessels at 5%.55 Had Kuwait been part of the Ottoman territories, it would never have 
imposed duties on the Ottoman vessels. 
2. Kuwait  had  its  own  red  flag  bearing  the  word  ‘Kuwait’.  The  red  colour  represented  
the Ottoman empire, which represented the Islamic world and the religious aspects only, 
while   the   word   ‘Kuwait’   indicates   the   independence   of   the   Kuwaiti   emirate   from   any  
influence.56 Kuwait maintained the Ottoman flag for two reasons: the first was that Kuwait 
considered the Ottoman empire  as  the  ‘symbol’  of  Islamic  religion  for  all  Islamic  nations,  
and   the   second   was   related   to   Kuwait’s   interests,   as   the   surrounding   countries   did   not  
acknowledge local flags during the trading overseas to India, which might have placed 
these vessels at risk of piracy or confiscation by the surrounding territorial States. 
Therefore, Kuwait maintained the Ottoman flag for its own interests and to safeguard its 
trade. This practice was repeated in the 1980s due to the Iraq-Iran War, when the two sides 
began to bombard Kuwaiti oil tankers (Tanker War 1984-1987), which led Kuwait in 1987 
                                              
52  Cited in Sluglett, Peter, Op.Cit. p. 797. 
53  The literature has already been cited in chapter 3, but it is worth perhaps pointing to some of the most 
authoritative ones: Anscombe, The Ottoman Gulf, op. cit;  and Schofield, Kuwait and Iraq, op cit.. 
54  Sultan, Ghanem, Op.Cit. p.10. 
55  Pillai R.V and Mahendra Kumar, Op. Cit. p110 
56  Sultan, Ghanem, Op.Cit. p.10. 
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to re-flag its vessels with US, Soviet, and British flags to protect its interests. This was not 
actual subjugation; rather it was for the interest of the State. 
3. Kuwait was dependent on itself to protect its population and territories since its 
emergence against external threats such as the attacks launched by the al-Muntafiq tribe57 
in 1786, the Beni Kaab tribe in 1783 (AlRaga Battle), and the Wahhabis movement by Ibn 
Suad in 1793, 1795, 1797 and 1804 etc. Kuwait had never depended on or requested 
assistance from Ottoman authorities. 58 Should Kuwait have been subject to the Ottoman 
regime; it would request assistance from Ottoman authorities to protect its territory.  
4. Kuwait was a resort for rebels against Ottoman authorities. In 1789, Sheikh 
Thuwaini, head of the al-Muntafiq tribe, and Mustafa Agha, the ruler of Basra province, 
fled to Kuwait due to their rebellion in 1787 against Süleyman (II) Basha a-l Mamluk, the 
Governor of Baghdad, who dispatched a military power to Basra to eradicate the 
movement for independence of Basra. Sheikh Abdullah Al Sabah, ruler of Kuwait (1762 – 
1815), refused their extradition to the Ottoman authorities because this action contradicted 
Arabian traditions for the protection of refugees, which led the Ottoman authorities to 
prepare a military power to occupy Kuwait. The officials of the British Agency, (India 
Eastern Company), informed the Kuwaiti Sheikh of the importance of extradition of those 
individuals to the Ottoman authorities, otherwise Ottoman would occupy Kuwait. 
However, the Kuwaiti ruler informed the British official that he was ready to fight the 
Pasha in order to protect his justice, which led him to let his refugees escape to Najd. This 
incident confirmed the independence of Kuwait from being subject to Ottoman Empire. 59  
5. Relocation of the India Eastern Company (UK) from Basra to Kuwait during the 
period from 1793 to 1795 due to a dispute between the British and Ottoman authorities, 
which incited the Ottoman ruler to ask Britain to remove the company from the Ottoman 
territories. Accordingly, this company was relocated to Kuwait without any objection from 
the Ottoman Empire.60 This incident was repeated on several occasions in 1821 and 
1823.61. Had Kuwait been an Ottoman State, it would never have accepted the British 
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company in its territory and the Ottoman ruler would have asked the British authorities to 
move away from the Ottoman territories. 
6. The Ottoman Empire recognized the   ‘autonomous   entity’   of   Kuwait   from   any  
Ottoman States in the Anglo-Ottoman Draft Convention in 1913, and its frontiers with 
Kuwait were demarcated (see Figure 1).62  
7. In modern history, Iraq has recognized the independence of Kuwait through: 
a. Correspondence exchanged between Nuri al-Said, the Prime Minister of Iraq, and 
Ahmed Al Jaber, the Kuwaiti ruler, in 1932 demarcating the Kuwaiti-Iraqi frontiers, as 
previously mentioned in Chapter 3 (Appendix 1, 2, 3 & 4). 
b. Abdul Karim Qasim, the Iraqi President (1958- 1963) applied to open an Iraqi 
consulate in Kuwait before the independence of Kuwait, as mentioned in Chapter 3, and 
congratulated Kuwait on its independence in 1961. 
c. Iraq recognized the independence of Kuwait as per a convention signed between 
the two countries on 4th October 1963, and it also recognized the Kuwaiti frontiers 
specified  in  the  1932  ‘Exchange of  Letters’, as mentioned in Chapter 3 (Appendix 5).63 
d. The Ottoman Empire had signed the Treaty of Sèvres (peace treaty) on 10th August 
1920, after its defeat in the World War I. In accordance with Article 94 of this treaty, Iraq 
(Mesopotamia), Syria and Palestine territories were recognized as independent States 
subject   to   the   ‘rendering   of   administrative   advice   and   assistance   by   a   Mandatory and 
determined  the  Turkish  properties  between  parties  later’. However, this treaty did not state 
that Kuwait was among the Turkish properties. Despite the fact that it had not been ratified 
by the parties, it is considered as important evidence of the actual frontiers of modern 
Iraq.64 Moreover,  Turkey  had  signed  and  ratified  the  ‘Lausanne  Treaty’ on 24th July 1923, 
in   which   it   ‘renounces   all   rights   and   title   whatsoever   over   or   respecting   the   territories  
situated outside the frontiers laid down in the present  Treaty  and  the  islands’  as  per  Article  
16.65 This means Turkey had renounced all rights over Kuwait, if accepted, that Kuwait 
                                              
62  Schofield, Richard, Arabian Geopolitics Regional 3: Documentary Studies: The Iraq – Kuwait Dispute 
1830-1994, Vol. 5. Op.Cit. p.830. 
63 Al-Anzi, Mohammad Nayif, Op. Cit. p. 51. 
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was  ‘a  part  of  Ottoman’.  Further,  this  treaty  did  not  mention  Kuwait  or  point  out  it  as  Iraqi  
heritage in the Ottoman properties.66 On the contrary, the Lausanne and Sèvres treaty 
resulted  in  the  creation  of  the  state  of  Iraq  as  a  ‘political  entity’ for the first time in 1921, 
which was divided  into  three  States  under  the  Ottmans’  rule.67  
7.  Historical maps drawn by travellers from Dutch, Portuguese, French and Arabs 
during 15th, 16th, 17th and 18th centuries, showing the frontiers of independent Kuwait away 
from   Iraq,   that  were   affiliated   to  Ottoman   empire   such   as   J.H.   Linschoten’s  map   in   the  
Netherlands in 1596, the French geographer  N.  Sanson’s  map  in  1652,  Brothers  R.  and  J.  
Ottens’s  map  of  the  Ottoman  State  and  Persia  in  1737,  C.  Nebuhr’s  map  of  Kuwaiti  Warba  
and  Bobyan  islands.  C.  Retter’s  map  in  1818,  A.  K.  Jonston’s  map  (1803-1871) and maps 
drawn and issued in 1840 under the supervision of the Society for the Diffusion of Useful 
Knowledge in London.68  
 
4.2.  The argument that Kuwait was stealing oil from the southern section of the Iraqi 
oilfields 
 
There are neighbouring oilfields along the international frontier between Kuwait and Iraq 
in the southern section of Iraq and the northern section of Kuwait. Iraq calls this oilfield 
‘Al-Rumaila’,  while  Kuwait  calls  it  ‘Al  Ratqa’  (see  Figure  4). 
International treaties determine the exploitation of the oilfield, which lies on the border, at 
sufficient distance away from international frontiers. Kuwait has claimed that it has 
utilized  ‘Al  –Ratqa’  oilfield  at  enough  distance  from  the  international  frontier  between  the  
two  countries.  Kuwait  has  claimed  that  the  ‘Al  –Rumaila’  oilfield   is completely different 
from   ‘Al   Ratqa’   and   they   are   not   one   oilfield,   as   described   by   Iraq.69 Several studies 
confirm that the two oilfields are completely different according to the strata supporting oil 
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from the geological aspect and geological oil and water components as well as the type of 
crude oil extracted.70 Geologists   have   affirmed   that   ‘Al-Rumaila’   oilfield   is   not   a  
neighbouring   oilfield   on   the   international   frontier   and   that   ‘Al-Ratqa’   oilfield   was  
discovered in 1967 and the oil extraction began in the end of 1970s,71 in addition that ‘Al  
Ratqa’  is  5  km  away  from  the  Iraqi  borders.72 
Kuwait has affirmed that in its memorandum to the Arab League on 18th July 1990, it 
requested   the   ‘formation   of   an   Arab   Arbitration   Panel’   from   the   Arab   League   to  
investigate Iraqi claims, but Iraq rejected this proposal.73 In May 1993 the UN Iraq-Kuwait 
Boundary Demarcation Commission confirmed that Iraq was utilizing ten oilfields within 
Kuwaiti territories without having the right to do so. Accordingly, and as per this 
resolution, these oilfields have been restored to Kuwait.74 
Regarding international oil prices at that time, Kuwait claimed, on several occasions, its 
commitment to the prescribed shares and to the new quotas, as during the OPEC meeting 
in Geneva on 27th July 1990, it was confirmed that no member was allowed to exceed its 
prescribed shares for any reason. However, this new OPEC agreement was not given much 
time, due to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, although it was an Iraqi demand.75 Kuwait 
claimed that the deterioration   of   oil   prices   in   the   international   market   was   a   ‘global  
problem’   involving   producers   and   consumers,   and   that   many   OPEC  member   countries,  
including Iraq, had exceeded their prescribed share, while Kuwait accepted its prescribed 
share of 1.5 million barrels in the OAPEC meetings held in Jeddah on 10th July 1990 and 
in Geneva on 27th July1990.76 Kuwait clarified that its oil production dropped from 1.5 
million barrels a day in 1979 to 800 thousand barrels during the 1980s, with a 
corresponding fall in revenue from $6 billion in 1981 to $1.4 billion in 1986 due to its 
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commitment   to  OPEC’s  prescribed  shares.77 Several studies have pointed out that fixing 
oil prices was a very complicated issue involving many elements related to exporters, 
importers, restrictions, agreement and difference inside OPEC, and the decline of oil prices 
was due to many factors, the most important of which were increasing production from the 
North Sea78 and Alaska, as well as great stock with the main oil consumers.79 This was 
confirmed in a study indicating that the decline in oil prices was due to the increase in oil 
production   by   the   ‘Independent   Petroleum   Exporting   Countries’   (IPEC),   estimated   at   8  
million barrels per day over 1975-1985, while the world consumption of oil decreased to 6 
million   barrels   per   day.   In   contrast,   OPEC’s   oil   production   declined   from   31.7   million  
barrels in 1977 to 17.2 million in 1985.80 For example, in the late 1980s, increased 
demands for oil in the Atlantic Basin were offset by the North Sea, Venezuela and 
Colombia, in addition to the Petroleos de Venezuela (PdVSA), in North America, creating 
‘dedicated  buyers’  of  Venezuela  crude  that  shut  cut  the  oil  coming  from  the  Arab  Gulf.81  
 
 4.3. Economic Justifications  
 
Iraq   considered   that   Kuwait’s   refusal   to write off its debts and grant Iraq a loan was 
because  Kuwait  was  involved  in  a  ‘US  conspiracy’  to  strangle  Iraq  economically82, despite 
the fact that USA-Iraq relations had improved dramatically in the 1980s: as the so-called 
‘Wikileaks’   documents   have   shown, during the meeting between Saddam Hussain and 
USA ambassador April Glaspie on 25th July,   1990,   Saddam   himself   said   ‘Iraq   does   not  
consider  the  US  an  enemy  and  has  tried  to  be  friends’,  and  added,  ‘Iraq wants American 
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friendship…  Although  we  will  not  pant  for  it,  we  will  do  our  part  as  friends’.83 However, 
Al  Shaheen   said,   ‘Kuwait  has  never   asked   Iraq   to   repay   its   debts...  We   (Kuwaitis)  have  
said to the Iraqis, no one is asking Iraqis to repay our debts in order to ask us to cancel the 
debts’.  Al  Shaheen continued, but Kuwait refused to assign these debts for the following 
reasons:  
1. The  first  reason  was  related  to  Iraq’s  interests,  as  if  Iraq  is  exempted  from  its  debts,  
then Iraq debts to the International Monetary Fund would be smaller and other 
parties would press Iraq to refund their debts. Therefore, it was for the benefit of 
Iraq that its debts would seem huge, even on paper.84 
2.  The second was related to Kuwait interests. Should Kuwait write off its due debts 
from Iraq, then all debtors would claim for reciprocity, and in this way, Kuwait 
would lose its huge dues from many parties. 85 
 
4.4. The reasons for the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 
 
The actual reasons for the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, as examined in the literature, included 
the following: 
1.  Bankruptcy of the Iraqi treasury after the Iraq-Iran War, which exhausted its 
economy at a cost of $452.6 billion,86 due to military expenditure that absorbed 40–75% of 
Iraq’s  GDP  during  the  1980s.  For  example,  Iraqi  military  spending  during  1981-1985 was 
estimated at $119.9 billion.87 Further, Iraq owed heavy debts estimated at $ 80 to $100 
billion and the destruction of economic and strategic installations was estimated at $ 8.2 
billion,88 as well as the cost of reconstruction of Iraq after the war, estimated at $230 
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billion.89 This was in addition to the skyrocketing inflation rates, estimated between 20% 
to 40% per year during the 1980s, shortages in basic goods,90 unemployment, domestic 
instability (as in the case of the Kurds in 1988).91 Thus, the solution was to occupy Kuwait 
and acquire its wealth, seize 20% of the world oil reserve fund92 and thus resolve most of 
Iraq’s  economic  problems.  This  reality  was  confirmed  by  the  Iraqi  Deputy  Prime  Minister  
for  the  Economy,  one  month  after  the  invasion,  when  he  said  ‘Iraq will now be able to pay 
its  debts  in  less  than  five  years’,  that  Iraq's  oil  reserves  had  doubled  and  that  the  'new  Iraq  
would have an oil production quota of 4.6 million barrels per day instead of 3.1 million 
barrels per day; that its oil income will reach $38 billion per year to rise to $60 billion in 
the  near   future’.93As the Wikileaks documents have shown, during the meeting between 
Saddam Hussain and US ambassador April Glaspie on 25th July, 1990, seven days before 
the invasion, Saddam did not mention any historical allegations or accusations of stealing 
oil   towards   Kuwait,   but   said   that   Iraq’s   problems   were   related   to   its   poor   internal  
economy,  stating,  ‘but  how  can  we  make  them  (Kuwait  and  UAE)  understand  how  deeply  
we are suffering? The financial situation is such that the pensions for widows and orphans 
have   to   be   cut’.   He   added   ‘I   begged   Shaykh   Zayid   to   understand   our   problems   (when  
Saddam entertained him in Mosul after the Baghdad Summit in May 1990)’,  and  stressed  
that   ‘in   serious   financial   difficulties with 40 billion USD debts, Iraq needs a Marshall 
Plan’.94 
2. To attract the attention of the Iraqi military away from the bad internal situation by 
controlling Kuwait to avoid any revolution or military coup attempts that would dethrone 
the regime.95 The Iraqi regime between 1988 and 1990 executed a large group of officers 
on charges of bringing down of government.96 
3. Iraq’s   expansionist   ambitions   in   the   Gulf   and   its   desire   to   control   the   Kuwaiti  
islands of Warba and Boubyan and Marine Ports to appear as a regional power for strategic 
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counterbalance  of  Iran’s  presence  in  the  Gulf.97 This is quite evident from the Iraqi claim 
for Warba and Bubyan Islands of Kuwait, as explained later. Iraq alleged that it does not 
have sufficient seaports or outlets, despite the fact that the two Kuwaiti islands represent a 
quarter of the area of Kuwait. The area of Bubyan Island is 840km2, while Warba is 37km2 
98 (see figure 3). Iraq overlooks the Arabian Gulf and has 70km of coast on the Arabian 
Gulf, which could reach 235km if the coast of Khowr Zobaeir (25km) and the distance 
between  Sha’at  Al  Arab  and  Basra  port  (140km)  were  added  as  an  extension  to  the  Marine  
front. The Arabian Gulf comprises 35 commercial and oil seaports, distributed along the 
Arabian Gulf States. These ports are distributed as follows: nine ports in the United Arab 
Emirates, six in the Republic of Iraq, six in Iran, five in Kuwait, four in the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia, three in Bahrain and two in Qatar, while Oman does not have any ports 
overlooking the Arabian Gulf, rather it has seaports overlooking the Oman Gulf the and 
Arabian Sea99.  
Iraq has six commercial and oil ports, equal to that of Iran and more than any other Gulf 
State, at 17% of the total number of sea ports overlooking the Arabian Gulf. These six 
ports have been invested in the following ways:  
 
1. Three commercial ports: 100 
a. Basra Port: its operational capacity is 5 million tons per year at 30.5% of 
the total commercial capacity of all three commercial ports.  
b. Umm Qasr Port: its operational capacity is 5 million tons per year at 43.5% 
of the total commercial capacity of all three commercial ports.  
c.  Khowr Zhobeir Port: its operational capacity is three million tons per year 
at 26% of the total commercial capacity of all three commercial ports.  
The total operational capacity of these ports is about 11.5 million tones per year. 
 
 
                                              
97  Panel of specialists 1995, Op.Cit. p.99. 
98  Ministry of Information, Al Kitab Al Sanawi 2007,‘Year  Book’, Kuwait. p. 18.  
99 Centre for Research and Studies on Kuwait, Iraq Navigational Outlets, 3rd edition, Kuwait, 2000.p. 31. 
100  Ibid. p. 35. 
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2.  Three oil ports:101  
a. Al-Faw Port: its operational capacity is 35 million tons per year at 20% of 
the total commercial capacity of all three oil ports.  
b. Al-Baker Port: its operational capacity is 78.8 million tons per year at 45% 
of the total commercial capacity of all three oil ports.  
c. Khor al-Amaya Port: its operational capacity is 61.3 million tons per year at 
35% of the total commercial capacity of all three oil ports.  
 
This capacity may be increased via constructing more piers, promoting the efficiency of 
business at these ports and constructing more oil ports, such as the new Faw Port, which 
has been under construction since 1993, overlooking the Arabian Gulf directly to the West 
of  Sha’at  Al  Arab  entrance,  in  addition  to  oil  pipelines  at  Iraq  that  are  considered  as  one  of  
the greatest oil pumping stations in the world such as the oil pipeline between Iraq and 
Turkey (1000 km), established in 1977, the oil pipeline between Iraq and Syria, the oil 
pipeline between Iraq and Saudi established during the Iraq-Iran War, and the oil pipeline 
Kirkuk- Hadithaha,which ends at ALFaw Port (Arabian Gulf), established in 1975.102 
These Iraqi oil pipelines, which go through Turkey to the north and north-western Iraq, are 
considered as some of the greatest oil pipelines in the world.    
However, it is thought, though not substantiated, that the original intention of Iraq may not 
have been to take all of Kuwait, but only the northern strip, which would, first, have 
brought the Al Ratqa oil fields within Iraqi territory and second, have brought the islands 
also within Iraqi maritime territory. Then that would have put pressure on Kuwait to make 
official concessions in favor of Iraq. For this reason, the Crown Prince, Sheikh Saad Al-
Sabah,   in  his   speech  at   the  Jeddah  Conference   in  October  1990,   reiterated   that  Kuwait’s  
sovereignty was not negotiable or for concession.103 
                                              
101  Ibid. pp. 63 – 77.  
102  Edith, W. and Benroz, F. , Op.Cit. pp.215-217. 
103 Key Note Speech of H.H. Sheikh Saad Al-Sabah, Crown Prince and Prime Minister, at Jeddah 
Conference on 13-15 October, 1990; available online at http://www.kuwait-
history.net/vb/showthread.php?t=1696; Alraimedia Newspaper, Sunday 17 April, 2011, No. 11612, 
Kuwait.
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5. Kuwaiti, International, Arab and Islamic responses to the Iraqi invasion  
 
5.1.  The Kuwaiti stand  
 
Before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the internal situation in Kuwait was not stable, as the 
Amir of Kuwait, Sheikh Jaber Al Sabah (1977-2006), had suspended the democratic path 
through dissolution of the elected National Assembly in July 1986 and replaced it with a 
consultative National Council ‘Majlis  al-Watani’  on 22nd April 1990 after severe disorder 
and confrontations between the blocks of political opposition, that opposed the cessation of 
democratic life, and government since late 1989.104 Saddam utilized this situation and 
invited Kuwaiti political opposition and Syndicate figures to visit Iraq on 15/7/1990 to be 
employed  as  ‘political  means  of  pressure’  on  the  Kuwaiti  government.  The  Iraqi  officials 
expected that no less than 100 Kuwaiti figures would respond to this invitation, but only 
sixteen turned up, most of whom were journalists. The Iraqi official believed that the 
Kuwaiti people would support them in any action, even against the Kuwaiti government, 
due to the crisis between the Kuwaiti opposition and the political system.105 During the 
Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, Iraq failed to mobilise the prominent political elements of 
Kuwait  to  form  an  ‘interim  government’.  Consequently,  Iraq  appointed  a  ‘Provisional  Free  
Government  of  Kuwait’  made  up  of  Kuwaiti   individuals.106 The Iraqi regime launched a 
propagandist   campaign   that   the   events   in   Kuwait   were   ‘internal   matters’   and   Iraq’s  
assistance  had  been  requested  by  the  ‘Provisional  Free  Government  of  Kuwait’.107  
After being granted asylum in Saudi Arabia, all Kuwaiti political blocs convened a 
meeting during the period 13-15/10/1990 at Jeddah, which was originally initiated in 
September by Sheikh Saad Al-Sabah during his visit to London, and published a statement 
wherein they emphasized the rejection of the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait and their 
                                              
104  Awadh, Sami, Op.Cit.p.47. 
105  Al-Bazzaz, Saad, The Generals Are The Last To Know, Dar Alahliya, Amman, 1996. p.22. 
106  Ibid. pp.32-34. 
107  The  Speech  of  Iraq’s  Representative at the Security Council meeting; Repertoire of the Practice of the 
Security Council, Op. Cit. p.568. 
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adherence to the Kuwaiti legitimacy and observance of the 1962 constitution.108  In fact, 
the Kuwaiti political groups at this meeting insisted, before offering any support for their 
political leadership, that there be a return the democracy and elections in accordance with 
the Kuwaiti constitution of 1962. Commitments to that purpose were made to them by 
Crown Prince Sheikh Saad al Abdullah Al-Sabah at the end of this meeting. 
The stand of the Kuwaiti people left in the country towards the occupation was shown in a 
number of ways:109 
1. The Kuwaitis declared civil mutiny and almost to a person did not go to their 
government posts or private business in order to stop civil life. 
2.  They refused to change their Kuwaiti Civil ID Cards and nationality to Iraqi identity 
documents. 
3. They traded in Kuwaiti instead of Iraqi currency.  
4. Resistance forces against the Iraqi invasion were organised at grassroot level. 
 
After the Jeddah Conference, the popular committees formed by Kuwaiti politicians, 
merchants and political blocs travelled around the world in order to garner support for the 
legitimacy of the Al-Sabah   family’s   rule   and   to explain Kuwaiti issues on the Arab and 
international levels in order to counter the Iraqi propaganda.  On   a   popular   level,   ‘The  
Kuwaiti   Community’   was   formed   on   3   August   1990   in   London   by   Kuwaiti   students,  
individuals, patients, journalists and tourists and so on, to unite the efforts of the media and 
coordinate activities in order to gain foreign and Arab official and popular opinion to stand 
with Kuwait in its liberation from the Iraqi occupation. The activity of this Community 
resulted  in  approximately  7,000  British  citizens  joining  one  of  this  Community’s  branches 
under the name of the Free Kuwait Campaign: Friends of Kuwait.110 In addition to this 
were the individual popular committees, which were formed by Kuwaitis, such as the 
                                              
108  Text Statement of representatives of the Kuwaiti people, at Jeddah Conference on 13-15 October, 1990; 
available online at http://www.kuwait-history.net/vb/showthread.php?t=1696; Alraimedia Newspaper, 
Sunday 17 April, 2011, No. 11612, Kuwait.  
109 Al-Sabah, Maimouna Khalifa,  ‘Research papers presented in the seminar on Arab – Arab Relations after 
the  Liberation  of  Kuwait’,  Center  of  Gulf  &  Arabian  Peninsula  Studies,  Kuwait  University, May 26-28th, 
1997. pp. 63 – 67.  
110 Alkhadher, Othman, Epic of Kuwaiti Popular Action 1990-1991, National Union of Kuwait Students, 
United Kingdom & Ireland Branch, 2011. pp.27-30. 
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Kuwait Popular Committee, the International Association for Solidarity with Kuwait, the 
Association of Free Kuwait and the Kuwaiti  Women’s  Gathering  in  1990.111 The lobbying 
by all these committees of the international media and key global players became crucially 
important in supporting the issue of Kuwait and countering Iraqi allegations, particularly in 
the democratic states.   
 
  
5.2.  The International Response  
 
On 2nd August 1990, the international community, represented by the UN, condemned the 
Iraqi  invasion  of  Kuwait  as  ‘blatant  violation’  of  the  international  system.112 For example 
the  twelve  members  of  European  Community  deemed  this  invasion  a  ‘dangerous  threat  to  
peace   and   stability   in   the   region’.113 The Secretary-General of Organization of African 
Unity (OAU) in January, 1991 appealed Iraq to end this occupation.114  Also there was 
condemnation from Non-Aligned Movement to this invasion.115  International powers such 
as the United States, Britain, France, the Soviet Union and China condemned the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait. However, they had some differences regarding how to deal with the 
Iraqi regime and convince it to withdraw its forces from Kuwait.116 In fact, this occupation 
represented  an  actual  threat  to  the  international  powers’  interests,  particularly  the  industrial  
countries that are the most important importers of oil from the Gulf region. Their greatest 
fear was that Iraq would occupy Saudi Arabia and all Gulf States and control 62% of the 
world reserve of oil.117 Therefore, the USA led international coalition forces to convince 
                                              
111  Ibid. p.177.  
112  Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, Op. Cit. p.568. 
113  General  Assembly,  ‘Statement  by  the  Twelve  Member  States  of  the  European  Community  on  the  Iraqi  
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Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait and restore the legitimate government without any 
conditions or restrictions.118  
During this invasion, the international community, represented by the UN, Arab119 and 
Islamic countries, endeavoured to end this crisis, yet Iraq did not respond to these appeals 
to withdraw its forces from Kuwait.120 The UNSC issued twelve resolutions (660, 661, 
662, 664, 665, 666, 667, 669, 670, 674, 677, 678) from the Iraqi invasion until the 
liberation of Kuwait on 26 February 1991, calling for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.121 
The most important of these resolutions are resolution no. 660, adopted through fourteen 
voters (Yemen did not participate in the voting) on 2nd August 1990, which condemns the 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and demands that Iraq withdraw immediately and unconditionally 
all its forces to the positions in which they were located on 1 August 1990, and resolution 
No. 661, adopted through thirteen votes and two abstentions (Cuba, Yemen) on 6th August 
1990,  which  imposed  ‘economic  sanctions’  under  Chapter  VII  against  Iraq  to  compel  Iraq  
to withdraw its forces from Kuwait. After the annexation of Kuwait to Iraq on 8th August, 
UNSC unanimously adopted resolution no. 662 on 9th August 1990, which decides that the 
annexation of Kuwait by Iraq under any form and whatever pretext has no legal validity, 
and is considered null and void. After the Iraqi occupation of foreign embassies on 12th -
13th and 14th September 1990 in Kuwait and violation of the Vienna Conventions of 1961 
and 1963 on Diplomatic and Consular Relations,122 the UNSC unanimously adopted 
resolution no. 667 on 16th September 1990, which strongly condemns aggressive acts 
perpetrated by Iraq against diplomatic missions and personnel in Kuwait, including the 
abduction of foreign nationals who were present in those missions. Resolution no. 674, 
adopted by through thirteen votes and two abstentions (Cuba, Yemen) on 29th October 
1990 demands that the Iraqi authorities and occupying forces immediately cease and desist 
from taking third-state nationals hostage and mistreating and oppressing Kuwait and third- 
State nationals and any other actions. Resolution no. 677, adopted unanimously on 28th 
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November 1990, condemns the attempts by Iraq to alter the demographic composition of 
Kuwait and to destroy the civil records.  
Due to the fact that Iraq rejected all of the aforementioned resolutions, the UNSC adopted 
resolution no. 678 through twelve votes, with two against (Cuba, Yemen) and one 
abstention (China), on 29th November 1990 under Chapter VII: authorizes Member States 
cooperating with the Government of Kuwait, unless Iraq on or before 15th January 1991 
fully  implements,  or  ‘to  use  all  necessary  means  to  uphold  and  implement  resolution  660  
(1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and 
security   in   the   area’.123 This resolution was the last attempt to give Iraq a chance to 
withdraw its forces from Kuwait by 15th January or face the use of force.  
 
 
5.3. The stand of Arab and Islamic countries  
 
This crisis damaged Arab cohesion and solidarity and it was clear that Arab countries did 
not adopt a unified stand towards it, yet the behaviour of some Arab countries was equal in 
practical terms to support for Iraq.124 On 3rd August 1990, the GCC states issued a 
statement   condemned   this   invasion   as   ‘brutal   Iraqi   aggression’.125 On the same day (3rd 
August), the emergency Arab Ministerial meeting in Cairo adopted resolution no. 5036 by 
14 votes,126 in favour out of 19 votes (attendees) condemning the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, 
demanding that Iraq withdraw immediately and unconditionally all its forces to the 
positions in which they were located on 1 August 1990 and calling for an emergency Arab 
summit.127 However,  despite  the  fact  that  this  resolution  did  not  involve  ‘measures’  against  
Iraq in accordance with Article 6 of the Arab League Charter, it did not receive unanimous 
approval from the attendees compared with UNSC resolution 660. After the annexation of 
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Kuwait to Iraq on 8th August, there was emergency Arab Summit in Cairo on 9th-10th 
August   1990.   This   summit   witnessed   ‘a   sharp   contrast’   in   the   Arab   stand,   which   was  
divided into two contradictory positions.128 However, at the end of this Summit, the Arab 
States adopted resolution no. 195 by 12 votes in favour out of 21 attendees.129 The most 
important provisions of this resolution were:130  
 
1. Confirmation of the resolution adopted by the Arab League on 3/8/1990 and 
the statement issued by the Organization of Islamic Conferences on 4/8/1990. 
2. Adherence to the UN Security Council Resolutions (660,661 and 662) as 
they expressed international legitimacy. 
3.  Condemnation of the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait, non-recognition of 
Iraq's annexation of Kuwait and support for all measures adopted by Kuwait to 
liberate its territories. 
4. Deploring the Iraqi threats to Gulf States, condemnation of the mobilisation 
of Iraqi armed troops at Saudi frontiers, affirmation of full Arab solidarity with 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Gulf States and support for the measures taken by 
Saudi Arabia and other Arab Gulf acts of the right of legitimate defence in 
accordance with the provisions of Article 2 of the Treaty of the Joint Defence and 
Economic Cooperation of League of Arab States as well as Article 51 of the UN 
charter. 
5. Response to the request of Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf States to send 
Arab troops to support the armed forces of these countries in defending its territory 
and territorial integrity against any external aggression. 
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The States that did not vote in favour of resolution no. 195, dated 10th August, justified 
their position of rejecting   the  ‘foreign   troops’   in   the  region   in   response   to   the  request  of  
Saudi Arabia, despite the fact that some of these Arab countries had already called for 
foreign troops to protect their political system against external risks. Some Arab leaders 
insisted   that   the   aforementioned   resolution   must   be   ‘unanimous’,   in   accordance   with  
Article 6 of the Arab League Charter. Legal analysts confirmed that the response to Saudi 
Arabia’s   request   for   non-Arab troops was valid in accordance with the provisions of 
Article  7  of  Arab  League  chapter,  which  provides  that:  ‘the decisions of the Council taken 
by a unanimous vote shall be binding on all the member States of the League; those that 
are reached by a majority vote shall bind only those that accept them. In both cases the 
decisions of the Council shall be executed in each State in accordance with the 
fundamental structure of that State’.131  However, the implementation of this decision 
whether  ‘unanimous’  or     majority depends on the States themselves in accordance of their 
fundamental system.132   The Article 6 of the Arab League charter requires a unanimous 
vote  in  the  case  of  ‘a  threat  or  aggression’  from  all  members133 in the following cases: 
 1. Adopting  ‘group  security  measures’  to deter any aggression, such as the formation 
of  Arab   troops   under   the   ‘administration   of   the  Arab   league’   similar   to   the  Arab   troops  
who were sent to the Kuwaiti-Iraqi crisis in 1961. 
                                              
131  Note; Article 7 was revised at the Algeria Summit in 2005, which canceled  the  ‘unanimous  voting’  and  
added to it some provisions in the voting system in accordance with the case and procedures , such as the 
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IzQbAmbEBy8FYeDrh8TFrHQ2E-
tuKjlVdTYFIjClTLpzlrTnqkxyEIKIjxXJcfesy0BItjw0FrriYoQZcclPnL7mJnq3bTIgAHQJvOQ-
NdHbUfTk8EXJEGC9Kr4ABZHwe2XtbFhoOB6HTW-
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vote’.  For  an  Arabic  transcript;;  see  Arab  league  Charter,  Article  7,  ‘Official  Documents  of  the  Arab  
League’,  Arab  League  Charter,  on  the  website  of the Arab League. For an English transcript; see 
http://www.mideastweb.org/arableague.htm  
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2. Adopting  ‘measures’  against  member  State   in   the  Arab  League   in   the  case  of   the  
failure to implement its Charter, such as freezing the membership of one member and 
expulsion of a member from the organization. This was similar to the measures taken 
against Egypt to freeze its membership after Egypt signed a peace treaty with Israel in 
1978. Legal analysts have confirmed that the aforementioned resolution did not require 
unanimous votes for two reasons:  
a. The  previous   resolution  did  not   adopt   any   ‘measures’   against   Iraq   (as  mentioned  
above) or formation of Armed Forces under the name of the Arab League. 134 
b.  The summit convened to denounce the invasion and explain the consequences of 
the invasion. In this case, the resolution would be issued by simple majority. Thus, Saudi 
Arabia’s  request  for  Armed  Forces  is  classified  under  this  case,  i.e.  denunciation,  appeal, 
condemnation and in accordance of the Article 2 of the Treaty of Joint Defence and 
Economic Cooperation.135 
 
Regarding  the  Islamic  countries’  stance,  on  4th August 1990, 136  the Ministerial Meeting of 
the OIC in Cairo condemned the invasion and called for prompt withdrawal of Iraqi troops 
from Kuwait and restoration of legitimate government without condition.137 Many Islamic 
countries participated in the international coalition forces, such as Bangladesh, Pakistan, 
Senegal and Niger, in addition to Afghan militants.138 
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The Iranian and Turkish stands deserve consideration because both of them are Islamic 
countries having common frontiers with Iraq. Although this crisis affected Turkey due to 
the shutting down of the oil pipeline passing between Turkey and Iraq, which sustained 
losses estimated at $6.2 billion, Turkey condemned the invasion in accordance with UN 
resolutions.139 The Turkish attitude can be seen as follows:  
1. Agreement to use its territories to attack Iraq. 
2. Participation in the international coalition forces.140  
 
With respect to the Iranian stand, Iraq tried to neutralize Iran via an agreement concluded 
between the two countries on 15th August 1990, as previously mentioned. However, Iran 
condemned  the  invasion  as  a  ‘blatant  violation’  of  the  UN  charter,141 despite participating 
in international coalition forces for various political reasons.142 However, on 3rd February 
1991, Iran made an initiative to solve the crisis, rejected and considered by the USA and 
Britain  as  a  ‘diplomatic  manoeuvre’,  which  included the following ideas: 
 
1. Ceasefire between coalition forces and Iraq. 
2. Withdrawal of the Iraqi forces from Kuwait. 
3. Withdrawal of coalition forces from the Arabian Gulf and replacing these forces 
with Islamic forces. 
4. Revision of all frontier disputes between Kuwait and Iraq by Islamic experts. 
5. Setting up an Islamic fund to support Iraq due to the destruction caused by the war. 
6.  Non-aggression agreement to be signed among Gulf States as a final step for 
peace. 143  
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6. Liberation and the effects of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait  
 
6.1. The Liberation of Kuwait  
 
Upon the request of Kuwait, the US-led international coalition forces were stationed in 
Saudi Arabia to liberate Kuwait under the UN resolutions.144 After  Iraq’s  rejection  of  the  
UN resolutions, particularly resolution no. 678, which granted Iraq a final chance to 
withdraw from the Kuwait up to 15th January 1990, the coalition forces (700,000 soldiers), 
waged  a  war  against  Iraq,  known  as  ‘Operation  Desert  Storm’,  to  liberate  Kuwait  on  17th 
January 1991.145 This war started with forty-two days of air strikes, estimated to have 
included 109, 876 air attacks.146 The land attack started on 24th February 1991, involving 
the armed forces of eleven countries, which resulted in the liberation of Kuwait on 26th 
February 1991.147 On 3rd March 1991, Iraq accepted all twelve UN resolutions contained in 
the UNSC resolution no. 686 issued on 2nd March 1991.148 On 6th April 1991, Iraq 
accepted UNSC resolution no.687 of 3rd April 1991 as a condition for ceasefire, which 
called Iraq to respect the international treaties signed between Iraq and Kuwait and 
establish  UN  specialized  commissions  related  to  ‘the  situation  between  Iraq  and  Kuwait’,  
which we will discuss later.149 
 
6.2. Losses resulting from the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 
 
On the level of civilian human losses, Kuwait lost 1000 Kuwaiti civilians, 15,000 
casualties due to torture, 1000 cases of rape committed by the Iraqi troops and 605 Kuwaiti 
prisoners of war. An estimated 1700 civilians were injured due to mines, including 480 
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deaths, and most of them were children. The cost of removal of 1.1 million mines and 
82,000 tons of ammunitions was estimated at $760 million (KD216 million). About 
500,000 vehicles and trucks were looted.150 This war resulted in 300,000 Kuwaiti refugees 
abroad. 
On the level of economic and environmental losses, the environmental damage due to the 
burning of Kuwaiti oil wells in the Gulf region was disastrous.151 Iraq destroyed 1164 out 
of  Kuwait’s  1268  oil  wells,152 at 91.8% of the total productive oil wells in Kuwait.153 Thus, 
the losses of the Kuwaiti Oil Sector alone (installations, assets, burring of wells) are 
estimated at $75 billion.154 The destruction of Kuwaiti infrastructure, institutions and 
authorities and looting of Kuwaiti properties were massive,155 which led Kuwait, for the 
first time, to take a loan estimated at $5.5 billion for reconstruction;156 however, the total 
cost of reconstruction is estimated at $40 billion.157 The value of the claim for total losses 
claims submitted to the UN Compensation Commission in 2010 was 
$177,418,859,292.50.158 However, this amount represents claims for direct losses only,159 
whilst the indirect damage is irreparable: according to UN resolutions, it is estimated at $ 
43.6 billion,160 including Kuwaiti expenditure on  ‘Operation  Desert  Storm’  at  $16  billion  
                                              
150  Assiri, Abdul Reda, 1992, Op. Cit. p. 351. 
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in   cash   and  $32  million  as   tangible   aid.  Kuwait’s   foreign   investments  portfolio  declined  
from $100 to $40 billion161 and debt cancellations are estimated at $4.9 billion. Thus, the 
total Kuwaiti direct and indirect losses are estimated at $233 billion, in addition to claims 
for environmental losses, estimated at more than $40 billion.162 The losses of GCC States 
are estimated at between $200 and $300 billion, out of which $64 billion was sustained by 
Saudi Arabia and $140 billion by other Gulf States (except Kuwait). On the Arabian level, 
the losses of Arab economies exceeded $800 billion.163 According to the Special UN 
Mission report to Iraq in 1991, the Iraqi losses were massive. In terms of human losses, it 
is estimated that Iraq lost between 50,000 and 120,000 soldiers and between 5,000 and 
15,000 civilians during the war itself. The asset losses of Iraq are estimated at $200 
billion.164 
 
 
7. A summary assessment of the effect of the invasion and its aftermath on 
Kuwait’s  foreign  relations 
 
7.1. Kuwait’s  recalibration  of  its  foreign  relations  with  the  Arab  world 
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait caused a clear division in Arab–Arab relations after the 
liberation of Kuwait. It was in particular the question of how to react to the invasion, and 
what means to use to reverse it, that split the Arab League. The invasion resulted in a 
relationship crisis between Kuwait and those Arab countries that did not support Kuwait 
and   the  GCC   states’   demand   for   an   armed   international   intervention. These eight states 
were classified in Kuwait policy as “duwal aḍ-ḍidd”  (Opponent States)165: Jordan, Yemen, 
                                              
161 The cost of Desert Storm was $61.1 billion. The coalition forces paid $54 billion while Kuwait paid $16 
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Sudan, PLO, Mauritania, Tunisia, Algeria and Libya.166 Both the invasion and the divided 
Arab reaction had a huge impact on Kuwaiti feelings at the popular and leadership levers 
alike.  
Dr. Ghanem Sultan conducted a questionnaire on the impact of the Iraqi invasion, targeting 
more than 500 students in Kuwait in 1992. The results of this questionnaire were that 94% 
considered  the  invasion  to  be  ‘a  stab  in  the  back  for  Arab  solidarity’,  48%  considered  it  as  
‘undoing  Arab  Unity’,  31%  considered  it  to  be  ‘planting  doubts  in  Arab  relations’,  while  
20.5%   said   the   invasion   ‘divided   the   Arab   world   into   two   camps’.167  There followed 
media battles between Kuwait and Arab Gulf states on the one hand, and the duwal aḍ-
ḍidd on the other hand. Not surprisingly, Kuwait drastically revised its relations with these 
states. After its liberation, Kuwait, as a result of the duwal aḍ-ḍidd stance, recalibrated its 
foreign policy with these Arab states in diplomatic and economic terms as follows: 
1. Diplomatic relations with these states were severed. 
2. Economic aid to these states was suspended, with the exception of PLO, due to the 
Israeli occupation, as previously discussed.    
3. The majority of the citizens of these states were expelled from Kuwait.  
4. The entry visas of citizens of these states to Kuwait were suspended. 
5.  Political, trade and economic cooperation with these states were suspended.   
 
This was especially striking given that its largest gift of foreign aid went to the duwal aḍ-
ḍidd before the Iraqi invasion, as shown in Chapter 4. As result of the recalibration of its 
foreign relations, Kuwait did not sign any cooperation agreement with these states over the 
period 1990 – 2000, in contrast to treaties signed with Arab states that supported Kuwait in 
its liberation war, as discussed below.168 This is in addition to the suspension of its 
economic aid to these Arab countries. This was evident through the suspension of KFAED 
loans to the “duwal   aḍ-ḍidd”   until   Kuwait   started   to   review   its   relations   with   these  
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countries in order to isolate Iraq on a regional and international level after successful Iraqi 
political movements on Arab and international levels to break the international and Arab 
isolation, as discussed in chapter 6.  
According to the Jordanian statistics in 1992, the number of Jordanians, mostly of 
Palestinian origin, who left Kuwait to travel to Jordan, amounted to 329,000, including 
14,579 families. 169 In 1991, King Hussein of Jordan asked the international community to 
provide material assistance to Jordan due to the mass return of Jordanians from Kuwait 
and  GCC  states,  which  he  described  as  a  ‘third  wave’,  after  their  displacement  in  the  wars  
of 1948 and 1967.170 Nonetheless, in 1992 King Hussein attacked the policy of GCC states 
towards   Jordan   and  described   it   as   a   stance   lacking   ‘good  neighborliness’,171 due to the 
expulsion of Jordanian citizens from GCC states, which caused an economic burden to 
Jordan. This is in addition to Saudi Arabia's action to end the residence permits of Yemeni 
workers, whose numbers up to 1990 were estimated at one million, and cancel all the 
privileges that the Yemeni community enjoyed. To this number was added the 45,000 
Yemeni who fled from Kuwait and the 2,000 who left Qatar.172  Nimer Hammad has 
commented that  ‘the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait has affected the Arab world negatively; we 
(as Palestinians) still   witness   its   impact   at   the   present   time’.173  After the liberation of 
Kuwait, the feelings of MPs, at the Kuwait National Assembly, and the Kuwaiti people, as 
mentioned above, represented the main obstacle in any attempt to normalize the relations 
with these Arab states. The former MP Saleh Al-Fadhala,  commented  that  ‘MPs, at Kuwait 
National Assembly for 1992, after the liberation, were against the restoration of relations 
with these Arab countries due to their bad stance in supporting Iraq, who rejected all 
agreements  with  these  Arab  states’.  However,  he  added,  ‘the  enthusiasm  of  MPs  and  even  
the PM Sheikh Saad Al-Sabah’,  on  the  issue  of  blocking  the  normalization  of  the  relations  
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between Kuwait and the duwal aḍ-ḍidd,  ‘became  gradually  less,  became  weaker over the 
years’.174  
In sum, the Iraqi invasion negatively affected Gulf-Arab relations in the critical period that 
witnessed international and regional changes such as the fall of the Soviet Union and the 
start of Arab-Israel negotiations for peace at the Madrid Conference in 1991.   
In contrast, Kuwaiti relations improved with Arab states that supported the liberation war 
of Kuwait, headed by Egypt and Syria due to their participation in the coalition forces sent 
to liberate Kuwait in 1991. This became evident when Kuwait replaced Jordanian and 
Palestinian workers with an Egyptian and Syrian labour force.  According to Kuwaiti 
statistics, the number of Arab immigrants who were granted residence in Kuwait was 
estimated to be 167.699 in 1992, 57.792 in 1993, 53.262 in 1994, 10.960 in 1995, and 
8.764 in 1996, of whom the Egyptians and Syrians were the biggest beneficiaries of these 
permits. 175 This is in addition to the economic aid provided by GCC states to these two 
countries in 1991, estimated at $6 billion, as previously mentioned. The relationship 
between Kuwait and these Arab states has been strengthened through economic, trade, 
labor and political agreements as a result of their positive stance towards Kuwait. This is 
demonstrated by Kuwait signing 18 agreements with Egypt, 17 with Syria, 11 with 
Morocco and seven with Lebanon since 1991 regarding the economy, investment, trade, 
education, media, and labor cooperation etc..176 This is in addition to the fact that Kuwaiti 
economic aid to these countries has been expanded through KFAED loans, which 
amounted to KD 553.585 million to Egypt, KD 332.914 million to Syria, KD 205.140 
million to Lebanon, KD 387.814 million to Morocco from 1990 until 2010.177 These states 
represented the Arab political security bloc for Kuwait against Iraqi threats since its 
liberation  until  the  fall  of  Saddam  Hussein’s  regime  in  2003. 
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7.2. Kuwait’s  recalibration  of  its  foreign  relations  with  key  global players  
 
At the international level, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was an essential factor in 
strengthening   Kuwait’s   ties   with   global   players,   especially   with   the   US.   Thus,   after   its  
liberation, Kuwait re-examined its foreign policy with key global players around the world 
who supported Kuwait during the Iraqi invasion, such as the US, Britain, France, Russia, 
China, Japan and Germany. After its liberation, Kuwait sought to become closer to these 
countries  by  engaging  their  economic  interests  in  the  process  of  Kuwait’s  reconstruction  in  
the oil sector, health, development projects and construction, estimated at $ 40 billion,178as 
an instrument for rapprochement with these key global players. From 1991, Kuwait aimed 
to reinforce its political and economic ties with these countries through signing a number 
of agreements at all levels. Thus, the concept of making strategic alliances with 
superpowers started to play a role in Kuwait policy.  Before the Iraqi invasion, Kuwait had 
refused any foreign intervention or presence in the Gulf region. However, as a result of the 
invasion, Kuwait came to believe a foreign military presence in the region to be essential 
because of the aggressive policies and conduct of Iraq and Iran. Thus, Kuwait turned to 
major countries to protect it and signed five security agreements with permanent members 
of the UN Security Council.   
In addition to these five security agreements, since 1991 Kuwait has signed three 
agreements with the US, four with Germany, eight with Britain, four with France, six with 
China and two with Russia, in the field of economic cooperation, trade and investment and 
education.179 Thus, over the 1990s-2000s,  Kuwait’s   relationship  with   these  countries  has  
developed and reached the stage of a political, economic and security partnership. For 
example, on economic  level,  Kuwait’s  exports  were  estimated  to  be  $95.46  billion  in  2008.  
Of this amount, Japan imported 19.9%, the US 8.4%  and  China  4.4%.  Kuwait’s   imports  
were estimated to be $26.54 billion, of which 12.7% came from the US, 8.5% from Japan, 
7.3% from Germany, 6.8% from China, 5.8% from Italy, and 4.6% from Britain.180 With 
regard to politics and security, relations between Kuwait and some of these states have 
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179  The Legal Department, List of Agreements Signed between State of Kuwait and a Number of Countries 
for 2010, Op.Cit.  
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reached the stage of strategic alliances through the combating of global terrorism and 
terrorist intelligence networks, the emergence of the US-Kuwaiti alliance after the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait,181 and the signing of a set of agreements between Kuwait and NATO 
allies in 2006.182 The agreements concerned the exchange of experiences and cooperation 
in matters of border security, counterterrorism, crisis management, joint military exercises 
and military education and training.183 This was expressed by the Minister for Kuwaiti 
Foreign Affairs, Sheikh Mohammad Al-Sabah,  who  stated  ‘the  reservation  of  alliances  and 
foreign  military  bases  no  longer  exists’184  as  a  result  of  Kuwait’s  overall  recalibration  of  
its foreign policy towards key global players.  
Since the emergence of the New World Order led by the US in 1991, directly after the 
liberation of Kuwait, Kuwait reinforced its relationship with the US at all levels including 
military, security and commercial, due to the main role of the US in the liberation of 
Kuwait. This was demonstrated by the US-Kuwaiti strategic alliance after 1991 on the one 
hand, and on the other hand, the signing of the Trade and Investment Framework 
Agreement (TIFA) in 2004, with the aim of establishing a free trade area between the two 
countries by 2013;185 the volume of trade exchanges between Kuwait and US had reached 
$6.1 billion by 2006.186  The Kuwaiti-US relationship has been enhanced by the annual 
visits of officials and academics between the two countries to participate in US-Kuwait 
Gulf Security Dialogue (GSD) since 2006. This dialogue addresses the two countries 
issues of security, politics and economic need.187  
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7.3. Recalibration of relations with Iran 
 
Iran is one of the states with which Kuwait achieved an overall recalibration of its foreign 
relations. Before the Iraqi invasion, Kuwait- Iran relations were disrupted by the Iranian 
revolution in 1979, and the attempts of the new Iranian regime to export revolutionary 
‘Shi'ism’   to   its   neighboring countries. Thus, relations between the two countries 
deteriorated to hostility, especially given Kuwaiti financial and media support for Iraq 
against Iran during the Iraq-Iran War (1980-1988). As a result of the Iraqi invasion, 
Kuwait realized that the foreign aid given to Iraq during the Iraq-Iran War did not support 
its security and sovereignty against Iraqi ambition. This also applied to the other Arab 
states which did not support Kuwait, as mentioned above. Therefore, after its liberation, 
Kuwaiti aimed to reestablish its relationship with Iran, firstly due to the positive stance of 
Iran towards the Iraqi invasion, and secondly, in order to quell pro-Iranian elements in 
Kuwait from inciting military action or prompting destabilization in Kuwait.188  
This political and economic rapprochement with Iran is made evident by the 24 
agreements signed between Kuwait and Iran since 1992 relating to the economy, culture 
and trade and cooperation. This is especially significant given that Kuwait had not signed 
any cooperation agreements with Iran since the outbreak of revolution in 1979. Therefore, 
the large number of agreements Kuwait made with Iran, compared with the number 
completed   with   other   countries,   reflects   Kuwait’s overall recalibration of its foreign 
relations with Iran due to social and geographic dimensions.189 This policy was described 
in a secret telegram sent by the US Embassy in Kuwait in 2007   ‘Kuwait and Iran have 
enjoyed a close trade relationship. This relationship is based as much on social networks as 
it   is   on   geography   […]  Since   the   1990   invasion   of  Kuwait   by   Iraq,  which  was   strongly  
opposed by Iran, Kuwait-Iran trade relations have been  particularly  strong’.190  The total 
volume of Iranian exports to Kuwait rose from $ 110 million in 2001191 to $241 million in 
                                              
188 Kenneth Katzman,  ‘Kuwait:  Security,  Reform,  and  U.S.  Policy’,  CRS  Report  for  Congress,  US,  
December 6, 2012. p.21 
189 The Legal Department, List of Agreements Signed between State of Kuwait and a Number of Countries for 
2010, Op.Cit. 
190 Wikileaks,  ‘Kuwaiti  - Iranian Trade  Relations:    An  Overview’,  Reference  ID:  07KUWAIT183 , 
CONFIDENTIAL, Embassy Kuwait, 2007-02-07.   
191  KUNA,  ‘Trade  Exchanges  between  Kuwait,  Iran  below  Desired  Level’,  Economics, 21 October, 2001. 
Kuwait;   http://158.50.10.7/ArticleDetails.aspx?language=en&id=1200972 
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2004, while the value of Kuwaiti exports to Iran was estimated at $22 million in 2004.192  
This is in addition to the exchange visit of parliamentary delegates between two counties 
to enhance their acquaintance.   
To strengthen its relationship, Kuwait started to balance its relations between Iran on the 
one  hand,  and   Iran’s  opponents   such  as   the  US,  on   the  other  hand.  This  was   in  order to 
maintain   its   regional   and   international   interests,   especially   regarding   the   issue   of   Iran’s  
nuclear program. However, Kuwait has remained cautious about Iranian political and 
nuclear ambitions in the region, especially after the Iranian ‘spy  cell’,  discovered in May 
2010 in Kuwait, as mentioned in Chapter 4. As the Wikileaks document shows,  LeBaron, 
the US ambassador to Kuwait, commented in 2006 on Kuwaiti policy towards Iran, saying 
‘Kuwait   walks   a   fine   line   with   its   large   neighbor   across   the   Gulf,   enjoying extensive 
economic  and  commercial  ties,  but  remaining  wary  on  the  political  front’.  193 In addition, 
the unsettled maritime border between Kuwait and Iran over the exploitation of the 
Continental Shelf in Durra (Arash) oil field was described by the Kuwaiti Minister of 
Foreign Affairs as a  ‘thorn  in  Kuwaiti  - Iranian  relations’.194  Therefore, as Wikileaks has 
shown,  Kuwait  ‘uses  its  contacts  with  Iran  to  assure  Tehran  of  its  continued  friendship  and  
to pursue parochial economic interests, to include off-shore oil field development and 
access   to  gas’.195 Thus, the Iraqi invasion gave a fine opportunity for the recalibration of 
Kuwaiti-Iranian relations.  
 
7.4. Impacts of the Iraqi invasion on the Palestinian Issue 
Before the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, there were approximately 400,000 Palestinian 
citizens living in Kuwait, representing great support to the Palestinians in the occupied 
territories, in addition to Kuwaiti (official and popular) support through financial transfers 
to the occupied territories, estimated at between $140 million and $200 million 
                                              
192  This amount does not represent Kuwaiti investments in Iran.  
193 Wikileaks,  ‘Scenesetter  For  Counselor  Zelikow's  Feb.  28  - March  1  Visit  To  Kuwait’,  Reference  ID;;   
06KUWAIT594, CONFIDENTIAL , Embassy Kuwait,  2006-02-21 
194  Ibid,  ‘Iranian  Parliament  Speaker  Larijani  Completes’,  Reference  ID: 10KUWAIT61, CONFIDENTIAL, 
Embassy Kuwait, Jan 27, 2010.  
195 Wikileaks,  ‘Kuwait  Tries  To  Downplay  Importance  Of  Visits  By  Iranian  Speaker  Larijani;;  Iranian  
Economic  Team  Accomplishes  Little’,  Reference  ID:   10KUWAIT95 , CONFIDENTIAL, Embassy 
Kuwait, Tue, 2 Feb 2010.   
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annually.196 Following the liberation of Kuwait, most of the Palestinians who had 
remained then left Kuwait. Mahmoud Abbas, President of the Palestinian National 
Authority, commented on this issue, saying that   ‘we   (as   Palestinians)   have  made three 
historical   mistakes   as   follows:   aylūl   al-aswad   ‘Black   September’   in   Jordon   (1970),   our  
involvement  in  the  Lebanese  Civil  War  (1975),  and  the  Iraqi  invasion  of  Kuwait  (1990).’    
He   added,   ‘The   Iraqi   invasion   had   broken   our   back,   because   half   a  million Palestinians 
were living in Kuwait whose money was a source of financial aid to the Palestinians in the 
occupied   territories  before   their  departure   from  Kuwait’.  Abbas   continued,   ‘We  will   not  
repeat  these  mistakes  again’.197    
 
The invasion inflicted losses on Palestinians in several ways:198 
1. The agricultural and industrial exports from Jordan to Kuwait were closed. These 
exports were estimated at $100 million in 1989.  
2. The Kuwaiti Dinar declined at 25% from its original value, which reduced the 
available incomes of the Palestinians employed in Kuwait. 
3. The Palestinian financial transfers to occupied territories declined by more than 
$350 million at 60%. 
4. Per capita income for each Palestinian declined by 10% in the West Bank and 15% 
in the Gaza Strip, while consumer rates increased by 29% and investment rates 
declined by 20% in the occupied territories. Government consumption decreased 
by 73% in the West Bank and 25% in the Gaza Strip. 
5. The number of unemployed persons in the occupied territories increased to 110,000 
by the end of 1991, representing 65% of the labour force in the 1989 statistics. 
Further, most Palestinians left Kuwait for Jordan during the invasion and 
consequently, Jordan suffered from this departure.  
 
                                              
196 Abdul Kareem, Ibrahim, ‘Al-inʽiqāsāt  il-iqtisādīya  li  ʼazmat  il-khalīj  ʽala  al-filastīnīyīn  fiḍ-ḍiffa  wal  
qitāʽ’,  ‘Economic  Implications  of  Gulf  Crisis  on  the  Palestinians  in  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  Strip’,  
Cooperation Journal, issue No. 29, Secretariat General of GCC States, 1993. p. 81. 
197 Interview by the researcher with Mahmoud Abbas, President of the Palestinian National Authority, in 
Ramallah City, Palestine, on Tuesday 6 March, 2012. 
198  Abdul Kareem, Ibrahim, Op.Cit. pp.87- 89. 
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Nimer Hammad comments that, after the expulsion of the Palestinian people from Kuwait 
and  other  GCC  states,   ‘the Palestinians   felt   isolated,   especially  with   the  GCC  countries’  
and  ‘Israel  exploited  this  invasion  to  show  the  world  that  it  is  a  peaceful  state,  because  of  
the lack of response   to   the   Iraqi  missiles  against   Israel  during   the   invasion’.199  Ghassan 
Khatib commented   on   this   topic,   saying   that   ‘of   course,   the   Iraqi   invasion   has   several  
negative effects on the Arab situations in general, and on the Palestinian issue in particular 
[…]  The  event  itself  transferred  local  and  international  attention  from  the  Palestinian  issue,  
as  a  central  issue,  to  the  other  issues  resulting  from  this  invasion’.  He  added,  ‘Due  to  this  
invasion, there was a decline in the value of revenue GNP (remittances) by 25% to the 
Palestinians in the occupied territories in accordance with the study done one year after the 
liberation  of  Kuwait’,  and  further  commented,  ‘Israel  exploited  the  situation  to  set  up  the  
checkpoints   such   as   ‘Qalandia   Checkpoint’ to crackdown   on   the   Palestinian   people’.     
Ghassan   continued,   ‘One   of   the  main   reasons   for   the  Madrid   Conference   for   the   peace  
process and the attention of the world in 1991 to solve the Palestinian issue was the 1990 
Gulf  War  Crisis.’200  Ahmed Majdalani commented on  this  point,  saying  that  ‘one of the 
repercussions of the 1991 Gulf Crisis was the Madrid Peace Conference, after US 
President George Bush’s   initiative   for   peace   in   1991’.  He alluded to the impact of this 
invasion   on   the   Palestinian   people,   saying   that   ‘in   fact,   the   major   disaster   is   that   the  
Palestinians have been exiled three times in their recent history, in 1948, 1967 and in the 
Kuwait  crisis  of  1990’.  201  
 
 
8.  Conclusion  
  
Against the background of geography, it was the economic factor and the military 
dimension that played the main role in the Gulf crisis in 1990, although they need to be 
seen in the context of the domestic political and decision-making contexts of both 
countries., and also the ideational elements that influenced perceptions and calculations on 
both sides. 
                                              
199  Interview by the researcher with  Nimer Hammad , Political Advisor to the Mahmoud Abbas, President 
of the Palestinian National Authority , in  Ramallah City,  Palestine,  on Monday  5  March , 2012. 
200 Interview by the researcher with Dr. Ghassan Khatib, Director of the Government media Center, in 
Ramallah City, Palestine, on Tuesday 6 March, 2012. 
201 Interview by the researcher with Dr. Ahmed Majdalani, Minister of Labour, in Ramallah City, Palestine, 
on Wednesday 7 March, 2012. 
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 The poor economic and political situation of Iraq after its war with Iran from 1980 until 
1988, in addition to the Iraqi ambitions to become the central power in the region, with a 
deeper historical irredentist mindset underpinning this, were the main reasons for its 
occupation of Kuwait in August   1990,   as   this   occupation   enabled   Iraq   to   gain  Kuwait’s  
wealth and its strategic location. The concentration of decision-making power in Kuwait 
before the way, and even more extremely so in Iraq under Saddam, also played a role in 
the choices made. 
 
Yet the occupation   represented   an   actual   threat   to   the   international   powers’   interests,  
particularly the industrial countries that are the most important importers of oil from the 
Gulf region, but also more broadly in the challenge it constituted to the emrging new world 
order that had been envisaged by many. Thus, the condemnation of this occupation 
witnessed for the first time a wide-ranging international coalition against Iraq led by the 
US, which liberated Kuwait in February 1991. The occupation of Kuwait resulted in 
economic and environmental losses for Kuwait and for Arab and regional states, in 
addition to the discord between the Arab states that it engendered. This negatively 
reflected on the Palestinian issue, and drastically damaged relations between Kuwait and 
these Arab states, such as Jordan, Sudan, Tunisia, Yemen, PLO, Mauritania and Algeria.  
This can be illustrated by the use of the term duwal aḍ-ḍidd or ‘Opponent  States’, which 
appeared in the policy of Kuwait, after its liberation in 1991, to describe the Arab states 
that did not support Kuwait during the Iraqi invasion.  
 
The invasion has become a milestone in Kuwaiti consciousness ever since 1990. This was 
evident  through  Kuwait’s  overall  recalibration  of  its  foreign  relations with Arab states, Iran 
and global players. The Iraqi invasion, then, would reshape the concepts of Kuwaiti 
foreign policy on a regional and international level, including, most acutely, in terms of its 
behaviours towards Iraq. It is this particular aspect that we next turn to in Chapters 6, 7, 8 
and 9.  
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                                                Chapter VI 
 
 Key official Kuwaiti positions towards Iraq after the invasion 
 
  
 
 
 1. Introduction 
 
 
Iraqi-Kuwaiti relations were severed at all levels following the Iraqi invasion. The Kuwaiti 
attitude towards Iraq  was  expressed  by  Sheikh  Sabah  Al  Ahmed  Al  Sabah,  then  Kuwait’s  
Foreign  Minister,  when  he  stated,  ‘we  differentiate  between  the  regime  and  the  people [...] 
we cannot tolerate the sufferings of our brothers who are suffering from hunger and 
poverty [...] Kuwait is among the countries that assisted the Iraqi people directly after 
liberation with food and medicines, particularly those who migrated from the north and 
south  where  humanitarian  aid  was  sent  to  them’.1 
 
In this brief chapter, we outline the basic positions that have undepinned and defined 
Kuwait’s   policy   towards   Iraq   since   the   invasion.   Subsequent   chapters  will   then  delve   in  
more detail into the specific evolution of policy and behaviour in successive periods. 
 
As has been made clear in Chapter 4, the definition of these stances, while promulgated by 
the Amir and the Government and backed up by the National Assembly, has been very 
much in the hands of, initially, Crown Prince and Prime Minister Sheikh Saad and Foreign 
Minister Sheikh Sabah, with the Amir playing a les assertive role, and then from 2007 
really by Sheikh Sabah alone, albeit obviously with advice from others. The only obvious 
area  of  dispute  was  over  the  Kuwaiti  position  towards  the  ‘Opponent  States’,  with  Sheikh  
Sabah in favour of restoring relations, and Sheikh Saad against. The National Assembly 
                                              
1  Al   Watan   Information   and   Studies   Center,   ‘Foreign   Policy’,   classification   No.   5-6 dated 14/1/1994, 
Kuwait. 
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was divided. In 1999, the National Assembly, by the of a different complexion, sided with 
Sheikh Sabah, who had by then become in effect the real decider of foreign policy, after 
Sheikh Saad’s  being  laid  low  by  illness. 
 
After the liberation of Kuwait, Kuwaiti behaviour towards Iraq was based on several 
pillars and principles represented by the call for complete implementation of UN Security 
Council (UNSC) resolution No. 687, dated 3/4/1991,  which  included  ‘specific  conditions’  
for a ceasefire and an end to the conflict between Iraq and coalition forces, which Iraq 
officially   accepted.   This   resolution,   which   may   be   described   as   the   ‘main   resolution’,  
included the following items: 
 
1. The issue of demarcation of the international frontiers between Kuwait and Iraq as 
specified  in  the  agreed  ‘Minutes  of  1963’  on  4/10/1963  and  registered  with  the  UN. 
2.  The prompt deployment of UNIKOM to control the water passage (Khor 
Abdullah) and Demilitarized Zone located between Iraq and Kuwait. 
3. The destruction of all Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, chemical and biological 
weapons and all missiles of 150-kilometer range. 
4. The repatriation of Kuwaiti prisoners of war and those from other countries as well 
as restoration of Kuwaiti properties. 
5. The payment of compensation related to Kuwaiti and international claims resulting 
from the losses sustained by Iraq.  
 
Upon resolution No. 687(1991), several UN entities were established:  
 
- United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM). 
- United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission (UNIKBDC). 
- United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC). 
- United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) in 1991,   2   replaced with the 
United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) 
pursuant to resolution No. 1284 in 1999. 3 
                                              
2   Weller,  M.  (ed),  ‘Iraq  and  Kuwait:  The  Hostilities  and  Their  Aftermath’  ,  Op.  Cit.  p.8. 
3 Security Council,  ‘Resolution  1284  (1999)  Adopted  by  the  Security  Council  at  its  4084th  meeting,  on  17  
December1999’,S/RES/1284,17December1999,United  Nations.  Available  on  online  at: 
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2.  Principles of   Kuwait’s   Foreign   Policy   towards   Iraq   during   the   period   from  
1990 to 2010 
 
2.1.  Inviolability of the international boundary between Kuwait and Iraq in accordance 
with UN resolution 833 
 
Under resolution No. 687 of 1991, Para 3, UNSC formed the UN Iraq-Kuwait Boundary 
Demarcation Commission (UNIKBDC) to demarcate the Iraqi-Kuwaiti land and marine 
frontiers in accordance with treaties signed between both countries. Resolution No. 687 
states:  
 
Iraq and Kuwait, as independent Sovereign States, signed at Baghdad on 4 October 1963" 
Agreed Minutes Between the State of Kuwait and the Republic of Iraq Regarding the 
Restoration of Friendly Relations, Recognition and Related Matters", thereby recognizing 
formally the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait and the allocation of islands, which were 
registered with the United Nations in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the 
United Nations and in which Iraq recognized the independence and complete sovereignty 
of the State of Kuwait within its frontiers as specified and accepted in the letter of the 
Prime Minister of Iraq dated 21 July 1932, and as accepted by the Ruler of Kuwait in his 
letter dated 10 August 1932).  
 
Accordingly, the resolution 
 
Demands that Iraq and Kuwait respect the inviolability of the international boundary and 
the allocation of islands set out in the "Agreed Minutes Between the State of Kuwait and 
the Republic of Iraq Regarding the Restoration of Friendly Relations, Recognition and 
Related Matters", signed by them in the exercise of their sovereignty at Baghdad on 4 
October 1963 and registered with the United Nations and published by the United Nations 
in document 7063, United Nations, Treaty Series, 1964.4  
 
                                                                                                                                        
  http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1999/sc99.htm  
4 Security   Council,   ‘Resolution   687   of   3   April   1991’,   United   Nations;;   available   online   at  
http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1991/scres91.htm ; Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, 
‘Items  relating  to  the  situation  between  Iraq  and  Kuwait’,  Op.  Cit.  p.650. 
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As  mentioned  in  Chapter  3,  these  frontiers  had  been  previously  specified  in  the  ‘Exchange  
of  Letters  1932’  and  recognized  in  the  agreed  ‘Minutes  of  1963’  (see  Appendices  1-5).  
The UNIKBDC was established on 2nd May 1991 and practised its mandate within the 
powers included in the Secretary-General’s   report   of   that   date.5 The resolutions of the 
Commission are final and binding to both parties. There were five members of the 
Commission: three independent experts appointed by the Secretary General and one 
representative each from Kuwait and Iraq, to be appointed by their Governments. The 
UNIKBDC concluded its task and submitted its final report after demarcating the marine 
and land frontiers to the Secretary General on 20th May 1993.6 The functions of the 
UNIKBDC were as follows:  
1. It performs technical tasks only rather than political ones and the nature of its task 
was the demarcation of boundaries.  
2. Through demarcating the frontiers, it will not reallocate territory between Kuwait 
and  Iraq;;  rather,  it  will  ‘carry  out  technical  tasks  necessary  to  demarcate  for  the  first  time’  
the frontier lines between the two countries set out in the agreed Minutes of 1963 referred 
to above7 (appendix 5). 
The Commission convened eleven sessions that included eighty-two meetings to 
demarcate the land and marine frontiers between the two countries. It defined the frontiers 
as  mentioned  in  the  ‘1932  Exchange  of  Letters’  and  recognized  by  Iraq  and  Kuwait  under  
the agreed Minutes of 1963, which provided that the frontiers lay:  
From the intersection of the Wadi el Audja with the Batin and thence northwards along the 
Batin to a point just south of the latitude of Safwan; thence eastwards passing south of 
Safwan wells, Jebal Sanam and Um Qasr leaving then to Iraq and so on to the junction of 
                                              
5  Security   Council,   ‘Report   of   Secretary-General Regarding Paragraph 3 of The Security Council 
Resolution  687  (1991)’,  S/22558,  2  May  1991,  United  Nations.   
6  The members of Commission are Nicholas Valticos (Chairman); Ian Brook (Technical Director of the 
Swedsurvey: National Land Survey of Sweden); Mr. William Robertson (Surveyor General / Director, 
General of Department of Survey and Land Information of New Zealand), as independent experts, and 
Riyadh Al Qaysi, representative of the government of Iraq and Dr. Tariq Razzouki, representative of the 
State  of  Kuwait.  See;;  Security  Council,  ‘Final  Report  on  The  Demarcation  of  The  International  Boundary  
Between of The Republic of Iraq and The State of Kuwait By The United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Boundary 
Demarcation  Commission’  ,  S/25811,  20th May 1993,United Nations. pp. 9- 10. 
7  Security  Council,  ‘Letter  dated  21  May  1993  From  the  Secretary-General Addressed to the President of 
the  Security  Council’,  S/  25811,  United  Nations.   
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the Khor Zubeir with the Khor Abdullah. The islands of Warbah, Bubiyan, Maskan (or 
Mhasjan), Failakah, Auhah, Kubbar, Qaru, and Um el Maradim appertain to Kuwait.8 
(Appendix 1). 
The Commission divided the frontiers into three sections: 
Section I:  called  the  western  section  (land  boundary),  described  in  the  ‘1932  Exchange  of  
Letters’  as  follows:  “From the intersection of the Wadi el Audja with the Batin and thence 
northwards along the Batin to a point just south of the latitude of Safwan.”  
Section II:   the   northern   section   (land   boundary),   described   in   the   ‘1932   Exchange   of  
Letters’   as   follows:   “Thence eastwards passing south of Safwan wells, Jebal Sanam and 
Um Qasr leaving then to Iraq and so on to the junction of the Khor Zubeir with the Khor 
Abdullah.” 
Section III: ‘Khowr  Abd  Allah’   (marine  boundary),  described   in   the   ‘1932  Exchange  of  
Letters’   as   follows:   “The islands of Warbah, Bubiyan, Maskan (or Mhasjan), Failakah, 
Auhah, Kubbar, Qaru, and Um el Maradim appertain to Koweit.” 9 
 
2.1.1.  Land Boundary 
 The Commission held five sessions attended by all parties to demarcate the land boundary 
between 23/5/1991 and 16/4/1992. The Commission faced one problem during this 
demarcation:   designating   the   proper   place   for   the   ‘notice   board’   that   was   erected   from  
1923  until  1939  south  of  Safwan  (northern  section)  to  mark  the  ‘Iraqi-Kuwaiti  boundary’  
and recognized by both countries as their international boundary.10 However, this sign was 
removed in March 1939, which resulted in disagreement between Kuwait and Iraq in 
establishing its proper place. On 25th June 1940, Iraq sent a letter to the UK wherein it 
mentioned  that  the  ‘notice  board’  must  be  placed  1,250m  south  of  the  ‘old  customs  post’  at  
Safwan, rather than 1000m from this location as requested by Kuwait (appendix 6). Thus, 
                                              
8  Security   Council,   ‘Final   Report   on   The   Demarcation   of   The   International   Boundary   Between   The  
Republic of Iraq and The State of Kuwait By The United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation 
Commission’, Op.Cit. pp.9-10. 
9 Ibid. p.12.  
10 Ibid.  pp.13-14. 
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the Commission had three opinions with respect to interpreting the boundaries south of 
Safwan upon documents as follows:  
1. The opinion of Iraq, set forth in its letter submitted above, wherein it determined 
the  location  of  the  ‘notice  board’  at  1,250  meters  away  from  old  customs  post  at  Safwan. 
2. The   opinion   of   Kuwait,   which  was   that   the   ‘notice   board’   is   1000  meters   away  
from the old customs post at Safwan as determined in 1923 by Major More, the Political 
Agent in Kuwait.11 
3. The opinion of C. Dickson (British Agent in Kuwait 1929-1936) in his 
correspondence dated 27/1/1935, wherein he determined that the notice board should be 
one mile (1609m) south of Safwan. 
However,  the  UN  Commission  determined  that  the  ‘notice  board’  should  be  1,430m  south  
of Safwan, taking into consideration both the Iraqi and Dickson opinions, given the 
absence of reliable evidence.12 Thus, the UN Commission finalized full demarcation of the 
land boundary after placing pillars No.1 to 106 for this section.13 Consequently, UNSC 
issued resolution No. 773 of 1992, calling the Commission to continue its task and finalize 
the demarcation of the marine frontiers at Khowr Abd Allah.14  
 
2.1.2. Maritime Boundary  
This section is called Khowr Abd Allah and runs from the junction of Khowr Zhobeir to 
the eastern end of Khowr Abd Allah at the eastern frontiers of Kuwait (offshore boundary). 
The UN Commission concluded several resolutions concerning this section: 
1. It was decided to demarcate the maritime boundary at Khowr Abd Allah based on 
the median line between the two countries as shown on the 1991 edition of British 
                                              
11  Richard  Muir,  ‘The  Iraq–Kuwait  border  dispute:  still  a  factor  for  instability?’,  Asian Affairs, Vol. XXXV, 
No. II, July 2004. p.155. 
12  Security   Council,   ‘Final   Report   on   The   Demarcation   of   The   International Boundary Between The 
Republic of Iraq and The State of Kuwait By The United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation 
Commission’,  Op.  Cit.  pp.20-21. 
13  Ibid. pp.31-35. 
14  Security   Council,      ‘Resolution   773   (1992)   adopted   by   Security   Council   at   its   3180th meeting, on 26 
August  1992’,  S/RES/773  (1992),  26  August  1992,  United  Nations.   
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Admiralty  Chart  No.  1235,  defining  the  ‘median  line’  at  Khowr  Abd  Allah,  in  addition  to  
the World Geodesic System WGS (84) datum.  
2. It affirmed that the median line at Khowr Abd Allah was used in 1959 on the map 
of Coucheron-Aamot, a Norwegian hydrographer, and approved by the Iraqi Ministry of 
Oil  at  the  request  of  Iraq,  which  determined  the  ‘median  line’  at  Khowr  Abd  Allah  as  the  
offshore boundary line separating the two countries at sea. This official map was 
transferred to the Danish Embassy at Baghdad by the Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs on 
22/8/1960 and published in the pleadings of the International Court of Justice (see Figure 7 
on the territorial waters and continental shelf, as determined by Coucheron-Aamot in 
December 1959). 
3. Frontiers were demarcated at Khowr Zhobeir using geographical lines from 
infrared aerial photography. Further, numerical signs and plates were placed in this region 
to determine the separating frontiers.15 
The UN Commission finalized the demarcation of the maritime boundary at Khowr Abd 
Allah, and on 20th May 1993, UN Secretary General submitted a report to UNSC along 
with all documents related to the business of the Commission. The legal bases adopted by 
the   UN   Commission   to   demarcate   the   marine   frontiers   based   on   the   ‘median   line’   at  
Khowr Abd Allah are grounded on the following principles:  
1. Under rules of International law, as embodied in the UN Convention on the Law of 
the Sea of 1982, ratified by both Iraq (30 July 1985) and Kuwait (2 May 1986), it is 
provides  under  Article  15  that  ‘where  the  coasts  of  two  States  are  opposite  or  adjacent  to  
each other, neither of the two States is entitled, failing agreement between them to the 
contrary,  to  extend  its  territorial  sea  beyond  the  median  line’.16  
                                              
15  Security   Council,   ‘Final   Report   on   the   Demarcation   of   the   International   Boundary   between   of   the  
Republic of Iraq and the State of Kuwait by the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation 
Commission’,  Op.  Cit.  pp.24-.28. 
16  United  Nations,  ‘United  Nations  Convention  on  the  Law  of  the  Sea  (with  annexes,  final  act  and  procès-
verbaux of rectification of the final act dated 3 March 1986 and 26 July 1993): Concluded at Montego 
Bay  on  10  December  1982’,    Article  15,  United Nations — Treaty Series, Vol. 1833, 1-31363, New York. 
p.403. Available online at: 
  http://www.unrol.org/files/volume-1833-A-31363-English.pdf  
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2. The median line was concluded in 1959 by the Aamot Report and approved by Iraq 
in the early 1960s.17 
However, the report of the UN Commission also mentioned that the current frontiers are 
based  on  the  median  line,  such  that  navigational  access  ‘should  be  possible  for  both  to  the  
various   parts   of   their   respective   territory   bordering   the   demarcated   boundary’.18 In this 
way, neither country will be deprived of access of navigation. This fact was not been taken 
at the demarcation of Khowr Zhobeir. The UN Commission apparently took into 
consideration the safeguarding of water passages at the entrance of Khowr Zhobeir in 
favour of Iraq and ignored the median line, as per the text of Article 15 of the 1982 UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea. The UN Commission demarcated the line at this 
entrance deviating to the south inside the Kuwaiti territorial waters to enable Iraq to 
benefit from the deep side of the Khowr Zhobeir, which deprived Kuwait of shipping at 
the entrance of Khowr Zhobeir. The reason was that this area is low water, and taking into 
consideration  the  circumstance  of  this  area,  ‘the  right  of  access  implies  a  non-suspendible 
right of navigation for both States’19 (See figure 8). Kuwait had reservations about the 
resolution of the UN Commission at Khowr Zhobeir; but eventually accepted it.20  
On 27th May 1993, the UNSC issued resolution No. 833, wherein it finalized the 
demarcation of frontiers between the two countries, appealed to Kuwait and Iraq to respect 
the inviolability of the international boundary as demarcated by the UN Commission and 
warned both counties against any violation of this resolution.21 However, Iraq only 
accepted this resolution after a year and a half on November 1994, following some tension 
between  Iraq  and  the  UN.  This  recognition  was  published  in  ‘Mujalat  AlWga’ih  Aleraqia’, 
                                              
17  Security   Council,   ‘Final   Report   on   the   Demarcation   of   the   International   Boundary   between   of   the  
Republic of Iraq and the State of Kuwait by the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation 
Commission’,  Op.  Cit.  pp.26-27. 
17  Ibid. p.27. 
18  Ibid. p.24. 
19  Ibid.  p.27. 
20  Centre for Research and Studies on Kuwait, Iraq Navigational Outlets, Op. Cit.p.21. 
21  Security  Council,  ‘Resolution  833  (1993)  adopted  by  Security  Council  at  its  3224 th meeting, on 27th May 
1993’,  S/RES/833  (1993),  27th May 1993, United Nations. 
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the Iraqi gazette of the Republic of Iraq as discussed below.22 Thus, the respect of frontiers 
based upon resolution  833  is  one  pillar  of  Kuwait’s  demands  towards  Iraq.   
 
 2.2.  Payment of financial compensation and obligations 
 
The compensation imposed on Iraq by the UN must be distinguished from the Iraqi debts 
to Kuwait during the Iraq-Iran War. This section will shed light on the compensation, 
which obliges Iraq to pay the claims for losses for the UN Compensation Fund (UNCF) 
under resolution 687, section E.23 Due to the losses and damages as result of the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait, the UNSC established the UNCF and the UN Compensation 
Commission (UNCC) to administrate the Fund pursuant to its resolution 692 on 20th May 
1991.24 The UNCC divided the claims into six categories:  
1. Category A: Individual claims for departing from Iraq and Kuwait during the period 
from 2/8/1990 until 2/3/1991. 
2. Category B: Individual claims for death or serious physical injury. 
3. Category C: The claims of individuals and individual establishments (less than $ 
100,000).  
4. Category D: Claims of individuals and individual establishments (more than $ 100,000). 
5. Category E: Claims for the losses of other companies and institutions. 
6. Category  F:  Government  and  International  Organizations’  claims,   including  claims  for  
environmental damage.25 
Kuwait established the Public Authority for Assessment of Compensation for Damages 
resulting from the Iraqi aggression on 27th May 1991, to estimate the Kuwaiti losses to be 
submitted to the UNCC under the six categories mentioned above.26 The total Kuwaiti 
                                              
22  Muharib, Abdullah, Everlasting Documents: Kuwaiti Right vis-à-vis the Iraqi Aggression , 1st edition, 
Centre for Research and Studies on Kuwait, Kuwait, 2000. p. 119. 
23  Repertoire   of   the   Practice   of   the   Security   Council,   ‘Items   relating   to   the   situation   between   Iraq   and  
Kuwait’,  Op.  Cit.  p.652. 
24  Public Authority for Assessment of Compensation for Damages resulting from the Iraqi Aggression 
(PAAC), At-takrīr  us-sanawi  ,  ‘Annual  Report1995  – 1996’,   Kuwait, 1995. p.19.  
25 Ibid. An-nashrah al-faslīyah   lit-taʽwidāt,   ‘ Compensations   Periodical   Bulletin’,  issue No. 1/2001, 
Kuwait, 2001. p.14. 
26  Ibid. p.9.  
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claims submitted under these six categories were estimated at $177,418,859,292.50 until 
2010. However, the UNCC approved only $41,082,716,186.04 from the total Kuwaiti 
claims, and out of this approved amount, Kuwait received $18,141,563,043.05, and the 
remaining amount was for Kuwait, estimated at $23 billion up to 2010.27 Kuwaiti 
environmental claims under category E twere more than $40 billion. .28 Kuwait submitted 
48 claims worth 16.6 billion up to 2009. However, the UNCC approved only 22 of these, 
at a total value of $3.7 up to 2009, from which Kuwait received $1, 593 billion.29  
The international claims under all six categories, including Kuwait, are 2,686,131 claims at 
a total value estimated at $352,532,838,903. However, the UNCC approved 1,543,619 
claims only at total value $52,383,356,715, out of which the States received 
$26,681,677,779 up to 2010 (see Table 3).30 
As regards the method of the payment of these claims, the UNSC determined 30% to be 
deducted annually from the Iraqi oil exports for compensation in its resolution 705 of 
August 1991.31 In resolution 712 (September 1991), the UNSC determined the Iraqi oil 
sales (Oil for Food - OFF) at $ 1.6 billion every six months. However, Iraq refused these 
two resolutions from 1991 to 1995 and demanded that Iraqi oil exports be increased to 
$2.6 billion,32 which resulted in the deterioration in its humanitarian situation due to the 
suspension of Iraqi oil exports. For this reason, the UNSC, in its resolution 986 of 1995, 
made some amendments to the OFF program, increasing Iraqi oil exports from $1.6 to $2 
billion every six months, out of which 30% was deducted for compensation. Iraq accepted 
this resolution in May 1996 and it became the mechanism of the OFF program.33 On 20th 
February 1998, UNSC increased the Iraqi oil exports OFF from $ 2 billion to $ 5.2 billion 
                                              
27 Ibid,  An-nashrah al-faslīyah   lit-taʽwidāt,   ‘ Compensations   Periodical   Bulletin’, issue No. 1/ 2010, 
Kuwait, 2010. p. 25. 
28  Ibid.,  At-takrīr  us-sanawi,,  ‘Annual  Report  2006’,  Kuwait. 2006 .p. 20.  
29  Ibid., An-nashrah al-faslīyah   lit-taʽwidāt,   ‘   Compensations   Periodical   Bulletin’, issue No. 1/2009, 
Kuwait, 2009.p. 20. 
30  Ibid. p.21.  
31  Ibid, An-nashrah al-faslīyah   lit-taʽwidāt,‘   Compensations   Periodical   Bulletin’, issue No. 1/2001, Op. 
Cit.p.15.  
32 Lutfi,  Manal,  ‘ʽāmān  ʽalā  ʼindilāʽ  ḥarb  il-khalīj:  ʼidarat  ma  baʽd  al-ḥarb’  ,‘Two  Years  from  the  Wage  of 
the  Gulf  War:  Administering  Post  War  Results’,  Al-Siyassa Al-Dawliya Magazine, issue No. 111, Cairo, 
January 1993. p. 104. 
33  Registry  of  Current  Events   in   the  Gulf  &  Arabian  Peninsula  Region,   ‘Iraq’s  Tense  Relation  With  The  
United  Nations’,  Vol.  2,  Issue No.8, Center of Gulf & Arabian Peninsula Studies University of Kuwait, 
Kuwait, October/December, 1998.p.66. 
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every six months pursuant to resolution 1153 of 1998. Under resolution 1330 of December 
2000, UNSC reduced the percentage deducted from the Iraqi oil imports from 30% to 
25%.34 This percentage was reduced once again from 25% to 5% as per UNSC resolution 
1483  of  2003  after  the  collapse  of  Saddam  Hussein’s  Regime.  Moreover,  the  OFF  program  
was  terminated  and  the  ‘Development  Fund  for  Iraq’  (DFI)  was  established  and  Iraq’s  oil  
revenues were placed into this fund in order to reconstruct Iraq.35 Kuwait reiterates the 
importance of payment the outstanding compensation, estimated at $23 billion up to 2010, 
as  one  pillar  of  Kuwait’s  behaviour  towards  Iraq. 
 
 2.3. Repatriation of Kuwaiti Prisoners of War 
 
International Law guarantees protection for armed forces prisoners of war, civilians and 
other prisoners of war under four treaties of Geneva signed in August 1949 and its relevant 
protocols.36 In 1956, Iraq acceded to these treaties, while Kuwait acceded to the same in 
1967: hence the provisions of these treaties are applicable to both countries in case of any 
dispute that may arise.37 UNSC resolution 687 of 1991, Para 30 & 31 thereof, demands 
that Iraq return all Kuwaiti nationals and third country nationals and fully cooperate with 
the International Red Cross Committee (IRCC) via providing them with the names of the 
prisoners of war detained by Iraq during the period of occupation.38 
Following the cessation of hostilities in 1991, the UNSC formed a Committee under 
resolution no. 686 of March 1991, originally called the Riyadh Committee and renamed 
the Tripartite Commission (TC), to follow up the issue of prisoners of war under the IRCC 
                                              
34  Public Authority for Assessment of Compensation for Damages resulting from the Iraqi Aggression, An-
nashrah al-faslīyah  lit-taʽwidāt,  ‘Compensations  Periodical  Bulletin’, Kuwait, 1998. p.14. 
35  Security   Council,   ‘Resolution   1483’,   S/RES/1483   (2003),   United   Nations,   New   York,   22  May   2003.  
Available on online at  www.un.org  
36   Registry  of  Current  Events  in  the  Gulf  &  Arabian  Peninsula  Region,  ‘Waḍʽ  il-ʼasrā  fī  manẓūr  ʼitifākīyat  
Jinīv   aghusṭus   1949   wa   brūtūkūlātiha’,  ‘The   Status   of   Prisoners   in   the   Perspective   of      Geneva  
Convention   of   August   1949   and   Its   Protocols’,   issue No. 13, Center of Gulf & Arabian Peninsula 
Studies, Kuwait University, Kuwait, March 2000.p. 47. 
37  Al Anezi, Rashid Hamad, Op.Cit. p. 819.  
38  Weller,  M  (ed.),  ‘Iraq  and  Kuwait:  The  Hostilities  and  Their  Aftermath’,  Op.  Cit  .p.  8. 
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auspices. The members of this Commission consisted of coalition forces and Iraq.39 At the 
first meeting of this Commission on 7th March 1991, both parties exchanged some 
Prisoners of War in Riyadh; then Iraq boycotted the meetings of this Committee from July 
1993 to July 1994. Futher, after the liberation of Kuwait, during the mutiny and uprising 
rebellion that occurred in southern Iraq on 28/2/1991, 6000 Kuwaiti prisoners of war 
escaped and returned to their homeland. On 12/4/1991, Kuwait made a business plan via 
compiling the names of the Kuwaiti prisoners of war still detained by Iraq based on Iraqi 
documents left behind by the Iraqi forces as well as the information gathered from Kuwaiti 
families who had lost their sons. In addition, it established the National Committee for M. 
& POWs Affairs (NCMPA) on August 15, 1992 to follow up the release of all Kuwaiti 
POWs. During the Iraqi boycott of this Commission from 1993 to 1994, Kuwait submitted 
650 individual files based the statements of many eyewitnesses and the official Iraqi 
documents left behind by the Iraqi forces, while Saudi Arabia submitted seventeen files.  
Given the importance  of  this  issue,  the  TC  established  a  ‘Technical  Sub-Committee’  (TSC)  
in December 1994 to expedite the search for prisoners of war. Within four years (1994 – 
1998), the TSC convened thirty-six meetings, in addition to twenty-one meetings held by 
the TC with the participation of Iraq. Therefore, the total number of meetings that were 
held between coalition members and Iraq on this issue was fifty-seven.40 During its 
participation (1994 – 1995), Iraq submitted incomplete responses regarding on 126 out of 
605 prisoners of war, which were classified as initial replies by IRCC. Moreover, Iraq did 
not provide any final reply regarding 479 Kuwaiti files out of 605 and 17 Saudi files.41 In 
its replies to the files of 126 Kuwaiti prisoners, Iraq alleged that 114 of these prisoners 
were lost during the mutiny that occurred in Iraq on 28/2/1991 and six were killed or died. 
However, there were six unclear replies. Iraqi justifications for detaining these persons 
were killing Iraqi soldiers (two cases) and resistance acts (114 cases), and no reasons were 
given for ten cases.42 All these meetings failed to achieve any progress concerning the 
                                              
39  Coalition forces were represented in this Committee by Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, USA, France and UK. 
See;  National Committee for M. & POWs Affairs (NCMPA),   ‘Asrā   al-Kuwayt   fil   ʽirāk’,   ‘Kuwaiti  
Prisoners   of   War   in   Iraq’, Kuwait, 2001.p.9.  Available online on NCMPA website at; 
http://www.pows.org.kw/index2.html  
40  Al  Watan  Information  and  Studies  Center,  ‘Prisoners of War – National  Committee’  Classification  No.  4  
– 6/9, dated 30/8/2000, Kuwait.  
41  Ibid,  dated 29/8/2000.  
42 National  Committee  for  M.  &  POWs  Affairs  (NCMPA),  ‘Asrā  al-Kuwayt  fil  ʽirāk’,    ‘Kuwaiti  Prisoners  
of  War  in  Iraq’,  Kuwait,  2002.p.23. 
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prisoners of war. On December 1998, Iraq boycotted the activities of the TC until the 
American threat to Iraq in 2002. Saeed Hasan, Iraqi representative to the UN, stated that 
‘Iraq  refuses  to  sit  down  at  one  table  with  the  USA,  Britain  and  France,  who  had  nothing  to  
do  with  the  issue  of  prisoners  of  war’.43 
The Prisoners of War represent 0.1% of the total Kuwaiti population and comprised 474 
civilians (78%) and 131 military persons c (22%). The age category of the prisoners of war 
is as follows: 42 persons less than 18 years old (7%), 411 from 18 to 30 (68%), 136 
persons from 31 to 50 (22%) and 116 persons of more than 50 years old (3%). If we 
compared this percentage (0.1%) of the Kuwaiti population with British citizens, it would 
be 57,000 prisoners. 44 
Due to the Iraqi boycott of the activities of the TC since 1998, the UNSC issued resolution 
No. 1284 on 17/12/1999 and appointed an international high-level coordinator (Mr. Yuli 
Vorontsov) for the first time to tackle the issue of the Kuwaiti prisoners and its 
properties.45 Vorontsov  stated  that,  ‘Iraq  gives  the  issues  of  the  prisoners  of  war  a  political  
dimension that justifies boycotting the  activities  of  the  Tripartite  Commission.’  However,  
on   20/5/2000,  Vorontsov   declared   that   the   ‘Iraqi   authorities   did   not   desire   to   cooperate  
with  the  International  community  to  find  a  solution  for  the  issue  of  the  prisoners  of  war’. 46 
Mr. Kofi Annan, UN Secretary General, pointed out in his report submitted to the UN 
Security Council on 16 April 2000 that Iraq rejects receipt of the international high level 
coordinator for Kuwaiti prisoners of war affairs, Vorontsov, on the allegation that there are 
no prisoners of war or Kuwaiti detainees in Iraq.47  
The Kuwaiti and Iraqi parties exchanged accusations regarding the existence of Kuwaiti 
prisoners in Iraq. In 1998, Iraq alleged that there were 1115 Iraqi prisoners of war in 
                                              
43 Al   Watan   Information   and   Studies   Center,   ‘Prisoners   of   War   – National   Committee’,   Op.Cit,   dated  
26/2/1999.  
44  National Committee for M. & POWs Affairs (NCMPA) 2002, Op. Cit. p. 106.  
45  Security  Council,  ‘Resolution  1284  (1999)  Adopted  by  the  Security  Council at its 4084th meeting, on 17 
December  1999’,  S/RES/1284,  17  December  1999,  United  Nations.  Available  online  on  UN  website  at     
http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1999/sc99.htm  
46  Al Rai Al Am Newspaper, Issue No. 12682, Monday dated 11/3/2002, Kuwait. p.3. 
47  Security  Council,  ‘Report  of  the  Secretary-General  pursuant  to  paragraph  14  of  resolution  1284  (1999)’,  
S/2000/347, 26 April 2000, United Nations. pp.1-5. 
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Kuwait and called for their return to Iraq. However, Kuwait refuted this claim and stated 
that:  
1. Iraq did not claim for any prisoners of war throughout the eight years starting from 
the liberation of Kuwait: therefore, the current allegation of Iraq is grounded on 
political reasons. 
2. The Iraqi citizens in Kuwait are freely living and trading in Kuwait. According to 
official statistics, Iraqi citizens who had valid residence permits during the period 
from 1/1/1997 to 31/12/1997 was 2231, in addition to 107 Iraqi citizens who had 
obtained residence permit for the first time. Therefore, the total number of Iraqi 
citizens living in Kuwait is 2338.  
3.  Kuwait invited international organizations and human rights committees to visit its 
prisons and verify that the Iraqi allegations were false. However, Mr. Yuli 
Vorontsov affirmed that the issue of the existence of Iraqi prisoners of war in 
Kuwait does not fall under the powers granted to him as per international 
resolutions.48 
Kuwaiti claims of the existence of its prisoners were based on the following evidence:  
1. The availability of Iraqi documents left behind by the Iraqi army after withdrawal 
from  Kuwait,  which   contained   some  prisoners’   names.  These   official   Iraqi   arrest  
records were submitted and filed to the TC, IRCC and Arab League.49  
2.  The availability of some Kuwaiti eyewitnesses who were in prisons in southern 
Iraq and released by the Shiite revolution that occurred following the liberation of 
Kuwait. 
3.  Many Kuwaiti prisoners were detained in front of their relatives and neighbours by 
Iraqi armed forces.  
                                              
48  Al Watan Information and Studies Center,   ‘Prisoners   of   War   – National   Committee’,   Op.Cit,   dated  
3/11/1998.  
49  Copies of the dossiers can be obtained by request from the NCMPA; National Committee for M. & 
POWs Affairs (NCMPA) 2001, Op. Cit.  
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4.  The Iraqi release of 318 Iranian prisoners of war in April 1998, where Iraq alleged 
that they were not detained throughout the previous period.50 
5. The statements of Hussain Kamel al-Majid, Iraq's minister of industries, after his 
rebellion against the Iraqi regime and asylum to Jordan on 8/8/1995, through his 
indirect contact with Kuwait: he claimed that there were Kuwaiti prisoners but did 
not mention their names or their actual number.51 
However, the validity of the Kuwaiti claim was confirmed after the collapse of Saddam 
Hussein’s  regime  in  2003,  when  great  numbers of corpses of these prisoners of war were 
recovered from several group tombs in Iraq. Ban Ki Moon, UN Secretary General, 
affirmed in his report submitted to the UN Security Council on 4/12/2008 that 236 corpses 
of Kuwaiti prisoners were recovered out of 605. All countries and international and 
territorial organizations condemned the killing of the Kuwaiti prisoners.52 In 2008 Mr. 
Gennady Tarasov was appointed as high-level coordinator following the death of Mr. Yuli 
Vorontsco in 2008. Kuwait reiterates that this item must be maintained under chapter VII 
of the UN charter until the fate of the remaining prisoners of war is revealed. 
 
 2.4. Removal of the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction 
Kuwait considers that Iraqi possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) constitutes 
a threat to its security and people, as Iraq may use these weapons against Kuwait, similar 
to what happened with the Kurds at Halabja in 1988 and with the Iranian Army during 
Gulf War I to overcome the great number of Iranian soldiers.53 Previously, Iraq 
endeavored to have nuclear weapons, assisted by France. However, Iraq suspended a 
                                              
50  Mahrous,  Sadiq  S.,  ‘Al-ḥimāyah  ad-duwalīya  li  ʼasra  al-ḥarb:  Dirāsa  li  qawaʽidiha  al-ʽāmma  maʽ  ʼishāra  
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and international protection; A study with special relevance to Kuwaiti  POWs  in  Iraq’, Journal of Social 
Sciences , Vol. 24,  issue No. 1, Kuwait University, Kuwait, 1996. p.36. 
51  Al   Watan   Information   and   Studies   Center,   ‘National   Committee   for   Prisoners   of   War   Affairs’,  
Classification No. 4-6/9, dated on 18/3/1996, Kuwait.  
52  Security Council  ,‘Twenty-seventh report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 14 of resolution 
1284  (1999)’,  S/2008/761,  4  December  2008,  United  Nations.  p.4. 
53  Registry of Current Events in the Gulf & Arabian Peninsula  Region,   ‘as-saʽī   li   jaʽl  minṭiqat   il-khalīj   il-
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project to produce a nuclear bomb after the Israeli attack against the Iraqi nuclear reactor 
Tummouz I in April 1979 and the second reactor Tummouz II, known as Osirak, in June 
1981.54 Under UNSC resolution No. 687 of 1991, the UN Special Commission 
(UNSCOM) was formed to supervise the removal of the Iraqi arsenal of WMD,55 and had 
the right to inspect any location or facility used by Iraq without condition or restriction 
according to UNSC resolutions no. 707 and 715.56 During the UNSCOM work from 1991 
to 1998, it supervised and dismantled some Iraqi WMD.57 However, Iraq dismissed the 
inspectors and refused to cooperate with UNSCOM on 15/12/1998, which resulted in the 
USA and Britain launching a military operation against Iraq during the period from 16th to 
19th December  1998,   i.e.  70  hours:   ‘Operation  Desert  Fox’.58 Thus, the UNSC a formed 
new Commission to replaced UNICOM – UNMOVIC, in its resolution 1284 of 1999. 59 
Mr. Hans Blix was appointed as Executive Chairman of this new Commission. According 
to this resolution, economic sanctions were suspended and would be lifted after 120 days 
or   six  months   from   Iraq’s   full   cooperation  with  UNMOVIC.   In  2002,   Iraq   accepted   this  
resolution three years after its issue, after the Iraqi leadership became aware of the 
intention of the USA to launch a military campaign against Iraq (see chapter 8).60 
However, this Commission was terminated in 2007 according to UNSC resolution 176261 
due to the fact that there were no WMD in Iraq.62  
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60 Kenneth   Katzman,   ‘Iraq:   Compliance,   Sanctions,   and   U.S.   Policy’,   Congressional   Research   Service 
(CRS), Washington D.C , July 5, 2002. p.2.  
61  UNMOVIC  website,  ‘  Basic  facts’;;  United  Nations,  available  online  at  http://www.unmovic.org/  
62  Security  Council,   ‘Letter  dated  8  April  2007  from  the  Minister  for  Foreign Affairs of Iraq addressed to 
the  President  of  the  Security  Council’,  S/RES/1762, United Nations, 8 April 2007. 
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2.5. Return of all Kuwaiti properties 
UNSC resolution No. 687 of 1991 (section D) demanded that Iraq return all Kuwaiti 
properties seized during the invasion.63 On 14/3/1991, Mr. Mohammed Abu Al-Hassan, 
Kuwaiti representative to the UN, submitted an initial statement to the UN, wherein he 
determined the Kuwaiti stolen properties, including the Kuwaiti National Archive, Kuwaiti 
National  Library,  all  ministries’  properties,  Kuwait  Airways  Corporation,  Central  Bank  of  
Kuwait, Kuwait National Museum and Kuwait National Assembly.64 The value of the 
stolen Kuwaiti items has been estimated at $100,000 million and includes gold, Kuwaiti 
currency, paintings, artistic works, medical equipment, military and civil aeroplanes in 
addition to the public documents. On 27/3/1991, Abdul Amir Al-Anbari, Iraqi 
representative to the UN, officially confirmed that Iraq had some of these properties, 
consisting of standard gold bars and currency at a total value $1060 million. However, the 
restored items represent just 20% of the total looted items.65 After the collapse of the 
regime of Saddam Hussein, Gennady Tarasov, the high-level coordinator, visited Baghdad 
for the first time in 2008 and emphasized that additional effort must be exerted to return 
the Kuwaiti National Archive. Kuwait has appealed that the status of the international 
high-level coordinator be maintained until all Kuwaiti properties have been handed over or 
their destiny determined.66 
 
3. Summing Up  
 
Since its liberation in 1991, the key official Kuwaiti positions towards Iraq after the 
invasion have been based on several pillars and principles represented by the call for 
                                              
63  Weller,  M  (ed.),  ‘Iraq  and  Kuwait:  The  Hostilities  and  Their  Aftermath’,  Op.  Cit.  pp  2-6. 
64  Security Council ,   ‘Report   of   the   Secretary-General on the Return of the Kuwaiti Property Seized by 
Iraq’,  S/1994/243,  2  March  1994,  United  Nations.  p.5.   
65  Centre for Research and Studies on Kuwait, Who Looted Kuwait? Readings of the Iraqi Documents , Op. 
Cit. p. 28.  
66  Security Council ,   ‘Report   of the Secretary-General on the Return of the Kuwaiti Property Seized by 
Iraq’,  S/1994/243,  2  March  1994,  United  Nations.  Op.  Cit.  p.4. 
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complete implementation of UNSC resolutions  concerning  the  ‘situation between Kuwait 
and  Iraq’,  which  included the following issues: 
1. Inviolability of its demarcated international borders with Iraq in accordance with 
UNSC resolution No. 833 (1993) 
2. The full payment of its compensation 
3. The return of Kuwaiti prisoners of war  
4. Return of all Kuwaiti properties and its archives 
5. Removal of the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction 
Since the 1990s, Kuwait has continued to reiterate the importance of solving these 
‘outstanding   issues’: this has become a  pillar  of  Kuwait’s  behaviour   towards   Iraq. It has 
emhasised that these issues must be maintained under Chapter VII of the UN Charter until 
they are resolved. This has made the UN organization a key component in   Kuwait’s 
behavior towards Iraq since 1990. 
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                                                    Chapter VII 
 
Kuwait’s  Foreign Policy towards Iraq from 1991 to 2001    
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This  chapter  examines  the  determinants  and  evolution  of  Kuwait’s  policy  towards  Iraq  in  
the first period after liberation. In shaping the environment for this evolving Kuwaiti 
policy, two factors stand out: the role of the international community and organisations; 
and the regional Arab environment. Just like at other times, of course, the domestic 
decision-making context is the funnel through which these and other inputs were translated 
into policy formation. 
 
1.1. The international community and international organisations 
As chapter 2 made clear, the international environment including international 
governmental organizations (IGOs), always forms part of the explanatory mosaic for a 
state’s,   and   indeed   Kuwait’s,   foreign   policy.   In   the period in question for the case of 
Kuwait’s  Iraq  policy,  this  was  more  evident  than  ever.  As discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, 
the United Nations (UN) played an essential role in the Gulf crisis in 1990 through its 
issuance of 12 resolutions condemning the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and authorizing the 
International coalition to liberate Kuwait in 1991. This UN role became integrated into 
Kuwaiti policy:  the  country’s  approach  to  Iraq since 1991 until the present time has been 
based on UN resolutions. The  UN’s role as a pillar of Kuwaiti sovereignty and territorial 
integrity, and the UN-legitimated requirements regarding  the  ‘outstanding  issues’  between  
Kuwait and Iraq, of which more later. UN resolutions also became the basis for the 
improvement in Kuwait's relationship with other countries, based on their positions 
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towards   the   ‘outstanding   issues’   between   the   two   countries.   Since   Kuwait’s liberation, 
these  ‘outstanding  issues’  and their treatment remained the foundation of Kuwaiti behavior 
toward Iraq. Iraq procrastinated about implementing UN resolutions for more than a year 
and a half, especially dragging its feet over resolution No. 833 (1993), on the demarcation 
of borders and UN resolutions for the OFF program, which resulted in the deterioration of 
the Iraqi  people’s  humanitarian  situation.  Thus,  Kuwait  has  sought  at  both  the  regional  and  
the international level to urge states to put pressure on Iraq to implement UN resolutions 
between Kuwait and Iraq for the stability of the region.  
 
1.2. The regional Arab environment  
 Given  Kuwait’s   location  and   the role of Arab identity across the Arab region, this Arab 
environment obviously plays a significant role in shaping the political and security 
dimensions of Kuwait’s   foreign   policy.   A  member   of the Arab League, Kuwait cannot 
isolate itself from the Arab world. While the Arab League was one forum where support 
had  to  be  acquired  for  the  country’s  liberation,  it  was  also  inescapable  that  nearly  half  the  
member states had failed to lend their support. This made for a difficult set of relationships 
from 1991.  An initial refusal to engage began to change from 1996, when relations with 
the   so   called   “duwal aḍ-ḍidd”   or   ‘Opponent   States’   began to thaw, as an initial step 
towards containing Iraq and avoiding isolating Kuwait from the Arab world. It was in 
Kuwait’s    interests to restore relations with these countries in order to gain Arab support 
against Iraqi threats, and to challenge the Iraqi media campaign in these countries, which 
has accused Kuwait of being behind the economic embargo on Iraq and the consequent 
humanitarian suffering of the Iraqi people. Yet effecting this shift was not straightforward, 
given feelings in Kuwait itself, not least among some key players in the decision-making 
system. 
 
1.3. The domestic decision-making environment 
As already noted in Chapter 4, the above question was one where a division was apparent 
at the highest levels, as well as in the National Assembly. There is no scientific way of 
ascertaining what the wider popular views were on the matter, but given the bitterness felt 
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by many about those perceived to have failed Kuwait in its hour of need, and the position 
taken by some prominent MPs against restoring relations, it is plausible to assume that the 
latter’s  position  did reflect the presence of similar views amongst significant numbers of 
their constituents. Certainly the Assembly made its presence felt from its reconvening in 
1992. Sheikh Sabah was temporarily removed from his position as Foreign Minister that 
year, because   of   government  worries   over   the  Assembly’s   ‘interpellation’   rights against 
the government in relation to the Iraqi invasion. The Assembly also formed an 
investigation   committee   called   ‘Fact-Finding Commission on the Causes of the Iraqi 
invasion   of   Kuwait’,   which summoned Kuwaiti officials who had been in office to 
question them about the circumstances that led to the invasion. 1 
When it came to the question of restoring relations with the ‘Opponent   States’,   strong 
feelings were again evident. Then MP Saleh Al-Fadhala has commented: ‘After   the  
liberation  of  Kuwait,  Yemeni  delegation  came   to  Kuwait’   in  order   to  meet  MPs   ‘to   talk  
about the resumption of relations [...] I refused this delegation permission to enter the hall 
of Kuwait National Assembly and the MPs also refused all the agreements between 
Kuwait  and  these  states’.  He  adds: ‘The  Tunisian  President ... sent a negotiator to me in 
1994 in order to convince me to repair the relations between two countries. I asked him to 
present  an  official  written  apology  to  the  Kuwaiti  people  in  order  to  restore  relations’.2  
Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian president, also attributed the reason for the slow 
resumption of Kuwaiti-Palestinian   relations   to   ‘some   political   parties   and   MPs   at   the  
Kuwait   National   Assembly’   adding that he felt ‘those   impeded   the Kuwaiti Foreign 
Minister, Sheikh Sabah Al Sabah, in the re-opening of the Palestinian embassy in 
Kuwait’.3 
As note earlier, however, it is telling that this happened at a time when the top of the 
regime was also divided, with Sheikh Saad objecting to normalization, and Sheikh Sabah 
in favour. At the same time, it would be just two years into the increasingly obvious 
eclipsing by Sheikh Sabah of Sheikh Saad as a result of the latter’s   illness,   that   the  
Assembly in 1999 went along with  Sheikh  Sabah’s  preference. 
                                              
1  Alam alyawm newspaper,  ‘Facts  and  Mysteries  of  Iraqi  invasion  of  Kuwait’,  Kuwait,  29  July  2007. 
http://www.alamalyawm.com/ArticleDetail.aspx?artid=2707   
2  Author’s  interview  with  Salah  Al-Fadhala, September 2011. 
3  Author’s  interview,  2011. 
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2.  Kuwait Foreign Policy towards Iraq from 1991 until 1998 
2.1. Iraqi Recognition of the Kuwaiti-Iraqi frontiers as per UN resolution no. 833 of 
1993 and the crisis of 1994 
 
Following the demarcation of frontiers between the two countries, Kuwait welcomed 
UNSC resolution No. 833 of 1993 and called for Iraq to accept this resolution without any 
condition or restriction.4 However, Iraq refused to recognize this resolution and launched a 
huge campaign to raise doubts among Arab and international public opinion concerning 
the task of the UNIKBDC. On 21/5/1992, Iraq sent a letter to the UN rejecting recognition 
of  the  agreed  ‘Minutes  of  1963’  signed  between  the  two  countries  on  the  assumption  that  
the Iraqi National Assembly, the legislative power, did not ratify the said treaty; despite 
the fact that Iraq since the signing of 1963 treaty had no legislative council until the end of 
1970s due to the military coups since 1958.  Therefore, Kuwait officially responded to the 
Iraqi letter with its own letter to UN as follows:  
1. Kuwait affirmed that Oppenheim,  the  international  law  expert,  had  stated  ‘should  it  
be an exchanged Protocol, Declaration or Notes, then it may not be ratified unless 
otherwise is provided for so long as any of these tries do not increase or add any 
specific point or record the agreement of both parties to the interpretation of one 
paragraph  of  the  original  treaty’.  Thus,  the  letter  declared  that  the  agreed  Minutes  
of 1963 do not remove frontiers or establish alternatives; rather, it is a re-
recognition of frontiers that were previously agreed upon in the 1932 Exchange of 
Letters. Kuwait added that the Iraqi letter had been rejected under international 
customs that allow countries to intervene in the internal affairs of other countries 
on the assumption of examining the agreement.  
2. The contracting parties (Iraq and Kuwait) executed most items of these Minutes 
immediately after signing the same, such as political re-recognition, exchanging 
diplomatic representation, establishing commercial and economic agreements, etc. 
                                              
4  Panel of Specialists, Demarcation of the International Boundary Between The State of Kuwait and the 
Republic of Iraq By the UN, 1993. Op. Cit. p.190.  
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The Kuwaiti part provided financial assistance with KD 30 million as per the 
agreement.  
3. The Minutes of 1963 do not require any ratification because this treaty does not 
provide the necessity of this ratification, as all other treaties signed with Iraq 
(except those related to frontiers) expressly provide and stipulate that it must be 
ratified, including Bilateral Cooperation Protocol between Iraq and Kuwait. 
Therefore, the non-existence of this text in the documents related to frontiers 
between the two countries is a strong presumption that the ratification is not 
required. 
4. The Minutes of 1963 were registered in the UN Secretary General on 10/1/1964 
without any objection to this treaty on the grounds that it has not been ratified. 5 
In this period, Kuwait started to focus on UNSC members to press Iraq to accept its 
resolution No. 833, especially because Kuwait faced a problem regarding trespassing on 
the Demilitarized Zone of Kuwaiti-Iraqi frontiers, estimated at 35 incidents between 
1/4/1991 and 20/11/1993.6 This was evident in the reports of Secretary –General of UN 
when the UNIKOM mandate was expanded on 5th February 1993, following a series of 
incidents on the newly demarcated boundary. 7 However, Iraq created a crisis on the 
Kuwaiti-Iraqi frontiers through deployment of its military forces, with 60,000 to 100,000 
at the northern frontiers of Kuwait on 6/10/1994. At the end of a joint meeting presided 
over by the Iraqi president of the Ba'ath Party, the official Iraqi spokesman declared that 
‘the  Iraqi leadership is discussing the adoption of a new stand that will enable Iraq to get 
rid  of  the  embargo  already  imposed  on  Iraq’.8 On the political level, Kuwait presented this 
issue to the UNSC and there was diplomatic movement on the Arab and international 
                                              
5   Centre for Research and Studies on Kuwait,    Rad Dawlat il-Kuwayt  ʽalal  ʼidiʽa’āt  il-ʽirāqīya al-warida 
fī  mudhakkarat  wazīr  al-kharijīyh al-ʽiraqī  ʼilal  ʼamīn  il-‘ām  lil  ʼumam  il-motaḥida  bitārīkh  21  Māyo  
1990,      ‘Reply  of  the  State  of  Kuwait  to  the  Iraqi  Allegation  Contained  in  the  Memo  of  the  Iraqi  Minister  
of  Foreign  Affairs  to  UN  Secretary  General  Dated  21/5/1992’,  Kuwait,  1994.  p.21. 
6  Al  Watan  Information  and  Studies  Center,  ‘Iraqi  Aggressions  on  the  Kuwaiti  Frontiers’,  Classification  
No. 4-6/16, dated 21/11/1993, Kuwait.  
7  Security  Council,  ‘  Report  of  the  Secretary  –General on the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation 
Commission’  from  1994  to  2003,  Reports  of  the  Secretary  –General, available online at 
http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/ ; The UNIKOM was established in 1991( 687) and terminated in 2003; 
available online at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unikom/background.html  
8  Centre for Research and Studies on Kuwait, The Iraqi Mobilization on Kuwait Borders: A Documentary 
Study, Op.Cit.p.99. 
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levels to counter the Iraqi threats. On the military level, Kuwait mobilized 20,000 Kuwaiti 
soldiers on its northern border. The official spokesman of the Kuwaiti Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs  stated  that,  ‘the  suffering  of  the  Iraqi  people  is  the  responsibility of the Iraqi regime 
itself because it did not observe UNSC resolutions 706 and 712 dealing with the issue of 
the  Iraqi  people’s  needs  for  food  and  medication’.9 In fact, as mentioned in Chapter 6, the 
deterioration of humanitarian situation in Iraq was because Iraqi refusal to OFF program 
from 1991 to 1995. On 15/10/1994, UNSC unanimously issued resolution no. 949, 
wherein it condemned the Iraqi military deployment and demanded that Iraq immediately 
withdraw its military to their original position and recognise  Kuwait’s  sovereignty  with  its  
frontiers in accordance with resolution no. 833.10 On 17/10/1994, Mohammed Abu Al-
Hassan, Kuwaiti representative to the UN, determined thirteen of Kuwaiti demands from 
Iraq, the most important of which are as follows:  
1. Official  recognition  of  Kuwait’s  sovereignty,  independence  and  territorial  integrity;; 
2. Recognition  of  Kuwait’s  international  borders  as  laid  down  in  resolution  833  (1993);; 
3. These   two   recognitions   should   be   fully   documented   through   Iraq’s   constitution  
channels,  published  in  Iraq’s  Official Gazette;  
4. The remaining Kuwaiti prisoners and Kuwaiti properties stolen must be returned; 
5. Iraq must fulfil its obligations related to payment of compensation under section E of 
UN Security Council Resolution no. 687; 
6. The destruction  of  all  Iraq’s  weapons  of  mass  destruction;;  refraining  from  terrorism  or  
from supporting terrorism and pursuing a policy of suppressing or violating human 
rights.11 
This crisis ended on 23rd October 1994, when Iraq withdrew its forces from Kuwaiti 
borders after facing international pressure and condemnation. Moreover, Iraq recognized 
Kuwait’s   sovereignty   with   its   frontiers   in   accordance   with   resolution   no.   833   on  
                                              
9  Ibid. p. 111.  
10  Security  Council,  ‘Resolution  949  (1994)  Adopted  by  the  Security  Council  at  its  3438th  meeting,  on  15  
October  1994’,  S/RES/949,  15th October 1994, United Nations.  
11  Security  Council,  ‘3439th  Meeting  Monday,  17th October  1994,  11  a.m.  New  York’,  S/PV.3439,  United  
Nations, pp.16-18.  
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10/11/1994 through the recognition of the Iraqi government and the Iraqi National 
Assembly   in   resolution   833,   published   in   Iraq’s  Official Gazette.12 On 23/8/1995, King 
Hussein of Jordan affirmed in his speech to the Jordanian people that Lt. Gen. Hussein 
Kamel al-Majid, Iraq's  Minister  of  industries,  after  his  defection  against  Saddam’s  regime 
in 1995, had informed him that Iraq had discussed and planned to attack Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia at the highest level during that period.13 
 
2.2.  Kuwait’s  containment  policy towards Iraq from 1995 to 1998 
 
After the recognition of Iraq in resolution 833, Kuwaiti policy focused on compelling Iraq 
to  implement  the  remaining  resolutions  of  the  UNSC  related  to  ‘the  situation  between  Iraq  
and  Kuwait’.   
 
During that period, Iraq started successful political movements on the Arab and 
international levels to break the international and Arab isolation through resumption of its 
relations with the neighbouring countries. At the Gulf level, Qatar nominated its 
ambassador to Baghdad and an Iraqi Ambassador was appointed at Doha in 1993. At the 
Arab level, Egypt sent a diplomatic delegation to Baghdad on 10/3/1993. At the regional 
level, Turkey decided to open its embassy in Baghdad and Iraq endeavoured to improve its 
relations with Iran. At the international level, Iraq tried to open new channels with the 
USA and the UK, but such initiatives failed.14 Within the light of these variables, Kuwait 
from 1996 started, as we have already had occasion to point out, to explore re-booting its 
relations with what were called the ‘opponent  countries’  (“duwal aḍ-ḍidd”), which had not 
supported Kuwait after the invasion, in order to contain Iraq. These countries, as 
previously mentioned were Jordan, PLO (greatest opponents), Yemen, Sudan (mild 
                                              
12  Centre for Research and Studies on Kuwait, The Iraqi Mobilization on Kuwait Borders: A Documentary 
Study, Op. Cit. p.210. 
13  Hassan,  Haytham  Hassan,‘  As-Siyāsa  al-khārijīya  al-ʼurdunīyh  tijāh  al-ʽirāq min  1990  ʼilā  1998’,  ‘  
Jordanian  Foreign  Policy  towards  Iraq  from  1990  to  1998’,  unpublished  Master’s  Thesis  ,  Jordanian  
University, Jordan, Ayar 2000. p. 176. 
14  Kuwait National Assembly,  ‘Muḥawalāt  an-niẓām  il-ʽirāqī  Fak  il-ʽuzla  ad-Duwalīya’  ,  ‘Attempts  of  the  
Iraqi  Regime  to  Dismantle  International  Isolation’,  unpublished  Report,  Kuwait,  2  April,  1997.  p.13. 
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opponents), Mauritania, Libya, Algeria and Tunisia (lesser opponents).15 The Policy of 
Rapprochement with these countries led to a major collision between the Crown Prince, 
Sheikh Saad Al-Sabah, who did not support it, and the Foreign Minister, Sheikh Sabah, 
who did.16 As pointed out earlier in this chapter, a number of those states had approached 
Kuwait within the first few years but had been rebuffed, not least by the National 
Assembly. However, at the beginning of 1996,  a more insistent approach became evident 
when they appealed to Iraq to fully implement the international resolutions related to the 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. For instance, Abdul Karim Al Kabbariti, the Jordanian Prime 
Minister,  declared,  ‘Kuwait  suffered  the  most  awful  aggression  against   its   independence, 
security, territories and people in 1990, so it has the right to adopt all necessary measures 
to rebel against any aggression and to protect its security and to defend the safety of its 
people and the integrity of its territories’17. Further, he declared that the threats made by 
Tariq  Aziz,  the  Iraqi  Deputy  Prime  Minister,  in  1996  were  considered  as  ‘an  act  of  war’.  18  
As already noted, Sheikh Sabah was firmly in favour of responding positively, as part of a 
strategy to contain Iraq and pre-empting Kuwait’s   own   isolation.   However,   even   while  
pursuing incremental steps to push this agenda, Sheikh Sabah found himself held back  
initially by Sheikh Saad and opponents in the National Assembly.   
 
Former foreign minister Al Shaheen comments: ‘these   countries   felt isolated, especially 
with the GCC countries ... So they pressed for the restoration of relations with Kuwait... 
the restoration of relations with these countries were not in order to isolate Iraq, but the 
target  was  to  make  friends’.19   
 
The rebuilding of relations began in 1997 – not coincidentally the year when Sheikh 
Saad’s  illness  removed  much  of  his  power  to  shape  events.  It  began  with  the resumption of 
                                              
15  Kuwait  News  Agency  (KUNA),’  The  Positions  of  the  Coalition  Countries  and  other  States’,  Vol.  2,  1991,  
Kuwait ; Al Shayji, Abdullah,‘  Kuwait  and  Opponent  Countries:  Is  It  Time?’  Al Watan Newspaper, 
7/6/1997, Kuwait.  
16  Wikileaks,‘The  Rift  Between  The  Crown  Prince  And  Foreign  Minister’,  Reference  ID;;      96kuwait4046, 
Confidential, EmbassyKuwait, 1996-06-30 , available online at   
http://www.wikileaks.org/origin/117_0.html   
17  Al  Watan  Information  and  Research  Center,  ‘Iraqi  Threats’,  Classification  No.  4-6/11, dated 15/9/1996, 
Kuwait.  
18  Ibid. 
19  Author’s  interview with Suleiman Majed Al Shaheen, former Kuwaiti Minister of State for Foreign 
Affairs, in Kuwait City, on Thursday 16th June 2011.  
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flights and visits by public delegations, businessmen and academic staff as a precursor to 
the resumption of relations. In 1999, relations were officially resumed with the approval of 
the national Assembly, with the exchange of embassies with these countries and 
appointing ambassadors from both sides, except for the PLO.20 However, when Mahmoud 
Abbas came to power and presided over the PLO following the death of Yassar Arafat, 
former Palestinian President, relations were resumed between Kuwait and Palestine after 
his first visit to Kuwait at the end of 2004. Relations were reinforced when Sheikh Ahmad 
Fahed  Al  Sabah,  the  Chairman  of  the  Kuwait  National  Security  Bureau,  paid  a  ‘historical  
visit’  to  the  Palestinian  occupied  territories  on  22/3/2009.21   
 
The policy or re-engagement   became   a   successful   component   in   Kuwait’s   campaign 
internationally to isolate Iraq and put pressure on the Iraqi government to implement the 
UN resolutions.22 Yet there were a number of additional factors that had brought Kuwait – 
and in particular Sheikh Sabah, to the conclusion that this was the way forward. For one, it 
was known  that  all  coalition  forces  had  resumed  relations  with  these  ‘opponent  countries’  
except Kuwait.  Some of the coalition, not least the US, had specifically advocated such a 
resumption in relations. For instance, Robert Pelletreau, US Assistant Secretary of State, 
pointed out that it was high time to consider reconciliation with Jordan to achieve supreme 
strategic interests.23  
 
The conditions Kuwait, in the event, set out for the resumption of relations with these 
included the following:  
  
1. Official apology and acknowledgment of their mistake by these countries. Further, 
these countries must provide justifications and observe the pact of the Arab 
League.  
2. Pressure on Iraq to observe all UN resolutions, particularly those related to the 
situation between Kuwait and Iraq. 
                                              
20  Al Watan Information  and  Studies  Center,  ‘Relations  with  Jordan’,  Classification  No.  5-2/6, dated 
2/3/1999, Kuwait. 
21  Al Watan newspaper, issue No. 11924, Sunday, dated 22/3/2009, Kuwait. p.10. 
22  Terrill, W. Andrew, Op. Cit. pp.44-45. 
23   Al-Enezi, Abdullah and Saher, Abdullah, Op. Cit. p.51. 
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3. Condemnation and rejection of the Iraqi aggression towards Kuwait. These acts 
must be clear, without contradictory interpretation or clarification.  
4. Respect of the international legitimacy and supremacy of each State and its right to 
its natural wealth as well as to safeguard means of self defence and the measures 
already adopted by Kuwait for liberation. 24  
Judging by the results, it did not appear that the countries in question had an issue with 
these, although the precise phrasing of statements regarding the first point will have been 
modulated. Indeed, as we have seen, some had already offered similar statements to that 
effect as part of their own campaign to resume relations. 
 
 
3. Kuwait Foreign Policy towards Iraq from 1998 to 2001  
 
3.1.  The 1998 Crisis and Kuwaiti moves to counter the Iraqi threat 
Iraq dismissed the UNSCOM inspectors in December 1998 following a series of tensions 
between Iraq and the UNSCOM, which resulted in the USA and Britain launching military 
attacks   against   Iraq   in   ‘Operation   Desert   Fox’   from   16-19 December 1998,25 which 
reflected on Kuwait due to its geographic location. Over the seven years from 1991 to 
1998, relations between Iraq and UNSCOM witnessed numerous crises, at an average of 
one   crisis   each  month.   Therefore,   the   situation  was   described   as   ‘a   crisis   gives   birth   to  
another’.26 One of the most important confrontations between Iraq and UN inspectors was 
that of April 1991 when UNSCOM accused Iraq of negative cooperation.27 Further crises 
occurred during the period from October 1997 to December 1998, the most important of 
which were:  
                                              
24  Al-Enezi, Abdullah and Saher,  Abdullah,  ‘Al-kuwayt  wa  ʽalaqātiha  maʽ  “duwal  iḍ-ḍid”:  Dirāsa  
maydanīya’,    ‘Kuwait  and  Its  Relations  with  Opponent  States:  Field  Study’,  Al Mustaqbal Al Arabi 
Journal , issue No. 245, Centre for Arab Unity Studies , Beirut , July 1999.  p. 50.  
25  Cordesman,  Anthony  H.,  ‘The  Military  Effectiveness  of  Desert  Fox:  A  Warning  About  the  Limits  of  the  
Revolution  in  Military  Affairs  and  Joint  Vision  2010’,  Op.  Cit.  p.7. 
26  Registry of Current Events in  the  Gulf  &  Arabian  Peninsula  Region,  ‘Iraq’s  tense  Relation  With  The  
United  Nations’,  Op.  Cit.  p.15.   
27  Katzman, Kenneth, Op. Cit. p.1.  
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1. The crisis of October 1997 when Iraq refused to allow the inspectors to oversee 
some Iraqi locations.28  
2. The crisis of November 1997 (known as the 1998 February Crisis) when Iraq 
moved  to  bar  inspectors  to  visit  some  ‘sensitive  presidential  locations’.29  
3. The crisis of August 1998, when Iraq suspended its cooperation with UNSCOM 
and ceased its work in Iraq except with the IAEA in October.30  
Richard Butler submitted a letter to the UNSC on 15/12/1998, indicating that Iraq had not 
cooperated with the international inspectors and had placed hindrances and new 
restrictions on them.31 Accordingly, the USA and UK launched a military operation 
‘Desert  Fox’  for  70  hours  from  16th to 19th December 1998 against Iraqi military targets.32 
This operation sparked outrage among Arab and Islamic people, particularly against 
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, due to the Iraqi accusations that American and British planes 
flew from both Kuwaiti and Saudi territories to bombard Iraq,33 which resulted in terrorist 
threats to Kuwait after this operation. The Iraqi President appealed to the Arab people to 
overthrow  the  Arab  rulers  and  described  them  as  ‘agents  to  the  West’  in  the  celebration  of  
‘Army  Day’  on  January  1999.  The  Kuwaiti  Crown  Prince,  Sheikh Saad AlSabah, refuted 
the  threats  of  the  Iraqi  President,  saying,  ‘aggressive  intents  are  always  present  in  Saddam  
Hussein's regime. His attacks against Arab leaders are not new because abuse and insults 
and conspiracies are tools which the Iraqi regime uses against all those who do not follow 
                                              
28   Zarnoqa,  Salah  Al  Salem,  ‘Majlis  at-taʽāwun  il-khalījī  wal  masʼalah  al-ʽirāqīyah’,  ‘GCC  and  Iraqi  Issue’,  
Al-Siyassa Al-Duwaliya Magazine , issue No. 136, Cairo, April 1999.  p. 132.  
29  These locations are eight, viz: (1) The Republican Palace at Baghdad, (2) Al Radwania Presidential 
location at Baghdad, (3) Al Sujood presidential location at Baghdad, (4) Tukrit Presidential location, (5) 
Atharsar Presidential location, (6) Miguel mountain presidential location (7), Al Basra presidential 
location, (8) Al Mosul presidential location.  
30  Art,  Robert  J.  and  Patrick  M.  Cronin,  ‘The  United  States  and  Coercive  Diplomacy’,  United  States  
Institute of Peace, Washington D.C, 2003. p. 288. 
31  Security  Council,  ‘Letter  dated  15  December  1998  from  the  Executive  Chairman  of  the  Special  
Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council 
resolution 687 (l991) addressed to the Secretary –General’,  S/1998/1172,  United  Nations;;  available  
online at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N98/395/75/IMG/N9839575.pdf?OpenElement  
32   Masoud,  Ahmed  Ibrahim,  ‘ʽamalīyat  thaʽlab  as-saḥraʼ:  tatawwurāt  wa  nataʼij  al-muwājaha  al-ʽaskarīya fil 
khalīj’,  ‘Desert  Fox  Operation:  Developments  and  Results  of  Military  Confrontation  in  the  Gulf’, Al-
Siyassa Al-Dawliya Magazine  , Issue No. 135, Cairo, January 1999.p. 172.  
33  Terrill, W. Andrew, Op. Cit. p.45. 
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it’.34 In February 1999, the Iraqi president threatened Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, saying that 
they  would  pay  a  ‘high  price’  for  allowing  coalition  forces  to  bombard  Iraq  and  promising  
to attack the military bases in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia from which US fighters flew to 
control no-fly zones. Hence, there was severe attack from Gulf newspapers against Iraqi 
threats.35 
Kuwait officially denied the Iraqi accusations and reiterated that it had nothing to do with 
this crisis between Iraq and the UN because Iraq had ignored the relevant UNSC 
resolutions.36 Abdul Aziz Al Adsani, the Chairman of Foreign Affairs Committee at the 
Kuwait  National  Assembly,   stated   that   ‘the   feelings   of   the  Kuwaiti   people are with the 
Iraqi people and we pray to God to save them from all calamities. Our differences are with 
the   present   Iraqi   regime.’37 On the Arab level, the Prime Minister of Jordan, Faiz Al 
Tharouna,  declared,  ‘the  current  crisis  is  not  between  Iraq  and  Kuwait;;  rather  it  is  between  
Iraq and the UN regarding the international inspection team and how to continue 
inspection  operation’.38 The GCC States published a statement wherein they condemned 
the Iraqi threats and confirmed that the reason for the crisis was Iraqi reluctance to 
cooperate with UNSCOM.39 Thus, Kuwait was able to mobilise Arab support against Iraqi 
threats  due  to  its  ‘open-door’  policy  with   the duwal aḍ-ḍidd since 1996.  
Saddam Hussein threatened Kuwait once again in his speech dated 8/8/2000 on the 
occasion of the ceasefire with Iran. He claimed that Kuwait and Saudi Arabia had offered 
their territories to the US troops to bombard Iraq, prompting Kuwait to submit a letter to 
the UN against the threats made by him.40 This threat was also presented to the Arab, Gulf 
and International States, which appealed to Iraq to stop its threats against Kuwait. In 
addition, the Secretary General of the Arab League called for Iraqi threats to be suspended 
                                              
34 Cordesman,  Anthony  H.,  ‘The  Air  Defense  War  Since  Desert  Fox:  A  Short  History’,  Center  for  Strategic  
and International Studies, Washington D.C, 1999. pp. 7-12. 
35  Ibid., p. 26. 
36  Al  Watan  Information  and  Studies  Center,  ‘Iraqi  Threats’,  No.  4-6/16’,  dated  15/2/1999.  Op.Cit. 
37  Ibid, dated 18/12/1998. 
38  Al  Watan  Information  and  Studies  Center,  ‘Crisis  of  December  1998’,  Classification  No.  4-10/5, dated 
25/12/1998, Kuwait. 
39  Registry of Current Events in the Gulf & Arabian Peninsula Region, issue No. 5, Center of Gulf & 
Arabian Peninsula Studies, Kuwait University, Kuwait, 1998. pp. 39 – 43. 
40  Al Watan Information  and  Studies  Center,  ‘Crisis  of  December  1998’,  dated  9/8/2000.  Op.Cit. 
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at a time when the Arab league was endeavouring to achieve national reconciliation and 
purify the Arab atmosphere.41  
In September 2000, Naji Sabri Al-Hadithi, Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs, sent letter to 
UN Security–General   Kofi   Annan,   accusing   Kuwait   of   ‘looting   the   Iraqi   oil   from   the  
southern  section  of  Iraq’  (Al-Rumaila oilfield) via horizontal drilling. On 14th December, 
Iraqi  Minister  of  Oil,  Amer  M.  Rashid  estimated  the  ‘stolen  oil’  at  300  – 350,000 barrels 
per day. Kuwait responded to these claims under the following points:  
1. Iraq did not submit any documents, evidence or scientific studies confirming the 
validity of its allegations despite occupying Kuwait for seven months and its 
complete control on the Kuwaiti oil capabilities as well as perusal of the Kuwait oil 
archive and its knowledge of the oil fields and their natural characteristics. 
2. Kuwait affirmed that it had never confessed to stealing Iraqi oil, as claimed by Iraq, 
and stated that the UNIKBDC had confirmed that Iraq was utilizing ten 10 oilfields 
located inside the Kuwaiti territories without having the right to do so. 
Consequently, these oilfields were returned to Kuwait.42  
3.  On 18 December 2000, Kuwait officially declared the invalidity of the Iraqi claims 
and  welcomed   any   ‘neutral   concerned   entity’   to   inspect   the   oilfields   adjacent   to  
Kuwaiti-Iraqi frontiers on both sides to establish the validity of the these claims, 
which would not require more than few months to solve the difference between 
Kuwait and Iraq, similar to what happened between Britain and Norway in the 
North Sea.43  
Sheikh Saud Al Sabah, the Kuwaiti Minister of Oil, affirmed that Kuwait was unable to 
drill horizontally as claimed by Iraq, as this work required costly and sophisticated 
technology and all activities carried out on the frontiers were conducted in the presence of 
UNIKOM. He added that the oil production from Al Ratqa oilfield does not exceed 43,000 
                                              
41  Ibid, dated 14/8/2000.  
42 Centre for Research and Studies on Kuwait, ‘Objective  and  Scientific  Vision  in  Iraq’s  accusation  for  
Kuwait of Stealing Its Oil, Op.Cit.pp.10-12.  
43  Ibid. p.14. 
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barrels per day and this production is well known to specialist oil companies and OPEC 
and represents 2% of the daily oil production of Kuwait.44 
Kuwait responded to the Iraqi letter with its own letter from Sheikh Sabah Al Sabah, 
Foreign  Minister   of  Kuwait   to  Kofi  Annan,  wherein   it   pointed   out   that   ‘any   investment  
business carried out by Kuwait to exploit and develop its resources and natural wealth at 
any location is made within its internationally recognized   frontiers…Iraq  has   intensively  
produced oil for more than 40 years from Al Rumaila and Zubair oilfields before 1990; at 
that time Kuwait had very little oil, which resulted in depletion of the oil stock from oil 
reserves and the migration of oil from   the   Kuwaiti   side   to   the   Iraqi   side’   Kuwait  
considered the Iraqi letter as a threat to the stability of the region.45 
 
3.2. Kuwaiti Stance regarding the Kuwait-Iraq case and reconciliation with Iraq (2000 
– 2001) 
This period was characterised by the movement of Kuwaiti diplomacy on the Arab and 
international levels to explain its position on Iraqi issues such as economic sanctions, the 
military   attacks   against   Iraq   beyond   the   resolutions   of   the   UNSC   and   the   ‘situation  
between  Iraq  and  Kuwait’. 
 In 1997, at the 8th OIC Summit in Tehran, Iraq had endeavoured to delete the words 
‘aggression,  occupation,  invasion’  related  to  Kuwait  liberation  war  in  the  final  statement  of  
the  OIC   and   replace   the   same  with   the   phrase   ‘the   situation   between   Iraq   and  Kuwait’. 
However,  Kuwait  rejected  the  Iraqi  demand  at  that  time  because  it  was  concerned  by  Iraq’s  
lack of commitment to implement the UN resolutions in the case of change.46 However, on 
November  2000,  Kuwait  accepted   the   Iraqi  demands   to  entitle   the  ‘Kuwaiti-Iraqi file’  as  
‘The  situation  between  Iraq  and  Kuwait’  instead  of  the  words  mentioned  above  in  the  final  
statement   of   the   9th   OIC   Summit   in   Doha.   Thereafter   the   word   ‘sitiuation’   became   an  
essential word in all statements of Arab and Islamic Summits. This change in Kuwaiti 
stance was cleared by Sulaiman M. Al Shaheen, the former Kuwaiti Minister of State for 
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Foreign   Affairs,   in   19/2/2000,   when   he   stated   that   ‘the   resolutions   of   the   UNSC   were  
issued  under  the  name  of  this  title’.  Further,  Khaled  Al  Jarallah,  the  Undersecretary of the 
Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs,   affirmed  on  4/12/2000   that   ‘changing   the  name  of   the   Iraqi  
aggression  to  Kuwait  in  1990  to  ‘the  situation  between  Iraq  and  Kuwait’  is  a  formal  issue  
that does not relieve Iraq from implementing international resolutions, particularly those 
related  to  the  release  of  the  Kuwaiti  prisoners  of  war’.47  
At the beginning of 2001, some Arab and Islamic States tried to find reconciliation 
between Kuwait and Iraq. Thus Kuwait determined three essential conditions to enter into 
negotiations with the Iraqi regime: 
1. Iraq must submit guarantees that it will not invade or threaten Kuwait. 
2. UN resolutions must be implemented and prisoners of war must be released.  
3.  An apology must be issued to the Kuwaiti people.48  
Iraq rejected the last Kuwaiti demand concerning an apology, which prompted Kuwait to 
abandon this request and adhere to other demands, as evident in the words of Sheikh Dr. 
Mohammed  Sabah,   the   former  Minister  of  State   for  Foreign  Affairs,  who   stated   ‘Where 
did you hear that we are insisted on the apology condition? Our demands are clear, namely 
the   security,   existence,   independence   and   supremacy   of   Kuwait…   I   am   speaking   about  
guarantees’.49  
These developments urged Kuwait to move on the Arab level to explain its position on the 
Iraqi issues during the visits made by Sheikh Sabah Al Sabah, the Kuwaiti Minister of 
Foreign affairs, as follows: 
1. Kuwait respects the integrity and sovereignty of Iraqi territories and had never 
been party to the sanctions imposed on Iraq, which were imposed by the UNSC 
rather than Kuwait. 
                                              
47  Ibid. p.10. 
48  Al Watan Information  and  Studies  Center,  ‘Reconciliation  with  Iraq’,  Classification  No.  25  – 1/5, dated 
12/1/2000, Kuwait. 
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2. Kuwait sympathizes with the suffering of the Iraqi people and supports the call 
to lift the embargo imposed upon Iraq. Hence, Kuwait has no objection to any 
initiatives designed to mitigate these sufferings.  
3. Kuwait does not object to the release witnessed by the economic and political 
relations between Iraq and some Arab countries. 
4. The Kuwait relationship with Iraq is not prohibitive to discussions. 
5. Kuwait highlights the necessity of implementing UN resolutions related to the 
‘situation  between  Kuwait  and  Iraq’.   
6. Kuwait  does  not  insist  on  having  an  ‘official  apology’  from  Baghdad;;  it  would  
suffice to have security guarantees that would prevent the repetition of the 
calamity in 1990. 
7. Kuwait accepts the   call   to   lift   the   embargo   from   Iraq,   denounces   the   ‘no   fly  
zones’   in   the  south  and  north  of   Iraq  and  objects   to   the  attack  of   Iraq  outside  
UNSC Resolutions.50 
In   March   2001   and   before   the   Arab   Summit   in   Amman,   Kuwait   announced   that   ‘the  
position of Kuwait is clear regarding lifting the sanctions on Iraq and its people and 
stopping   the   Iraqi   sufferings’.   51 At this Summit on 27-29 March 2001, Arab countries 
endeavoured for the first time to find reconciliation between Kuwait and Iraq via creating a 
‘Conciliation   Formula’   to be acceptable to both parties. Thus, Arab countries formed 
several   ‘mediation   committees’   between   the   Iraqi   and   Kuwaiti   delegates   that   finally  
concluded  the  ‘final  formula’  accepted  by  sixteen  Arab  States.  This  formula  included  three  
main principles:  
First: affirming respect of the Arab League Charter and objectives, maintaining Arab 
national security based on the respect of the safety and supremacy of its state on its 
territories, resources and oilfields, non-intervention or permitting intervention in the 
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internal affairs of Arab countries. Furthermore, threats or force may not be used against 
Arab countries; rather, disputes must be settled by peaceful means via negotiation and 
discussion employing the vehicles of dispute settlement. 
Second:  
a. Confirming on the respect the independence and supremacy of Kuwait as well as 
the safety and integrity of territories within its internationally recognized frontiers. Further, 
Iraq should not interfere in the internal affairs of Kuwait and it should be incited to adopt 
sufficient policies to respect this obligation. 
b. Confirming respect of the independence and supremacy of Iraq and the integrity of 
its territories and territorial safety in addition to non-intervention in its internal affairs as 
well as calling for suspension of all acts trespassing on its supremacy and threatening its 
safety, particularly those committed beyond the scope of the UNSC Resolutions, especially 
military attacks. 
c. Inviting Iraq to fully implement all international resolutions of the UNSC to find a 
quick and ultimate solution to the issue of the Kuwaiti Prisoners of War and other 
detainees as well as the return of all Kuwaiti properties. 
d. Calling for finalizing outstanding issues concerning weapons of mass destruction 
and surveillance methods via negotiations between Iraq and the Security Council to 
complete all obligations as soon as possible in accordance with the respective UN Security 
Council resolutions in order to establish a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the 
Middle East. 
Third:  
a. Calling for a lifting of the sanctions imposed on Iraq. 
b. Adopting necessary measures to resume air flights with Iraq. 
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c. Calling for cooperation with respect to the information already submitted by Iraq 
regarding Iraqi prisoners of war under the sponsorship of the international Red 
Cross Committee52. 
 
Kuwait   promptly   accepted   the   ‘Conciliation   Formula’,   while   Iraq   rejected   the   same,  
requesting  that  the  phrase  in  Paragraph  C  of  the  second  item  calling  for  ‘execution  of  all 
international  resolutions’  be  replaced  by  ‘execution  of  resolutions  only’.  Further,  the  Iraqi  
delegation  considered  paragraph  A  of  the  second  item  ‘calling  Baghdad  to  adopt  sufficient  
policies  to  respect  the  supremacy  and  independence  of  Kuwait’  as  a  clear accusation of the 
Iraqi intentions towards Kuwait.53 
According  to  Sheikh  Sabah,  ‘The  Amman  Summit  convinced  all  Arab  leaders  that  Kuwait  
does not constitute an impediment before lifting the sanctions imposed on Iraq as some 
Arab leaders believed. Further, Iraq would like to put an end to the sanctions so that the 
current situation will continue and enable Iraq to control the community via a food share 
system’.   He   added   that   ‘Iraq   refused   to   form   a   committee   from   five  Arab  Ministers   of  
Foreign Affairs to contact   the  UNSC   to   lift   the   sanctions   imposed  on   Iraq’.  He  claimed  
that   ‘the  UN  Secretary-General stated that there are is less than $600 million ready for 
Iraqi imports for food and medication, but the Iraqi leadership only requested $34 million, 
as they desire to maintain the sanctions for propagandist purposes. Consequently, the 
Amman summit endeavoured to deprive the Iraqi leadership of this propagandist weapon 
and in this way, all Arabs will know who is responsible for the continued suffering of the 
Iraqi  people’.54  
Talib Al Rifai, the Jordanian Minister of Information, held the Iraqi delegation responsible 
for not concluding the formula that was unanimously accepted by the other Arab States 
and   by  Kuwait.  He   asked:   ‘Kuwait   has   accepted   lifting   the   sanctions, what about other 
countries?’55 Dr. Esmat Abdel Majid, Arab League Secretary–General, confirmed that 
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54  Interview with Sheikh Sabah Al Sabah, Kuwaiti Minister of Foreign Affairs with Asharq Al Awsat 
Newspaper;;  Centre  of  Iraq  for  Studies,  ‘  Iraqi  file’,  Issue  No.  114,  2001.  p.  21. 
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‘Iraqi   endeavoured   to   hold   Kuwait   responsible   for   the   failure   of   the   Arab   summit   in  
Amman  with   respect   to   concluding   a   solution   for  what   is   called   ‘The situation between 
Iraq  and  Kuwait’  - this is unacceptable.56  
Several factors incited Kuwaiti diplomacy to move concerning the Iraqi file during this 
period. First, there was the weakness of the international coalition that was formed 
following the liberation of Kuwait in 1990 for several reasons, including but not limited to: 
- Contradiction of political and economic interests among coalition members, 
particularly the States having permanent membership in the UN Security Council. In 
this respect, the US and Britain adopted one opinion while Russia, France and China 
adopted another. 
- The lengthy period of embargo and the collapse of US anticipation to dethrone the 
Iraqi regime.  
- The sufferings of the Iraqi people as a result of the embargo that lasted more than 10 
years and the death of 100,000 of children and old people, a matter that created 
international sympathy with the Iraqi people from non-government organizations and 
public figures in the west and the Arab world.  
Second, the reconciliation and friendship policy adopted by the Iraqi regime towards Arab 
countries, which resulted in establishing several joint free-trade zones with many of these 
countries, such as Egypt, Syria and Tunisia. At the same time, there were many calls from 
the Arab countries to lift the embargo, which made some Kuwaiti writers and intelligence 
affirm that Kuwait might be politically isolated from Arab and international states should it 
did not evolve its political speech. 
Third, Iraq successfully used its issues and the sufferings of its people on the Arab and 
international levels. In this respect, it held Kuwait and some Arab Gulf States responsible 
for the continuity of the miserable situations of the Iraqi people due to the embargo.57  
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4. Conclusion  
 
Kuwait’s   options   and   imperatives were determined mainly, in this period, by the 
international environment – especially the United Nations system – and the Arab regional 
environment,  as well as by the shifting decision-making environment at home. The way in 
which it reacted to the pressures and opportunities, in pursuing the UN and, from 1997, 
also the Arab world, as an avenue and platform for achieving its aims of security and 
international support, and to ensure sustained pressure on Iraq over the so-called 
‘outstanding  issues’,  was  ultimately  decided  by  Sheikh  Sabah,  the  Foreign  Minister.     
 
Thus,  after  Iraq’s  successful  political  moves  to  break  its international isolation from 1993, 
Kuwait began its own diplomatic strategy to reorganize its previously tense relations with 
the so-called  “duwal aḍ-ḍidd”  or  ‘Opponent  States’  in 1996, in an effort to  to contain Iraq 
and avoid its own isolation from the Arab world. 
 
Sheikh   Sabah’s   determination   to   pursue   this   policy  was   complicated   initially   by   Sheikh  
Saad’s opposition, and indeed a long-standing reluctance to such normalisation among key 
sections of the National Assembly. The latter became less potent once Sheikh Saad 
effectively disappeared from the policy-making scene as a major player following his 
illness,   and   Sheikh   Sabah’s   emergence   as   the   unquestioned   lead   policymaker   in   foreign  
affairs.  
After the formal resumption of Kuwaiti diplomatic relations with the ‘opponent’  states  in 
1999, Kuwaiti demands towards Iraq gained full support from these states.   
 
Between 1991 and 2000, the Iraqi regime constituted a real threat to Kuwaiti security, the 
most important features of which were the deployment of 100,000 Iraqi troops on the 
Kuwaiti border in 1994 and its continuous threats to attack Kuwait, and of course, Saudi 
Arabia,  after   the  ‘Operation  Desert  Fox’  against   Iraq   in   late  1998,   in  which  Iraq  claimed  
that  US  and  UK  jet  fighters’  attacks  came  from  their  bases  in  Kuwait  and  Saudi  Arabia.   
 
In 2001, Kuwait started to follow a flexible policy towards Iraq itself, through its 
acceptance   of   the   ‘Conciliation   Formula’   at   the   Amman   summit   of   2001,   while   Iraq  
rejected this, calling instead for the economic sanctions and no-fly zone imposed on Iraq to 
be lifted and the rejection of any military strike against Iraq beyond the UN resolutions. 
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The Iraqi rejection of this formula gave Kuwait greater credit in the eyes of the Arab world 
in that Kuwait did not constitute an impediment regarding the lifting of the sanctions 
imposed on Iraq, as some Arab leaders had believed.  The following the year, after US-UK 
troop mobilizations in the Arabian Gulf, and in order to gain Arab support in preventing 
any   ‘military   action’   against   Iraq, Iraq would finally accepted the formula at the Beirut 
summit – a subject we will address in Chapter 8.  
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Chapter VIII 
 
Kuwait’s  Foreign  Policy  towards  Iraq 
2001 – 2003 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 In the period 2001-2003, the effect of the international and regional environment on 
Kuwait’s  policy  towards  Iraq    became especially evident. The key external developments 
were the terrorist attack of 9/11-2001 in the US and its impact on the global political scene 
that led to the war in Afghanistan in 2001 – all in the context of the arrival in the White 
House of a neo-conservative group. As a result, the attention of the US turned to Iraq 
under the pretext that Iraq had WMD and provided shelter for the al-Qaeda network. These 
events resulted in hostility between Iraq and the US over the Iraqi WMD program and 
mobilization of coalition forces by the US, UK and their allies (30 countries) from 2002-
2003 to attack Iraq. The mobilization of international forces in the Gulf region, which 
ended   with   the   occupation   of   Iraq   in   2003,   reflected   Kuwait’s   economic   and   security  
concerns due to its geographical proximity to Iraq. It also reflected the views of Arab and 
regional states, which led to regional movement to solve the crisis.  The war resulted in 
temporary tension in the relationship between Kuwait and some Arab states such as Syria 
and   Lebanon   due   to   Kuwait’s   own   foreign   policy   stance   supporting   the   international  
coalition to occupy Iraq.  
 
These international events changed the pattern of Kuwaiti behavior towards Iraq, and also 
Iraqi  behavior  towards  Kuwait,  through  Kuwait’s  hosting of international forces to wage a 
military war against Iraq, on the one hand, and contact with the Iraqi opposition to 
determine the future of Iraq, on the other. So the international and regional environment, 
represented by the international events that took place from 2001-2003, played a 
prominent role in Kuwaiti behavior towards Iraq.  
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It is worth noting that during this period, Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al Sabah, the Foreign 
Minister,   was   in   effect   in   sole   charge   of   the   country’s   foreign   policy,   even   though 
nominally the Amir, Sheikh Jaber, remained the fount of power. The Amir was, however, 
retreating ever further from active policy involvement, while Sheikh Saad, the Crown 
Prince, was now in effect out of the loop due to his deteriorating health. Although 
consulting trusted advisors, and to some extent working with the Foreign Affairs 
Committee of the National Assembly, he was for all intents and purposes in sole charge, 
and appears not to have experienced much countervailing pressure (se chapter 4). 
 
This chapter, then, charts Kuwaiti behaviour towards Iraq from 2001 to 2003 in light of 
political   tension  between   Iraq   and   the   international   coalition   and   its   impact  on  Kuwait’s  
internal and external position after the surge of US troops in the Gulf region to attack Iraq.    
 
 
2.  The changing regional and global environment   
 
Between 2001 and 2002, the world witnessed several events that affected the Arabian Gulf 
region in general and Kuwaiti policy towards Iraq in particular:  
1. The arrival of neo-conservatives to power in the US in January 2001, headed by 
George Bush, whose stance supported the use of military force for regime change in Iraq.1  
2. The terrorist attack of 9/11-2001 in the US, its impact on the global political scene 
in general, and on the policy of the US in particular, through the emergence of the term 
‘Bush  Doctrine’,  which  would allow the US to pursue terrorist networks in the world2 as 
‘preventive  war’  to protect the security of the US.3 This ‘doctrine’  led to the formation of 
International Coalition forces under the command of the US to invade Afghanistan in 
October 2001 and overthrow the Taliban regime which had provided shelter for the al-
Qaeda network. Accordingly, in 2002, this event turned the attention of the US to Iraq 
under the pretext that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and that it had a 
                                              
1   Metz, Steven   and   John   R.   Martin   (eds.),   ‘Decisionmaking   in   Operation   Iraqi   Freedom:   Removing  
Saddam Hussein By  Force’, Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), US, February 2010. pp.7-11. 
2   McAllister,   IAN,   ‘A  War   Too   Far?   Bush,   Iraq,   and   the   2004   US Presidential   Election’,   Presidential 
Studies Quarterly Vol. 36, no. 2 (June), 2006. p.261. 
3   Leffler,   Melvyn   R,   ‘9/11   in   Retrospect   :   George   W.   Bush's   Grand   Strategy,   Reconsidered’,   Foreign 
Affairs , Vol. 9o, No.5, 2011. p.34. 
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relationship with the al-Qaeda network.4 This is illustrated  in  the  ‘strongly worded’   letter 
neo-conservative senators sent in early December 2001 to president George Bush 
requesting the overthrow of Saddam’s regime and the policy of regime change in Iraq.5  
3. The conviction of the new US administration headed by Bush, following the 9/11 
attack, that the ‘Iraq Liberation Act’   of October 1998 by the US Congress was, in fact, 
ineffective, and emphasize the  importance  of  ‘military  action’  for regime change in Iraq.6  
As a result, after the occupation of Afghanistan, in November 2001, i.e. two months after 
9/11, Bush ordered the US Secretary of Defense to set up an initial military plan for regime 
change in Iraq in the case of a lack of cooperation by Iraq with the UNSC resolutions, 
especially concerning the return of international inspectors to supervise the program of 
WMD.7 This step came after the US and the UK had attempted to resolve the issue of 
economic sanctions imposed on Iraq at UNSC; in July 20018, they submitted a draft 
resolution  called  ‘Smart  Sanctions’  to  control  the  economic  sanctions  on  Iraq  through  the  
strict monitoring of the borders of the countries surrounding Iraq to prevent the smuggling 
of   oil,   due   to   Iraq’s   ability   to   violate   the   imposed   economic   sanctions   under   the  Oil   for  
Food Program (OFF). However, this draft resolution was withdrawn due to opposition by 
some countries at UNSC, especially Russia.9 
The confrontation between Iraq and the US developed in January 2002, when Bush 
delivered  a  speech  on  ‘Union  Address’,  in  which  he  described  Iraq,  North  Korea  and  Iran  
as  the  ‘axis  of  evil’.10 The former UK PM, Tony Blair, has pointed out in his memoirs that 
Bush’s  Speech indicated that the US would endeavor to change the world, using force if 
necessary, as happened in Afghanistan. 11  
                                              
4   Allawi, Ali A., The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace, Yale University Press 
publications, 2007. p. 80. 
5   Blair, Tony, Tony Blair A Journey, Arrow Book, The Random House Group Limited, 2010. p.396. 
6   This law allocated $97 million, which calls for coordination with the Iraqi opposition only to topple the 
regime  of  Saddam  Hussein  without  the  use  of  force  against  Iraq.  See  Michael  J.  Mazarr,  ‘The  Iraq  War  
and  Agenda  Setting’, Foreign Policy Analysis, Vol 3. No.1, 2007.  p.4. 
7   Bush, George W., Decision Points, Virgin Books, the Random House Group Limited, 2010. p.234. 
8   Allawi, Ali A, Op.Cit. pp.78-80. 
9   Blair, Tony, Op. Cit. p. 383. 
10   Bush, George W., Op. Cit. p.233. 
11   Blair, Tony, Op. Cit. p.388.
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These factors led the Iraq regime to adopt a flexible policy at regional and international 
levels after March 2002 to prevent the support of any ‘military   action’   against Iraq as 
follows:  
1. On the international level: Iraq declared its willingness to reopen negotiations with the 
UN regarding the return of international inspectors, who had been expelled from Iraq 
since 1998, in order to get closer to the international community to avoid any 
international support for action against Iraq.12 Also, Iraq had cemented its relations 
with Russia in August 2002 by signing commercial contracts worth $40 billion and had 
vowed to pay off its debts to Russia quickly (estimated at $10 billion) to ensure 
Russian support for Iraq.13 
2. On the Arab level: in March 2002, the Iraqi delegation, headed by Izzat Ibrahim, 
visited the Arab capitals states (Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt). Iraq affirmed its 
willingness to re-open negotiations with Kuwait on the ‘Conciliation  Formula’  during 
the Beirut summit scheduled to be held in March 2002. This formula had been rejected 
by Iraq at the Amman Summit in March 2001 (see Chapter 7).  
3. On the Gulf level: Izzat Ibrahim visited the Arab Gulf states (United Arab Emirates, 
Bahrain, Oman, Qatar) in March 2002, to support the initiative of Prince Abdullah for 
peace with Israel that was scheduled for discussion during the Beirut summit at the end 
of March 2002 as a rapprochement with GCC states .14  
 
3. Kuwait’s  position  towards  reconciliation  with  the  Iraqi  regime 
From 2002, the Iraqi movements focused attention on Kuwait, especially in light of 
political tensions in the Arab world due to the surge of US troops in the Gulf region to 
attack Iraq. Therefore, Kuwait started to give signals to the Arab world regarding its 
readiness to enter into negotiations with Iraq under the framework of the ‘Conciliation  
                                              
12   Ibid, p.396. 
13   Ambrosio, Thomas, ‘The  Russo-American Dispute over the Invasion of Iraq: International Status and the 
Role  of  Positional  Goods’,  Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 57, No. 8, December, 2005. pp.1191-1197. 
14   KUNA,   ‘Vice   Chairman   of   The Revolutionary Command Council In Iraq: Izzat Ibrahim Backs to 
Baghdad  At  The  End  of  Visit  Included  Eight  Arab  Countries’,  21/3/2002,  Kuwait.  Available  on  KUNA  
website at :  http://www.kuna.net.kw/ArticleDetails.aspx?language=ar&id=1770279  
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Formula’.   Thus, at the Beirut summit (27 - 28 March 2002), the Kuwaiti Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmed Alsabah,   pointed   out   that   ‘Kuwait   has   always  
been keen on solidifying the Arab ranks and solidarity and strengthening aspired security 
and stability in this region’  and had always   ‘been  supportive  of  any  efforts   to   strengthen  
security and stability of Gulf region, but we cannot place security and stability and 
sovereignty   of  State   of  Kuwait  within   the   quarters   of   the   illicit   Iraqi   intentions’. Sheikh 
Sabah’s  speech  determined  the  Kuwaiti  position  towards  Iraq, calling for Iraq:  
1.  to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity, international borders, security and 
political independence of Kuwait; 
2. to refrain from any hostile or provocative action against Kuwait; 
3. to implement, in accordance with international law, all relevant UNSC resolutions and 
to cooperate with the International Red Cross Committee to release all Kuwaiti 
prisoners of war and to restore Kuwaiti property.15  
At the end of the Beirut summit, Iraq declared for the first time its undertaking to prevent 
any possible repetition of the events of 1990 and its acceptance of the   ‘Conciliation  
Formula’  following some amendments, including the following items:  
a. to welcome the assurances provided by Iraq concerning respect for the independence, 
sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of Kuwait, thereby obviating any possible 
repetition of the events of 1990;  
b. to recognize the importance of halting negative media campaigns and pronouncements 
between the two countries;  
c. to uphold the principles of good neighborliness and non-interference in the internal 
affairs of others;  
d. to respect the independence, sovereignty, security and national unity and territorial 
integrity of Iraq; 
                                              
15   KUNA,   ‘Kuwait   Reaffirms   Support   of   Arab   Cases,   Cautions   of   Iraqi   Intentions   ,   Political   Affairs,  
Kuwait, dated 27/3/2002. On the KUNA website at :  
http://www.kuna.net.kw/ArticleDetails.aspx?language=en&id=1239895  
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e. to allow Iraq to cooperate in the formulation of a speedy and definitive solution to the 
issue of Kuwait prisoners and hostages and the return of property;  
f. to call for the sanctions imposed on Iraq to be lifted;  
g. to affirm their unconditional rejection of a strike against Iraq; 
h. to welcome the resumption of the dialogue between Iraq and the United Nations.16 
Izzat Ibrahim, to   express   the   ‘good   faith   of   Iraq’   approached Sheikh Sabah and shook 
hands in front of the Arab leaders17 in addition to the embrace between Azzat Ibrahim and 
the Saudi Crown Prince, Prince Abdullah bin Abdulaziz before the start of the closing 
session.18  
The ‘Conciliation  Formula’  had repercussions in the Kuwaiti streets in two different ways. 
The first was a belief that the Arab League Statement had achieved Iraq’s  compliance  with  
the demands of Kuwait, especially given that it had pledged for the first time in front of the 
Arab  world  to  respect  Kuwait’s  security  and  independence.  The  second  was  the  prevalence 
in articles of political analysts and in conversations between MPs of doubt regarding the 
seriousness and commitment of Iraq to meet its obligations under the pretext that Iraq had 
rejected this Formula in 2001 but had accepted the same in 2002 due to US threats.19  
Sheikh Sabah, in his meeting with the Editors-in-Chief of Kuwaiti newspapers, 
emphasised that this Formula was ‘not  a   reconciliation between Kuwait and Iraq, rather it 
is in favor of Kuwaiti interests’.   20 Kuwait sent a letter to the UN Secretary-General 
concerning this Formula and reiterated   the   importance   of   Iraq’s   implementation   of   the  
                                              
16   General Assembly, ‘Annex II to the Letter Dated 24 April 2002 from the  Chargé  D’affaires  a.i.  of The 
Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General’,  Fifty-sixth 
session Agenda items 41 and 42, A/56/1026, 15 August 2002, United Nations. pp.10-11. 
17   KUNA,   ‘Kuwait-Iraq  Term  Affirms  Basic  Principles  of  Kuwait’,  Politics, Kuwait, dated 3/28/2002.On 
the KUNA website at :  
http://www.kuna.net.kw/NewsAgencyPublicSite/ArticleDetails.aspx?Language=en&id=1240106 
18    KUNA,   ‘Iraqi Vice President, Prince Abdullah Embrace at   Arab   Summit’,   General,   Kuwait,   dated  
3/28/2002. On the KUNA website at: 
http://www.kuna.net.kw/ArticleDetails.aspx?language=en&id=1239992 
19   Diplomatic   Center   For   Strategic   Studies,   ‘Kuwaiti Issues: Kuwait Foreign Policy in 2002’, Report, 
Kuwait, 2002. p.48. Al Watan Information  and  Studies  Center,  ‘Relations  with  Iraq’,  Classification No. 
5-2/6 dated 29/3/2002.  
20   Al Watan Information   and   Studies   Center,   ‘Relations   with   Iraq’,   Classification No. 5-2/6 dated 
31/3/2002.  
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terms  of  this  agreement,  particularly  with  respect   to  ‘outstanding  issues’  between Kuwait 
and Iraq.21 Thus, during this period, Kuwaiti policy towards Iraq was characterized by 
what may be described as   ‘surveillance   and   caution’22 of Iraqi movements on the 
international   and   regional   level   regarding   the   implementation   the   terms   of   ‘Conciliation  
Formula’  under the US and UK intentions to attack Iraq. 
 
4.   Official and popular views on the US mobilization of forces to attack Iraq 
 
4.1.  The official Kuwaiti stance  
After the Beirut summit, Kuwait began focusing on Iraq’s implementation of the 
resolutions of the summit in accordance with the ‘Conciliation   Formula’   as mentioned 
above. However, Kuwait’s flexible policy raised questions among analysts regarding 
Kuwait’s  continuance of this policy as an allied state with the US should the US attack 
Iraq. Despite Kuwait’s declaration in 2002 that the US troop mobilizations based in Kuwait 
were for routine exercise and maneuvers as per the agreement concluded between the US 
and Kuwait,23 George Bush has since pointed out that the aim was to launch sudden 
military operations against Iraq should they be requested to do so.24  
In April 2002, Bush and Blair met in the US to discuss the issue of Iraq; they set up the 
option of military action as one of the initial plans to dethrone Saddam’s regime should 
diplomatic efforts fail to convince Iraq to cooperate fully with the UN and to implement 
UN resolutions, particularly those related to the return of the UNMOVIC inspectors who 
had been excluded from Iraq since 1998.25 However, in late April 2002, the US practically 
initiated a  campaign  for  ‘regime  change  policy’  in Iraq26 through the deployment of its 
troops in the Gulf region in preparation for any military operation against Iraq on the one 
                                              
21   Ibid, dated 18/4/2002.  
22   This description by the researcher.  
23   KUNA,   ‘Iraqi   Regime   Complied  With Resolution 1441 Upon International Community Seriousness’,  
Military and Security, Kuwait, dated 20/11/2002. Online on the KUNA website at:  
  http://www.kuna.net.kw/ArticleDetails.aspx?language=en&id=1299739  
24   Bush, George W., Op.Cit. p.236. 
25   Blair, Tony, Op.Cit. p.402. 
26   Flibbert,   Andrew,   ‘The Road to Baghdad: Ideas and Intellectuals in   Explanations   of   the   Iraq   War’, 
Security Studies, Vol. 15, No. 2 (April–June 2006). p.316. 
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hand, and efforts to coordinate with the Iraqi opposition since August 2002 on the other, as 
a signal of the US’s seriousness about changing the Iraqi regime.27 According to published 
sources, the US took the final decision to end the ruling regime in Iraq in June 2002 using 
the following justifications: 
1. the claim that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction  
2. the claim that there was a relationship between Iraq and terrorism   through   Iraq’s  
supposed ties to al- Qaeda  
3. Iraq’s  brutal  rule  and  its  violation  of  human  rights   
4. the promotion of democracy in the Middle East, and the need to improve Arab Israeli 
relations.28 
Signs of the possibility of war in the Gulf region between the US and Iraq emerged after 
September 2002, when Bush pointed out in his speech at UNGA on 12 September 2002 
that Iraq had violated UNSC resolutions, particularly those related to WMD, in addition to 
the claim of a link between Iraq and al-Qaeda elements who escaped from Afghanistan to 
Iraq in 2002. Bush concluded his speech by saying, ‘We cannot stand by and do nothing 
while dangers gather … the  United  States  of  America  will  make  that  stand’.29 Also, Bush 
repeated his claim later in November 2002 that Iraq was working with al-Qaeda through 
training al-Qaeda   elements   and   financing   them,   such   as   ‘Abu   Musab   al-Zarqawi’   in 
Afghanistan. Thus, he warned Iraq against transferring the WMD to terrorist groups and 
prohibiting the return of international inspectors to Iraq.30 After  Bush’s  speech at UNGA, 
he sought to obtain a resolution from the US congress allowing the US to use military 
force against Iraq.31 On 11 October 2002, the US congress approved a bill (voting: 
133/296) authorizing the President to use such force against Iraq.32 These developments 
led Iraq on 16th September 2002 to send an official letter to UNSC thorough its Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Naji Sabri, confirming its acceptance of the return of UNMOVIC 
                                              
27   Allawi, Ali A., Op.Cit. p.82. 
28   Flibbert, Andrew, Op.Cit. p.316. 
29   General  Assembly   ‘Statement  by  President  Bush  United  Nations  General  Assembly  UN  Headquarters,  
New York 12 September 2002’   , General Debate- 57th Session 12-15, 17-20 September 2002, United 
Nations. On the UN website at:  http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/57/statements/th020912.htm 
30   Committee on Government Reform — Minority  Office,  ‘Iraq  on The Record: The Bush Administration’s  
Public   Statements   on   Iraq’, Special Investigations Division, United States House of Representatives, 
March 16, 2004. pp.23-24. 
31   Michael J. Mazarr, Op.Cit. p.8. 
32   Bush, George W., Op.Cit. p.241. 
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inspectors without conditions and restrictions and with full compliance with international 
resolutions.33 In light of this letter, the UN Security Council issued resolution No. 1441 on 
8 November 2002 calling Iraq to allow the return of UNMOVIC inspectors, headed by 
Hans Blix, to monitor the WMD without condition or restriction. The 1441 resolution 
confirmed under paragraph 2 that this resolution was  ‘a  final  opportunity  to  comply  with  
[Iraq’s] disarmament obligations under relevant resolutions of the Council’   and in 
paragraph   13   warned   Iraq   that   it   would   ‘face   serious   consequences’   in the case of any 
violation of this resolution.34 Iraq immediately declared, on 15 November 2002, its 
acceptance of this resolution.35 Blair, in his book, comments that Iraq accepted the return 
of international   inspectors   due   to   ‘a   threat   of  military   action’.36 Consequently, the Arab 
League held an exceptional ministerial meeting on 10 November 2002 and issued a 
resolution welcoming UNSC No. 1441 and reiterating that Arab countries would refuse to 
attack Iraq as this act would threaten the national security of the Arab countries. 37  
 Kuwait feared the effects of the upcoming war on its economic and political situation, 
given its geographic location. The potential economic implications of war were noted in 
comments by the governor of the Central Bank of Kuwait, Sheikh Salem Abdulaziz Al 
Sabah: ‘The  region’s  economies  might  face  difficulty  in  adjusting  to a long war led by the 
United States against Iraq and the negative economic consequences of any military action 
will extend to the whole region and the world. The greatest concern of Kuwait is that the 
war would last a long time and it may be difficult to treat its impacts’.38 Meanwhile, on the 
political level, Kuwait witnessed terrorist operations that were claimed to be linked to al-
Qaeda’s network: one US soldier killed and another injured on 9 October 200239 a group of 
US soldiers injured in November 2002, one US soldier killed in January 2003, and 15 US 
                                              
33   United Nations, ‘Report of the Security Council 1 August 2002-31 July 2003’, General Assembly 
Official Records Fifty-eighth Session Supplement, No. 2, (A/58/2), New York, 2003. p.7. 
34   Security  Council,  ‘Resolution  1441  (2002)  Adopted  by  the  Security  Council  at  its  4644th  meeting’,  on  8  
November  2002’, United Nations, New York.  
35   Al-sharq Al Awsat newspaper,   ‘Saddam Justifies to The Iraqi Parliament the Acceptance of the UN 
Security  Council  Resolution’, Issue No. 8755, 17th November 2002, London.  
36   Blair, Tony, Op.Cit. p.420. 
37   Arab League, ‘The Resolution of the Arab League at the Ministerial Level Meeting in Extraordinary 
Session on 10/11/2002’,  Secretariat  General,  Arab League, Egypt.   
38   Al-Wasat Newspaper, ‘Central Bank of Kuwait Fears A Long War In Iraq’,  Issue No. 120, Saturday, 4th 
January 2003, Bahrain.  
39   KUNA,   ‘Sheikh   Mohammed Says Shooting Incident is   Attack   Against   National   Interest’,   General,  
Kuwait, dated 9/10/2002. On KUNA website at   
  http://www.kuna.net.kw/ArticleDetails.aspx?language=en&id=1288960  
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soldiers wounded on 30 March 2003 due to a truck crash.40 The situation in Kuwait 
became critical on 27 January 2003 after a threat by Tariq Aziz to Kuwait in his interview 
with the Canadian Broadcasting Channel: ‘Kuwait  now  is  a  battlefield  and  US troops are 
in Kuwait and preparing themselves to attack Iraq; if there will be an attack from Kuwait, I 
can't say that will not retaliate, we will of course retaliate against US troops whenever they 
start  their  aggression  on  Iraq’.41 Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmed promptly responded to this threat 
saying that the Prime Minister of the Iraqi regime could do whatever he announced to the 
Canadian TV and he should shoulder the consequences if he considered attacking 
Kuwait.42  
Kuwait started to lay out its position on the issue of attacking Iraq on the internal and 
external levels as follows – as per the official statement by Sheikh Sabah to the UN 
General Assembly on 13 September 2002: 
1. Reaffirm  Kuwait’s  refusal  to allow use of its territory for military strikes on Iraq or the 
participation in any future military operation without a UN resolution;43 
2. Emphasize the Kuwaiti obligation to uphold the principle of non-interference  in  Iraq’s  
internal and its adherence to the resolutions of the Beirut summit held in March 2002 
concerning the ‘Conciliation  Formula’;;  
3. Call upon Iraq to implement, in accordance with international law, all relevant UNSC 
resolutions and complete cooperation with international inspectors as per resolution 
No. 1441 to avoid war in the area.44  
 
The Kuwaiti government began to develop internal procedures to deal with any possible 
war against Iraq as well:  
                                              
40   Aljarida newspaper,   ‘Rounds  of  al-Qaeda   in  Kuwait’,   Issue  No.1238,  Tuesday,  13 May, 2011, Kuwait. 
Online on the Aljarida website at:  http://www.aljarida.com/aljarida/Article.aspx?id=207333 
41   The CBC  Digital  Archives  Website,   ‘Mansbridge  One   on  One:  Tariq  Aziz’, Recorded on 27 January, 
2003, Broadcast Date: Feb. 8, 2003, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. Online on the CBC website at  
http://archives.cbc.ca/politics/international_politics/clips/15002/ 
42   Asharq Al Awsat newspaper, ‘Kuwait: Iraqi Aggression Will Be As A Declaration To  Commit  Suicide’, 
Issue No. 8829, Thursday, 30/1/2003, London.  
43   Al-Wasat newspaper,   ‘Kuwait   Rejects   Attack   Iraq   without   UN   Resolution’,   Issue   No.   17,   Monday,  
23/9/2002, Bahrain.  
44   General Assembly ‘Statement By His Excellency Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah First 
Deputy Prime Minister And Minister of Foreign Affairs of The  State  Of  Kuwait’,  Fifty-Seventh Session 
of The General Assembly of The United Nations, Friday, 13 September 2002, United Nations. New 
York.  
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1. Security checkpoints were set up in all governorates of Kuwait to prevent any sabotage 
acts that may be carried out in favor of external entities in the case of the outbreak of 
war; 45  
2. Kuwaiti Ministry of Defense increased the readiness of the Kuwaiti forces to secure the 
protection of the border, as well as to secure the home front;  
3. Ministry of Interior and National Guard Forces adopted several measures to safeguard 
the security and to tackle all contingencies;  
4. A plan of medical emergency established in the hospitals to measure the degree of 
readiness and all necessary foodstuffs had been provided, in addition to a plan already 
prepared to receive casualties in the case of any attack with such weapons; 
5.  GCC Peninsular Shield forces were deployed on Kuwaiti borders to defend Kuwait in 
case of any attack;46  
6. A plan of media was set up to provide the people with real news and information on 
updated events, in addition to a media campaign launched to guide people in Kuwait 
on the likelihood of upcoming war; 47 
7.  The Central Bank of Kuwait set up precautionary measures to deal with any unusual 
circumstances that could affect the functioning of the banking business;48 
8. A Humanitarian Operation Centre (HOC) was established on 3 March 2003, to provide 
material support to the Iraqi people and refugees in case of outbreak of war,49 which 
was terminated in mid-2009;50 
                                              
45  Al-sharq Al Awsat newspaper,  Issue  No. 8831, Saturday, 1/2/2003, London.  
46   Kuwait  National  Assembly,  ‘Muḍbatat  jalsat  Majlis  il-ʼummah  al-Kuwayti al-‘alanīya: al-fasl at-tashrīʽī 
altase‘’,   15   min  Muḥarram   sanat   1424   h,   al-muwāfiq 18 min shahr   mars   sanat   2003  m’,   ‘Minutes of 
Kuwait National Assembly: 9th  legislative term, Tuesday 18, March 2003’,  Kuwait. Online on the KNA 
website at : http://www.kna.kw/clt/default.asp  
47   Kuwait Information  Office,  ‘The 12th Anniversary of Iraqi Invasion’, Embassy of State of Kuwait, Beirut, 
2000. Online on the KIO website at: http://www.kuwaitinfo.net/officeactive-embassy6.htm 
48   Asharq Al Awsat newspaper, Issue No. 8866, Saturday, 8/3/2003, London.  
49   Ministry of Foreign Affair, At-takrīr  us-sanawi 2004, Op.Cit. p.43. 
50   WikiLeaks, ‘  Kuwait's Ambassador To Iraq Describes Slow Progress; Humanitarian Operations Center 
To Close’  , Reference ID  ;  09KUWAIT462 , CONFIDENTIAL, Embassy Kuwait,   07-05-2009. Online 
on WikiLeaks website at ;   http://www.wikileaks.org/origin/117_0.html 
 
 
280 
9. On 31 March 2003, KD500 million to meet all the security needs of the emergency 
was approved.51 
 
Iraqi diplomacy became more flexible from early December 2002, and looked for 
rapprochement with Kuwait to neutralize any military action undertaken by the US against 
Iraq. This approach was seen first in the Iraqi attendance of TC meetings in Geneva on 18 
December 2002 to discuss the Kuwaiti Prisoners of War, after the Iraqi boycott of TC 
meetings since December 199852 (see Chapter 6); and second, in the  speech  of  ‘apology’  
by the Iraqi President, which was read by the Iraqi Minister of Information, Mohammed 
Saeed al-Sahaf on behalf of Saddam Hussein on 7 December 2002, addressed the Kuwaiti 
people for the first time. In this speech, Saddam Hussein apologized to the Kuwaiti people 
for the events of1990  saying,  ‘We apologize to Almighty God for any act that made Him 
angry, should this act have happened  in  the  past.  We  apologize  to  you  on  this  basis   too’.  
However, he claimed in his speech that Iraq was forced to invade Kuwait in 1990 because 
of  a  ‘conspiracy  of  Kuwaitis  and  Americans  in  preparation  for  aggression’  against Iraq and 
that   ‘the  Kuwaiti   officials   isolated   the  Kuwaiti   people   from   the  Arab  nation  and put the 
Kuwaiti wealth under the disposal of the foreigners …. We are sorry for everything that 
happened against you’   and   ‘we   say   this,   not   because  of   our  weakness   or   a   tactic for an 
illegal objective, but to clarify the facts as we see them,’53 he added. 
Kuwait officially rejected the Iraqi speech, considering it   an   ‘attack’   and   ‘incitement’  
against the Kuwaiti regime, and deemed it a violation of the ‘Conciliation  Formula’ under 
the resolutions of the Beirut summit. Therefore, Kuwait started its movements to condemn 
this speech on the internal and external levels as follows: 
1. On the internal level, the Kuwaiti National Assembly held an urgent session on 14 
December 2002 to refute the Iraqi speech; it issued statement rejecting this speech and 
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confirmed that  ‘the  Kuwaiti  people  are  free  and  no  one  can  sow  the  seeds  of  sedition 
among its individuals. Saddam Hussein is mistaken in trying to incite the Kuwaiti 
people against their  Kuwaiti   leadership’. Therefore, the MPs in their statement called 
upon the Arab League to determine its position on this speech.54 Sheikh Sabah Al-
Ahmed Al-Sabah commented on the MPs’ statement   saying   that   ‘this   initial 
spontaneous reaction and firm rejection of the speech by the Iraqi regime leader has 
proved the historic cohesion amongst the Kuwaiti people and leadership. Saddam 
appears to have forgotten that he could not find any Kuwaitis who would collaborate 
during the heinous  occupation’.55  
2.  On the external level, the leaders of the GCC in their statement during the meeting of 
the supreme council held in December 2002 at Doha, denounced the Iraqi speech and 
considered it as   ‘provocative’, producing more tension and instability in the region.56 
However, as WikiLeaks shows, the US Ambassador to Kuwait, Jones, during his 
meeting with Kuwaiti Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sheikh Dr. Mohammed Al Sabah in 
2002 to review the outcome of this summit and the possibility of discussion the post-
Saddam Hussein era, commented, ‘Dr.  Mohammed  could  not  have  been  clearer  about  
GCC States’ desire  to  be  rid  of  Saddam  once  and  for  all’.57 
After the speech of the Iraqi President and the passing of resolution 1441, Kuwait began to 
change the method of its movements towards  Iraq  based  on  ‘its  readings  and  vision’   that 
there was an approach undertaken either for ‘strangling   the   Iraqi   regime’   or   ‘dethroning  
the  same’.58 This new Kuwaiti method involved, first, coordination between Kuwait and 
the US to overthrow Saddam’s regime, and, second, liaising with the Iraqi opposition 
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abroad to know the future of Iraq after Saddam Hussein.59 Regarding the Iraqi opposition, 
it should be noted that Kuwaiti policy rejected the establishment of   ‘offices’   or 
‘organizations’  for opposition movements on Kuwaiti territory against any foreign country, 
whether Iraq or another country, for reasons related to its national interests with the 
international community.60 Instead, Kuwait, after its liberation in 1991, endeavored to 
create  ‘coordinating  relations  and  contacts  with  the  Iraqi  opposition  abroad  before  the  fall  
of  Saddam  Hussein   regime   in  order   to  explore   the  future  of   Iraq’.61  Sulaiman Majed Al 
Shaheen has commented on this relationship:  
Kuwait had never sought to meet with Iraqi opposition en masse, but Kuwait was in touch 
with influential figures of the Iraqi opposition such as the Supreme Council for Islamic 
Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), which is the closest party to Kuwait. These Iraqi figures were 
constantly visiting Kuwait for consultation. However, this coordination was not on such a 
level that Kuwait would adopt this opposition en masse. 62  
Thus, in late 2002, Kuwait sought to exploit its relationship with SCIRI by initiating 
coordination between the US and SCIRI to plan opposition activities inside Iraq. However, 
Kuwaiti attempts failed due to the rejection of SCIRI headed by Mohammed Baker Al-
Hakeem.63 This is in addition to Kuwaiti efforts in late 2002 to facilitate the 
communications and transportations of Iraqi opposition among the GCC states.64 The 
coordination between Kuwait and Iraqi opposition resulted in the participation of Kuwait 
(as an observer) in the Iraqi Opposition Conference held in London on 14 – 15 December 
2002 to discuss the future of Iraq post-Saddam Hussein. The Kuwaiti Ambassador to the 
UK, Khaled Al Duwaisan, commented that  ‘our  mission  was  to  find  out  who  those  (Iraqi  
opposition) were and what they intended after the fall of the Iraqi regime, and what would 
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be their relations with neighboring   countries,   especially   with   Kuwait’.65 The Kuwaiti 
participation was further clarified by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sheikh Sabah Al-
Ahmed Al-Sabah: ‘We were invited to attend the conference as other observing countries. 
Moreover, we were concerned about   Iraq’s   future’.66 Simultaneously, Kuwait sought to 
coordinate more closely with the US to get rid of Saddam’s regime. As WikiLeaks 
documents show, Kuwait granted military facilities to the US in Kuwait through hosting 
16,360 soldiers in bases such as camp Araifjan Commando Camp, Camp Doha, Ali Al 
Salem Airbase, Ahmed Al-Jaber Air base, Kuwait Navy base, desert camps and desert 
training areas.67  
As a result of events in the region throughout 2002, the relationship of Kuwait with some 
Arab countries on the one hand, and the Secretary General of the Arab League on the 
other, were affected by Iraq. This can be illustrated by some Arab states, such as Lebanon 
and Syria, not giving priority to Kuwaiti demands regarding Iraq as per international and 
Arab resolutions at meetings of the Arab league. The Kuwaiti Ambassador to Cairo, 
Ahmed Al-Kulaib commented:  
At one of the a ministerial meetings of the Arab League before the fall of Saddam, the 
Lebanon, which chaired the meetings, represented by its Minister of Foreign Affairs, lifted 
the session immediately before including the paragraph related to Kuwaiti prisoners of war 
in the Arab League statement, despite our demands to include this paragraph in accordance 
with previous Arab resolutions. Thus, we expressed reservations on the resolution passed 
by the ministerial meeting due to non-inclusion of this paragraph, which led Sheikh Sabah 
Ahmed Al-Sabah to intervene and change the Arab position regarding to this resolution. 
Accordingly, Sheikh Sabah Ahmed Al-Sabah protested against the chairmanship of the 
Lebanese Minister of Foreign Affairs at this meeting; in addition, some Arab states, such 
as GCC States, Egypt, and Jordan made a statement to the Secretary-General objecting 
about the non-inclusion of this paragraph.  
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Al-Kulaib added: ‘Then the resolution was amended and this paragraph was added to the 
Arab resolution, the consequences of this event was that the Lebanese Minister of Foreign 
Affairs was dismissed from his post as minster after the protest made by Kuwait.’68 . 
Returning to Syria, Al-Kulaib claimed that, at the meeting, Syria’s   role   was to incite 
Lebanon to take this position: ‘During this meeting, there was a clear signal from the 
Syrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Farouk al-Sharaa, to Lebanon to adjourn the 
meeting’.69 Al-Kulaib added that during the one of the meetings before the fall of 
Saddam’s regime, Farouk al-Sharaa said that he ‘advised   the  Kuwaiti   Foreign  Minister, 
Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmed, on the importance of resuming relations between Kuwait and 
Iraq’  on the grounds that   ‘the  Iraqi  occupation  of Kuwait   is  no  more’.  To this Al-Kulaib 
severely replied to Al-Sharaa saying,  ‘If you want us to resume relations with Iraq, after its 
occupation of Kuwait and displacement and killing the Kuwaiti people, it is better that 
Syria should resume its relations with Iraq because of the similarity of both regimes 
(Ba'ath Party) and as there was no occupation issue and blood between Syria and Iraq. Be 
a role model and example to us, so we can think about the return of relations between 
Kuwait and Iraq’. Al-Kulaib commented that Farouk al-Sharaa did not reply to his 
speech.70 Also, during the same period, Kuwaiti relations with AL Secretary–General, 
Amar Mousa, were tense due to Kuwaiti discontent regarding the visit of Amar Mousa to 
Iraq with a full delegation of a large number of staff and journalists compared with his 
visit to Kuwait comprising approximately five to six people. Al-Kulaib commented on the 
performance of the Secretary–General: ‘Before the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime, 
it  was  not  successful,  and  he  had  to  be  fair’.71 At the beginning of 2003, the US started to 
mobilize international support for military action against Iraq under the pretext that Iraq 
had not implemented UNSC resolution No. 1441 in accordance with the first report issued 
by Hans Blix on 27 January 2003, which pointed   out   that   Iraq   did   not   reach   ‘genuine  
acceptance’.72 The US troops’ mobilization in the Gulf region reached 250,000 soldiers 
during January and March of 2003,73 of which 150,000 were stationed in Kuwait.74  
                                              
68   Author’s   interview with Ahmed Al Kulaib, the former Kuwaiti Ambassador to Egypt, Kuwait City, on 
Sunday 14 August 2011. 
69   Ibid  
70   Ibid 
71   Ibid 
72  See  Blix’s  report  in  Blair,  Tony,  Op.Cit.  p.415. 
73   Blair, Tony, Op.Cit. p.424.  
74   Bush, George W., Op.Cit. p.250.  
 
 
285 
Kuwait announced that from the 15 February 2003, the entire northern area was a ‘military  
zone’  and  access was prohibited.75 Consequently, there was a movement on the regional 
level to resolve the Iraqi crisis after the first conference of countries neighboring Iraq held 
on 23 January 2003 at Istanbul to find a diplomatic solution and avoid war in the region. 
Kuwait was excluded from this meeting, which included the attendance of Egypt - Turkey 
- Saudi Arabia - Iran – Syria. 76  Some sources have indicated that this exclusion was due 
to the Kuwaiti policy, which contradicted the objective of this meeting.77 The Turkish 
Prime Minister, Abdullah Gul, claimed that Kuwait was not invited because he invited 
only the countries he had visited on his recent regional tour, but that Kuwait would be 
invited to future meetings.78 However, Sheikh Dr. Mohammad Al-Sabah blamed Syria for 
Kuwait not being invited to this meeting due to its objection to the joint attendance of 
Kuwait and Iraq: 
I spoke with Abdullah Gul and expressed our surprise that Kuwait was not invited to attend 
the  meeting  and  Gul’s  reply  was  that  there  was  opposition  to  the  attendance  of  Kuwait  and  
Iraq together to avoid a collision at the meeting at a time when the war was imminent and 
that (Gul said) the idea was to hold this meeting in the presence of all parties, but Syria 
was opposed to the attendance of Kuwait and Iraq. ... Then, I spoke with Farouk al-Sharaa, 
and inquired about the reason for not inviting Kuwait.  Al-Sharaa’s  answer  was   that   (the  
attendees] wanted to deliberate and discuss the situation and that the Kuwaiti attendance 
was  not  useful’,  because  the  issue  that  would  be  discussed  at  this  meeting  was  ‘not  related  
to Kuwait, but related to the security of the region. 
Sheikh Dr Mohammad replied that this was   ‘rejectable and the justifications are 
unacceptable to Kuwait. We [as Kuwaitis] have no problem in inviting Iraq to keep 
pressure on them’  regarding the Iraqi behavior with international inspectors and the UNSC 
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resolutions and that ‘Kuwait  should  to  be  present in any regional meeting discussing either 
Kuwait’s   relationship   with   Iraq   or Iraq’s   relationship   with   its   neighbours’.79  Kuwait 
indirectly expressed its discontent in its non-participation at the meeting by Sheikh Sabah 
Al-Ahmed Al-Sabah, who said: 
We followed closely the proceedings of that meeting which we would have hoped to have 
taken part in. Nonetheless, I received a telephone call from the Saudi Foreign Minister 
Prince Saud Al-Faisal who was present at the meeting. That to me was acknowledgement 
that Kuwait should have been there as an active participant in the meeting.80  
This was followed on the Arab level by the Ministerial meeting of the Arab League on 15 
– 16 February 2003 to discuss the Iraqi crisis. At this meeting, there were clear differences 
among the Arab states regarding this crisis, which resulted in the failure to reach an 
agreement on two main points. The first was on the subject of issuing a final statement at 
this meeting, and the second was on the Egyptian proposal to hold an emergency summit 
regarding Iraq. Kuwait and all the Arab states except Oman, Djibouti  and Somalia, did not 
support holding an emergency summit. Nonetheless, these differences were aggravated 
after Lebanon (the chairman) issued a statement on behalf of the Arab League that had not 
been discussed or approved by the Arab states. Kuwait objected severely to this 
statement.81 As the US Ambassador, Jones, reported in WikiLeaks, Sheikh Dr. Mohammed 
Al-Sabah  considered  ‘the  statement   issued  by  Lebanon  after   the  meeting   to  be  a   forgery.  
Syria, Lebanon, Sudan, Yemen and Palestinian supported issuing a statement and a draft 
was circulated half an hour before the meeting broke up, but it was never discussed 
because of widespread opposition to issuing  any  statement’.82  
At the Arab summit held at Sharm el-Sheikh on 1 March 2003, which was dominated by 
discussion on the Iraqi crisis, Kuwait pointed out in its speech that Iraq had violated the 
‘Conciliation  Formulae’  since the end of the Beirut summit, particularly those provisions 
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related to inviting Iraq to adopt policies that would guarantee such undertakings. 
Therefore, Kuwait had determined the aspects of this violation as follows: 
a. the   Iraqi   President’s   speech   in   December   2002,   in   which   he   threatened   the   Kuwaiti  
regime and praised the terrorist operations that had taken place in Kuwait against US 
troops;  
b. Tariq Aziz’s aforementioned threat, in his interview on 27 January 2003, to attack 
Kuwait; 
c. Kuwait’s claim that the Iraqi Intelligence Service had endeavored to attack Kuwaiti 
interests at home and abroad; 
d. non-disclosure regarding Kuwaiti Prisoners of War and the return of Kuwaiti property 
and archives; 
e. non-implementation of the UN resolution concerning the situation between Kuwait and 
Iraq.83  
Therefore,  Kuwait  started   to  give  ‘indications’  about its ‘distrust’   in the ruling regime in 
Iraq concerning the implementation of international and Arab obligations in order to solve 
the   Iraqi   crisis   since   1990.   Thus,   Kuwait   supported   the   ‘initiative’   submitted by UAE 
President, Sheikh Zayed Al Nahyan during the abovementioned Arab summit to find a 
solution to the Iraqi crisis. However, this initiative was withdrawn after a threat by Iraq to 
withdraw from the meeting should this initiative be on the agenda, which included the 
following items: 
1. call for Saddam Hussein to relinquish power and leave Iraq within two weeks from the 
date of accepting the initiative; 
2. legally binding guarantees locally and internationally to be provided to Iraqi leadership 
against any prosecution should it accept;  
3.  the call for full amnesty for all Iraqis at home and abroad; 
                                              
83    KUNA,   ‘Sheikh Sabah Lashes out at Iraqi Regime for Continuous Threats Against’,   Politics,   dated  
1/3/2003. Online on the KUNA website at :  
http://www.kuna.net.kw/ArticleDetails.aspx?language=en&id=1323149  
 
 
 
288 
4. the Arab League, in cooperation with the UN, to supervise the situation in Iraq during 
the transitional phase.84  
Kuwait welcomed this initiative in its statement, saying   that   ‘these   ideas  were  meant   to  
safeguard   Iraq’s   unity   and   spare   its   people   destruction   and   other   losses   and   spare   the  
region the woes of a destructive war that would jeopardize regional security and 
stability’.85 Also, Kuwait repeated its support for this initiative at the emergency meeting 
of the OIC in Qatar on 5 March 2003, which was described by Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmed 
Al-Sabah as a ‘sincere   invitation   to   the Iraqi leadership to deeply think of the huge 
sacrifice that suit the bulk of risks storming Iraq and the region’.86 However, as WikiLeaks 
shows, Kuwait expressed its discontent with UAE’s adoption of its initiative:   ‘The UAE 
had not been more active in pushing the proposal, leaving Kuwait to do most of the 
diplomatic   works’.87 At the end of the Arab summit in Sharm el-Sheikh, AL issued a 
resolution confirming the Arab states’ rejection of attacking Iraq or threatening its security, 
calling upon the Arab states to refrain from participating in any military action targeting 
the safety, security and territorial integrity of Iraq  or  any  Arab  country’.88  
Despite the fact that Kuwait officially announced its adherence to the Arab resolutions to 
reject any military action against Iraq, in a practical way, it was in favor of any military 
operation carried out by the US to  get  rid  of  Saddam  Hussein’s  regime  according to the US 
Ambassador to Kuwait, Jones, in Wikileaks documents. 89 This view was also expressed in 
the confidential telegram of the US   Embassy   to   Kuwait,   which   stated   that   ‘the   United  
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States and Kuwait are standing shoulder to shoulder in the international effort to disarm 
Iraq as  a  result  of  Kuwait’s  geographic  location  next  to  Iraq  and  the  political  decision  by  
the  government  of  Kuwait   to  support  very   large  numbers  of  US   troops   in   the  country’.90 
For this reason,   Kuwait   started   focusing   on   Iraq’s   neighboring countries to gain their 
support  in  any  military  action  to  dethrone  Saddam’s  regime  in  March  2003.  In  this  respect, 
Kuwait granted Jordan $100 million in cash, in addition to supplying 25,000 barrels of oil 
per day for six months in case of any interruption of the oil supply to Jordan at the start of 
military operations against Iraq.91 Kuwait also announced, at the beginning of March 2003, 
its willingness to receive the rest of the US forces after the Turkish parliament rejected the 
stationing of US troops in Turkish territory to launch an attack against Iraq.92 According to 
WikiLeaks documents, Kuwait was one of the countries most keen to overthrow the 
regime of Saddam. Thus, in 2003 Kuwait asked Jones   to   expedite   toppling   Saddam’s  
regime and giving   Kuwait   ‘at   least   one   or   two   days’   official notice in advance of 
hostilities’ 
 
4.2. The Popular Stance in Kuwait 
 
The popular views and reactions in Kuwait can be ascertained from statements, articles 
and analysis in the Kuwaiti newspapers on the positive aspects and benefits that would be 
gained should Saddam’s regime be toppled. This is not surprising given the experience 
Kuwaitis had gone through, and the widespread hatred of Saddam Hussein that any visitor 
to Kuwait could pick up in interactions with Kuwaitis of any walk of life. While it would 
have been useful if further more scientific corroboration cold have been obtained directly 
for the purpose of this thesis, time and resource limitations made this unfeasible, not least 
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given the time that has elapsed since then. However, there is, fortunately, a Kuwaiti study 
that does provide useful evidence, especially with regard to the proposals and ideas of 
politicians and political blocks in Kuwait regarding their perspectives of how to deal with 
Iraq should Saddam’s regime fall. All these proposals mainly supported the overthrow of 
Saddam, stressed the importance of communication and the link that brings together 
people of Kuwait and Iraq, and established the vision of political and economic ties 
between the two countries in the post-Saddam era. Among these proposals were those by 
the Islamic Constitutional Movement, and by the   ‘Liberal’ block.  The study also lists 
popular initiatives represented in a statement issued by key personalities, intellectuals, 
artists, politicians, academics, mothers of martyrs and wives of prisoners of war addressed 
to the Iraqi people.93 
 
One might add to this a statement by MP Mohammed Al-Saqer, the Chairman of Foreign 
Affairs Committee in Kuwait National Assembly, during a visit to Washington, that ‘most 
Kuwaitis support the United States in any military action against Iraq should this act help 
to rid the region of Saddam  Hussein’.94  
 
5. The official and popular stances of Kuwait on the American war against Iraq  
  
The crisis became more acute on 5 February 2003 when the US Secretary of State, Colin 
Powell submitted a presentation to UNSC claiming that Iraq had WMD and did not 
comply with UNSC resolution 1441, which had given Iraq   the   ‘final   opportunity’.  
Therefore, UK, Spain and the US on 24 February 2003, submitted a ‘second   draft’  
resolution at UNSC indicating that Iraq had failed to cooperate and comply with resolution 
1441. However, this draft resolution was withdrawn on 17 March 2003 due to the 
opposition of Russia, France and Germany.95 Thus, after the failure of obtaining a 
resolution from the UN  to  give  a  ‘permission’  or  ‘an  excuse’   to launch a war against Iraq, 
the Spain, UK and the US changed their movement thorough holding the ‘Azores  summit’  
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94   Diplomatic Center For Strategic Studies, ‘Kuwait Issues, Kuwait Foreign Policies in 2002’.  Op.Cit.  p. 41. 
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291 
in Portugal on 16 March 2003 to discuss the Iraqi crisis. 96 This summit could be described 
as a ‘war  summit’,  in  which  these  countries  sent  an  ultimatum  to  Iraq  to  resort  to  force  in  
case of non-compliance of Iraq with UN resolutions. After this summit broke up, the UN 
Secretary- General announced the withdrawal of international inspectors from Iraq on 17 
March 2003 following discussion of the Iraqi issue in the UNSC, and there were indicators 
to attack Iraq.97 
 
On the evening of 17 March 2003, George Bush, in a televised speech, gave the Iraqi 
President and his family 48 hours to leave Iraq or to face war. Iraq rejected the US 
initiative, which led the US, UK and their allies (30 countries) to launch first an air war 
against Iraq on 19 March 2003 and then a land attack on 20 March 2003 with 380,000 
soldiers  under  the  name  of  ‘Operation  Iraqi  Freedom’.98 
The military intervention in Iraq was the most prominent test of the Kuwaiti policy on the 
internal and external levels. Since the military operations had begun, Kuwait supported 
these operations on the official and public levels in order to dethrone the Iraqi regime. The 
Kuwaiti official stance was expressed by the permanent representative of Kuwait at the 
UN, Mohammed Aboual Hassan at the UNSC session on 26 March 2003; he stated, 
‘Kuwait reaffirms that its position on the ongoing military operations against Iraq is in 
conformity with relevant security council resolutions and with the legal obligations on Iraq 
that proceed from them. This fact has been totally flouted by the Iraqi government. 
Security Council resolution 1441 (2002) also included a clear warning to Iraq that it would 
face  grave   consequences   if   it   remained   in   breach   of   these   decisions’.99 This was also in 
addition to the Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmed Al-Sabah’s congratulations to the Iraqi people 
after the US declaration on 9 April 2003 of the fall of Saddam’s regime in Baghdad,100 
when  he  stated  that  ‘our  hearts  are  filled  with  joy  as  we  see  the  brotherly  Iraqi  people  with  
whom we have been bound with ties of neighborliness expressing jubilation over victory 
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and  restoration  of  freedom’.101 Despite the fact that Kuwait did not take part in this war, 
Kuwait was the main supporter of the coalition forces in the region, which developed as 
follows:  
1. Kuwait hosted the US forces on its territory and announced that the entire northern 
area was a ‘military  zone’  and   that the access was prohibited due to the stationing of 
these troops at this area. In addition, the US used its land and marine military bases to 
attack Iraq as mentioned previously. 
2.  Kuwait   provided   ‘free’   logistic support to coalition forces during the period of war 
from 2002 to 2004, which was estimated at $2.145 billion,102 especially as this support 
continued subsequently through the signing of contracts between Kuwait by KPC and 
the US to  provide  the  latter  with  gasoline  and  oil  at  ‘discounted prices’  in March 2005. 
This was renewed in March 2006 and March 2007 for a further one year103 to finance 
OIF in Iraq. As WikiLeaks shows, the US Embassy to Kuwait pointed out that the 
Kuwaiti support saved US tax payers millions of dollars annually.104 In addition to the 
abovementioned free and discounted jet fuel for OIF, Kuwait had provided the US 
subsidy to its troops since 2003 valued at $1 billion annually, which included the 
following: ‘waived  port   fees,  waived  ground   support   fees   for  military   air   craft,   coast  
free use of bases, convey escorts, security, customs waivers for import and export and 
7000  gallons  of  free  jet  fuel  per  day’.  Thus,  the  total  value  of  Kuwaiti  support  provided  
to US troops was in excess of $10 billion from 2003 until the end of 2008 as the US 
report mentioned in WikiLeaks. Therefore, Kuwaiti support to the US was expressed 
by US Ambassador to Kuwait, Jones, as follows: ‘Kuwaiti  support  for  the  US  military  
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presence is 25 times that of Germany, 16 times that of South Korea and 65 times that 
of  Italy’.105 
3. Kuwaiti media supported the military operations in Iraq; Kuwaiti official and non-
official media were the only media in the region that supported the military operation 
throughout the period of war, calling it ‘Operation  Iraqi  Freedom’.106 
 
On the public level, the members of parliament at Kuwait National Assembly, in their 
session on 31 March 2003, supported military operations against Iraq and criticized the 
Arab countries and AL for failure to condemn the Iraqi missiles that had hit Kuwait at the 
beginning of this war.107 Therefore, the Kuwaiti MPs persuaded the Kuwaiti government 
to cut off economic aid for the Arab countries that did not support Kuwait. This stance can 
be illustrated in how after the US announced the fall of Saddam’s regime in April 2003, 
the MPs at the Kuwait National Assembly congratulated the Iraqi people on 14 April 
2003.108 The Kuwaiti official and popular stances were expressed by US Ambassador to 
Kuwait, Jones,  saying  ‘It is the only Arab State where both government and public opinion 
openly supported the US  in  eliminating  Saddam  Hussein’s  regime  by  force’.109 However, 
the Kuwaiti popular stance excluded some  ‘religious  groups’  who  considered  this  war  as  a  
‘new  crusade’  on Iraq.110 Thus, in appreciation of the Kuwaiti support, the US declared 
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Kuwait to be ‘a  major  ally  for  US  non-north Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)’  on 1 
April 2004.111  
As an expression of Kuwaiti discontent with the stand of some Arab countries due to the 
lack of condemnation of the Iraqi missiles that hit Kuwait, the Kuwaiti Minister of Foreign 
Affairs did not take part in the Ministerial meeting of the Arab League on 23 March 2003, 
which was held directly following the start of the OIF. Instead, the Kuwaiti participation 
was represented by its ambassador to Cairo, Ahmed Al-Kulaib.112 The US Ambassador, 
Jones, commented on non-participation of the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister at the 
abovementioned  AL  meeting,  saying  that  ‘sending  the  Kuwaiti  Ambassador  to  Egypt  in  his  
stead   is   a   clear   signal   of  Kuwait’s   displeasure  with   the   recent   performance   of   the  Arab  
League in general and Arab league Secretary General Amar Mousa in particular’.113 At 
this meeting, the AL condemned the US-British occupation of Iraq and called for the 
immediate withdrawal of these forces from Iraq.114 Kuwait expressed reservations about 
the statement of the AL due to the failure to denounce the Iraqi missiles that hit Kuwait, 
which was described by Kuwaiti Ambassador, Ahmed Al-Kulaib,  as  ‘imbalance’.115 As a 
reflection of the AL statement, a public demonstration took place in Kuwait on 3 April 
2003, denouncing the Arab League stance from the lack of condemnation of these 
missiles.116 The Kuwaiti discontent with the AL Secretary-General, as shown in 
WikiLeaks by the statement of the Egyptian Ambassador to Kuwait to US Ambassador 
LeBaron, prompted President Hosni Mubarak to visit Kuwait on 27 February 2006 to 
convince Kuwaiti officials to renew the term of office of Amar Mousa as AL Secretary 
General, because Kuwait and UAE had reservations about him due to his handling of the 
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Iraqi crisis and the UAE initiative as mentioned above.117 The Kuwaiti reservations 
regarding the issue of renewal of the AL Secretary General was expressed by the Kuwaiti 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sheikh Dr. Mohammad Al-Sabah to the US Ambassador 
LeBaron, saying   that   ‘politically,   the   Government   of   Kuwait   had   serious   disagreement  
with Mousa over  his  attempt  to  rehabilitate  Saddam  Hussein’s  regime’.118  
As a result of the Kuwaiti stance in supporting the military operations against Iraq, Kuwait 
felt   ‘isolated’   in its regional environment, as the US Ambassador Jones pointed out. 
Therefore, Sheikh Dr. Mohammed Al-Sabah did a tour of the P-5 States at UNSC starting 
on 6 April 2003 in order to deliver the following messages:  
1. to demonstrate to the Arab world that Kuwait has powerful friends and it is not alone 
or isolated.119 Therefore, the US Ambassador to Kuwait, LeBaron commented on this 
issue  later  in  2006  saying  that  ‘Kuwaiti  officials  view  that  support  as  sometimes  costly  
in  their  dealings  with  other  regional  countries’120  
2. to express Kuwaiti discontent with some countries at UNSC, such as Russia and 
France, about the   ‘German   proposal’,   following   the   fall of Saddam, concerning 
changes to the procedures related to payments of compensation to Kuwait as these 
procedures were designed to delay the compensation payments121 
3. to call for the denouncing of the Iraqi missiles that attacked Kuwait 
4. the importance of joining Kuwait in the practical efforts to reconstruct Iraq122  
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5. to deliver special thanks for the US’s  efforts  to  remove  Saddam  from  power 123  
6. the importance of continuing the UN resolutions regarding the situation between 
Kuwait and Iraq.124  
 
All sources and interviewees agree that Sheikh Sabah – in the end the one decision-maker 
who mattered – forcefully supported the role of US, British and other forces in the 
overthrow of Saddam Hussein. Nor was there any opposing voice to be heard within 
Kuwait.   There were several political, security and economic reasons that encouraged 
Kuwait to support this war to get rid of Saddam’s regime: 
1.  Saddam’s regime constituted a security threat for Kuwait from 1991 to 2003. This 
became obvious when this regime occupied Kuwait in 1990 and mobilized its forces 
once again against Kuwait in 1994 in addition to continuous threats to Kuwait as 
mentioned in the previous chapters.  
2. This regime was one of the main reasons for the decline of economic growth and 
investment in Kuwait. The foreign investment in Kuwait from 1990 to 2000 was 
estimated at $58 million only. After the fall of Saddam’s regime in 2003, foreign 
investments rose to $24 million in 2004 and $250 million in 2005125 then dropped to 
$156 million from 2005 – 2007 due to violence that took place in Iraq and the region, 
as will be discussed in the next chapter. This decline increased in 2008 due to the 
financial global crisis.126 Therefore,   after   the   fall   of   Saddam,   the   term   ‘economic  
diplomacy’  appeared in Kuwaiti foreign policy in 2004, the aim being to employ the 
diplomatic corps to attract foreign investment to Kuwait.127 This was in addition to the 
amendments to the Kuwaiti foreign investment law in 2008 by reducing the tax rate on 
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the foreign companies from 55% to 15% in order to encourage more foreign 
investment in Kuwait. Therefore, the total value of foreign investment in Kuwait 
reached KD600 million ($2.16 billion) up to 2010.128  
3. The nature of the Kuwaiti-US alliance since 1991 was further developed by the US 
announcement that Kuwait had become  ‘a  major  ally  for  US  non-north Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO)’  on 1 April 2004. This was in addition to the convergence of 
interests between the US and Kuwait to end Saddam’s regime. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The changing international and regional environments played   a   major   role   in   Kuwait’s  
policy towards Iraq during this period, after the terrorist attack of 9/11-2001 in the US and 
its impact on the global political scene that led to the war in Afghanistan in 2001. This and 
the so-called war on terror turned the attention of the US to Iraq, which resulted in hostility 
between Iraq and the US over the Iraqi WMD program and mobilization of coalition forces 
in the Gulf region. This culminated in the occupation of Iraq in 2003 – with close linkage 
to   Kuwait’s   security concerns. Over the period 2002-2003, Kuwaiti policy was 
characterized by, first, the coordination between Kuwait and the US to overthrow 
Saddam’s  regime,  and,  second,   liaising  with   the  Iraqi  opposition  abroad   to  determine   the  
future of Iraq after Saddam Hussein. Thus,   Kuwait’s   relationship   with   some   Arab  
countries, such as Syria and Lebanon, on the one hand, and the Secretary General of the 
Arab League on the other, were affected by Iraq. Thus,   Iraq’s   flexible policy towards 
Kuwait since December 2002, through its acceptance of the ‘Conciliation   Formula’,   the  
Iraqi   President’s   ‘apology’   speech   to   Kuwait   and   Iraq’s   attendance   of   TC   meetings   in  
Geneva in late 2002 to discuss the Kuwaiti prisoners of war, after the Iraqi boycott since 
December  1998,  were  a  reflection  of  Iraq’s  need  to  gain  Arab  political  support  to  prevent  
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any military attack against Iraq. Thus, the characteristics of Kuwait policy, during this 
period,  are  what  may  be  described  as  ‘surveillance  and  caution’  of  Iraqi  movements  on  the  
international and regional level regarding the implementation of the terms of the 
‘Conciliation  Formula’  in  the  light  of  the  US  and  UK  intentions  to  attack  Iraq. 
Even though Kuwait officially announced its adherence to the Arab resolution to reject any 
military action against Iraq, in practice it was in favor of any military strike to get rid of 
Saddam  Hussein’s  regime.  Not suprisingly, then, both official and popular Kuwaiti support 
was forthcoming for the intervention in order to dethrone the Iraqi regime; this was visible 
in Kuwait’s  logistical  support  for  US  and  UK  troops  in  offering  its  air  space  and  land  for  
such military intervention. However, as a result of this stance, Kuwait felt isolated in its 
regional environment. Yet there were several political, security and economic reasons that 
encouraged  Kuwait  to  support  this  war  to  topple  Saddam’s  regime,  the  most  important  of  
which were the continuous threats by the regime to Kuwait security since 1991 with the 
corresponding impact on the economic growth and investment in Kuwait, which led to the 
convergence  of  interests  between  the  US  and  Kuwait  to  end  Saddam’s  regime. 
Throughout, the key decision maker was Sheikh Sabah, the Foreign Minister, whose 
dominance of the foreign policy landscape was now virtually unchallenged. Indeed, this 
would only be confirmed further when he took up the post of Prime Minister a few months 
later. Yet he could count on widespread support among policy circles in Kuwait. 
After the fall of the regime in April 2003, Kuwait entered into a new phase of its 
relationship with Iraq, especially with regard to the ‘outstanding’   issues   and   the  
improvement of relations between the two countries, as will be discussed in Chapter 9.  
 
 
  
 
.  
 
 
299 
 Chapter IX 
 
 
Kuwait’s Foreign Policy towards Iraq,  
2003 to 2010  
 
 
1. Introduction 
Both the regional and internal environments played an essential role in Kuwaiti behavior 
towards Iraq after the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime in 2003 – the period which the 
present chapter will chart. Before detailing the evolution of policy, it is worth briefly 
introducing these factors.  
1.1. The role of population and ideational factors 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, ideational factors, demography and geography help shape the 
foreign policy of states. Religion, for instance, along with ethnicity, has become an 
influential element in international politics, which tends to be linked to both domestic  
demographic structures and ethnic or religious composition, and border-transcending 
identities. Such factors have certainly shaped Kuwaiti foreign policy towards Iraq since the 
fall of the Saddam Hussein regime.  As mentioned in Chapter 4, the Kuwaiti population is 
divided in various ways, between Kuwaiti and non-Kuwaiti, as well as Sunni and Shi'a. 
This potentially exposes the country to internal security risks, as demonstrated by a few 
terrorist operations during the Iraq-Iran War (1980-1988). Concerns rose again after the 
fall of the Saddam Hussein regime due to sectarian violence in Iraq between Sunni and 
Shi'a and its potential (and in some cases actual) regional effects.   In   Kuwait,   the   Shi’a  
comprise approximately 15% to 25% of the otherwise largely Sunni population, while in 
Iraq, the Sunnis make up approximately 40%, with a largely Shi'a population. Due to 
sectarian violence in Iraq, relations between Sunni and Shi'a have been strained in Kuwait, 
leading increasing proportions of the Kuwaiti people to support their own ideological 
affiliations, thus harming national unity in Kuwait.  
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Kuwaiti officials have expressed concerns that the sectarian violence in Iraq might threaten 
their  country’s  domestic  security  and  social cohesion, as Wikileaks has shown. This is in 
addition to the fear that this sectarian violence could result in the disintegration of Iraq and 
the  possibility  of  a  ‘Shi'a’  state  being  established  in  the  south  of  Iraq  that  would  be  loyal  to  
Iran and would destabilize Kuwait.   But as already mentioned, there are are further 
border-transcending linkages to these religious, sectarian and ethnic cleavages:  Iran is 
majority-Shia, as well as ethnically different, although there are populations of Arab 
ethnicity; while at the same time, there are Shia, and indeed people of Iranian ethnicity, 
throughout the Gulf and Iraq. This is one way in which the regional environment 
intertwines with the domestic. 
 
1.2. The role of the regional environment 
Countries are inevitably affected by geographic location and the foreign politically salient 
activities of regional states. This factor has been significant in Kuwaiti policy towards Iraq 
since the fall of Saddam Hussein regime. The occupation of Iraq by an international 
coalition led by the US and the UK in 2003, had political and security implications, as 
mentioned in Chapter 8. Also, foreign interventions and terrorist networks sought to 
destabilize Iraq and support terrorist operations in Iraq, in part in reaction against the US-
UK occupation. These issues are central to understanding Kuwaiti policy towards Iraq 
since 2003, because of Kuwait’s   geographical   location   near   Iraq. Iraq has become the 
unwitting host for violent radicals linked to al-Qaeda and foreign networks, leading to 
insecurity in the country. As a result, Kuwait has become concerned about transmission of 
such elements and terrorist operations to Kuwait. There is particular concern over Basra 
city  in  south  Iraq,  which  might  become  a  ‘failed  state’  under  the  control  of  these  extremist 
networks, which would affect Kuwait due to its geographic location.  
Therefore, Kuwait used the diplomatic and economic tools at its disposal (see Chapter 4), 
to support Iraq in restoring its security and stability to avoid it being converted into a 
center for tension or terrorism and thus constituting a risk to stability in Kuwait. This is 
especially the case since the rebirth of Kuwaiti-Iraqi relations after the fall of Saddam 
Hussein's regime, when the  ‘outstanding  issues’ between Kuwait and Iraq, which were the 
main impediment to the development of relations between the two countries, began to be 
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addressed.  This chapter, then, examines the evolution and components of Kuwait’s policy 
towards Iraq after the removal   of   Saddam’s   regime,   and its perspective on solving the 
‘outstanding  issues’  between  the two states – all in light of the concerns over physical and 
ideological security stemming from the above.  
 
1.3. The decision-making environment 
As always, the domestic decision-making environment needs to be understood to make 
sense of how these factors are turned into policy. As will have become clear from the 
previous chapters and the overall picture sketched in chapter 4, decision-making at the 
strategic level in foreign policy had by this point come to be concentrate very much in the 
hands of Sheikh Sabah Al Ahmad Al Sabah, the Foreign Minister – who in July 2003 
became Prime Minister of Kuwait, taking the place of Crown Prince Sheikh Saad in a 
move which split the position of Crown Prince and Prime Minister, thus consolidating his 
formal hold on power. While Sheikh Saad remained as Crown Prince, his indifferent health 
kept him away from the actual levers of power when it came to foreign policy. As Sheikh 
Sabah took over as Prime Minister, Sheikh Dr Mohammed Sabah Al Salem Al Sabah took 
the Foreign Affairs portfolio. Highly trusted, senior in the family, and with wide 
experience in foreign affairs – indeed including two years as deputy minister until that 
point – he became, as already noted in Chapter 4, an important figure in policy formation, 
much respected also by foreign diplomats, but playing his role very much discreetly, with 
ultimate direction firmly in the hands of Sheikh Sabah. This did not change, of course, 
when Sheikh Sabah was made Amir in 2006, instead of the largely incapacitated Sheikh 
Saad, who had to concede the position under pressure from the National Assembly a mere 
9  days  after  the  previous  Amir’s  passing. 
There was not really any countervailing or even diverging voice anymore in the policy 
establishment, but there were some strong views held and expressed in the National 
Assembly – especially against any moves towards debt relief for Iraq without National 
Assembly approval. Indeed some MPs threatened to use their constitutional power of 
‘interpellation’   against   the   Kuwaiti   Government should that be in prospect.1 MPs sent 
                                              
1  Arab News,  ‘Kuwaiti  MPs  Oppose  Iraqi  Debt  Write-Off’,  Friday  26  November  2004.  Available  online  at:  
http://www.arabnews.com/node/258683 
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frequent parliamentary questions to the foreign minister from 2003 on the outstanding 
issues with Iraq, 2  and the US took them seriously enough for the Ambassador to spend 
time discussing with them the issue of Iraqi debt relief. 3 MPs also convened regularly with 
the Foreign Minister in 2007, 2008 and 12009, to discuss, for instance, international 
positions on the execution of Saddam Hussein, 4 and Iraqi challenges to Kuwait in 2009. 5 
Remarkably, there was little difference among the different parliamentary factions – 
otherwise so prone to dispute – when  it  came  to  Kuwait’s  policy  towards  Iraq.   
 
2. Kuwait’s  policy  towards Iraq after the collapse of the Iraqi regime 
 
Following the collapse of the Ba'ath Party regime presided over by Saddam Hussein in 
2003, Iraq witnessed four main phases from 2003 to 2006:  
a. First   Phase:   formation   of   ‘Iraqi  Governing  Council   (IGC)’   (13   July,   2003   – 2004).6  
During this phase, the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) was promulgated on 8 
March, 2004 by the so-called  ‘Iraqi  provisional  constitution’,  which  administrated  the  
transitional phase in Iraq in full. Under Article (2) of this law, it called for the transfer 
of sovereignty in full to an elected Iraqi government no later than 30 June, 2004.  
b. Second  Phase:  formation  of  ‘Iraqi  Interim  Government’  (30 June, 2004 to 31 January, 
2005).7 During this phase, sovereignty was transferred to this government from the 
Provisional Coalition Authority (PCA), and the occupation was no longer as per 
UNSC resolution No. 1546 of 2004.8 
                                              
2  For  all  these  parliamentary  questions;;  Kuwait  National  Assembly  Website,’  Parliamentary  questions  
submitted by members  ‘  from  2003-2013 at: http://www.kna.kw/clt/default.asp   
3  Wikileaks,  ‘Kuwait  National  Assembly  Members  Agree  With  GOK  on  Iraqi  Debt  Relief’,  Reference  ID;;  
05KUWAIT651 , CONFIDENTIAL, Embassy Kuwait,  2005-02-14 .  
4   Ibid, At-taqrīr  as-sanawi 2007, State of Kuwait, 2007.  p.31. 
5 Ibid, At-taqrīr  as-sanawi 2009, State of Kuwait, 2009. pp.19-20. 
6   Allawi, Ali A, Op.Cit. p.166. 
7    GlobalSecurity,  ‘Law  of  Administration  for  the  State  of  Iraq  for  the  Transitional  Period,  8  March  2004’.  
Online  on the website of GlobalSecurity.org at: 
      http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iraq/2004/03/iraq-transitional-adminsitration-
law_8mar2004.htm 
8   Security  Council,  ‘Resolution  1546  (2004)  Adopted  by  the  Security  Council  at  its  4987th  meeting’,  
S/RES/1546 (2004), on 8 June 2004, United Nations, New York. 
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c. Third   Phase:   formation   of   ‘Iraqi   Transitional   Government’   (3   May,   2005   – 2006). 
During this phase, the permanent constitution was approved by referendum by the 
Iraqi people on 15 October, 2005’ the parliamentary election was held on 15 
December, 2005 in accordance with the approved constitution mentioned above.9  
d. Fourth Phase:  formation  of  ‘Permanent  Iraqi  Government’  (20 May, 2006 till present). 
During this phase, the political process in Iraq was culminated by the formation of this 
government on 20 May, 2006 presided over by Nouri al-Maliki.10  
 
During all these phases, Kuwaiti policy was determined by the principles laid out by 
Foreign Minister Sheikh Dr Mohammad Al Sabah in a speech in 2008:  
1.  Reaffirming the respect of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence 
and national unity of Iraq and its Arab  and  Islamic  identity;;  the  inviolability  of  Iraq’s  
internationally recognized borders; and adherence to the principle of non-interference 
in  Iraq’s  internal  affairs  and  good  relations with all its neighbours;  
2.  Stressing the right of the Iraqi people to determine freely their political system and 
common future, and control their natural and financial resources;  
3. Reaffirming, in this context, the obligation of all States, in accordance with 
international law, to combat terrorist activities and prevent the use by terrorists of their 
territory for supplying, organizing and launching terrorist operations. Specifically, it 
reiterated its call to prevent the transit of terrorists and arms to and from Iraq and re-
emphasize the importance of strengthening cooperation between Iraq and its 
neighbouring countries to control their common borders; 
4. Reaffirming the security stability of Iraq and condemn all acts of terrorism in all its 
forms in Iraq, notably against civilians, infrastructure, and government institutions; to 
emphasize the importance of addressing sectarianism and disarming and dismantling 
all militias and illegally armed groups without exception; and to suspend all acts of 
compulsory immigration and expulsion carried out by such powers;  
                                              
9   Allawi, Ali A, Op.Cit. pp.396-436. 
10    Ibid. p.446. 
 
 
304 
5.  Stressing the need to assist the government of Iraq to build up its defence and security 
forces on a national and professional basis;  
6.  Emphasising the importance of the United Nations’ support, and the need to 
strengthen its central role in coordinating international assistance and supporting the 
political process and national reconciliation; 
7.  Reiterating the importance of bringing to justice members of the previous Iraqi regime 
who had committed war crimes against Kuwait and Iran, and crimes against humanity 
against the Iraqi people; 
8.  Affirming that it is the responsibility of the Iraqi Government to pursue its obligation 
in accordance with the relevant international conventions and resolutions and to 
establish solid relations based on good neighbourhood in order to achieve security and 
stability in the region.11 
The principles of Kuwaiti foreign policy towards Iraq mentioned in Chapter 6 remained 
unchanged, and formed the basis of the new relations with future Iraqi governments.12  
Since the collapse of Saddam’s regime, Kuwait, with the international community, has 
endeavoured to rehabilitate Iraq on the political, economic and security levels due to 
security and geopolitical reasons. It  might  be  for  ‘ethical’  reasons too, due to its effective 
contribution in toppling Saddam’s regime. Therefore, Kuwait, in two main aspects, has 
determined   its   priorities   or   ‘concerns’   towards   several   issues   relating   to   Iraq in order to 
rehabilitate it internationally and regionally. 
 
2.1. Rehabilitation: political and security aspects of Iraq  
Due to geographic, ideological and political reasons, the security and political obsession in 
Iraq was considered one of the priorities and main worries of Kuwaiti foreign policy. 
Therefore, Kuwait focused on the importance of the political and security stability of Iraq 
in the region to avoid being converted into a centre for tension or terrorism that would 
                                              
11    Keynote Speech of Sheikh Dr. Mohammad Al-Sabah, Minister of Foreign Affairs, ‘The  Item  Related  To  
Iraq’  18th  EU-GCC Joint Council and Ministerial Meeting, Brussels, 26th May 2008. Available online on 
the Kuwaiti Ministry of Foreign Affairs  website at: http://www.mofa.gov.kw/MOFA/index.php/-57/813-
u--18  
12    See Chapter VI of this study. 
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constitute a risk to stability in the Gulf region in general and Kuwait in particular. Thus, 
Kuwait took steps at the regional and international level to support the political process in 
Iraq during the four phases mentioned above.  
 
Regarding the political aspects, Kuwait welcomed UNSC resolution No. 1483 (22 May, 
2003), which referred to US and   UK   forces   as   ‘occupying   powers’   under   the unified 
command of the   ‘Coalition   Provisional   Authority’   (CPA)   and   the   importance   of   the  
establishment of an internationally recognized, representative government of Iraq. In 
addition, this resolution called all countries and the UN and its specialized agencies to 
provide assistance to Iraq to support the political process and security stability by 
appointing a Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Iraq.13  Therefore, in 
the first phase of the political process in Iraq, Kuwait supported the Iraqi Governing 
Council (IGC) (25 members), which was formed on 13 July, 2003,14 and supported the 
UNSC resolution No. 1500 of 2003, which welcomed the formation of the IGC as an 
important step towards the formation of an internationally recognized government that 
would exercise the sovereignty of Iraq, in addition to the establishment of the United 
Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI).15 Hence, Kuwait endeavored to employ its 
diplomatic tools in order to gain regional and international recognition for the IGC as an 
initial step to restore Iraq to the international community by convincing first the Arab 
states to accept the IGC in the meetings of the Arab League (AL) as the legitimate 
representative of the Iraqi people, due to the fact that the vacuum of power in Iraq had to 
be filled in order to enable Iraq to restore its security and stability.16 In fact, some Arab 
states rejected the formation of the IGC, particularly Amr Moussa, the Secretary General 
of the AL, who refused to deal with the IGC under the pretext that it was not elected and 
did not represent the Iraqi people. Therefore, these parties sought to avoid giving the IGC 
                                              
13   Security  Council,  ‘Resolution  1483  (2003)  Adopted  by  the  Security  Council  at  its  4761st  meeting’,  
S/RES/1483, on 22 May 2003, United Nations, New York. 
14  Katzman,  Kenneth,  ‘Political  Scenarios  in  Post-War  Iraq’,  in  Alsuwaidi,  Jamal  S.  (ed.),  Iraq: 
Reconstruction and Future Rule, the Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 2004. p.95. 
 15    Security  Council,  ‘Resolution  1500  (2003)  Adopted  by  the  Security  Council  at  its  4808th  meeting’,  
S/RES/1500, on 14 August 2003,  United Nations, New York.  
16  KUNA,  ‘Kuwait  Supports  IGC  Participation  in  the  Arab  Foreign  Minster  Meeting- Kulaib’,  3      
September, 2003. Available  online on the  KUNA website at:  
     http://www.kuna.net.kw/ArticleDetails.aspx?language=en&id=1371267  
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legitimacy and refused to grant it Iraq’s seat in the AL. 17 It was eventually admitted on 10 
September, 2003 following regional and international pressure.18 The ambassador, Ahmed 
Al-­Kulaib,   commented on the significant role Kuwait played in the admission of the IGC: 
  
the Kuwaiti proposal was rejected at the beginning, which prompted Kuwait to withdraw 
from   the   Arab   League   meeting   in   protest   against   the   rejection   of   its   proposals   […]  
Following the withdrawal of Kuwait from the meeting, Amr Moussa, and the Egyptian 
Foreign Minister, Ahmed Mahr intervened to convince Kuwait to attend the meetings in 
consideration of accepting the Kuwaiti proposal. This actually happened and the delegate 
of Iraq was allowed to attend the meetings of the Arab League to occupy the seat of Iraq in 
the Arab League.19  
 
As WikiLeaks documents indicated, this support could also be illustrated by Kuwait 
seeking to support the IGC’s occupancy of Iraq’s  seat  in  the  meetings  of  the  Organization  
of Islamic Countries (OIC) held in Malaysia in October 2003. This was opposed by the 
host country, Malaysia, due   to   an   issue   related   to   the   ‘protocol’   as   Iraq   did not have a 
president. Further, Kuwait delayed the acceptance of the credentials of the Cuban 
ambassador to Kuwait to demonstrate dissatisfaction with Cuba’s position against the 
IGC.20 Thus, the IGC gained international and regional acceptance after its admission to 
the Arab League meetings,21 and particularly after UNSC resolution No. 1511 was issued 
on 16th October 2003, which demanded the IGC to submit a timetable to the UNSC no later 
than 15th December, 2003 for the drafting of a new constitution for Iraq and for the holding 
of democratic elections under that constitution.22   
 
                                              
17   Allawi, Ali A, Op.Cit. p.301. 
18   Crocker,  Bathsheba,  ‘Checking  the  Rising  Tide:  Anti- American in Iraq and the Future of the US-Iraq 
Relationship’,  in  Alsuwaidi,  Jamal  S.  (ed.),  Iraq: Reconstruction and Future Rule, The Emirates Center 
for Strategic Studies and Research, 2004. p.54. 
19    Author’s  interview with Ahmed Al Kulaib, the former Kuwaiti Ambassador to Egypt, Kuwait City, on 
Sunday 14 August 2011.  
20    WikiLeaks  ,  ‘Kuwaiti  FM Discusses Aid To Iraq, Afghanistan’,  Reference ID;      03KUWAIT4486    , 
CONFIDENTIAL  Embassy Kuwait, 2003-10-01   . Online on the WikiLeaks website at: 
      http://www.wikileaks.org/origin/117_0.html 
21    Crocker, Bathsheba, Op.Cit. p.54. 
22    Security  Council,  ‘Resolution  1511  (2003)  Adopted  by  the  Security  Council  at  its  4844th  meeting’      
S/RES/1511, on 16 October 2003, United Nations, New York. 
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Supporting the IGC on the regional level, Kuwait started exerting pressure on Syria to 
change   its   ‘old   guard’   policy   towards   Iraq   represented   by   Syrian   Minister   of   Foreign  
Affairs, Farouk al-Sharaa.  As WikiLeaks shows, the US Ambassador to Kuwait, Richard 
H. Jones reported that the Chairman of the National Security Bureau, Sheikh Sabah Khalid 
Al-Sabah, said that the Kuwaiti Prime Minister, Sheikh Sabah Al Ahmed Al Sabah, visited 
Syria in October 2003 to discuss the issue of Iraq. Sheikh Sabah Al Ahmed informed the 
Syrian President, Bashar al-Assad, in the presence of Farouk al-Sharaa himself, that  ‘FM  
Farouk al-Sharaa is the architect of your entire mistake. Now it is in Syria's own hands to 
determine  its   future.  Act  swiftly  before  the  window  closes’.  Sabah  Al  Ahmed  added   that  
‘he   had   stood  with   Bashar’s   father   as   an   ardent   pan–Arabist, but those days were now 
gone,   never   to   return’.23 However,   the   Syrian   position   remained   ‘negative’   towards   the 
IGC, which prompted Kuwait to express its discontent with Syria because the latter did not 
invite the IGC and Bahrain (in its capacity as the Chairman of the Arab League) to attend 
the fourth meeting of neighboring countries for Iraq,24 held in Syria on 1-2 November 
2003.25  Thus, on the Gulf (Saudi Arabia) and Arabian (Egypt – Jordan) levels, Kuwait 
started to exert pressure on the Syrian government to invite the IGC to this meeting. The 
Kuwaiti efforts culminated in Iraq being invited to attend this meeting at the last 
moment.26 However, Iraq did not attend due to its discontent with Syria.27 Sheikh Dr. 
Mohammad Al-Sabah commented on this issue saying, ‘When I went to Syria to attend the 
meeting, I said to Farouk al-Sharaa that if Iraq was not invited to attend this meeting, I 
would withdraw from the meeting. And then al-Sharaa agreed that Iraq could attend this 
meeting on condition that the invitation  be  sent  by  Kuwait  instead  of  Syria’. He continued:  
                                              
23    WikiLeaks  ,‘Syria:  GOK  to  Host  Bashar  After  Ramadhan’,  Reference  ID;;   03KUWAIT4681    
CONFIDENTIAL, Embassy Kuwait, 2003-10-14 . Online on the WikiLeaks website at: 
      http://www.wikileaks.org/origin/117_0.html  
24    The First meeting was held in January 2003 at Istanbul, the Second meeting held in April 2003 in Riyadh 
and Third meeting held in  May 2003 in Tehran,  while the Forth  meeting in Syria.  
25   WikiLeaks  ,  ‘Syria  to  Convene  FM’s  on  Iraq’,  Reference  ID  ; 03KUWAIT4960, CONFIDENTIAL, 
Embassy Kuwait,   2003-10-28 . Online on the WikiLeaks website at: 
      http://wikileaks.org/cable/2003/10/03KUWAIT4960.html  
26   Ibid,    ‘More  on  Syria's  Iraq  Meeting’;;  Reference ID  :03KUWAIT4988, CONFIDENTIAL, Embassy 
Kuwait,    2003-10-29.   Online on the WikiLeaks website at: 
      http://wikileaks.org/cable/2003/10/03KUWAIT4988.html  
27   Ibid,  ‘Iraq:    GOK  Wants  to  Rebuild  People-To-People  Ties,  Encourage  Private  Sector’,  Reference  ID:  
03KUWAIT5057 , CONFIDENTIAL, Embassy Kuwait, 2003-11-04.  Online on the WikiLeaks website 
at:    http://wikileaks.org/cable/2003/11/03KUWAIT5057.html  
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Then, I called the Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hoshyar Zebari, and invited him to 
attend the meeting, but after a short time, Zebari called   and   informed   me   of   Iraq’s  
appreciation   of   Kuwait’s   efforts,   and   of   Iraq’s   refusal   to   attend   the   meeting   as   Iraq  
considered the method of sending the invitation was an insult to Iraq because it did not 
come from the host state, Syria. In addition, the Syrian regime had a negative stance  
towards Iraq.28   
Despite the absence of Iraq, the participating countries highlighted in the final statement of 
this meeting the importance of cooperation between the IGC and neighboring countries 
regarding security issues and the problem of terrorist operations in Iraq.29 Kuwait 
emphasised the importance of Iraq joining this kind of meeting to show support for Iraq on 
both regional and international levels. Therefore, Kuwait invited Iraq to attend the next 
meeting of neighboring countries for Iraq held in Kuwait on 14–15 November, 2004; this 
was attended by Iraq for the first time.30 The nine participating countries at this meeting 
confirmed   the   ‘birth’   of   a new Iraq that would respects its obligations towards the 
international community.31 
 
In the second phase of the political process in Iraq, Kuwait welcomed the formation of the 
Iraqi interim government,32 which was declared on 2 June, 2004 and presided over by 
Ayad Allawi,33 and the termination of the US–UK occupation of Iraq on 30 June, 2004,34 
as per UNSC resolution No. 1546 of 2004 whereby the CPA transferred Iraq sovereignty 
to this government.35  Thus,  during  the  ‘historical  visit’36 of the Iraqi Prime Minister, Ayad 
                                              
28    Author’s  interview with Sheikh Dr. Mohammad Al-Sabah, former Kuwaiti Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Kuwait City, 11 June 2012.  
29   Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs,  ‘Final  statement  of  the  Ministerial  Conference  of  the  Neighboring  Countries  
of  Iraq’,  Damascus,  2  November  2003,  Department  of  International  Organizations,  Kuwait.   
30   WikiLeaks,  ‘Iraq:  Neighboring  Countries’ Meeting  Supports  Political  Transition’;;   Reference ID: 
04KUWAIT539, CONFIDENTIAL, EmbassyKuwait, 2004-02-17.  Online on the WikiLeaks website at:  
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2004/02/04KUWAIT539.html  
31    Ministry of Foreign Affairs,  ‘Final  Statement  of  Fifth  Ministerial  Conference  of  the  Neighboring  
Countries  of  Iraq’  on  February  14-15-2004, Department of International Organizations, Kuwait.  
32    Al Watan  Information  and  Studies  Center,  ‘Relations  with  Iraq’,  Classification  No.  5-2/6, dated 
17/7/2004, Kuwait. 
33    Allawi, Ali A, Op.Cit. p.286. 
34    Al  Watan  Information  and  Studies  Center,  ‘Relations  with  Iraq’,  Classification  No.  5-2/6, dated 
30/6/2004, Kuwait. 
35     Under resolution 1546 of June 8, 2004, the UNSC demanded the termination of occupation and 
assumption of full responsibility and authority by a fully sovereign and independent Interim Government 
of Iraq by 30 June 2004. This was achieved on 28/6/2004.  
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Allawi, to Kuwait from 31 July to 2 August 2004, Kuwait and Iraq expedited resuming 
diplomatic relations between both countries, which had been severed since 1990.37 This 
relationship was reinforced following the visit of Ghazi al-Yawar,  the first Iraqi President, 
to Kuwait on 31 October, 2004.38   
 
In the third phase, Kuwait politically supported the political process in Iraq represented by 
the election of the Transitional National Assembly on 31 January, 2005 and the formation 
of the Iraqi Translational government on 3 May, 2005, which was described by Kuwait as 
a ‘historical’  step  39 in order to draft a permanent constitution and conduct free elections 
for a permanent Iraqi government.40 Thus, after the voting on the Iraqi constitution on 15 
October, 2005 and conducting the first Iraqi free elections on 15 December, 2005, which 
paved the way for the formation of the first permanent Iraqi government (Phase IV) on 20 
May 2006 presided over by Nouri al-Maliki,41 Kuwait promptly affirmed its support for 
this step in order to reinforce relations between both countries,42 and pushed Iraq to end 
hostilities between them. Therefore, Kuwait participated in the meetings of the Special 
Arab Committee for Iraq, held in Jeddah on October 2005, to urge the Iraqi parties to hold 
a reconciliation conference in order to support the political process in Iraq. This resulted in 
the Iraqi reconciliation meeting at the Arab League, 12-19 November 200543, in addition to 
its participation in all meetings of countries neighboring Iraq to support the political 
process in Iraq and its effective participation in the meetings of the International Compact 
                                                                                                                                        
36    WikiLeaks  ,  ‘Iraqi  Prime  Minister’s  Historic  Visit  To  Kuwait’, Reference ID  : 04KUWAIT2426 
CONFIDENTIAL, EmbassyKuwait, 2004-08-04. Online on the WikiLeaks website at:    
http://www.wikileaks.org/origin/117_0.html 
37    Ministry of Foreign Affairs, At-takrīr  us-sanawi 2004, Op.Cit. p. 46. 
38    Al  Watan  Information  and  Studies  Center,  ‘Relations  with  Iraq’,  Classification  No.  5-2/6, dated 
31/10/2004, Kuwait. 
39    WikiLeaks,  ‘Update  on  Key  Issues  For  Undersecretary  Bolton's  January  28-29  Visit  To  Kuwait’,  
Reference ID  ; 05KUWAIT327  , SECRET, Embassy Kuwait, 2005-01-19  . Online on the WikiLeaks 
website at:       http://www.wikileaks.org/origin/117_0.html 
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with Iraq (ICI) officially held on May 2007 at Sharm Al Sheikh, Egypt, until the present 
time.44  
 
Despite the above developments, represented in particular by the resumption of diplomatic 
relations between both countries in 2004, there was no diplomatic representation between 
both countries at an ‘ambassadorial   level’   until   2008. This became a controversial issue 
between Kuwait and Iraq. According to WikiLeaks documents, Kuwait had (unofficially) 
named General Ali Al-Mo’min   (Chairman of HOC) its ambassador to Iraq at the end of 
200545 in addition to reopening the provisional embassy of Iraq in Kuwait in November 
2005.46 Nonetheless, Kuwait officially delayed the announcement of the appointment of its 
ambassador until September 200847 for the following reasons:  
 
1. Kuwait was reluctant to send its diplomatic corps to Iraq, particularly following the 
deterioration of the security circumstances in Iraq since 2003. Al-Mo'min expressed this to 
the US Ambassador to Kuwait, LeBaron, in 2005: ‘Any Kuwaiti diplomat would be the 
prime target of the insurgents […]  we Kuwaitis have a lot of friends in Iraq, but we also 
have  many  enemies’.48  
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See  United  Nations,  ‘The  International  Compact  With  Iraq  2007  Mid  – Year Progress  Report’,  UN  News  
Center, 20 July 2007, New York. p.1. The report available online on the UN Website at :    
      http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocusRel.asp?infocusID=50&Body=Iraq&Body1 
45    WikiLeaks,  ‘Foreign  Minister  Confirms  Gen.  Al-Mumin is the  “Chosen  One”  For  Kuwaiti  Ambassador  
to  Iraq’,  Reference ID  ; 05KUWAIT5130 , CONFIDENTIAL, Embassy Kuwait  2005-12-14 .   Online 
on the WikiLeaks website at :          http://www.wikileaks.org/origin/117_0.html 
46  Calderwood, James,  ‘First  Iraqi envoy  to  Kuwait  in  20  years’,  The  National,  June 1, 2010. Available 
online on The National website at:  http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/first-iraqi-envoy-
to-kuwait-in-20-years  
47    Kuwait officially declared the appointment of its Ambassador to Iraq in September 2008. The Kuwaiti 
Ambassador assumed his duties in Iraq at the end of October 2008.  WikiLeaks ,  ‘Kuwaiti  Ambassador  
To  Iraq  Sworn  In  By  Amir’,  Reference ID;  08KUWAIT991   ,  CONFIDENTIAL , Embassy Kuwait, 
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08KUWAIT1113 ,  CONFIDENTIAL , Embassy Kuwait,  2008-11-06 .  Online on the WikiLeaks 
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2. Iraq delayed the appointment of its ambassador to Kuwait until March 201049 due to 
severe competition inside Iraq for this position, according to WikiLeaks documents.50  
Accordingly, Kuwait adopted the principle of reciprocity. Thus, in September 2008, the 
Kuwaiti Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sheikh Dr. Mohammed Al Sabah, highlighted to the 
US Ambassador to Kuwait, Deborah K. Jones, Kuwait’s  concerns  regarding  Iraq’s  failure  
to nominate its ambassador to Kuwait while Kuwait intended officially to announce its 
ambassador to Iraq.51  In addition, in June 2008, the Kuwaiti Prime Minister, Sheikh 
Nasser Al Sabah, pointed out to the US Coordinator to Iraq, Ambassador Satterfield, that 
the   Kuwaiti   stance   was   that   ‘both   countries   should   name   their   respective   ambassadors 
simultaneously’.52 However, this controversial issue was resolved after the appointment of 
the Iraqi ambassador to Kuwait for the first time in March 2010 despite Kuwait having 
officially announced its ambassador in 2008 as mentioned above. Sheikh Dr. Mohammed 
Al Sabah commented that this announcement was due to the  Amir’s  desire   to  encourage  
Iraq to nominate its ambassador. 53 
The  matter  of  the  ‘outstanding  issues’  remained the main impediment to the development 
of relations between Kuwait and Iraq. Therefore, the Kuwaiti Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Sheikh Dr. Mohammed Al Sabah, visited Iraq on 26 February, 2009. This was described as 
a ‘historical  visit’ because it was the first visit from a Kuwaiti official to Iraq since 1990 to 
discuss those outstanding issues which had become  a  source  of  ‘Kuwaiti  doubt’  regarding 
Iraqi behavior towards Kuwait.54 This was followed by the visit of the Kuwaiti Prime 
Minister, Sheikh Nasser Al Sabah, on 12 January, 2010 to Iraq for the first time since 1990 
to   strengthen   the   relationship   between   both   countries   and   to   discuss   the   ‘outstanding  
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issues’, as will be discussed later.55 In order to strengthen the relationship with Iraq, on 29 
March, 2012, the Amir of Kuwait, Sheikh Sabah Al Sabah, visited Iraq for the first time 
since 1990 to attend the Arab Summit held in Baghdad; this summit had been postponed 
since 2011 due to the events of the Arab Spring and the deterioration of the security 
circumstances in Iraq.56 Kuwait was the only Gulf Arab State of five other states that 
attended this summit at the level of the head of state. These states were absent due to 
Sunni–Shīʿah  tension  in  the  region,  especially  regarding the Syrian and Bahraini crises and 
the discrepancy among Arab countries and Iraq regarding their attitude towards these 
crises. This was expressed by the Qatari Prime Minister, Sheikh Hamad Bin Jassim, who 
stated that the ‘low  level  of  representation  was  a  message  to  Iraqi’s  Shīʿah  majority  to  stop  
the  marginalization  of  the  minority  Sunnis’.57  
The issue of uncontrolled security, lawlessness and foreign intervention, particularly at 
Basra city in south Iraq, had become a concern for Kuwait due to its proximity to the 
Kuwaiti border. Iraq had witnessed   sectarian   strife   between   Shi’a   and   Sunnis   since   late  
2006. This was in addition to the foreign intervention and terrorist operations in Iraq that 
had taken place since the collapse of Saddam’s regime,58 due to internal and external 
reasons, which were reflected in the national and ethnic composition in Iraq: Shīʿah 
(53.3%), Sunnis (42.3%), Arabs (77.1%), Kurds (19%), Turkmen (1.4%), Assyrians 
(0.8%), and Persians (0.8%), while Muslims made up 95.8%, Christians 3.5% and other 
religions 0.7%.59   The Iraq Family Health Survey Study Group and WHO60 estimated that 
the death toll in Iraq from 2003 to 2006 was 151,000 persons, while the study conducted 
by The Lancet estimated the death toll in Iraq for the same period to be 654,965 persons, of 
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which 601,027 persons were killed due to sectarian violence.61  Thus, the national and 
ethnic conflict was negatively reflected in Kuwait in particular and in the region in general 
due to ideological, religious, political and geo-political considerations, which were 
determined by the following three approaches:   
1.  Fear of the transmission of sectarian conflict in Iraq to Kuwait and the region.62 As 
mentioned in Chapter IV, in Kuwait, the   Shīʿah constitute 15% to 30%, while the 
majority belong to the Sunni sect.63  Therefore, Kuwait witnessed clashes between 
Sunnis and Shi'ites during the sectarian violence in Iraq with some Sunnis and Shi'ite 
mosques being attacked, in addition to political tension between the categories of 
Kuwaiti society due to the implication of the situation in Iraq.64  Thus, the chairman of 
HOC in Kuwait, Al-Mo'min (Shi'ite), commented to one US official in 2005 that 
‘Kuwaiti   Sunni–Shi'a relations are suffering due to the growing influence of Sunni 
fundamentalists  and  Zarqawi’s   influence  on  youth   throughout   the  region’,65 according 
to WikiLeaks documents., Regarding  Kuwait’s  concern  on  this  issue, LeBaron, the US 
Ambassador to Kuwait in 2007, commented,  ‘There is also mounting concern in Kuwait 
that  sectarian  violence  in   Iraq  could  threaten  domestic  security  and  social  cohesion’.66 
This tension between Sunni–Shi'a relations in Kuwait was aggravated in 2008 because 
some Kuwaiti citizens staged a funeral after the assassination of the Shi'a leader of the 
Lebanese Hezbollah party, Imad Mugniyah, believed to be the mastermind of the 
terrorist operations in Kuwait during the 1980s. This event affected Kuwaiti society and 
became  a  major  ‘controversial’  issue  between  the  members  of  the Kuwaiti parliament.67  
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Moreover, the Sunni–Shi'a tension increased sharply in Kuwait and the Gulf region 
after the events of the   ‘Arab Spring’ in Bahrain (Sunni regime) and in Syria (Shi'a 
regime) in 2011; this divided Kuwaiti society, leading people to support their own 
ideological affiliations through demonstrations and protests that took place after 2011 
and which threatened the ‘national  unity’ in Kuwait.68  Therefore, the ideational factors, 
as mentioned in Chapter 2, became a strong internal factor in Kuwaiti policy due to its 
social structure and geographic location bordering Iraq.  
2. Fear of transmission of the terrorist elements and terrorist operations to Kuwait to 
destabilize the region.69  Kuwait had suffered from the transmission of terrorist groups 
from Kuwait to Iraq to take part in terrorist acts in Iraq.70  As WikiLeaks documents 
show, in 2006, the Chairman of Kuwait National Security Bureau, Sheikh Sabah Al 
Khaled Al-Sabah, commented to LeBaron,   the US Ambassador to Kuwait about the 
lack of information on the number of Kuwaiti citizens who were travelling to Iraq for 
training and to carry out terrorist operations in Iraq.71 Therefore, Kuwait started to 
control its borders strictly to prevent the transfer of trained terrorist elements to 
destabilize Kuwait and Iraq. Moreover, Kuwait expressed fear over the poor situation in 
Iraq that could drive Iran to exploit the security disturbances in Iraq to support terrorist 
elements in Basra city near the Kuwaiti border in order to destabilize the internal 
stability of Kuwait.  This view was expressed in 2006 by the Kuwaiti Minister for Oil, 
Sheikh Ahmed Al Fahed Al Sabah, to the US Consul to Kuwait, Zelikow, who stated 
that  ‘Kuwait’s  first  concern  was the  South  of  Iraq’,  and  considered it ‘one of the main 
problems we  will  face  in  the  future’.72 
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3. Kuwaiti concern about the collapse of the security system in Iraq, which could result in 
the disintegration of Iraq and drive many Iraqis to seek refuge in Kuwait .73 There were 
Kuwaiti worries that Iraq could turn into a ‘failed  state’,  where  terrorists  could control 
Iraq due to the poor security situation since 2006,74 resulting in the instability and 
displacement of Iraqis to the Kuwaiti border, as happened in the uprising of the Iraqi 
people immediately after the liberation of Kuwait in 1991 in which an estimated 50,000 
Iraqis were killed,75 in addition to the 15, 000 Iraqi refugees who were hosted on the 
border by Kuwait during the war against Iraq since 1991.76 Therefore, this was a 
concern for   Iraq’s   neighbors,   especially   as the number of Iraqi refugees inside and 
outside Iraq was estimated at 1, 575, 50 million up to January 2012, due to acts of 
violence, war and sanctions.77 In 2010, Kuwait’s share of the Iraqi refugees was 596, 
and 214 asylum seekers.78 For this reason, in 2006, Kuwait set up a strategic plan in 
case of civil war in Iraq for the reception of Iraqi refugees on the Kuwaiti border as a 
result of sectarian violence in Iraq.79  According to the WikiLeaks documents, another 
Kuwaiti concern could also be the possibility of a ‘Shi'a’  state being established in the 
south of Iraq that would be loyal to Iran and would destabilize Kuwait should the 
security system in Iraq collapse.80 
For all the above reasons, Kuwait expressed its anxiety that the complete withdrawal of US 
troops from Iraq at the end of December, 2011, as per the 2008 SOFA treaty, could drive 
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Iraq to come under the control of terrorist groups.81  SOFA was the Status of Forces 
Agreement signed between US and Iraq on 17 November, 2008, which called for the US 
withdrawal from Iraq in three phases, beginning in 2008 and ending on 31 December, 
2011.82 This   actually   happened   when   the   US   announced   the   end   of   ‘Operation   Iraqi  
Freedom’  on  31  August,  2010  and  replaced  it  with ‘Operation  New  Dawn’.83 This added to 
Kuwaiti concerns as expressed in the telegram of the US Embassy in Kuwait dated July 
2007 as follows: ‘The leadership of the Government of Kuwait is nervous about possible 
US plans to pull out of Iraq […]  they fear that a near–term withdrawal will bring further 
instability to Iraq, which could have spill  over  effects  in  Kuwait’.84 Nevertheless, the US 
had completed its withdrawal from Iraq by the end of 2011 as per SOFA.85  
 
2.2. Economic rehabilitation of Iraq 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the economy is one of the key factors in the stability of people 
and nations. Thus, this factor was associated with the political and security factors to 
achieve stability in Iraq. The Iraqi economy had suffered comprehensive destruction from 
the 1980s up until the preparation for this research, despite having the second largest oil 
reserves in the world, estimated at 115 billion barrels, 86 due to the policy of Saddam’s  
regime, which was as follows:  
1. Iraq-Iran War (1980–1988);  
2. the implications of the Iraqi invasion of  Kuwait in 1990;  
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3. the economic sanctions on Iraq (1990–2003);  
4. the implications of war against Iraq in 2003;  
5. sectarian violence, terrorist operations and the chaos in Iraq following the collapse 
of Saddam’s regime in April 2003.87  
The process of determining the total cost of reconstructing Iraq remained unspecified and 
unknown before the US–UK occupation of Iraq in 2003. However, in 2002, the economic 
advisor to the White House, Lawrence Lindesy, estimated the cost of conflict with and 
subsequent rebuilding of Iraq to be between $100 and $200 billion.88  In June 2003, the 
UN and the World Bank estimated the medium-term financial need to be $56 billion: $36 
billion to reconstruct Iraq during 2005–2007 and $20 billion to rebuild the oil, gas and 
environment sectors, which were estimated separately by the PCA. However, this figure 
does not reflect the long-term overall need assessment for reconstructing Iraq.89 Therefore, 
Kuwait was aware of the importance of supporting international efforts to reconstruct Iraq 
as a prelude to political and security stability and so supported UNSC resolution No. 1483 
on 22 May 2003; this lifted the economic sanctions that had been imposed on Iraq since 
1990, even though it reduced the value of compensation payable to Kuwait from 25% to 
5%.90  This was in addition to the $1 billion economic assistance provided from Kuwait to 
Iraq by HOC from 2003 till the mid of 200491 and the $500 million in grants and loans 
pledged by Kuwait to Iraq at the Madrid Conference on 23 – 24 October 2003, at which 
the 73 participating states pledged to grant Iraq $32 billion from 2004 to 2007.92 
According to WikiLeaks documents, Kuwait was concerned that at the Madrid 
Conference, Saudi Arabia was reluctant to provide financial assistance to Iraq due to the 
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current chapter. 
88   Allawi, Ali A, Op.Cit. p.194. 
89   International  Reconstruction  Fund  Facility  for  Iraq  (IRFFI),  ‘United  Nations/World  Bank  Joint  Iraq  
Needs  Assessment’,  United  Nations,  October  2003.  pp.54-56. The report available on  the IRFFI website 
at:   
http://www.irffi.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/IRFFI/0,,contentMDK:20490285~menuPK:497543~pagePK:
64168627~piPK:64167475~theSitePK:491458,00.html 
90   Security  Council,  ‘Resolution  1483  (2003)  Adopted  by  the  Security  Council  at  its  4761st  meeting’,  
S/RES/1483, on 22 May 2003, United Nations, New York.  
91    Al -Qabas Newspaper, Issue No. 11025, Saturday, 21/2/2004. Kuwait.  
92   International  Reconstruction  Fund  Facility  for  Iraq  (IRFFI),  ‘Madrid  Conference:  Conclusions  by  the  
Chair of International  Donors  Conference  for  the  Reconstruction  of  Iraq  Madrid’,  23–24 October 2003’,  
United Nations, New York.  The report available on  the  IRFFI website at:  
http://www.irffi.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/IRFFI/0,,contentMDK:20241550~pagePK:64168627~piPK:
64167475~theSitePK:491458,00.html 
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lack of an internationally recognized Iraqi government. So, Kuwait asked the UAE to 
pressurise Saudi Arabia into providing assistance to Iraq due the significance of the 
political status of the Saudis.93 Moreover, Kuwait provided $10 million to Iraq via the 
World Bank Iraq Trust Fund (WBIF) and United Nations Development Group Iraq Trust 
Fund (UNDGIF); thus, Kuwait became a member of the Donor Committee for Iraq, which 
coordinates the funding between these two trust funds .94  Further, Kuwait released $78 
million of Iraqi assets that were frozen in Kuwaiti banks, which were transferred to the 
Iraq Development Fund as per UNSC resolution No. 1483 of 2003.95  Accordingly, the 
total value of Kuwaiti assistance pledged to Iraq from 2003 to 2010 was estimated at 
$1.575 billion, distributed as follows:  
1. $1 billion by HOC from 2003 to 2004, as mentioned above (all funds disbursed)  
2. $5 million grant by HOC (all funds disbursed)  
3. $10 million grant to International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI) 
coordinated between WBIF and UNDGIF as previously mentioned (all funds 
disbursed)  
4. $120 million grant from the council of ministers managed by KFDAC ($60 million of 
this disbursed), distributed as follows:  
a. $30 million grant for construction of schools in south Iraq 
b. $30 million grant for medical storage facilities and one mobile surgical facility  
c. $36 million grant for water and sewage projects in Sadr City 
d. $24 million grant for schools in Northern and Middle provinces including Baghdad.   
                                              
93   WikiLeaks  ,  ‘Iraq:  GOK  Says  Saudis  Reluctant  To  Commit  Specific  Funding  At  Madrid’, Reference ID;  
03KUWAIT4682, SECRET, Embassy Kuwait,  2003-10-14 .  Online on the WikiLeaks website at:   
http://www.wikileaks.org/origin/117_0.html 
94   International Reconstruction Fund Facility  for  Iraq  (IRFFI),  ‘About  the  Facility’,  United  Nations,  New  
York. Report  available on the IRFFI website at:  
http://www.irffi.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/IRFFI/0,,contentMDK:20241542~menuPK:497521~pagePK:
64168627~piPK:64167475~theSitePK:491458,00.html 
95   WikiLeaks  ,  ‘GOK Response on Release of  Iraq Assets To DFI And Info on Al-Fahdli  Designation’,   
Reference ID;  05KUWAIT1557,  SECRET, Embassy Kuwait,  2005-04-18 . Online on the WikiLeaks 
website at: http://www.wikileaks.org/origin/117_0.html 
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5. $500 million in the form of concessionary loans allocated at the Madrid Conference in 
2003. This amount was reduced to $440 million (fund not yet disbursed), distributed as 
follows:  
 $200 million to construct power plants in north Iraq  
 $100 million to construct schools  
 $100 million for sewage and water desalination plants  
 $40 to rehabilitate roads and railway stations.96 
Since 2008, Kuwait had disbursed $60 million out of the remaining value of Kuwaiti 
assistance estimated at $560 million for sanitary and educational projects in all Iraqi 
governorates.97  Therefore, the total value of Kuwaiti assistance already disbursed to Iraq 
was $1.75 billion, while the remaining value of Kuwaiti assistance pledged to Iraq, which 
up to 2010 had not yet been disbursed, was $500 million. Thus, Kuwait employed both 
economic and diplomatic tools as a new Kuwaiti framework to restore security, political 
and economic stability to Iraq. It is worth mentioning that Kuwait has not used its 
economic tool as an   access   to   solve   the   ‘outstanding   issues’   between   Kuwait   and   Iraq.    
Sheikh Dr. Mohammed Al Sabah commented on the reasons behind the Kuwaiti support 
for  Iraq  saying,  ‘We  want  to  create  a  natural  neighbor  with  Iraq,  and  for  us  it  is  to  measure  
the intentions  of  this  new  regime  in  Iraq’.98  
 
 
3. Kuwait’s  perspective  for  solving  the  ‘outstanding  issues’  with Iraq 
 
The outstanding issues are those issues contained in the UNSC resolutions concerning the 
situation between Kuwait and Iraq resulting from the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, in addition 
                                              
96   Ibid,  ‘Kuwait  Fund  on  Iraq,  Lebanon,  PA  And  Strategic  Investment  Initiative’,  Reference ID; 
06KUWAIT399 , CONFIDENTIAL, Embassy Kuwait  2006-02-05 .  Online on the WikiLeaks website 
at:  http://www.wikileaks.org/origin/117_0.html;;  Ibid,    ‘Time  To  Accelerate  Kuwaiti  Foreign  Assistance  
To  Iraq’,  Reference ID; 08KUWAIT77 , CONFIDENTIAL, Embassy Kuwait  2008-01-17    . Online on 
the WikiLeaks website at:  http://www.wikileaks.org/origin/117_0.html 
97   Author’s  interview with Nawaf Almahamel, Legal Advisor for Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic 
Development, Kuwait City, 21st April  2012, Kuwait.  
98   Author’s  interview with Sheikh Dr. Mohammad Al-Sabah, former Kuwaiti Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Kuwait City, 11 June 2012. 
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to the issues concerning the two countries bilaterally, which Iraq had to implement in full 
accordance with international law.99 These issues became the main obstacle in the 
development of Kuwaiti-Iraqi relations and were described by one Kuwaiti newspaper as a 
‘tumor’  in   the  relations  between  both  countries.100 Therefore, Iraq and Kuwait set up the 
‘Supreme  Joint Kuwaiti -Iraqi  Committee’. It comprised all ministers of both countries and 
met first in 2011 and again in 2012 to discuss the bilateral relations and solve these 
outstanding issues.101  These issues are divided into two sections as follows:  
 
3.1. Issues related to UN Security Council resolutions  
 
These are the issues contained in the UNSC resolution No. 687 dated 3 April, 1991 under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which set the requirements and obligations both Kuwait 
and Iraq had to  implement  to  close  the  file  of  the  ‘situation  between  Kuwait  and  Iraq’.102  
Since the issuance of this resolution, there are still outstanding issues that need to be 
solved, which include the following: 
 
 3.1.1. The maintenance of the Iraq-Kuwait international boundary  
  
After the demarcation of the Kuwaiti-Iraqi border in 1993 as per UNSC resolution No. 
833, the UNSC demanded that both Iraq and Kuwait maintain boundary pillars between 
both countries annually through the UN until other technical arrangements could be made 
between Iraq and Kuwait to maintain the physical representation of their common 
boundary.103  UNIKBDC recommended that Iraq and Kuwait should share equally the 
costs   of   boundary   maintenance   in   the   allocated   ‘Iraq–Kuwait Trust Fund for Border 
Issues’.  From 1993 to 2003, the maintenance and repair of the boundary pillars was carried 
                                              
99   See Chapter VI of this study for more details concerning these issues,  
100   Al -Qabas Newspaper,  ‘Al  Kuwait:  almlfat  al'ealqh  m'e  al'eraq:  wrm  fi  jsm  al'elaqat’,  ‘Outstanding  Issues  
with Iraq:  A Tumor in  the  Body  of  Relations’,  Issue  No.  12936,  Wednesday,  3/6/2009.  Kuwait.   
101   Mulvane,  Peter,  ‘Kuwait  /  Iraq:  Two  agreements  signed  and  more to  follow’,  Middle East Confidential, 
Wednesday, 2 May 2012. Available online at: http://me-confidential.com/3879-kuwait-iraq-two-accords-
signed-and-more-to-follow.html 
102   For more details, see Chapter VI of this study.  
103   Security  Council,  ‘Resolution  833  (1993)  adopted  by  Security  Council  at  its  3224th meeting, on 27th May 
1993’,  S/RES/833  (1993),  27th May 1993, United Nations.  
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out periodically by the UNIKOM. However, after the expiry of the activities of UNIKOM 
on 6 October, 2003,104 the functions of the UNIKOM were assumed by the Department of 
Peace   Keeping   Operation   (DPKO)   through   the   ‘Iraqi   Kuwait   Boundary   Maintenance  
Project’   (IKBMP).  Due   to   the  consequences  of   the 2003 war in Iraq, the maintenance of 
the pillars had been suspended, which resulted in the need to maintain these pillars once 
again to avoid any future border problems. Therefore, Kuwait called upon the UN in 2004 
and 2005 to assume its responsibility for forming a technical team to maintain these pillars 
in accordance with the resolution 833. Thus, the United  Nations  team  for  the  ‘Maintenance  
Project’  made its first technical field visit in February 2006 to assess the boundary pillars 
and submitted its assessment to UNSC on 17 April, 2006 regarding the importance of 
maintaining the pillars in the two phases as follows:  
1. First Phase: (Preparations for Boundary Maintenance). This phase was completed in 
the report of assessment of 2006 by the aforementioned field visit by the United 
Nations team.  
2. Second Phase: (Field maintenance). This phase represents the implementation of 
Boundary Maintenance Project.105 
Field maintenance of the pillars (Phase II) was originally scheduled to start the late 2006 
according to the timetable of the United Nations team. However, this phase was delayed 
several times, first in 2007 and again in 2008 until the present time; this has become a 
source of concern for Kuwaiti security. The reason for the delays, according to the report 
of the Secretary General dated in July 2009, was the following obstacles faced by United 
Nations team:  
i. The need to remove encroachments on Kuwaiti territory:  
The UN Demarcation Commission in 1993 found Iraqi buildings and farms along the 
boundary between pillars 104a and 106 on Kuwaiti territory, particularly at Umm Qasr 
town; these needed to be removed as they were blocking the inter-visibility of the 
boundary between two these pillars. Thus, Iraq was required to relocate the residents and 
                                              
104   Security Council, ‘Report  of  the  Secretary-General on the activities of the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait 
Observation Mission for the period 16 June-1  October  2003’,  S/2003/933,    2  October  2003,  United  
Nations, New York.  
105   Security  Council,  ‘Report  of  the  Secretary-General Pursuant  to  Paragraph  5  of  Resolution  1859  (2008)’,  
S/2009/385, 27 July 2009, United Nations, New York. p.5. 
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encroaching buildings in order to maintain the pillars; this became known as the Iraqi 
Farmers Issue. For this reason, the UNSC issued resolution No. 899 in 1994, demanding 
compensation for Iraqi private citizens whose assets remained on Kuwaiti territory.106, 
Kuwait paid this compensation, which amounted to $671,000, to   the   ‘Trust   Fund’  
allocated for this purpose by the UN. However, Saddam did not hand this compensation 
over to those affected until the collapse of the regime in 2003.107  To resolve this issue, 
Kuwait  and  Iraq  held  the  first  ‘Joint  Technical  Committee’  in  November  2005  on  the  level  
of the under secretary of Minister of Foreign Affairs, which signed  a  ‘Minutes  of  Meeting’  
to   end   the   ‘outstanding   issues’   between   both   countries   including   the   formation   of   a 
technical team to work with the UN team to maintain the border pillars.108 However, the 
issue of the maintenance of the pillars has remained unsolved since 2006 until the present 
day, due to the Iraqi failure to remove the encroachments on Kuwaiti territory, despite the 
fact that maintenance work was originally scheduled to take place late in 2006 in 
accordance with the plan of United Nations team.109 According to the WikiLeaks 
documents, these encroachments, which are not more than 5 to 6 meters on Kuwaiti 
territory110 and involve 60 Iraqi families, have become an impediment to the work of the 
UN team,111 although, Iraq asked the UN first in February and again in March 2008 to 
deposit the $671,000 compensation paid by Kuwait into the  ‘Development  Fund  for  Iraq’  
account to be paid to those affected in order to maintain boundary pillars.112 To push Iraq 
to put an end to this issue, which had lasted five years from 2003, Kuwait submitted a 
                                              
106   Security  Council,’  Resolution  899  (1994)  Adopted  by  the  Security  Council  at  its  3343rd  meeting’,  
S/RES/899, on 4 March 1994, United Nations, New York.  
107   Security  Council,  ‘Report  of  the  Secretary-General  Pursuant  to  Paragraph  5  of  Resolution  1859  (2008)’,  
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108    Al  Watan  Information  and  Studies  Center,  ‘Relations  with  Iraq’,  classification  No.  5-2/6, dated 
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109   WikiLeaks,  ‘UN  Team’s  First  Kuwait-Iraq  Border  Assessment  on  Demarcation  Maintenance’,  Reference 
ID; 06KUWAIT659 ,CONFIDENTIAL , Embassy Kuwait ,  2006-02-27 .   Online on the WikiLeaks 
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110   Ibid,  ‘Kuwait  MFA  U/S  on  Iraq,  GTMO,  1267  Designees’,  Reference ID;08KUWAIT98     
CONFIDENTIAL, Embassy Kuwait, 2008-01-24 . Online on the WikiLeaks website at :   
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111   In fact that, only 13 families out of 60 families are actually trespassing on the Kuwaiti border while the 
remaining families are directly adjacent to the Kuwaiti borders. Kuwait undertook to build residential 
units for all these Iraqi families due to political and security reasons in order to keep all these families 
away from the Kuwaiti border.  Interview done by researcher with Nawaf Almahamel, Legal Advisor for 
Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development, Kuwait City, 21 April  2012, Kuwait. 
112   Security  Council,  ‘Report  of  the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 5 of Resolution 1859 (2008), 
Op.Cit. p.16. 
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‘proposal’  to  Iraq  in  early  2008  in  which  Kuwait  offered  to  bear  the  cost  of  building  new  
private homes by KFAED to those Iraqis affected, even though Kuwait had already paid 
compensation to those affected.113  However, Iraq did not  respond  to  this  ‘proposal’  until  
2011.  
Due to this delay, the UN team held two meetings with representatives both of Kuwait and 
Iraq from 21 to 23 June 2007 in New York and from 21 to 23 October 2008 in Kuwait City 
to end the phase   of   ‘Field   maintenance’.   During   two   these  meetings,   the   two   countries  
expressed their commitment to implementing the recommendations of the 2006 assessment 
report and   agreed   to   start   the   ‘Field  maintenance’   on   15   September   2009,   provided   that  
both states send a letter to the UN Secretariat confirming their agreement to start the work 
on that date.  Thus, on 1 December, 2008, Iraq sent such a letter, while Kuwait sent its 
letter on 5 January, 2009. On 9 March, 2009, Kuwait sent another letter confirming its 
readiness to provide access and security on the Kuwaiti side of the boundary for the UN 
team. 114 This was followed by the agreement of two states to start the final phase of the 
Boundary Maintenance Project (Field maintenance) as scheduled   in   the   ‘Minutes   of  
Meeting’   signed   between   Kuwait   and   Iraq   on   4   February,   2009   at   the   second   ‘Joint  
Technical  Committee’  held  in  Kuwait.115  Due to the importance of this issue, the Kuwaiti 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sheikh Dr. Mohammed Al Sabah visited Iraq on 26 February 
2009   to   establish   the   first   ‘Kuwaiti–Iraqi   Committee’   on   the   level   of   the   Minister   of  
Foreign  Affairs  to  solve  the  ‘outstanding  issues’  between both countries and to urge Iraq to 
meet its obligations to maintain the boundary pillars in accordance with the agreed 
timetable.116  Nonetheless, on 14 May 2009, Iraq sent a letter to UN Secretariat requesting 
the postponement of the implementation of ‘Field  maintenance’  project  without  specifying  
a new deadline. Therefore, in response to the Iraqi letter sent on 14 May 2009, the DPKO 
sent notes to both Kuwait and Iraq on 9 June 2009 asking them to commence the final 
phase   of   ‘Field   maintenance’   by   30   October 2009. Kuwait promptly responded to the 
DPKO note with two letters dated 17 and 25 June 2009 confirming its readiness to start the 
                                              
113   Al Rai newspaper, Issue No. 1187, Tuesday January 17 2012, Kuwait.   
114   Security  Council,  ‘Report  of  the  Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 5 of Resolution 1859 (2008), 
Op.Cit.p.5. 
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final phase as scheduled and asking the reason for the delay. However, to date, Iraq has not 
responded to the June 2009 note. For this reason, the UN Secretary–General, in his report 
to UNSC of July 2009, held Iraq responsible for the delay, stating, ‘I  would  like  to  urge  the  
Government of Iraq to respond positively to the note verbale dated 9 June 2009 from the 
Secretariat   regarding   the   final   phase   of   the   project’.117  According to the WikiLeaks 
documents, the Iraqi charge d'affaires to Kuwait, Al-Azzawi, pointed out to the US 
Embassy officials in November 2008 that the reason behind the failure to implement the 
‘Kuwaiti   proposal’   for   building   new   homes   for   affected   Iraqis,was due to Iranian 
intervention, citing ‘the  provocations  by   Iranian-backed Shia elements who have gone to 
the  farmers  and  urged  them  to  reject  the  idea  of  abandoning  the  ‘land  of  their  ancestors’  to  
prevent  reconciliation  with  Kuwait’.118   
After three meetings had taken place between the two countries since 2009 to 2010 to 
discuss  the  ‘proposal  of  Kuwait’,  Iraq  submitted  to  Kuwait  in  2011  the  initial  plan  for  the  
construction of 202 housing units in the city of Umm Qasr at a distance of 1800 meters 
from the international border, despite the fact that the encroachments involved no more 
than 60 Iraqi buildings. Thus, Kuwait prepared a final study to determine the value of the 
final cost of building 202 residential units in Umm Qasr town. It is expected that the cost 
will be determined by the end of 2012119 to put an end to this issue that has become an 
Iraqi justification for delaying the maintenance of boundary pillars. 
   
ii. Political, security and funding reasons:  
  
These reasons show the importance of providing security protection and material 
assistance to UN team members to complete their work in full at the final phase (Field 
maintenance).  The UN team affirmed its need to put in place the necessary safety and 
                                              
117   Security  Council,  ‘Report  of  the  Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 5 of Resolution 1859 (2008), 
Op.Cit. pp.5-6. 
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security arrangements for the Boundary Maintenance Team on the Iraqi side of the border 
throughout maintenance work. In particular, regarding the process of coordination and 
communication of the work, it would take 120 days to contact security forces on the Iraqi 
side to put in place security arrangements, in addition to the procurement process to 
contract an engineering firm. Therefore, Kuwait faced the problem of the delay in the 
formation  of  Iraq’s  security  team  to  accomplish  the  work  of  the  UN  team.120  According to 
WikiLeaks documents, Kuwait has sought to convince the Iraqi side of the importance of 
the formation of the Iraqi security team to end the work of the maintenance of boundary 
pillars through the visits of Iraqi officials to Kuwait. 121  This is in addition to the problem 
of  Iraq’s  failure  to  pay  its share  in  the  ‘Iraq–Kuwait  Trust  Fund  for  Border  Issues’,  which  
required Kuwait and Iraq to share equally the costs of Boundary Maintenance fees 
estimated at $600,000 for each country. Therefore, the UN Secretary-General called for 
Iraq to fulfill its obligations to end the maintenance work as per the scheduled plan since 
2006.122 Thus, according to WikiLeaks documents, Kuwait began to be suspicious of 
Iraq’s behavior towards its obligation as per UNSC resolution No.833. This concern was 
expressed by the Kuwaiti Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sheikh Dr. Mohammed Al Sabah, to 
the US Ambassador to Kuwait, Deborah. K. Jones, in October 2008, when he stated that 
‘Al- Maliki’s   rejection   of   the   reaffirmation   in   UNSCR   833   is   the   primary   source   of  
Kuwaiti mistrust of the   Iraqi   PM’.   He   added   that   ‘Al-Maliki’s   refusal   to   accept   the  
demarcation  led  to  the  postponement  by  a  year  of  a  UN  team’s  scheduled  September  2008  
visit   to  maintain   the   border’.123 It was also expressed by the Kuwaiti Undersecretary of 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Khalid Al-Jarallah to US officials in August, 
2009 regarding Kuwait’s concern  over  Iraq’s  failure  to  confirm  the  Iraqi  -Kuwait borders 
as per UNSC resolution No. 833, either orally or in writing .124  Sheikh Dr. Mohammed Al 
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Sabah commented, ‘We have clear letters from the Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affair 
confirming Iraqi commitment towards the international boundary, but the letters of Iraqi  
Prime Minister, Nouri al-Maliki, were vague; thus, our relationship is still   ‘cautious’   in  
dealing with Nouri al-Maliki  personally’.125    
 
3.1.2. The Compensation Issue 
  
As mentioned earlier, in 2010, the unpaid compensation for Kuwait was estimated at $23 
billion.126  After   the   collapse   of   Saddam’s   regime,   several   variables   resulted in the 
compensation percentage being reduced from 25% to 5% as per UNSC resolution No. 
1483 of 2003, even though Kuwait’s   officials   expressed   their   discontent   with the US 
support for this reduction without any coordination with Kuwait.127  This was in addition 
to Iraqi attempts to reduce the compensation percentage once again through the UN since 
2003 as will be discussed below. In fact, the implications of the 2003 War affected on the 
compensation issue between the members of UNSC who supported or opposed this war. 
For instance, France and Germany, which opposed the war against Iraq, sought to draft a 
new resolution in UNSC in 2003 requiring first the approval of UNSC of any payments of 
compensation exceeding $25,000, which would in fact, suspend the payments of 
compensation in the case of any objection by any permanent member at UNSC. Therefore, 
Kuwait urged the US to oppose this proposal, so it was not put to a vote.128  The Germans 
and the French, supported by Russia, attempted to delay the payments as they wanted to 
‘compensate   their   suppliers’, i.e. French and German companies in Iraq, as Kuwaiti 
Foreign Affairs, Sheikh Dr. Mohammad Al-Sabah stated to US Ambassador Jones in April 
2003.129 Thus, since 2003 Kuwait has based its position according to this issue as follows:  
                                              
125    Interview done by researcher with Sheikh Dr. Mohammad Al-Sabah, former Kuwaiti Minister of Foreign 
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1. Keep the compensation percentage at 5% without reduction until the full completion of 
payments of compensation.  
2. Any proposal suggested must be discussed among the states at the UNCC Governing 
Council.130 
In October 2007, the UNCC rejected Iraq’s  request  to  reduce  the  compensation  percentage  
of 5%, and called for Iraq to pay this percentage in full without any change. Thus, Iraq 
shifted its endeavors to the UNSC through sending two letters, the first on 7 December 
2007131 and the second on 7 December 2008, requesting officially the reduction of 
compensation payments from 5% to 1% or the complete cancellation of this unpaid 
compensation under the pretext of the financial burden that Iraq was experiencing and the 
need for those funds to rebuild Iraq. These developments prompted Kuwait to send a letter 
to the UNSC on 23 March 2009 stressing its view that Iraq should fulfill its obligations to 
pay compensation without any change. In addition, Kuwait expressed its readiness in April 
and October, 2008 to enter into negotiations with Iraq to discuss the outstanding unpaid 
compensation under the auspices of the UN Compensation Commission.  Thus, Iraq and 
Kuwait held negotiations in Amman under the auspices of UNCC on 19 – 20 May 2009 to 
settle the outstanding unpaid compensation. During these negotiations, Kuwait submitted a 
proposal to Iraq to invest the unpaid compensation in enterprises in Iraq, which would 
benefit both countries. However, Iraq emphasised its wish to cancel the unpaid 
compensation in full. Kuwait considered that the Iraqi position was not a good starting 
point for the meeting.132  According to WikiLeaks documents, Iraq has still not responded 
to the Kuwaiti proposal.133  Therefore, this matter has become a politically controversial 
issue in Kuwaiti society and particularly between the members of Kuwaiti parliament, who 
                                              
130   Ibid, ‘Kuwait Urges No Change To UNCC Iraqi Compensation Payments Until Environmental 
Remediation  Claims  Are  Paid’,  Reference ID  ; 08KUWAIT112,  CONFIDENTIAL,  Embassy Kuwait , 
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132   Security  Council,  ‘Report  of  the  Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 5 of Resolution 1859 (2008), 
Op.Cit. pp.3-4. 
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are against any reduction of compensation. 134  Yousef Al-Ibrahim, Economic Advisor of 
the Amir of Kuwait, stated this to the US officials in 2008, as WikiLeaks shows, when he 
commented,   ‘The reduction of compensation payments is currently impossible due to 
Kuwaiti  popular  and  parliamentary  opposition  to  any  such  accommodation’.135  
 
3.1.3.  Repatriation of Kuwaiti Prisoners of War, Properties and Archives 
 
According to the report of the Secretary- General dated 8 April 2009, these issues have 
remained outstanding between Iraq and Kuwait for the following reasons:   
1.  The number of Kuwaiti and third-country nationals whose remains have not been 
identified stands at 369, out of a total of 605;  
2.  The Kuwaiti properties have not been completely recovered;  
3.  The Kuwaiti national archives have not been completely recovered.136  
Therefore, in the letter sent to UNSC dated on 10 February 2009, Kuwait expressed its 
regret that for several years the files had witnessed no progress and urged the UN to work 
with Iraq to put an end for these humanitarian issues. In contrast, in the letter sent to 
UNSC dated 10 March 2009, Iraq claimed its full compliance with all its obligations 
towards these issues and requested the termination of the High-level   Coordinator’s  
mandate and the transferral of these issues to be resolved on a bilateral level between 
Kuwait and Iraq.137 On 23 March 2009, Kuwait responded to the abovementioned Iraqi 
letter confirming its view that Iraq should fulfill its obligations and support the High-level 
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Coordinator’s  efforts  by putting an end to all the outstanding issues.138 These issues had 
become important for Iraq itself, after the discovery of the remains of 55 Iraqi military 
personnel in northern Kuwait on 6 May 2010.  Thus, in a letter sent to the UN on 12 May 
2010, Iraq suggested that the mandate of the High-level Coordinator be continued. Due to 
the importance of these issues, Kuwait granted financial contributions amounting to 
$974,000 in May 2010 to a UN project sponsored by UNAMI and the Ministry of Human 
Rights of Iraq to help Iraq to find the remains of missing persons regardless of their 
nationality.139 Thus, these issues remained the main priority of Kuwait, particularly after 
the further discovery of 32 Iraqi corpses in Kuwait by a TSC mission in 2011.140 
  
3.1.4.  The issue of Iraq evading Chapter VII mandate of UN Charter 
 
Iraq began its movements to evade Chapter VII of the UN Charter in December 2008, 
through the termination of all UN resolutions and sanctions imposed on Iraq since 1990 
which threatened to use economic or military measures against states in the case of the 
non-implementation of the resolutions of the UNSC.141 On 7 December 2008, the Iraqi 
Prime Minister, Nouri al-Maliki sent a letter to the UNSC requesting the restoration of 
Iraq’s   legal   and   international   status   as it had been prior to the adoption of the UNSC  
resolution 661 of 1990 and the subsequent sanctions imposed on Iraq under Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter. In response, the UNSC issued resolution No. 1859 on 22 December 2008; 
paragraph 5 deals with the decision ‘to  review  resolutions  pertaining  specifically   to   Iraq,  
beginning with the adoption of resolution 661 (1990) to achieve international standing 
equal  to  that  which  it  held  prior  to  the  adoption  of  such  resolutions’.142 In fact, the SOFA 
treaty of 17 November 2008, had great effect in the issuance of this resolution, in which 
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the US pledged as per Article 25 as follows: ‘Iraq   should   return   to   the   legal   and  
international standing that it enjoyed prior to the adoption of UN Security Council 
resolution 661 (1990), and that the United States shall use its best efforts to help Iraq take 
the steps necessary to achieve this by  December  31,  2008’.143  
  
UN resolution 1859 represented a real concern for Kuwait due to the existence of 
outstanding issues. The Kuwaiti concern was that should Iraq get out of Chapter VII, the 
resolution of outstanding issues would not be under the supervision of the United Nations; 
rather they will be resolved on the level of bilateral relations, It was of particular concern 
that these outstanding issues had not been completed due to Iraq’s behavior despite being 
under the supervision of the UN.  The Kuwaiti concern was clarified by Kuwaiti officials, 
as WikiLeaks shows, when the Amiri’s advisor, Muhammad Abulhassan, told US 
Ambassador Hill in May 2009 that   Iraq’s   attempt to evade Chapter VII presented ‘a 
serious obstacle to the goal of improved bilateral relations as there can be no  shortcuts’ and 
that Kuwait viewed ‘continued UN leverage as essential in obtaining progress from Iraq on 
resolving  several  critical  issues’.   
 
The Under Secretary of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Khaled Al-Jarallah, was even clearer 
with Ambassador Hill regarding   the   importance   of   the   remaining   ‘outstanding   issues’  
under  the  ‘umbrella  of  the  UN’,  when  he  stated  that  ‘if this does not occur, Iraq will again 
be in a position to threaten regional security and   stability’.   He   cautioned,   ‘Without the 
leverage the UN provides, Kuwait would never reach any agreement with the Iraqis’.144 
Thus, Kuwait stated officially its objection to Iraq getting out of Chapter VII until the full 
implementation of outstanding issues between both countries. This attitude was clear in the 
letter sent to the UNSC on 24 March 2009 by the Kuwaiti Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Sheikh Dr. Mohammed Al Sabah, which pointed out in detail the outstanding issues 
between both countries and stressed  that Iraq should remain under Chapter VII until the 
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resolution of these issues in full.145 Further, the Amir of Kuwait, Sheikh Sabah Ahmed Al 
Sabah, sent his special envoy, Mohammed AboualHassan, to five permanent state 
members at the UNSC and the UN Secretary-General in May 2009, to deliver letters 
explaining  Kuwait’s  stance  on  the  importance  of  keeping Iraq under Chapter VII until the 
completion of the outstanding issues.146  Therefore, this issue has remained a source of 
concern to Kuwait, particularly after the termination of all sanctions imposed on Iraq such 
as   the   ‘economic’   sanctions   as   per   UN   resolution   No.   1483   in   2003,   the   ‘weapons  
embargo’   as   per   UN   resolution No. 1957 in 2010,147 and the DFI, which was 
administrating the Iraqi oil imports, as per resolution No. 1956 in 2010.  It is obvious that 
the two latter resolutions were issued in one session of UNSC on 15 December 2010.148  
Therefore, Mohammed AboualHassan commented  on   this   issue  saying   that   ‘in   fact   there  
are no sanctions imposed on Iraq, and thus, the issue of Chapter VII will be automatically 
removed once the obligations for it to be implemented in full as per UNSC resolutions’.149  
Sheikh Dr. Mohammed Al Sabah commented, ‘The UN resolutions are not subject to the 
bilateral relations since being issued by UNSC, they are related to the international 
community and the international peace and security. Therefore, it is important that the 
international community is present to prevent Iraq from returning to its previous reckless 
policies; thus, these international resolutions do not constitute any harm to Iraq and, in 
fact, they are a guarantee for the Iraqi  people  to  prevent  the  return  of  dictatorship  in  Iraq.’  
He added that after the lifting of the sanctions on Iraq, ‘Chapter VII is a moral constraint 
only’  to  focus the attention of the international community on Iraq.150  
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United  Nations  addressed  to  the  President  of  the  Security  Council’,  S/2009/178,  6  April  2009,  United  
Nations, New York. 
146   KUNA,  ‘Amir’s  envoy  meets  Russian  President’s  Middle  East  Envoy’, Politics, 25 May 2009, Kuwait.  
Available online on the KUNA website at:           
http://www.kuna.net.kw/ArticleDetails.aspx?language=en&id=2000776 
147   Security  Council,  ‘Resolution 1957 (2010) Adopted by the Security Council at its  6450th  meeting’,  
S/RES/1957, on 15 December 2010, United Nations, New York.  
148   Security  Council,  ‘Resolution  1956  (2010)  Adopted  by  the  Security  Council  at  its  6450th  meeting’,    
S/RES/1956,  on 15 December 2010, United Nations, New York. 
149   Al Rai newspaper, Issue No. 10926, Sunday May 23 2009, Kuwait.   
150  Author’s  interview with Sheikh Dr. Mohammad Al-Sabah, former Kuwaiti Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Kuwait City, 11 June 2012. 
 
 
332 
3.2. The outstanding issues on the level of bilateral relations 
 In addition to the isues discussed above, which were given n international framework 
through th UN, a number of further issues  were not included within UN resolutions under 
Chapter VII of the UN charter; rather, they are related to bilateral relations between 
Kuwait and Iraq, even though some of these issues were referred to in the UN resolutions. 
We turn to those issues below. 
 
3.2.1.   The Iraqi Debts    
 
These debts were provided to Iraq by Kuwait during the Iraq-Iran War (1980–1988), 
through direct loans and sale of oil by Arabian Oil Company, which were estimated at $25 
billion (with interest) until 2007.151  Following the collapse of Saddam’s regime, the 
UNSC resolution No. 1483 of 2003 called the donor states to hold a meeting in order to 
find   a   solution   for   Iraq’s   sovereign   debt   problems.152 Therefore, the Paris Club held a 
conference on 21 November 2004 to discuss the $120.2 billion of Iraqi debts as endeavors 
to help Iraq economically. The Iraqi debts to the Paris Club creditors as of 2004 were 
estimated at $38.9 billion153, while the debts to the non-member states at Paris Club were 
estimated at $60 to $65 billion, most of which was owed to Arab Gulf States. The 
remaining debts of $15 billion were owed to the commercial creditors. The Paris Club 
conference of 2004, agreed on the reduction of 80% of the Iraqi debts owed to Paris Club 
members in three phases starting from January 2005.154  
 
Kuwait has determined its position regarding the Iraqi debt relief either to the special 
envoy of US President, Secretary Baker who visited Kuwait in January 2004 or to the Iraqi 
officials as follows: 
1. Kuwait agrees to the reduction of 80% of the Iraqi debts in accordance with the Paris 
Club meeting of 2004. 
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2. Kuwait’s   agreement   of   reduction   of   these   debts,   as   mentioned   above,   requires   the  
approval of the Kuwaiti parliament in accordance with the Kuwait Constitution.155  
In fact, the Kuwaiti stance in supporting the Iraqi debt relief has constituted an extremely 
controversial issue in Kuwaiti society and between the members of Kuwait parliament. 
This controversy was expressed by the US Ambassador to Kuwait, LeBaron, in November 
2006 as follows: ‘These attitudes are particularly prevalent among the Kuwaiti public and 
the Kuwait National Assembly, which has made clear its distaste for the idea of Iraqi debt 
relief   ’.156  This is in addition to the debt relief having become   a   ‘dilemma’   facing   the  
Kuwaiti government for discussion with MPs, after the Government of Kuwait rejected the 
proposal submitted on 19 December 2006 by some MPs to write off the bad debts of 
Kuwaiti citizens to local Kuwaiti banks.157  Thus, some expressed a concern that the 
Government of Kuwait may follow the decision taken by the UAE in July 2008 to write 
off its debts to Iraq.158 Therefore, the Kuwaiti bad debts have negatively affected on the 
issue of Iraqi debt relief, which was expressed by Sheikh Dr Mohammed Al Sabah to the 
US Coordinator for Iraq, Ambassador Satterfield, in June 2008 as follows: ‘In light of a 
recent decision by parliament not to forgive the outstanding debt of Kuwait, it would be 
impossible   to   attempt   to   reduce   the  debt  of  another   country’.159  Hence, the issue of the 
Kuwaiti   bad   debts   and   the   ‘memory’   of   the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait have remained the 
main obstacle facing the Iraqi debt relief in Kuwait as WikiLeaks shows.160  
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3.2.2. Kuwait Airways Corporation compensation 
 
This problem stems from the fact that the UN Compensation Commission did not pay any 
compensation for the damages and losses (for 10 aircrafts) estimated at $630 million 
sustained during the Iraqi invasion to the Kuwait Airways Corporation (KAC) because the 
KAC was compensated by its underwriters after the liberation of Kuwait.161 Thus, KAC 
filed a lawsuit at the request of its underwriters in the British courts against Iraqi Airways 
Corporation (IAC) to ensure that the compensation would be repaid to these underwriters. 
In November 2005, KAC obtained a court order from the British courts obliging IAC to 
repay the paid compensation with interest.162   The value of compensation (with interest), 
including the other court orders for KAC in 2007 and 2008, was estimated at $1.200 
billion  up  to  2009.  As  a  result  of  Iraq’s  non-payment of such compensation in accordance 
with the judgments, this issue has been disputed between Kuwait and Iraq, especially after 
the detention of Iraqi Airplanes in Canada in August 2008,163 and an Iraqi Airplane in the 
UK in April 2010 pursuant to the judgments against IAC. Therefore, in September 2008, 
Iraq and Kuwait entered into negotiations to settle the issue of compensation to KAC. 
During these negotiations, the Iraqi delegation has submitted two offers to put an end to 
this issue:  
1. First offer:  
a. Iraq would pay off $150 million in cash, out of the total amount of $1.200 billion;  
b. The remaining amount of compensation will be invested by KAC in the aviation, 
logistics, shipping in the assets owned by Iraqi Airways.  
2. Second offer:  
Iraq would pay off $500 million in cash at once, in exchange for all claims, entitlements 
and judicial rulings for KAC being dropped.  
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KAC has rejected these two offers and stressed the importance of compensation being paid 
in full for its dues as per court orders. Consequently, Kuwait has submitted its own offer to 
Iraq, which includes the following items:  
a.  Payment of the principle amount of compensation issued in the judicial rulings in cash 
estimated at $829 million.  
b. The remaining value of interests will be paid by installments or invested with Iraq.164  
However, Kuwait accepted a settlement with Iraq in March 2012, in which Iraq was to  
pay $300 million in cash, and invest $200 million in joint ventures between two countries 
in return Kuwait  drops all  its claim and judicial rulings.165  
 
3.2.3.  Common oilfields between Kuwait and Iraq 
 
Kuwait and Iraq share common oil fields along their international borders in the area of 
Safwan, Al Zubair, Al-Ratga or Al Rumaila (see figure 9.). 166  As mentioned in Chapter 
V, this issue was one of Iraq’s justifications for invading Kuwait. Saddam Hussein had 
exploited this issue in 1990 as an excuse for occupation by accusing Kuwait of stealing its 
oil. Thus, the problem of this issue stems from the fact that Kuwait and Iraq have not 
reached an agreement concerning the exploitation of joint oilfields on their borders until 
the present, similar to the agreement concluded between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to 
exploit their joint oilfields in the Neutral Zone. Therefore, after the collapse of Saddam’s 
regime, Kuwait and Iraq established the ‘Oil  Technical  Committee’  in  2003  to  discuss  and  
cooperate in the issues of energy and oil.  According to the WikiLeaks documents, at 
Iraq’s   request, Kuwait and Iraq did not discuss this issue in the first meeting of the 
Committee   due   to   its   ‘political   sensitivity’.      Issa  Al-Own, the undersecretary of Kuwait 
Minister of Oil, told the US Ambassador to Kuwait, Jones, in   2004   that   ‘   due   to   the 
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sensitivity surrounding the idea of joint exploitation of the Rumaila fields, this part of the 
technical  committee’s  discussion  was  not  even  recorded  in  the  meeting's  minutes’.167 Due 
to the importance of this issue, Kuwait and Iraq agreed in November 2005 in their 
‘Minutes  of  Meeting’  at  a ‘Joint  Technical  Committee’   to  push   forward   the  negotiations  
between them to reach an agreement for exploitation the joint oilfields.168 Especially, once 
Kuwait had set up investment plans to exploit and develop the so-called  ‘North  Oilfields’  
project amounting to $8.5 billion through seeking  assistance from international 
companies, as scheduled on the agenda of the Kuwait National Assembly for approval 
since being submitted in 1996.169 This issue has became critical between Kuwait and Iraq, 
when in April 2009, the Iraqi Minister of Oil, Hussain al-Shahristani, declared that Iraq set 
up towers for drilling at Sawfan City for oil extraction from the Iraqi territories, which 
prompted Kuwait to ask  Iraq for coordination on this issue so as not to affect the stock of 
oil fields on Kuwaiti territory in the case of horizontal drilling that would lead to the 
migration of large quantities of oil.170. Kuwait and Iraq especially developed a mechanism 
and perceptions provided by the two sides to resolve this problem through the Joint 
Committee in February 2009. 171  Thus, the issue of the exploitation of oil still governs the 
development of relationship between two countries in the absence of agreement.  
 
 
 
4. Summing Up 
 
The factors that shaped Kuwaiti foreign policy towards Iraq since 2003, after the fall of 
Saddam Hussein regime, have been both internal – not least in the sense of the 
demographic and socio-cultural make up of the population, and the ideational factors 
associated with that – and external. In the latter category the regional intertwined with the 
                                              
167   WikiLeaks, ‘Kuwait And Iraq Begin Addressing Bilateral  Energy  Concerns’, Reference ID; 
04KUWAIT786, CONFIDENTIAL, Embassy Kuwait, 2004-03-09 . Online on the WikiLeaks website at: 
http://www.wikileaks.org/origin/117_0.html 
168   Al Watan information and studies center, ‘Relations with Iraq’,  Classification  No.  5-2/6, dated 22 
November, 2005, Kuwait. 
169   Wikileaks, ‘Energy Secretary Bodman and Kuwaiti Amir Discuss  Middle East Conflict, Iran, Iraq, and 
Kuwait Oil Sector’, Reference ID; 06KUWAIT2898, CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN, Embassy 
Kuwait,2006-07-19 .Online on the WikiLeaks website at: http://www.wikileaks.org/origin/117_0.html 
170   Al Watan Information and Studies Center, ‘Relations with Iraq’, Classification No. 5-2/6, dated April 23, 
2009, Kuwait.   
171   Ibid, dated 6 February 2009, Kuwait. 
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internal precisely because of the ethnic/sectarian/religious identifications that cross 
regional   borders.   Iraq’s   fluctuating   policy added to this mix, along with the instabilities 
inside its own borders. The global environment – with continued relevance and 
involvement by the UN organisations and the US – remained critical, as well as a crucial 
resource to be drawn on.  
 
The  period  covered  in   this  chapter  saw  the  consolidation  of  Sheikh  Sabah’s  predominant  
role in foreign policy making, as he assumed the presidency. He did need to take into 
account some strong feeling in the National Assembly over how to deal with Iraq, in 
particular concern over giving too much too quickly, but on balance was able to impose his 
vision quite comprehensively. 
 
The Kuwaiti population’s   make-up   combined   with   the   country’s   geographic   location   to  
expose Kuwait to internal security risks, as spill-over from sectarian violence in Iraq 
between Sunni and Shi'a..This is in addition to the regional environment’s    plethora of  
foreign interventions and terrorist networks seeking to destabilize Iraq and support terrorist 
operations, as a result of the US-UK occupation. Therefore, after  the  collapse  of  Saddam’s  
regime, Kuwait endeavored to rehabilitate Iraq on the political, economic and security 
levels for security and geopolitical reasons, the most importance of which was to avoid 
Iraq being converted into a centre for tension or terrorism that would constitute a risk to 
stability in the Gulf region in general and Kuwait in particular. The issue of uncontrolled 
security, lawlessness, foreign intervention and sectarian violence in Iraq had become a 
concern for Kuwait due to its impact on Kuwaiti border security and the increasing 
sectarian strife among the Sunni and Shia sects in Kuwait society. Thus, Kuwait focused, 
at both regional and international levels, on supporting the political process in Iraq during 
the four phases mentioned above on the one hand, and providing economic aid to Iraq 
from 2003 to 2010 estimated at $1.58 billion on the other, to  ensure  Iraq’s stability.   
 
Despite the developments in the relations between Kuwait and Iraq, represented by the 
resumption of diplomatic  relations  in  2004,  the  matter  of  the  ‘outstanding  issues’  remained  
the main obstacle in the development of relations between the two countries; this had 
become a source of Kuwaiti doubt regarding Iraqi behaviour towards Kuwait. These 
outstanding issues included maintenance of the Iraq-Kuwait international boundary, 
unpaid compensation, Kuwaiti prisoners of war, properties and archives, the Iraqi debts, 
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Kuwait Airways Corporation compensation and the exploitation of the common oilfields 
between the two countries, especially after Iraqi attempts to evade its obligations regarding 
these issues through its demands to end the Chapter VII imposed on Iraq since 1990. Thus, 
the UN resolution 1859 (2008) - the SOFA treaty of November 2008 was influential in the 
issuance of this resolution - represented a real concern for Kuwait, as it called for a review 
of UN resolutions imposed on Iraq since 1990 to get Iraq out of Chapter VII. The Kuwaiti 
view was that this was premature due to the existence of outstanding issues that had not 
been   resolved   due   to   Iraq’s   behavior   despite   being   under   the   supervision   of   the   UN.  
Therefore, Kuwait stated officially its objection to Iraq getting out of Chapter VII until the 
full implementation of outstanding issues contained in the UNSC resolutions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
339 
Chapter X 
 
 
Conclusion   
 
 
 
1. Overview and contribution of the study 
This study has charted the influence of the Iraq invasion of Kuwait in 1990 on the 
formation of Kuwaiti foreign policy, with particular reference to Iraq, during the period 
1990-2010, detailing and analysing evolving Kuwaiti policy positions towards Iraq.  
Chapter 3 used documentary evidence to shed light on the political history of Kuwait since 
its emergence in the 17th century and its relationship with the Ottoman Empire, until the 
agreement with Britain that, just as the Ottoman Empire came to an end, consolidated 
Kuwait’s   autonomy   as  well   as   the  hold   on   power  of   the  Al  Sabah. It sketched the early 
relationship with Iraq and its evolution to the 1980s, while putting this in the context of a 
description   of   Kuwait’s   foreign   policy   decision-making system.  It then, in chapter 5, 
oultlined the Iraqi invasion itself, and the regional and international response. Chapter 6 
laid  out   the  key  pillars  of  Kuwait’s  policy  position  vis-à-vis Iraq since then – setting the 
scene for the detailed depiction and analysis of consecutive periods in policy towards Iraq 
since 1991, in chapters 7-9. 
From  early  on,  Kuwait’s  foreign  policy  was  aimed  at  security,  in  recognition of the polity 
vulnerable nature and limited resources other than, from the 1950s, oil and the wealth it 
gradually brought.  The desire to obtain protection from Britain – while retaining 
complementary channels of support – was adjusted after independence, first by a 
combination of   a   more   ‘Arabist’   stance   and   a   mutiplicity   of   relationships,   although  
seasoning   its   ‘non-aligned’   position   with   a   good   dose   of   great   power   protection.   Even  
without a formal security arrangement with the US, which would have seemed not in 
keeping with Kuwait’s   efforts   to   present   itself   as   both   non-aligned and aligned with the 
Arab cause, there were nevertheless close security understandings with the superpower. 
Similarly   finely   balanced  was  Kuwait’s   collaboration  with   the  GCC   from  1981,  without  
ever signing the internal security agreement that the other states were pushing for. 
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Yet the study showed that the trauma of the invasion drastically affected both Arab politics 
overall and Kuwait’s   own   policy:   for   the   first   time   the   notion   of   alliance   became   a  
cornerstone   of   Kuwait’s   overall   foreign   policy   – even if its geographical location and 
exposure  to  possible  threats  from  Iraq  meant  that,  after  Saddam’s  fall  in  2003,  there  was  a  
gradual evolution towards trying to help a stabilisation in that country occur. The 
combination of geographical location and ideational factors in the shape of sectarian 
cleavagaes crossing domestic and regional theatres, meant a continued sharp focus not 
only on military security with external help, but also on the pre-emption of spill-over 
effects from the sectarianised Iraqi political landscape to Kuwait’s   own   latent   ethno-
sectarian divisions.  Even so, there were certain red lines that remained uncrossed, in the 
shape of the so-called outstanding issues that remained to be resolved between Iraq and 
Kuwait. 
This study has, for the first time, drawn the sort of detailed picture of the evolution of 
Kuwaiti perceptions and policy towards Iraq since the invasion – and an analysis of the 
key factors involved – that has not featured anywhere in the existing literature. This 
includes also the first in-depth examination and detailed identification of the Kuwaiti 
position (and its evolution) regarding   the   ‘outstanding’   issues   between  Kuwait   and   Iraq,  
such as Iraqi debts, borders, prisoners of war, compensation, Kuwaiti properties, and 
weapons of mass destruction and UN resolutions already issued.  
This has been done on the basis not only of the sort of combination of Arabic and English-
language sources that has not been exploited systematically before, but through the 
extensive use of primary sources, including interviews with key players in Kuwait and the 
Arab world, documents not previously brought together, including from Arab, UN and 
British sources, and a thorough scouring of the hundreds of relevant Wikileaks files.  
The thesis is also the first systematically to take into account the fluctuating but invariably 
important roles of the regional and international environment – including the significant 
changes in those environments – notably, at the global level, the changes from Cold War to 
post-Cold War and then to the shifts brought about in US and global politics by the events 
of 2001 – in turn gradually followed by the return of a more multipolar order and the dhift 
to Asia;  and, at the regional level, the shifts that were in many cases caused by those 
global shifts and by the Invasion, and the subsequent removal of Saddam,  but also the 
broader regional context of instabilities and sectarianisation of conflict and politics. 
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The study also provided  more  of  the  ‘fine  grain’ on the political decision-making apparatus 
in   Kuwait’s   governmental   system, through which all the above is perceived and 
interpreted, and from which emerges policy in response, than previous studies have done, 
and followed this through in the discussion of the particular relationship between Kuwait 
and Iraq.  
As noted in Chapter 2, the works of Abdul Reda Assiri and Ahmad Hammoud Alduehis do 
give   an   interpretation   of   Kuwat’s foreign policy to 1991 but, other than obviously not 
covering the post-invasion period, also did not systematically deal with the factors 
affecting policy evolution – whether regional and international factors or the internal 
political and decision-making system.1 Sulaiman Majed Al Shaheen, while explaining the 
Kuwaiti   position   towards   Iraq’s   territorial   demands   before   the   Iraqi   invasion   of  Kuwait, 
does,2 not shed light on the impact of the Iraqi invasion on Kuwaiti foreign policy 
behavior.  Partrick’s  study of Kuwait's Foreign3 ends in1977, and Bader Al-Edwani stops 
at the invasion.4  
Abdullah Al-Enezi  and  Abdullah  Saher’s  article  ‘Al-kuwayt  wa  ʽalaqātiha  maʽ  “duwal  aḍ-
ḍidd”:  Dirāsa  maydanīya’,5 is useful in understanding Kuwaiti relations with the so-called 
“duwal aḍ-ḍidd”  (Opponent States) after the Iraqi invasion, but provides limited depth in 
analysing these relations and especially the role of the Kuwaiti National Assembly as an 
internal constraint factor in blocking relations between Kuwait and these states. Fattou 
                                              
1   Assiri, Abdul Reda, Al-kuwayt fis-siyāsa ad-duwalīya  al-muʽasira:  ʼinjāzāt..  ʼikhfāqāt..  taḥaddīyat, 
‘Kuwait  in  the  Contemporary  International  Policy:  Achievements,  Failures  and  Challenges’,  2nd edition, 
Kuwait University, Kuwait, 1992. Ibid, Kuwait’s  Foreign  Policy  - City-State in World Politics, 
(Colorado; Westview Press, 1990). Ahmad Hammoud Alduehis , ‘Siyāsat  al-Kuwayt il-khārijīya min 
1961  ʼilā  1990’,    ‘Kuwait’s  Foreign  Policy  from  1961  – 1991’  ,  unpublished  master’s  thesis,  Jordanian  
University, Amman, 1992. 
2  Sulaiman Majed Al Shaheen, Ad-diblumāsīya  al-kuwaytīya  bayn  al-miḥna wal mihna, ‘Kuwait  
Diplomacy  between  the  Crisis  and  Professionalism’, 1st edition, National Library of Kuwait, Kuwait, 
2001. 
3  Patrick,  Neil  ,  ‘Kuwait's  Foreign  Policy  (1961-1977): Non-Alignment, Ideology and the Pursuit of 
Security’,  unpublished  Thesis  (Ph.D.),  University  of  London,  2006. 
4  Al-Edwani,  Bader  Ali,  ‘ad-dawr il-ittiṣālī  lid-diblumāsīya  al-Kuwaytīya fī  Taḥqīq  ʼahdāf  as-siyāsa  al-
khārijīya:  Dirāsa  Maydānīya’  ,  ‘Communicative  Role  of  Kuwait  Diplomacy  to  Achieve  the  Objectives  of  
Foreign  Policy:  Field  Study’,  ‘Al-Dawr Al-Ettisali Li-l-Diblomasaya Al-Kuwaitiya Fi Tahqeeq Ahdaf 
Al-Siyasa Al-Kharijya’,   unpublished Master Degree Treaties, Private University, Kingdom of Bahrain, 
2007.  
5  Al-Enezi,  Abdullah  and  Saher,  Abdullah,  ‘Al-kuwayt  wa  ʽalaqātiha  maʽ  “duwal  iḍ-ḍid”:  Dirāsa 
maydanīyah,    ‘Kuwait  and  Its  Relations  with  Opponent  States:  Field  Study’,  Al Mustaqbal Al Arabi 
Journal , issue No. 245, Centre for Arab Unity Studies , Beirut , July 1999. 
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Abu  Dahab’s  article   ‘At-taḥaruk ad-diblumāsi  al-Kuwayti: ad-dalālāt  wal  nataʼij’,6 limits 
itself only to Kuwaiti behavior towards Iraq at the Amman Summit in 2001.   
Abdullah Mutlaq Al   Edwani’s   Master’s   thesis ‘Dawr   Majlis   il-ʼumma   fis-siyāsah   al-
khārijīyah  al-Kuwaytīyah’7 is useful in discussing the role of the Kuwaiti Parliament as a 
consistent factor in Kuwaiti policy. However, the author does not offer a comprehensive 
discussion on the role of the Kuwaiti Parliament on the  ‘outstanding  issues’  with   Iraq  or  
Kuwaiti relations with the duwal aḍ-ḍidd after the Iraqi invasion and did not place weight 
on external factors as a constraint for Kuwaiti policy.   
Lori   Plotkin  Boghardt’s study Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution,8 is valuable in 
addressing the effect of regional events such as the Iranian revolution in 1979, the Iraq-
Iran War (1980-1988) and the Iraqi invasion on the internal situation of Kuwait and the 
GCC states, but does not discuss the effect of the Iraqi invasion on the foreign policy of 
Kuwait, especially towards Iraq.  
Katzman’s  article ‘Kuwait:  Security,  Reform,  and  U.S.  Policy’,9 addresses Kuwaiti foreign 
relations in general since 2003, but it offers a very limited and unsystematic analysis of 
Kuwaiti relations with Iraq, or  even with  Iran..  Terrill’s  study  Kuwaiti National Security 
and the U.S.-Kuwaiti Strategic Relationship After Saddam,10 is critical and objective in 
addressing Kuwaiti security relations with the US after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and 
Kuwaiti relations in general with Iraq and Iran. However, this study is restricted to 
Kuwaiti-US relations with regard to security until the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime, 
and Kuwaiti-Iraqi relations in general from a security perspective only until 2006. It offers 
a very limited analysis of Kuwaiti-Iraqi relations and does not discuss in detail the 
‘outstanding   issues’   between   Kuwait and Iraq or even Kuwaiti behavior towards Iraq 
before and after the fall of Saddam Hussein.  
                                              
6  Abu  Dahab,  Fattouh  ,  ‘At-taḥaruk  ad-diblumāsi  al-Kuwayti: ad-dalālāt  wal  nataʼij’,  ‘Kuwait  Diplomatic  
Movement:  Indications  &  Results’,  Sho'oun Khalijia Journal , No.. 26, The Gulf Centre for Strategic 
Studies ,London, Summer 2001. 
7  Al Edwani, Abdullah Mutlaq,  ‘Dawr  Majlis  il-ʼumma  fis-siyāsah  al-khārijīyah  al-Kuwaytīyah’  , ‘Role  of  
the  National  Assembly  in  the  Foreign  Policy  of  Kuwait’,  Jordanian  University, unpublished Master 
Degree, Jordan, 2006. 
8  Boghardt, Lori Plotkin, Kuwait Amid War, Peace and Revolution,  St  Antony’  Series,  2006. 
9  Katzman, Kenneth, ‘Kuwait:  Security,  Reform,  and  U.S.  Policy’,  CRS  Report  for  Congress,  US,  
December 6, 2012. 
10  Terrill, W. Andrew, Kuwaiti National Security and the U.S.-Kuwaiti Strategic Relationship After 
Saddam, Strategic Studies Institute  United States Army War College, SSI, USA, 2007. 
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Abdulla Al-Enezi’s   article   ‘amn   il-khalīj   il-ʽarabi:   dirāsah   fil   ʼasbāb   wal   muʽtayāt’,11 
discusses Kuwaiti security arrangements after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, but the author 
does not discuss in detail the reasons for regional and international circumstances that 
motivated the six GCC states, along with Egypt and Syria, to sign the Damascus 
Declaration in 1991 and its effect on Kuwaiti policy. A study conducted by the Center for 
Research and Studies on Kuwait, entitled  Al-ḥushūd  ʽala  al-ḥudūd  il-Kuwaytīya  uktūbar  
1994:   dirāsh   tawthiqīya li-rudūd   il-fiʽl   il-ʽarabīya   wal   ʽālamīya,12 is restricted  to  the 
1994 crisis between Iraq and Kuwait and does not undertake an overview of the 
comprehensive position of Kuwait towards Iraq during this crisis.  
The existing literature, then, does not cover some of the key aspects and factors, and 
indeed details, of Kuwait-Iraqi relatins and the effect of the invasion on Kuwaiti policy. 
Most prior studies have focused on the Gulf crisis in 1990-1991 and the relationship 
between the two countries before Iraq invaded Kuwait, while those that do focus on the 
two  states’  specific  relations  with regard to the issues at hand are scarce. It is hoped that 
the present study has made some contribution to filling these gaps. 
Below, some of the more specific findings are listed that fill out the overall picture 
sketched at the outset of this chapter, of Kuwaiti policy towards Iraq since the invasion. 
First, however, I sum up the overall findings on the factors that have shaped this policy – 
and  indeed  Kuwait’s  foreign  policy  more  generally. 
 
2.  The  factors  shaping  Kuwait’s  foreign  and  Iraq  policies 
While  the  factors  shaping  Kuwait’s  foreign  policy  overall  were  laid  out  in  detail  in  Chapter  
4, it may be worth summing up the key ones that have particularly affected policy towards 
Iraq.  
 
                                              
11  Al-Enezi, Abdulla,  ‘ʼamn il-khalīj  il-ʽarabi:  dirāsa fil  ʼasbāb  wal  muʽtayāt’,  ‘The  Arabian  Gulf  Security:  
Reasons  and  Results’,  Journal of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula studies, Vol.21, No. 83, Kuwait 
University, Kuwait, 1996.  
12  Centre for Research and Studies on Kuwait, Al-ḥudūd  al-kuwaytīya  al-ʽirāqīyah:  taṭawwurha wa 
wathaʼiquha,  ‘  Kuwaiti- Iraqi  Borders:  Developments  &  Documents’,  1st edition, Kuwait, January 1999. 
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Geography 
The geographic and strategic location of Kuwait overlooking the Arabian Gulf and next to 
Iraq was one of the main factors that resulted in the occupation of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990. 
Secure access to the Gulf had been an aim of successive Iraqi regimes for both commericla 
and naval military reasons, not least to counter Iran. This was evident in  Iraq’s  attempts  to  
acquire control of Warba and Bubiyan from the 1930s until the 1980s, due to their 
geographical location at the head of the Gulf. Kuwait’s   location,  moreover,  among   three  
large and powerful neighbours – Iran, Saudi Arabia and Iraq – explains   the   country’s 
pursuit of a policy of ‘neutrality’   when it could, only diverging when it could not, in 
accordance with political circumstances, to maintain its existence: a theme since its 
emergence as an autonomous entity, This, and its very smallness, lack of natural borders, 
and hence vulnerability is also why its rulers for over a century have looked for a major 
external protector – something that became more explicit with the actual invasion by Iraq, 
as this now swept away the constraints of the ideational factor of Arab identity. 
 
Military weakness 
Smallness in size and population was exacerbated, when it comes to military strength, by 
features of the nature of the polity, including its rentier aspect: together, this made for a 
military capacity that was very weak both in size and capability – something that the shock 
of the invasion led Kuwaitis and their leadership to begin addressing, but that still leaves 
the country unable to defend itself effectively even for a limited time. In turn, this 
reinforces the need both for a pragmatic policy of building bridges, and for external 
protection. 
 
The international environment 
In   light   of   the   above,   it   is   not   surprising   that   Kuwait’s   leaders   followed   their   long-
established role conception in securing external great power protection, without, at least 
until the invasion, making this too explicit, and keeping it hedged and complemented by 
other relationships.  
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The global shift to the post-Cold War period, enabling the United Nations and the East-
West   collaboration   that   made   possible   the   coalition   to   respond   militarily   to   Saddam’s  
invasion, was of course of the greatest importance for Kuwait. Subsequently, the terrorist 
attack of 9/11-2001 in the US led to the formation of an international coalition and to the 
Afghanistan war in 2001 to overthrow the Taliban regime, which had provided shelter for 
the al-Qaeda network.  This, in the context of the rise of a neoconservative policy cabal in 
Washington, turned the attention of the US to Iraq under the presumption that Iraq had 
WMD: ultimately this resulted in the occupation of Iraq in 2003. But the specific form the 
impact of the international environment took, was of course related to the dynamics and 
developments in the regional environment. 
 
The regional environment 
The regional environment in the Gulf itself had straightforward strategic security 
implications, as already noted. In addition the region also posed ethno-religious 
challenges, in particular given the Shia-Sunni cleavages in =Iraq and Iran, some of which 
were mirrored in Kuwait itself, thereby posing a threat of spill-over in case of conflict, or 
indeed in case of the sort of political upheaval that characterised Iraq since 2003.  More 
straightforwardly, of course, it is the domestic political and economic features and 
problems of Iraq, together with the advent of the Iranian revolution, and the subsequent 
Iran-Iraq war, that would indirectly create the conditions for the Iraqi invasion.  
The Gulf also offers, of course, resources, not least in the form of the GCC, which proved 
an essential forum for support after the invasion. 
The wider Arab environment also presented both ideational constraints and pressures,  and 
a form for trying to build support – something that proved part-successful when the Arab 
League voted, just, to support the operation to liberate Kuwait, but left the region split, and 
Kuwait’s   relations  with   the  Opponent   States’   frozen.   Even   so,   the   exigencies of finding 
ongoing support among regional states, and of pre-empting  Iraq’s  own  counter-diplomacy, 
meant that traditional Kuwaiti pragmatism would once again re-boot those relations from 
the late 1990s. 
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Economic factors 
Economic factors were clearly very significant in a variety of ways. For a start, of course, 
Kuwait’s   wealth   gave   it   regional   and   international   clout,   and   resources   to   sustain   its  
existence even while occupied, as well as to run a major campaign to drum up support for 
its liberation. At the same time, it is also this wealth, juxtaposed with the politically critical 
economic hardship experienced by Iraq after the Iran-Iraq war (with foreign debts 
estimated at $120.2 billion),  that  fed  into  Saddam’s  decision  to  invade.  They  also  featured 
in the post-liberation external regional climate Kuwait could act on and deploy its 
economic means as a tool. This intertwined with the GCC context, to, as some of the 
‘Opponent   States’,   for   instance,   felt   the   effect   of   aid   streams   and   investment   that   had 
ceased, and were eager to restore relations.  
 
Demography, social structure and ethno-religious factors 
Similarly linked to the regional environment were demography, social structure and ethno-
religious factors. The simple fact of the small population size has already been mentioned. 
In addition, the varied socio-cultural structure of the Kuwaiti population (ethnic and 
religios, and carried in part by tribal affiliation and kinship) linked the domestic scene to 
regional cleavages and political upheavals, exposing Kuwait to spill-over risks. Foreign 
policy towards Iraq clearly needed to, and did, take this into account, trying to pre-empt 
and   contain,   not   least   by,   under   Sheikh   Sabah’s   lead   especially,      attempting   to   find  
legitimate ways to start re-engaging   with,   and   helping,   Iraq   and   formerly   ‘Opponent’  
states.  This was not only a phenomenon limited to the time of the invasion and after:  
Kuwait had been exposed also to internal security and terrorist operations during the Iraq-
Iran War (1980-1988). Concern rose again after the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime due 
to sectarian violence in Iraq. Within Kuwait, some of the spill-over translated into people 
tending to support their own ethno-religious affiliations, potentially  threatening social 
cohesion in Kuwait. This was evident in the sectarian tension in the Sunni-Shi'a relations 
in Kuwait, after sectarian violence broke out in Iraq in 2006: clashes erupted between 
Sunnis and Shi'ites with some mosques being attacked. This is in addition to fears of 
hardline Sunni fundamentalist influence crossing the border from Iraq, as some Kuwaiti 
youth were travelling to Iraq for training and to carry out militant operations.  
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Kuwait’s  foreign  policy  making machinery 
Foreign policy decision-making in Kuwait is entrusted to the executive authority. The 
Amir of Kuwait is the head of the executive hierarchy, which is considered the first circle 
in the process of decision making in Kuwait, while the second circle is made up of the 
cabinet and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, within which the ruling family members hold 
the essential posts; the Prime Minster; and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Interior and 
Defence: formally, they are meant to implement decisions pursuant to the instructions of 
the Amir.  
The legislative authority (Kuwait National Assembly) represents the third circle in the 
decision making through its supervisory role in the foreign-policy decisions on the one 
hand, and its own methods of influence on the other hand, such as interpellation, 
parliamentary questions, forming investigation committees, studying international treaties 
and conventions and discussing the internal and external issues. This can be illustrated 
when  MPs  blocked   the  Kuwaiti  Government’s  endeavor   to   renormalize its relations with 
the duwal aḍ-ḍidd (Opponent States) from 1992 to 1999, and to relieve Iraqi debts or 
reduce compensation payments without the consent of the Kuwait National Assembly. 
This is in addition to the objection of MPs, until 2009, to several treaties between Kuwait 
and other states such as the GCC Security Agreement, the GCC Counterterrorism Treaty, 
the Arab League Counterterrorism Treaty of 1998, OIC Counterterrorism Treaty of 1999, 
and the extradition treaty of 2004 for the Criminal Court between Kuwait and US.  
Clearly, the real locus of decision-making in foreign policy lies very much with Amir, 
Crown Prince/Prime Minister, and Foreign Minister. Yet the particular way in which this 
played out in practice had as much to do with the personalities and their health as with 
official status.  While in the 1980s one could still perhaps present the foreign policy 
decision-making apex as one of a triumvirate, between the Sheikh Jaber as the Amir, 
Sheikh Saad as Crown Prince and Prime Minister, and Sheikh Sabah as Foreign Minister, 
this picture soon evolved, bringing the latter two to the fore as the Amir less forceful and 
increasingly withdrawn personality enabled this. Sheikh Saad was at the heart of both 
conception and diplomatic execution of policy towards Iraq, in the lead-up to and after the 
invasion. The invasion also further accentuated the diminishing active role, as he appears 
to have been severely affected by the traumatic events. Increasingly, Sheikh Sabah, who 
had built up enormous experience as Foreign Minister since 1963, gathered effective 
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control over foreign (and Iraq) policy in his hands, clashing with Sheikh Saad over the 
policy to start rebuilding relations with the so-called   ‘Opponent   States’   from   1996.   The  
role of the National Assembly, newly reconstituted and invigorated in 1992, also was 
notable – although not definitive. It could constrain policies such as normalization with 
those state, or debt relief towards Iraq, although ultimately it tended, especially after the 
eclipsing from the policy arena of Sheikh Saad through illness from 1997, to go with the 
forcefully pushed policy preferences of Sheikh Sabah. Parliament did remain a force to be 
engaged with and assuaged or persuaded, but from the late 1990s it is fair to say that 
policy towards Iraq, and foreign policy in general, became the de facto domain of Sheikh 
Sabah himself – a position further cemented when he became, first, Prime Minister, taking 
over this position from Sheikh Saad in 2003, and then was confirmed as Amir by the 
National  Assembly  in  2006,  after  Sheikh  Jaber’s  death  and  in  preference  over  Sheikh  Saad,  
who, largely incapacitated, had to give up his prior claim to the position after 9 days of 
uncertainty. Since 1997, therefore, Kuwaiti foreign policy making and policy towards Iraq 
has seen an exceptional concentration of control in one, by all accounts exceptionally able, 
man’s  hands. 
 
3. The impact of the invasion and liberation on the domestic and regional levels 
3.1. Regional Impacts 
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait had major impacts at a regional level. Fist, of course, there 
were the humanitarian, environmental and economic losses caused by the Iraqi invasion, 
not only for Kuwait itself but also for the other GCC and Arab states.  Second, the Arab 
world was dramatically divided. Third, there was real damage inflicted on the Palestinian 
cause, in several simultaneous ways: the Palestinians lost their main financial backers as 
the GCC states turned away; and 400,000 Palestinians had to leave Kuwait.. Not least, the 
presence of foreign troops in the Gulf region had medium to longer-term effects on 
domestic and regional tensions, even aside from the concern about possible implications 
for Arab national security interests should the interests of the superpowers change. The 
failure of the previous Arab security system led the GCC, Egypt and Syria to sign the 
‘Damascus  Declaration’  in  1991, in principle involving the Arab countries in the security 
of the Gulf region. But the Declaration soon proved dead letter: it as amended towards 
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‘security  cooperation’  rather  than  the  introduction  Arab military forces in the Gulf, as the 
GCC  states  neither  trusted  such  Arab  forces’  ability  to  ensure  the  desired  external  security,  
nor felt comfortable having non-GCC Arab troops stationed on their territories:  this was a 
reflection of the turn to stronger external alliance, most strikingly so in Kuwait itself. 
Yet the regional impact was not all negative. Some modest adjustments were made to the 
concept of a joint Arab framework, when a number of amendments were made to the Arab 
League Charter in 2005, regarding the voting system, to cope with new developments – in 
effect recognising the need for the League to be able to respond more effectively to new 
developments. More significantly, the invasion and the international response also 
indirectly resulted in renewed US involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the  
convening of the Madrid Peace Conference between Arab countries and Israel in 1991.  
This recognised, from an Arab perspective, that the principles upon which the international 
community was called upon to reject the Iraqi invasion and occupation also applied to the 
occupation of Palestine, and from the perspective of the external powers demonstrated they 
were not applying double standards – a key legitimacy requirement given the controversy 
over the motivations of these powers for their armed involvement in the Gulf. The 
conference resulted in the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993 and the subsequent Peace 
Process between Palestinians and Israelis.  
 
3.2. The  effect  of  the  invasion  and  liberation  on  Kuwait’s  border  question 
The demarcation of Kuwaiti-Iraqi borders by the UN in 1993 as per the agreement signed 
between Kuwait and Iraq in 1963, was of huge importance. This question had dragged on 
for four decades without demarcation and had resulted in political disorder and the 
construction of installations on Kuwait’s frontiers. Iraq had used the issue of the ‘non-
demarcation  of  frontiers’  to  exert pressure on Kuwait and so obtain financial support and 
territorial assignments in addition to diverting the attention of the Iraqi people away from 
the poor internal political and economic situation in Iraq to the Kuwaiti- Iraqi border, with 
notable crises in 1966, 1967 and 1973. Finally, Iraq  used  the  ‘frontier  issue’  as  a  pretext  to  
invade Kuwait in 1990. Thus, the UN was given the essential role of practising its task in 
accordance with its Charter to maintain global peace and international security due to this 
invasion.   
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3.3. Kuwaiti domestic politics 
The key domestic political consequence of the invasion was, ultimately, Kuwait’s return to 
democracy immediately after the liberation in 1992, following actions by the former Amir 
of Kuwait, Sheikh Jaber Al Ahmed Al Sabah, who had suspended the democratic way of 
life, dissolved the Kuwaiti National Assembly, and suspended the constitution in 1986.  
This would in turn bring an additional factor into play when it came to the shaping of 
Kuwait’s  foreign  policy,  including  towards  Iraq. 
 
4. Effects  on  Kuwait’s  overall  foreign  policy 
One clear effect of the invasion and liberation was a Kuwaiti policy of increased openness 
to the western world on political, economic and cultural levels due to the role played by 
western countries in the liberation of Kuwait.  More specifically, though, as indicated 
already, one of the key changes resulting from the invasion, was that the concept of 
‘alliance’  for  the  first  ime  made  an  appearance  in  the  Kuwiait  policy  set,  in  quite  striking  
fashion.  This policy of alliance took several forms:   
a. the security agreements signed between Kuwait and five permanent States at the UN 
Security Council directly following its liberation in 1991. 
b. the Kuwaiti-USA alliance since 1991; this developed further after the USA 
announcement in April 2004 that Kuwait was   ‘a  major  US non-North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization  (NATO)  ally’. 
c. Kuwait’s  cooperation  with  NATO,  demonstrated in the signing of a set of agreements 
between Kuwait and its NATO   allies   in   2006   under   NATO’s   Istanbul Cooperation 
Initiative (ICI) of 2004 concerning the exchange of experiences and cooperation in 
border security, counterterrorism, crisis management, joint military exercises and 
military education and training.  
Kuwait’s  regional  policy  shifted  in  conjunction with this overall shift – as of curse it was 
precisely regional politics that had brought about the former. Relations with other Arab 
states were reassessed in light of their respective stances, and defined primarily by 
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Kuwait’s   interpretation   of   its interests. Yet this did not mean that the intricate regional 
balancing acts needed to maintain security in a difficult environment, were abandoned  - 
either with regard toIran or, indeed, Iraq itself:  that would become clear in the willingness 
to help bring about Iraqi stabilisation after the fall of Saddam. 
As one component in all this, Kuwait was able to review the economic, diplomatic, 
information and military tools of Kuwaiti policy as a donor state, and use these tools to 
serve the objectives of the security and politics of Kuwait in accordance with its interests.  
 
5. Findings  on  the  evolution  of  Kuwait’s  Iraq  policy  since  1991 
5.1. The principles of Kuwaiti foreign policy towards Iraq since 1991 
Since the liberation of Kuwait in 1991 until the present day, Kuwaiti foreign policy 
towards Iraq has been based on principles and grounds that call for Iraq to implement in 
full international resolutions that are relevant to the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, including:  
a. respecting the international borders between Iraq and Kuwait in accordance with UNSC 
resolution No. 833 of 1993 that demarcate the Kuwaiti-Iraqi borders; 
b. making full payment of the compensation and financial obligations resulting from the 
losses sustained by the Iraqi invasion; 
c. returning the remains of Kuwaiti prisoners of war who have not been identified; these 
number 369 out of a total of 605;  
d. restoring Kuwaiti property and archives that were looted during the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait; 
e. the disarmament of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction;  
f. reaffirming the importance that all the outstanding issues related to the Iraqi obligation 
in accordance with international and UN resolutions remain under the supervision of the 
United Nations until there has been a full implementation of these issues by Iraq.  
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5.2. Relations with the duwal aḍ-ḍidd 
The regime of the former Iraqi President, Saddam Hussein, constituted an actual security 
threat to Kuwait after the  country’s liberation in 1991 with a notable threat in 1994 when 
Iraq mobilized its military forces on the Kuwaiti border. Therefore, from 1996, Kuwait 
started to re-organize  its  relations  with  what  were  called  ‘opponent  countries’  (“duwal  iḍ-
ḍid”),  that is, those who had not supported Kuwait during the Iraqi invasion, to contain the 
Iraqi threat and oblige Saddam to implement international resolutions pertaining to the 
situation between Iraq and Kuwait. Indeed, by the end of 1999, and after the change at the 
top  of  Kuwait’s  policy-making system, where Sheikh Sabah was now definitively the sole 
key decision-maker on foreign policy, Kuwait had resumed relations with these countries – 
something which was facilitated when once they had called for Iraq to implement fully the 
international resolutions pertaining to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Thus, the concept of a 
‘containment’  policy  had  appeared  in  the  Kuwaiti  foreign  policy  due  to  the  Iraqi  threat  on  
the one hand and the need for Kuwait not to isolate itself from the Arab world on the other: 
both   because   the   ‘Arab’   theme   remains   an   non-negligible ideational factor in regional 
politics and because the usefulness – and inescapability – of the Arab environment as a 
fact of life and a potential diplomatic resource. 
 
5.3. Kuwait’s  policy  towards  Iraq from 2001 to the Fall of Saddam 
Several variables have played a role in the formation of Kuwaiti foreign policy towards 
Iraq since 2001, represented by the effects of economic embargo on the suffering of Iraqi 
people during the UN economic sanctions that created Arab and international sympathy 
with the Iraqi people. Saddam Hussein used this issue to hold Kuwait and some Arab Gulf 
States responsible for the continuity of the miserable situations of the Iraqi people, which 
prompted Kuwait to explain its position on Iraqi issues; these can be seen in Kuwait’s 
acceptance of the ‘Conciliation   Formula’ at the Amman Summit in 2001, which was 
rejected by Iraq. This formula had repercussions in the Kuwaiti streets with political 
clashes between supporters and objectors, which included the following important items:  
a. calling for a lifting of the sanctions imposed on Iraq as per resolution No. 661 (1990)  
b. calling for the adoption of necessary measures to resume international air flights with 
Iraq 
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c. calling for the suspension of all acts of trespass on Iraqi supremacy and threats to its 
safety, particularly those committed beyond the scope of the UNSC resolutions, 
especially military attacks 
d. denouncing the  ‘no  fly  zones’  in  the  south  and  north  of  Iraq  and  objecting to the attack 
of Iraq outside UNSC Resolution.  
 
As a result of the events in the Gulf region from 2002 to 2003, Kuwait changed its 
approach towards Iraq based on its understanding that the US had an approach to topple 
the Iraqi regime. Thus, Kuwait started to coordinate with the US on the one hand, and to 
form closer links with the Iraqi opposition abroad on the other, in order to get rid of 
Saddam’s regime, despite the fact that Kuwait officially announced its adherence to the 
Arab resolutions to reject any military action against Iraq. This coordination resulted in 
tension in relations between Kuwait and some Arab countries. Thus, Kuwait’s behaviour 
during this period was characterized as follows:  
a. Kuwait hosted over 130,000 US forces on its territory and announced that its entire 
northern area was a ‘military  zone’  to  launch  an  attack  against  Iraq. 
b. Kuwait facilitated the movements and communications of the Iraqi opposition abroad 
from Kuwait to the Arab Gulf States.  
c. Kuwait attended (as an observer) for the first time the Iraqi Opposition Conference held 
in London on 14-15 December 2002, to discuss the future of Iraq post-Saddam. 
d.  Kuwait supported the UAE initiative in 2003, which called upon President Saddam 
Hussein to relinquish power and leave Iraq within two weeks to avoid war in the region.  
As a consequence, in addition to the US’ mobilization of troops in the Gulf region over 
2002 and 2003 to launch a military attack against Iraq, Iraq started for the first time to 
pursue a flexible policy with Kuwait in late 2002. This was manifested as follows: 
a. Iraqi acceptance of the ‘Conciliation   Formula’ at the Beirut summit held in March 
2002, which had been rejected the previous year by Iraq at the Amman Summit held in 
March 2001; 
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b. the Iraqi President’s apology speech on 7 December 2002 to the Kuwaiti people, though 
this was officially and publicly rejected by Kuwait as it was considered a ‘provocative’  
speech against the Kuwaiti regime and in violation  of  ‘Conciliation  Formula’   
c.  Iraqi acceptance of UN resolution 1441 in November 2002 for the return of UNMOVIC 
international inspectors to Iraq, who had been driven out of Iraq since 1998; 
d. the Iraqi attendance of TC meetings in Geneva on 18 December 2002 to discuss the 
Kuwaiti prisoners of war, after the Iraqi boycott of TC meetings since December 1998.  
 
Kuwait’s  policy  on Operation Iraqi Freedom 
Regarding Kuwait’s official stance regarding the US occupation of Iraq in 2003, Kuwait 
supported   ‘Operation   Iraqi  Freedom’   launched  by   the US, the UK and their allies on 20 
March 2003. Although Kuwait did not take part in the military operations against Iraq in 
2003, it was the main supporter of the coalition forces aiming to depose Saddam by 
offering financial, media and logistic support to the coalition forces. It is worth mentioning 
that the Kuwaiti official and public stands, except for some religious personalities, were 
applied in supporting the  military  operations  against  Iraq.  This  led  Kuwait  to  feel  ‘isolated’  
in the region, as WikiLeaks documents show.  
Kuwait’s official stand towards ‘Operation  Iraqi  Freedom’  was based on several political, 
security and economic reasons: 
a. Saddam’s regime had constituted a major risk to the sovereignty of Kuwaiti since its 
liberation in 1991 until the outbreak of war in 2003;  
b. Saddam’s regime was among the reasons for the decline in economic growth and the 
discouragement of foreign investment in Kuwait due the instability in the region;  
c.  The nature of the Kuwaiti-US alliance since 1991, in addition to the convergence of 
interests between Kuwait and USA to get rid of Saddam’s regime.  
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5.4. Kuwait’s  Iraq  policy  after  the  fall  of  Saddam 
After the fall of Saddam’s regime in April 2003, several variables occurred in Kuwaiti 
foreign policy which was represented in the appearance of a new term, ‘economic  
diplomacy’,   and   the resumption of Iraqi-Kuwaiti relations in 2004, which had been 
severed since 1991.  
The security factor in Iraq remained a key concern in Kuwaiti policy for the following 
reasons:  
a. fear of the transmission of sectarian conflict from Iraq to Kuwait and the region after 
reputed sectarian violence in Iraq in 2006;  
b. fear of transmission of the terrorist elements and terrorist operations from and to 
Kuwait to destabilize the region since 2003;  
c. Kuwaiti concern about the collapse of the security system in Iraq, which could result in 
the disintegration of Iraq and so drive many Iraqis to seek refuge in Kuwait; in addition, 
Iraq could become a ‘failed  state’,  which  could be threat to Kuwaiti security or result in 
the possibility of establishing a ‘Shi'a’ State in the south of Iraq that would be loyal to 
Iran and destabilize Kuwait. Therefore, Kuwaiti officials expressed their worry about 
the USA withdrawal from Iraq as per the SOFA agreement that was signed in 
November 2008.  
Consequently, Kuwait employed its economic and political tools to support Iraq in 
restoring its security and stability to avoid it being converted into a center for tension or 
terrorism that constitutes a risk to stability in the Gulf region in general and Kuwait in 
particular.  
Economically, Kuwait provided financial assistance to Iraq amounting to $1.575 billion 
from 2003 in order to bolster international efforts to reconstruct Iraq and restore its internal 
and external stability, which would be positively reflected in the security of Kuwait and 
the entire region.   
Politically, Kuwait supported the transition of the political process in Iraq from 2003 to 
2006, seen in its support for the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) formed in July 2003, the 
formation of the Iraqi interim government in June 2004, the formation of the Iraqi 
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transitional government in May 2005, and the formation of the first permanent Iraqi 
government in May 2006.  
 
The outstanding issues 
Despite the resumption of diplomatic relations between Kuwait and Iraq in 2004, however, 
there were a number of obstacles to enhancing the ties between both countries due to the 
existence  of  some  ‘outstanding  issues’  that  currently remain unresolved; this constitutes a 
source of doubt regarding Iraqi behavior towards Kuwait. These issues are as follows:  
a. the issue of maintenance of the Iraq-Kuwait International Boundary in accordance with 
UNSC   resolution   No.   833   of   1993.   Since   the   fall   of   Saddam’s   regime   in   2003,   the  
border pillars along the Iraqi-Kuwaiti boundary have remained without maintenance 
due to the Iraqi failure to meet its obligation with the UN team to remove the Iraqi 
encroachments on Kuwaiti territory represented by the existence of some Iraqi 
buildings and farms on Kuwaiti land, whose encroachments prevent the UN team from 
completing the maintenance works.  
b. Payments of compensation to Kuwait in accordance with UNSC resolution No. 687 of 
1991. Kuwait urged Iraq to meet its obligation through the full payment of the unpaid 
compensation to those affected by the Iraqi invasion, which was estimated at $23 billion 
up until 2010. Thus, Kuwait has refused the Iraqi proposal and its demands to terminate 
the unpaid compensation or reduce the compensation percentage from 5% to 1%. 
c. The issue of disclosure about prisoners of war who are nationals of Kuwait or of a third 
country, whose remains have not been identified, as in paragraph 6c, in addition to the 
Kuwaiti national archives and property, which have not been completely recovered. 
Thus, Kuwait has refused the Iraqi demands to terminate the High-level  Coordinator’s  
mandate and transfer these issues to be resolved on a bilateral level between Kuwait and 
Iraq. 
d. The issue of Iraq avoiding the consequences of the Chapter VII mandate of the UN 
Charter. In this respect, Kuwait refused Iraqi demands to the UN to release it from 
Chapter VII by terminating all UN resolutions and sanctions imposed on Iraq since 
1990 until the full implementation of the outstanding issues between both countries 
mentioned above. 
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e. The issue of the Iraqi debts provided by Kuwait during the Iraq-Iran War (1980–1988), 
which remained outstanding despite the Kuwaiti announcement after 2004 that it had 
agreed to the reduction of 80% of the Iraqi debts in accordance with the Paris Club 
meeting of 2004. The reason for not reaching an agreement to put an end to this issue 
was Kuwait’s  agreement  to reduce these debts requires the approval of the members of 
Kuwaiti parliament in accordance with the Kuwait Constitution, but their stand became 
a  main   ‘obstacle’   to   taking such decision, especially after the Government of Kuwait 
rejected the proposal submitted on 19 December 2006 by some MPs to write off the bad 
debts of Kuwaiti citizens to local Kuwaiti banks. 
f. The issue of Kuwait Airways Corporation compensation (KAC). Kuwait demands Iraq 
pay off the amount of compensation estimated at $1.200 billion in accordance with 
court orders issued by British courts in favor of KAC against Iraqi Airways Corporation 
(IAC) for damages and losses sustained by KAC during the Iraqi  invasion.  Iraq’s  non-
payment of this has hindered the development of relations between both countries, 
especially after the detention of Iraqi airplanes in Canada in August 2008 and an Iraqi 
airplane in the UK in April 2010 pursuant to the court orders against IAC. 
g. The issue of exploiting the joint oilfields between both countries; this issue is still 
outstanding due to the lack of agreement between Kuwait and Iraq to extract the oil 
from the common wells along the boundary on the international borders of the two 
countries. This issue has become critical when Iraq declared in April 2009 that it had set 
up towers for extracting the oil at Sawfan City in the southern part of Iraq along the 
boundary of Kuwait; this prompted Kuwait to ask Iraq for coordination on this issue in 
order not to affect the oil reserves of Kuwaiti wells.  
 
The SOFA agreement concluded between Iraq and USA in December 2008 had a great 
impact on the issuance of the UNSC resolution No. 1859 in December 2008, which called 
for a review of the resolutions pertaining specifically to Iraq, beginning with the adoption 
of resolution 661 (1990) as discussed in paragraph 16d. This resolution represented a real 
concern   for   Kuwait   due   to   the   existence   of   ‘outstanding   issues’   that   have   not   been  
resolved, as mentioned above. Therefore, Kuwait began movements on regional and 
international levels to reaffirm its rejection of Iraq’s avoidance of the consequences of 
Chapter VII, and affirming that Iraq should remain subject to this chapter until the full 
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implementation of outstanding issues between both countries, especially after the 
termination of all the sanctions imposed on Iraq, such  as  the  ‘economic’  sanctions  as  per  
UN resolution No. 1483 in 2003 and the   ‘weapons   embargo’   as   per  UN   resolution No. 
1957 in 2010. Thus, as Kuwaiti officials explained, Chapter   VII   is   a   ‘moral   constraint 
only’   to   turn   the   attention   of   the international community to Iraq regarding the 
‘outstanding  issues’  between  the two countries.   
 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
 
While  this  thesis  has  detailed  the  evolution  of  Kuwait’s  Iraq  policy  for the first time in a 
way that takes into account the full range of internal and external factors that shaped this 
evolution, and that draws on a much wider range of primary sources in doing so, it remains 
only   the   first   ‘base-line’ for further work, not least in using these findings to enrich the 
broader study of Middle East states foreign policy and the conceptual frameworks for 
analysing foreign policies more broadly.   
 
It has been limited by practical research problems when it comes to the details of the 
domestic decision-making environment, including both the precise roles and views of 
particular individuals and offices, and the role of the Kuwaiti National Assembly and its 
various  members  and  blocs,  in  the  shaping  of  Kuwait’s  foreign  policy  and  in  particular its 
policy towards Iraq. One constraint has been the dearth of prior academic research on these 
matters. Another – in turn in part the explanation for this lack of previous research – is the 
fact that so much in this area of policymaking is, far more than in many more 
administratively developed states, very much personal rather than bureaucratic, informal 
rather than formal and written down in records. Allied with this is the fact that much of the 
real views and steps that lead to policy outcomes are purposely kept behind a veil of 
secrecy, and an unwillingness of officials to divulge relevant information, either as a 
matter of policy or out of personal reluctance borne of a system where such matters are not 
routinely revealed.  It proved very difficult to secure relevant Kuwaiti official documents 
other than formal statements of policy. While I was extremely fortunate to be given 
interviews by a few very high-ranking figures, more typical was the unwillingness of 
several officials to be interviewed at all. Likewise, it was difficult to obtain explicit 
information from senior figures and officials in the interviews conducted during this study, 
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especially about the idiosyncracies, views, and specific roles of Kuwaiti decision-makers 
in the Al Sabah ruling family, and of MPs in the Kuwait National Assembly.   
 
To an extent, these constraints were compensated for by the treasure trove of secret 
diplomatic cables and documentation that was revealed through Wikileaks in 2010. These 
proved especially useful for the period between 2002 and 2010.  
 
Even so, there is much scope for further research on Kuwaiti foreign policy towards Iraq 
within the same time period. One theme of such further research could be a deeper 
engagement, through primary research, on the evolving views and interactions regarding 
foreign policy on the part of different groups in society, looking at different generations, 
communication media, civic bodies and interest groups, and of the interaction between 
these and groups or individual MPs in the National Assembly. This would, however be a 
very major undertaking, the feasibility of which remains to be proven.  Another theme that 
might be explored further would be the dynamics, evolution and impact of the Kuwaiti 
regime’s  interests  and  interactions  with  the  US  and  other  powers,  in  relation  to  the  shaping  
of its foreign policies, including towards Iraq. Finally, further detail on the decision-
making process and internal debates would be desirable, if almost certainly very hard to 
come by.  
 
In his thesis, the basic outlines have been drawn for the first time, but it is possible that a 
wide-ranging trawl through various sources, including not least the Wikileaks archives, 
along with more interviews including with players in those states, would produce a richer 
image.  
 
While this thesis made the fullest possible use of the Wikileaks documentation within the 
time limitations for this project – I estimate them to number some 3750 documents 
regarding US embassy cables alone, sent from Kuwait to the US State Department – their 
very size and the timing of their release made it impossible to exploit them in the even 
more in-depth and comprehensive manner that a future researcher may find worthwhile:  
they were released in partial form in 2010, and as full unredacted cables only in late 
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2011,13 well into the current research project. As the reading and analysis of such an 
archive of documents is a hugely time-consuming process, the comprehensive examination 
of the certainty of effect or non-effect of particular domestic factors and decision-making 
detail, for instance, was inevitably beyond the scope of the current project:  ours could 
never be more than an initial effort, to be built on by others.  
 
It would also be fruitful for future researchers to compare the conclusions of this study, 
which ends in 2010, with Kuwait foreign policy towards Iraq since the withdrawal of US 
troops in 2011, particularly about the reasons and factors that led to the resolution of 
‘outstanding   issues’,   and   on   the   movement   on   some   of   these   issues,   such   as   missing  
Kuwaitis and Kuwaiti properties and archives, from Chapter VII to Chapter VI of the UN 
Charter in 2013,14  as they raise the question why Kuwaiti policy regarding these 
outstanding issues changed.  
 
Finally, it is hoped that the findings of this study may be of benefit for future comparative 
study of Kuwaiti foreign policy towards other Arab or Gulf states, including Iran, since the 
liberation of Kuwait.  
 
There remain, no doubt, alternative perspectives to be explored on the specific subject at 
hand.   It is hoped, however, that the present study has at least helped to prepare the ground 
for such further work. 
 
                                              
13  This is in addition to the release of the Global Intelligence Files, The Spy Files and the Syria Files in 
2012 and the Kissinger Cables in 2013. These are available online on  the Wikileaks website at: 
http://wikileaks.org/  
14  KUNA,  ‘UNSC  includes  Kuwaiti  issues  under  UNAMI  mandate’,  24/07/2013, Kuwait. Available on the 
KUNA website at: http://www.kuna.net.kw/ArticleDetails.aspx?id=2325041&language=en 
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Figure No. 1 
 
 
 
 
 
Map demarcating the frontiers of Kuwait with the Ottoman Empire as per the Anglo- 
Ottoman treaty of 1913 in Schofield, Richard,  Kuwait and Iraq: Historical Claims and 
Territorial Disputes ,  ( London : Royal institute of International Affairs) 1991.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
374 
Figure No. 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kuwaiti shaded area given to Ibn Saud  at the Al-Uqair Conference in 1922 in Richard 
Muir,  ‘The  Iraq–Kuwait border dispute: still  a  factor  for  instability?’,  Asian Affairs, Vol. 
XXXV, No. II, July 2004.  
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Figure No. 3 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Map of Kuwait 
 
 
Source:  Gulf States Newsletter, Vol. 35 ,  No. 892 ,  17 January 2011.  
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Figure No. 4 
 
  
   
 
 
 
Map showing the configuration of oilfield north and south of Kuwaiti-Iraqi international 
boundary in Schofield, Richard,  Kuwait and Iraq: Historical Claims and Territorial 
Disputes ,  ( London : Royal institute of International Affairs) 1991. 
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Figure No. 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Iraqi proposal of 1955 for lease a part of Kuwaiti territories in Schofield, Richard,  
Kuwait and Iraq: Historical Claims and Territorial Disputes ,  ( London : Royal institute of 
International Affairs) 1991. 
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Figure No. 6 
 
  
 
 
 
Demarcation of the land frontier at Safwan and opinions on the notice board located at 
south  Safwan  in  Security  Council,  ‘Final  Report  on  The  Demarcation  of  The  International  
Boundary Between of The Republic of Iraq and The State of Kuwait By The United 
Nations Iraq-Kuwait Boundary  Demarcation  Commission’,  S/25811,  20th May 1993,United 
Nations. 
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Figure No.7.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Centre for Research and Studies on Kuwait, Iraq Navigational Outlets, 3rd edition, 
Kuwait, 2000. 
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Figure No. 8 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Demarcating frontiers at the entrance of  Khowr Zhobeir between Iraq & Kuwait  By UN 
in 1993. Source: United Nations Map No. 3786.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
381 
Figure No. 9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kuwait Oil Field Map 
 
 
Source: Ministry of Oil, Kuwait.2011.  
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Table 1 
 
Geographical and Sectoral Distribution of Total fund Loans  
Up to 30/3/2011 (Kuwait Dinars)  
 
Sectors  Countries 
Percentage Total Others Development Banks Social 
Telecommuni
cation 
Water & 
sewerage Energy Industry Agriculture Transport 
 
54.57%  
(304) (4) (14) (8) (7) (29) (61) (32) (56) (93) 
Arab Countries   
2,479,625,566 8,938,031 122,819,575 98,900,000 86,655,928 230,063,834 795,745,260 181,473,717 331,978,669 623,050,552 
6.33% 
(56) 
- 
(1) (2) (1) (13) (6) (1) (6) (26) Central Asian & 
European 
Countries 287,300,572 6,100,000 9,500,000 2,586,309 92,086,163 20,838,626 5,100,000 17,791,968 133,297,506 
7.28% 
(107) (3) (2) (2) (3) (8) (16) (6) (11) (56)  Central south & 
east African 
Countries 330,814,847 4,898,027 4,375,698 6,100,000 6,509,091 21,763,604 56,966,796 20,342,552 22,358,439 187,500,640 
19.57% 
(153) (3) (1) (5) 
-  
(3) (41) (21) (23) (56) East. South Asia  
& the Pacific 
countries   889,347,566 19,350,000 1,493,888 43,800,000 16,707,833 280,295,647 125,205,577 104,879,890 297,614,731 
2.45% 
(39) 
- - - - 
(4) (1) 
- 
(23) (31) Latin American 
& The Caribbean 
Countries 111,344,184 10,241,712 890,361 15,243,086 84,969,025 
9.80% 
(139) (5)   (3) (3) (20) (14) (1) (19) (74) West African 
Countries 445,469,933 12,600,000  10,900,000 5,370,637 47,879,593 54,883,567 5,999,988 61,249,296 246,586,852 
100% 
(798) (15) (18) (20) (14) (77) (139) (61) (118) (336) Total  
4,543,902,688 45,786,058 134,789,161 196,200,000 101,121,965 418,742,739 1,209,620,257 338,121,834 553,501,348 1,573,019,306 
100% 1.00% 2.97% 3.72% 2.23% 9.22% 26.62% 7.44% 12.18% 34.62% Percentage ( % ) 
 
 
- Figures in parenthesis refer to number of loan. 
 Source: Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development, Forty Nine Annual Report 2010 /2011, Kuwait, 2011.
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Table 2 
 
Middle East and North Africa Defence Expenditure 2010-2011 (US Dollar)  
 
 
 
 
 
 Source: The International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, The Military balance 2012, UK, 2012. 
Country  2010  % of 
Regional 
Total 
2011 
Estimate  
% of 
Regional 
Total 
Real % Change  
Saudi Arabia   45.17 38.11% 46.18 36.18% -3.1% 
Israel  17.17 14.49% 18.25 14.30% -2.8% 
Iran  10.56 8.91% 11.96 9.37% -3.4 % 
UAE 8.65 7.29% 9.32 7.30% 5.1 % 
Algeria  5.59 4.72% 8.61 6.74% 44.0% 
Egypt  5.43 4.58% 5.53 4.33% -3.2% 
Iraq  4.19 3.53% 4.79 3/75% 8.9% 
Oman  4.19 3.53% 4.29 3.36% -1.6% 
Kuwait 3.91 3.30% 4.05 3.17% -6.2% 
Qatar  3.12 2.63% 3.45 2.71% 8.2% 
Sub-Total  107.97 91.09 % 116.42 91.21% -1.01% 
Regional 
expenditure 
Breakdown   
     
Oil exporting 
States  
87.97 74.21% 95.57 74.88% 0.08% 
Non-Oil 
Exporting 
Sates 
30.57 25.79% 32.07 25.12% -3.16% 
Total  118.53 - 127.64 -  -0.77% 
385 
 
 
Table 3 
 
 
Status of Processing and Payment of Claims up to 2012 (US Dollar)  
 
 
 
Category Number of 
claims 
resolved 
 
Number of 
resolved 
claims 
awarded 
compensation  
Compensation 
 sought by 
claims resolved 
(US$) 
Compensation 
awarded   
(US$) 
Percentage of 
awarded 
amount 
against 
claimed 
amount 
Net 
compensation 
paid (US$)   
Outstanding 
award 
amounts  
(US$) 
A 923,158 852,499 3,455,092,500 3,149,692,000 91.16 3,116,927,373 0 
B 5,734 3,935 20,100,000 13,435,000 66.84 13,377,388 0 
C 1,738,237 672,452 11,503,877,999 5,185,716,912 45.08 5,178,326,390 0 
D 11,915 10,343 16,539,501,201 3,348,902,861 20.25 3,347,980,604 0 
E1 105 67 44,740,422,417 21,522,047,546 48.1 7,879,471,684 13,634,875,280 
E2 2,445 954 13,661,076,541 916,054,517 6.71 913,638,683 1,841,509 
E3 398 159 8,538,543,367 402,562,327 4.71 402,563,804 0 
E4 3,623 2,868 11,796,336,671 3,456,889,662 29.3 3,458,491,969 0 
E/F 123 57 6,148,493,927 311,282,668 5.06 311,282,668 0 
F1 100 70 18,902,591,737 291,171,423 1.54 291,171,423 0 
F2 63 46 18,417,163,597 264,422,123 1.44 264,099,732 0 
F3 62 60 113,905,394,877 8,259,433,226 7.25 8,259,433,226 0 
F4 168 109 84,904,244,069 5,261,746,450 6.2 5,260,112,735 0 
Total 2,686,131 1,543,619 352,532,838,903 52,383,356,715 14.86 38,696,877,679 13,636,716,789 
 
  
 Source: United Nations Compensation Commission, Status of Processing and Payment of Claims, 25 October 2012. 
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